TABELL'S MARKET LETTER 909 STATE ROAD, PRINCETON, NEW JERSEY 0B540 MEMBER NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE, INC MEMBER NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF SECURITIES DEALERS, INC (609) 924-9660 March 16, 1984 We offer ,- i1re;iili, a gratuitous piece of ammunition to thoriticswhl; -they;;;s -'- have been skeptical of the forecasting record of this letter. All they need to do is correlate market activity with those times we have chosen to take vacations. A year and a half ago, in the midst of a market that was posting a series of new lows in a rather desultory fashion, we took the opportunity to spend a week in the White Mountains. In the middle of that week, August 17, 1982, there occurred one of the largest rallies in stock-market history and the one that marked the start of the strongest bull market in a couple of decades. For the beginning of 1984, we scheduled a six-week cruise to Antartica. Prior to our departure, in late January, the Dow had moved down marginally from a high of 1286.64 on January 6, within an ace of its all-time high at 1287.20 in November, and what appeared to be only a minor interruption of a typical year-end rally was occurring. Unfortunately, as we headed South, the market did the same thing. By February 22, the DJIA had posted a closing low of 1134.21, down just over 11. 8 from the double top formed in November-January. It fell to our colleague, Robert Simpkins, to interpret for our readers this first crack in the generally euphoric atmosphere which had characterized the market since summer of 1982. In the process, he drew attention to what seems to us to be the crucial factor in analyzing the current market environment. That factor is time. It is patently obvious that a major stock-market cycle commenced precisely on August 12, 1982. Such cycles have, ovel the years, produced an average length measured from low to low of four years. They have tended to spend at least 50, and often a – greaLdeaLmor.a,-OLtbe;r lifetime-in-anadvancingphase.-ILisextremelydifficulttosquare'-I this historical pattern, as Bob aptly pointed out in a series of charts in this space, with the market's posting its ultimate top in November, 1983, only 15 months after the rise began. Something, however, is unquestionably going on. A decline of 11.8 in the Dow, while not the end of the world, is, to say the least, unsettling. The drop, moreover, was noticeably broad with almost all groups participating to a greater or lesser degree in February's weakness. However, a decline of the proportions of the recent one, indeed of even greater proportions, is hardly without precedent within the context of an ongoing bull market. Indeed, every bull market of the post World-War II era, with a single exception of June, 1961!-February 1966 has been punctuated by at least one decline approximately equal to, or in many cases, greater than the m!,gnitude of the current case. We think a case can be made, and we will be developing it further in future issues, for placing the current weakness in this context, with similarities to, for example, summer 1956, early 1960, or late 1967-early 1968. Such periods of weakness have, in the past, possessed certain common characteristics. They tend to occur, first of all, in the maturing stages of bull markets — not particularly disquieting at the moment, since noone is pretending the current upswing is still in the full bloom of youth. Secondly, they have often persisted for protracted periods of time, certainly longer than January to date and generally longer than from November to the present. We are, thus, led to the question of whether the current process is, in fact, over. We would hesitate at this stage to say that such was the case. There is some persuasive evidence that an effective bottoming process began with the February low. Whether or not that low will be the ultimate bottom is another question. In any case, sufficient technical damage has beEn doneso that a basing process is almost a necessity before substantial upside progress can be made. Friday's strength could indeed be part of that basing process. With the foregoing caveat in mind, we suspect that the cycle upswing, which began in August, 1982, has not yet breathed its last. AWT rs ANTHONY W. TABELL DELAFIELD, HARVEY, TABELL INC. Dow-Jones Industrials (12 00 p. m.) 1187.60 S & P Composite (1200 p.m.) 160.04 Cumulative Index (3/15/84) 1948.00 No statement or expresSIOn of opinion or any other maUer herem contained 15. or IS to be deemed to be dlrectlv or Indirectly, an offer or the soliCitation of an offer to buyar sell any secunty reterred to or mentioned The matter IS presented merely for the convenience 01 the subscriber While we believe the sources of our mformalton to be reliable, we In no way represent or guarantee the accuracy thereof nor of the statements made herein Any aClion to be taken by the subscnber should be based on hiS own fnves\lgallon and information Delafletd, Harvey, Tabelt Inc, as a corporation and ItS officers or employees, may now have, or may later take, positions or trades In respect to any secunlles mentioned In thiS or any future Issue, and such pOSlllon may be dlflerent from any views now or hereafter expressed In thiS or any other Issue Delafield, Harvey, Tabell Inc, whiCh IS registered With the SECas an Investment adVisor, may gIVe advIce to Its inVestment adVISOry and other customers Independenlly of any statements made In this or In any other Issue Further information on any security rnenlloned herein IS available on request

,.. TABELL'S MARKET LETTER 909 STATE ROAD. PRINCETON, NEW JERSEY 08540 MEMBER NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE. INC MEMBER NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF SECURITIES DEALERS. INC (609) 9249660 March 23, 1984 rWe tried, in this space last week, to put together our thoughts on the market after return- ;. – -ing -from- prolractea-vacation. Tl1e bal;icconl!lusion-swe'reached-1'arr,b – summarized-as-followSi- . (1) Based on historical precedent, there was persuasive evidence for regarding the market weakness from November through February as part of a bull-market correction rather than a cycle bear mar- ket. (2) There existed, however, real cause to doubt that the corrective process was complete. (3) It was likely that, before the process came to an end, further base-building action would be required. Last week's action was consistent with that view. A week ago, the Dow had moved up 4.4 from its February low and a great many intermediate-term indicators were poised to produce buy signals on further strength. That strength totally failed to materialize, and the Dow retreated to a low, as this is written, of 1150.33 va. the February 22 low of 1134.21. We regard this as construct- ive. A significant move at this stage would have been premature and probably could not have gen- erated enough power to move through the overhead supply at year-end levels. We noted last week that, based on 1984 action so far, a new sort of process was Obviously under way. If one applies a 5 filter to the action of the Dow since August, 1982, one finds five declines prior to the present one. The largest was under 7 ,and the longest lasted 36 trading days. The present case has produced a 11. 89 decline so far and has lasted 58 trading days through the February low and 80 days to date. We suggested a week ago that such drops, rather than being without precedent, had been normal features of bull markets in the past. We attempt to document this fact in the following table, which shows the statistics for the largest correction in each of the nine bull markets since 1949 Largest Correction Change to Next High No. of Days Bull Mkt Breadth r'rom P,ev. From From Start Start Date Decline …. 6.f-1-3.J-49.f1-2-l50 -l-a.a5 Decline 2..-87 Days From Low 22 48-.-1-9 High Low 28 .64.r6-B3 High 7.05 9/14/53 8/26/56 -12.69 – 8.50 132 14.50 – 0.03 104 236 10/22/57 115/60 -17.42 – 9.28 205 29.83 7.16 284 489 6/26/62 5/14/65 -10.54 – 6.51 30 18.39 5.90 157 187 10/7/66 9125/67 -12.51 – 7.67 122 19.40 4.46 154 276 5/26/70 4/28/71 -16.07 -11.22 146 31.80 31.79 285 431 12/6/74 7115/75 -11.07 – 6.44 55 29.41 15.06 246 301 2/28/78 2/13/80 -16.01 – 6.93 46 34.90 13.29 256 302 8/12/82 11/29/83(1) -11.89(1) – 3.80(1) 59'80(2) (1) Todate (2) 58 days to 2/22; 80 days to 3/23 The first two columns of the table show the start date for each bull market followed. by the start date of that bull market's largest correction. All of them produced, somewhere along the line, corrections either approximately equal to, or in some cases significantly greater than, the present one. There were two instances of 16 declines and, in 1960, a 17.4 drop. Something on this order of magnitude would take the Dow to 1080. For purposes of comparison, the breadth-index decline (adjusted to issues traded) is shown for each correction. It can be noted the; drop in breadth is minor so far, and this could well tend to suggest more room on the downside. In terms of length, the current decline has been shorter, to date, than many of the pre- vious corrections. The 1960 correction was 205 days long, the 1967 drop lasted 122 days, and the 1971 decline consumed 146 days. Were we to move into this range, the ultimate low might not be reached until sometime during the summer. On the constructive side, however, it must be noted that, following the previous corrections, significant advances were invariably seen. The-1950 case is probably 'unusual but the other seven rallies range from 15 to 35 from their lows. Measured against the previous highs, they range from equaling the old high in 1956 to moving above it by fairly Significant amounts. As the final two columns show, most such rallies, again eliminating 1950, continued for six months to a year after their low and, in most cases, somewhat over a year beyond the previous high. This would extend the ultimate bull-market high into sanetime in early 1985 and would be consistent with both normal cycle theory and the election-year pattern. Thus the view of the present as a correction typical of a mature bull market is, we think, a not implausible scenario. AWTrs Dow-Jones Industrials (12 00 p. m.) 1150.33 S & P Composite (1200 p.m.) 156.72 Cumulative Index (3/22/84) 1969.18 ANTHONY W. TABELL DELAFIELD, HARVEY, TABELL INC. No statement 0' e)(press!on 01 opInion or any other malter herein contained IS, or IS to be deemed 10 be, directly or mdlrec1ty, an offer or the sollCllaUon 01 an ofler to buy or sell any secunty referred to or mentioned The matter IS presented merely lor tho convenience of the subSCriber While we bcllcve the sources of our information to be reliable, we In no way represent or guarantee the accuracy theroof nor of the statements made heroin Any action to be taken by the subscnber should be based on his own investigation and information Delafield, Harvey, label! Inc, as a corporation and Its officers or employees, may now haye, or may later take, posItions or trades In respect to any secuntles mentioned In thiS 01 any future Issue and such position may be different from any views nowor hereafter CJlpressed In thiS or any ether Issue Delafield, Harvey label! Inc, which IS registered With the SEC as an Investment advisor, may give advice \0 Its Investment adVISOry and ether customers Independently 01 any statements made In thiS or In any other Issue Further Information on any security menloned herein IS available on request

TABELL'S MARKET LETTER 909 STATE ROAD, PRINCETON, NEW JERSEY 08540 MEMBER NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE, INC MEMBER NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF SECURITIES DEALERS, INC (609) 924-9660 March 30, 1984 I . — QfteJ1tbebestw.ay.ofde.;;tling\ViththestQckmrlg'ti.)ostl'I't).Yffil'Inga.Lairlyongtr'!' view of events well in the past and then narrow do to a shorter-range-view- of the-'more recent pattern. With the full benefit of 20/20 hindsight, we now know that June 16, 1983 was a watershed date. As of that day, ten months ago, the party was over. The Dow close was 1248.30, the aver- age having anived at that juncture via a sixty-percent, almost uninterrupted advance which had started in August, 1982. New highs were yet to be posted by the widely followed averages, but not by all that much, and, for the OTC averages, June, 1983 was the absolute peak. The Dow, after declining to 1163 in August, posted a new high at 1284 in October, exceeded it by some 2t points in November (its actual all-time high to date), and reached 1286 in January of this year. For three months following the October high, it never moved below the lower 1200's. Such was the situation as 1984 began. It was a market that had made little or no upside pro- gress for half a year, but had also proved resista;1t to decline. Then, in January and February, the break came. The Dow fell almost 12, to a closing low of 1134.21 on February 22. This moved the index well below the bottoms that had been posted ,back in August, November, and early Dec- ember. It was also, as we examined at some length last week, by far the biggest downswing in the bull market to date. The dilemma the technician must resolve is how to treat the June-January trading range and the subsequent drop from that range. One such interpretation is to view the entire period as a massive top of cyclical proportions. We do not deny that such an interpretation is plausible. We have chosen, however, not to take this view, for reasons outlined in recent issues of this letter. First of all, as we have pointed out at some length, the timing is wrong. Cycle theory sug- gests a low probability of a major top beginning to form so short a time after an obvious major — bo1tomjn…August….19B2.–,-Asw.e..,.pointedollLlasLweek.D1Lbu11marlet in tbemodern.,.er!Lhas–'!ea,c!-,- ed its ultimate high without completing and erasing at least one intermediate-scale correction. What has been described above is the first and only plausible occurence of such a correction since the upswing began. Finally, we can see no justification for the levels of undervaluation which would occur were the Dow to reach the objectives suggested by the conventional reading of late 1983 as a top, objectives which could be as low as the low 900's. If we are correct in our refusal to accept the conventional analysis, however, such a refusal must be justified by subsequent action. A month is now past since the low in February was post- ed, and the evidence is mixed. On the plus side, the February low has held. Both the Dow and the S & P 500 successfully tested their February lows on March 9 and completed what could be described as a second test early this week, following which, the Dow produced its 20-point advance on Wednesday. The breadth of the recovery, however, has been somewhat less than impressive .. The ten-day advance-decline difference reached minus 4400 in mid-February, an appropriate level for an intermediate-term boltom. Since then, this indicator has been able to move only into moderate plus territory, without ever reaching levels which could be called over-bought. The market's inability to mount any reasonably broad short-term rally since the February low must thus be considered a negative. Volume statistics, on the other hand, have been more impressive. Ten-day downside volume in mid-February reached 620 million shares and has been declining ever since, dropping under 300 million late !!\t week. Upside v01ume has expanded only moderately, but nonethe1ess has managed to remain significantly greater than downside through most of March, suggesting underlying willing- ness to buy market weakness. From the conventional chart point of view, a base has been formed, but not one which would suggest a rally of any meaningful proportion. The best readable upside objective for the Dow would be somewhere around 1250, at which level six-months worth of overhead supply exist. We have suggested for the past three weeks that broadening of this base is needed, and this still continues to be the case. Further, such broadening, however, followed by rallying action with meaningful breadth, could well vindicate our reading of the present period as an intermediate-scale bull-market correction. AWTrs ANTHONY W. TAB ELL DELAFIELD, HARVEY, TAB ELL INC. Dow-Jones Industrials (12 00 p. m. ) 1167.82 S & P Composite (1200 p.m.) 159.33 Cumulative Index (3/29/84) 1984.92 No statement or eoresSjon of opInion or anyolher matter herein contained IS, or Is to be deemed to be, directly or Indirectly. an oller or the solicItatIon of an offer to buyor sell any security relerred to or mentIoned The maller IS presented merely lor the convenience of the subscnber While we believe the sources 01 our tnformatlon to be reliable we In no way represent or guarantee the accuracy thereof norof the statements made herem Any action to be taken by the subSCriber Should be based on hiS own InvestigatIon and mformatlOn Delafield, Harvey, Tabell Inc as a corporatIOn anellts olltcers or employees may now have or may laler take, poSitions or trades m respect to any seculltles mentioned 10 thIS or any future Issue, and such pOSlllon may be different from any views nowor heleafler e.pressec! In thiS 01 any other Issue DelafIeld, Harvey, Tabell tnc whIch Is registered With the SEC as an Investment adVisor, may give adVice to Its Investment adVISOry and other customers mdependently of any statements made In this or 10 any other Issue Further information on any secuntymentloned herein Is available on request

TABELL'S MARKET LETTER 909 STATE ROAD. PRINCETON, NEW JERSEY 08540 MEMBER NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE, INC MEMBER NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF SECURITIES DEALERS, INC. (609) 9249660 – April 6. 1984 avin gicbeen- unableto. generate sufficientdemand toproduce-an-effective bot tom at -theI1-30- H'AO, level. the Dow moved this week to a new low. suggesting that the basing process' may. as we suspected. take some time and involve lower levels over the short term. We continue to feel. though. that tliese lows will not be all that different from the ones already posted. Interestingly. the collapse was triggered by a not-unexpected rise in the prime rate and constituted yet another manifestation of the current conventional wisdom regarding the stock market and interest rates. That now current conventional wisdom seems to run as fOllows. Bond yields are now in the vicinity of 13. The recent inflation rate is in the vicinity of 4-5. Subtracting one from the other produces an extraordinarily high real rate of return of 8-9. Since this is roughly twice the current yield on highgrade stocks. the recent rule of thumb has been that. when the bond market catches cold. the stock market gets pneumonia. Even when bonds are compared to stocks on an absolute basis the results are pretty dismal. The most recent P IE ratio for the S & P 500 was 11. 37 which translates to an earnings yield of 8.8. again. pretty paltry compared to the 13 figure above. This common perception. since it is now in the rather advanced stages of development. has had the opportunity to become a great deal more sophisticated than the simple observation of interest rates and has evolved into the well-established sport of Fed watching. The Fed. of course. has been dragged. kicking and screaming. in recent years into the perception that its major function is controlling the rate of growth of the money supply. Monetary economists. who are largely responsible for this perception. would minimize the effects. over the intermediate term. of such a policy. properly administered. on interest rates. Wall Street has not bought this perception. It has long been convinced that the Fed's res- ponse to excessive money-supply growth will be to ratchet interest rates upward. However. we are well beyond simply postulating that the market will rise when money supply falls and vice versa. The moneysupply game is now somewhat like the beauty contest suggested by Lord Keynes. where the object is not to pick the most beautiful girl but the girl whom the other judges will percieve as most beautiful. Each ,week. these days. the sages.,make a guess as to what the money sllP.plyn.g be with the market lending to move in the following week bas'ed on whether the actual change was greater or lesser than that guess. The reader may have detected the fact that we tend toward a certain skepticism as regards this entire process. Space permits only the barest outline of the reasons for such skepticism. To begin with, the concept of the real interest rate is an elusive one. one dealt with perceptively by David Ranson in Tuesday's Wall Street Journal. Mr. Ranson suggests that what we may be seeing at the moment is not high real interest rates but a high level of inflationary expectations. This seems eminently logical. In- flation rates have been falling only for a couple of years now and had been rising for a couple of decades before that. It is hard to find strong levels of conviction backing the premise that the current relative- ly low inflation rate is permanent or the even more radical premise that the drop in the inflation rate which started in the early 1980's is likely to continue. It seems to us clear that built into the current level of bond prices is a perception of renewed inflation. This perception could be correct. but like many such notions in the past. i.e . the inevitable post-war depression of the late 1940's. it could prove to be wrong. Moreover. while many analysts are pointing out that stock returns look low in relation to bonds. few of them are citing any historical evidence to suggest just what that relationship. in fact. ought to be. In fact. this relationship has varied widely over time. and. although high bond yields certainly place some sort of effective ceiling on stock prices. it is difficult to tell just where that ceiling exists. Our biggest objection to the current conventional wisdom. however. is that it is currently approach- ing total reductio ad absurdum of turning the world upside down. A continuing recovery. we are told. will produce greater loan demand. followed by upward pressure on the money supply. followed by restrictive Fed action. followed by rising interest rates. followed by lower stock prices. Ergo — and we have seen this written in so many words — a strong recovery (and better corporate profits) is bear- ish for stock prices. We are. perhaps. old-fashioned. but this seems to be a bit far out. None of the above is meant to suggest that the current preoccupation with interest rates is about to go away soon, and. indeed. it has been ingrained long enough so that it will probably die hard. It has reached the stage, however, where some real surprises could be produced when, inevitably I for whatever reason, the current theoretical house of cards collapses. AWTrs ANTHONY W. TABELL DELAFIELD. HARVEY. TABELL INC. Dow-Jones Industrials (12 00 p.m.) S & P Composite (1200 p.m.) Cumulative Index (4/5184) 1130.13 155.13 1942.70 No statemont or expressIon of opInion or any other matter herein contained IS, or Is to be deemed to be, dlrecllv or indirectly, an alter or the soliCitation of an offer 10 buy or sell any security referred loor menl10ned The malter Is preseo1ed merely for the convenience of Ihe subscnbor While we bellevelhe sources at our mformallon to be reliable, we In no way represent or guarantee the accuracy Ihereof nor of the statemenlS made herem Any action to be taken by the subscriber should be based on hiS own Iflvestlgatlon and Informallon Delafield, Harvey, Tabell Inc, as a corporatIOn and Its ofllcers or employees, may now have, or may later lake, positions or 1rades In respeclto any secuntles mentIOned mlhls or any future Issue, and such posl\lon may be dllfcrent from any views now or hereafter expressed m this or any other Issue Delafield, Harvey, Tabell Inc, which Isreglsterel With the SECas an Investment adVisor, may give advlceta Its Investment adviSOry and other customers IndependenUyol any statements made m thiS or In any other Issue Furthermformallon on any secunly mentioned herein Is avanableon request

,——————————————————————————————————- TABELL'S MARKET LETTER 909 STATE ROAD, PRINCETON, NEW JERSEY 08540 MEMBER NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE, INC MEMBER NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF SECURITIES DEALERS, INC (609) 9249660 April 13. 1984 '''' T!!!Irsdy's bIznrre nction J with the Dow up 26 points and last-hour volume one of the highest .figures -for tlie bUlliiiarket-.-d6es nor;-byitself .change thTdesunorys)fOltfermmaflfeCpicture. Rather. It provides the ground work for future improvement in that picture should major breadth and volume indicators be able to follow through. The key question is not a short-term forecast, but rather the nature of the process in which we now find ourselves. It has been the position of this letter. based on the study of past market cycles. that that process is a correction in an ongoing bull market rather than a cycle bear market. Let us document our reasoning a bit further. S rI'Ihl HIllH ,LOW Torr'L M05 MOS 0, LOW (,S OF HIGH (i , OF HATE IJIA ——– ——– ———riAl – IJJ fI ——– ItA 1 E LtJIA HfJ OV MiV .DV DEC Hi.EV LOW F fi.V HIGH ——– JUN 1896 30.2 Arh t899 54.90 JMI 1901 411.94 55 14 6' S, -11 0 0 JAN 1901 48.94 JUN 1901 57.10 NOV 1903 3.47 14 5 15 17 -43 NOV 1903 32.47 JAN 1906 73.76 NOV 1907 4,79 '6 54 127 -012 ,.NOV 1907 42.79 NOV 1909 70.34 OCT 19l1 55.52 .7 51 6. -21 OCT 19.11 5S.! DEC 1912 64.37 HM'.' 191 !. 60. EJJ J4 16 -6 MAR 1915 60.83 NOV 1916 105.97 lEe 1917 74.38 33 00 61 7. -30 .OEC 1917 74.38 OCT 1919 118.92 AUG 1921 67.11 22 50 60 -44 UG 1921 67.11 MAR 1923 102. ni JUL 19Z3 86.91 2J I. S3 53 -15 JUL 1923 86.91 SEP 1929 343.45 NOV 1929 23B.9S 76 74 .7 295 -30 NOV 1929 238.95 APR 1930 279.23 JUL 1932 54.26 5 1. 17 -61 .,JUL 1932 54.26 FE 1934 103.46 SEF 1934 92.63 26 1. n -10 16 66 132 130 110 1' .0 130 275 OJ 10. 1..2,,9 165 112 66 3J4 61 37 SEF 1934 92.63 MAR 1937 IB6.41 APR 1938 111.28 43 30 70 101 -'0 APR 1938 11) 213 NOV t9J8 149.82 APR 1942 95.35 .6 7 15 35 -36 .,AH 1942 95.35 JUN 1946 20.62 NOV 1946 169.89 so 50 116 -17 .,NOV 1946 169.89 JUN 1948 189.46 JUN 1949 167.42 31 19 12 -12 JUN 1949 167.42 JAN 1953 289.77 SEP 1953 ;!64.0 51 43 S. 7J -.SfP 1953 264.04 JUL 1957 508.52 DEC 1957 435.69 51 .0 .3 -14 DEC 1957 435.69 DEC 1961 731.14 JUN 1962 561.29 54 .S S. 68 -23 171 120 S6 17. ISS 165 ISO .0 137 .2 153 ,1.7,5 JUN 1962 561.28 JAN 1966 983.51 OCT 1966 807.07 52 43 63 75 -16 ocr 1966 907.07 OEC 1968 9-43.75 MAY 1970 700.44 4J 26 .0 17 -26 .129 I'tA'f-1970700…44.JAtt-I-973-999'02-DEC-H1 …- 6 t 6 . 2 – 5 5 – – – 3 2 – 5 . – 4 3 – – 3 9 – – – – – 8 7 OEC 1974 616.24 SEP 1976 990.19 HAR 1978 757.36 39 21 54 r 61 -24 88 MAR 1978 757.36 APR 1981 997.75 JUL 1982 808.60 52 37 71 32 -1. 123 135 106 101 -AVERAGE -AVERAGE -AVERAGE JUNE 1896-HAR 1978 NOVEHBER 194o-HARCH 1978 OCTOBER 196o-HARCH 1978 .5 2. 61 72 -27 .7 35 72 55 -20 26 57 40 -29 127 131 106 125 12'5 100 The above table (in slightly different form) last appeared in this space in May. 1982 — in circumstances directly opposite to those today, since we were then probing for a low yet to occur, rather than attempting to determine whether a prior peak constituted a major high. The statistics can be, how- ever, useful in both circumstances. They show some relevant numbers, based on month-end closing prices. of the 23 completed major stock-market cycles since the Dow was first computed in 1896. The present cycle, on a month-end basis. began in July, 1982 and has continued, to date, through November. The advance so far has been 58, and in terms of percentage advance. there is nothing in the table to contravene the thesis that the rise so far could have completed a bull market. Although the average advance for all 23 cycles is 72. the cycles since World War 11 have shown smaller average percentage advances than has the recent rise and the cycles since 1966 smaller ones still. It is when we look at the time factor that the thesis of a bull market which ended last November runs into difficulty. As can be seen from the table. the average length of the advancing phase of the 23 cycles has been 29 months, with the post-war cycles a little longer. Through November, the current cycle had moved ahead for only 16 months. Now there are, as the table shows, four previous cycles that have posted shorter runs. The most recent one, however, was 1938. the previous one was the 1929-1932 bear market. and the other two go back into the early part of the century It is difficult to envision those experiences being terribly relevant to today's conditions. An even stronger argument is provided if one manipulates two of the columns in the table. The one headed total months shows an average cycle length, from low to low. of some 45 months, giving rise to the popular term ''four-year cycle'J It also shows that the average cycle. spends 60 of its lifetime in an advancing phase. If the period July. 1982-November, 1983 constituted 60 of the current cycle. it will wind up being only 26 months long. hslf the length of the last one. 60 of the average length. and shorter than any cycle in history other than 1932-34. We must confess we regard this as unlikely. It is interesting to speculate on the timing of the present cycle were it to conform exab'tly to the average of this century. If it lasts for precisely 45 months, the next major bear-market low will be seen in March, 1986, A 29-month advance would place the ultimate peak in December of this year, to be followed by a bear market which would consume most of 1985. There is obviously a great deal of room for variance in these figures. but we think that variance is unlikely to be so great as to make a late-1983 major top a credible hypothesis. AWTrs Dow-Jones Industrials (12 00 p. m.) 1155.98 S & P Composite (1200 p.m.) 158.83 Cumulative Index (4/12/84) 1944,79 ANTHONY W. TAB ELL DELAFIELD. HARVEY. TABELL INC. No state'llent or expression at oplnton or any other malter herein corltlllned Is, or Is to be deemed 10 be, directly or indirectly, an ofter or the SOliCitation of an offer to buyor sell any security ret erred toormentlonC! The mailer IS presented merely for the convenience ollhesubscriber While we believe the sources of OUf Informatlonl0 be reliable, we In noway represent or guarantee the accuracy thereot nor of the statements made herein Any action to be Ilken by the subscriber should be based on his oWl'linvesllgatlon and mformatlon Delafield, Harvey.labell Inc. as a corporalon and Its officers or omployecs. may now have or may later tae. pOSitions or trades In respect to any securIties mentioned In thiS or anI,' luture Issue, and such pOSition may be dlflef'mf from an\ Views nowor hereafter eJ(pressed (fl Ihls or any other Issue Delafield, Harvey. Tabell Inc, whIch IS registered wr!tT the SEC as an (flvestment advrsor, may give advice 10 Its Investment adVISOry and other customerS Independentlv 01 any statements made In thiS or In anI,' olher Issue Further mformatmn on any secunty mentioned herem 15 available on request …' .— c C . . .

',' TABELL'S MARKET LETTER 909 STATE ROAD, PRINCETON, NEW JERSEY 08540 MEMBER NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE, INC MEMBER NATIONAL. ASSOCIATION OF SECURITIES DEALERS, INC (609) 9249660 April 19. 1984 One of the many criticisms that have been leveled in this letter over the years is that we are prone to the use of long and obscure words, We have no apology for this. We are —. '' -oy circumstarices. compelled to-produce 'some'-800'worcts-of-the-Engltsh language'ElachCweek, – – and we like to think that we have gained. in the process. some appreciation of the versatility of that language (There are. for example. about twice as many words available in English as there are in French or German). We see no reason why we should not utilize all the diverse weapons available in this arsenal. The above is by way of introduction to the subject of this piece. which is anthropomor- phism. Webster defines it as an interpretation of what is not human or personal in terms of human or personal characteristics. We became ourselves victims of this practice on our recent Antarctic vacation as we walked among flocks of penguins. These little birds may be the most lovable of all animals precisely because they resemble nothing more than silly. awkward little fat men wearing tuxedos. There exists an not-uncommon inclination among financial writers to anthropomorphize the stock market. This often takes the form of presenting it as a continual war between two sets of contending forces. identified respectively as bulls and bears. One of our respected colleagues. indeed. heads each issue of his letter with cartoon figures of a bull and a bear. each drawn with distinctively human characteristics. This view of the market. as a continuing battleground between contending armies. has some degree of justification in early history. It is impossible to read about the exploits of the Goulds and Livermores. or the organized armies of professional market manipulators. without gaining the impression that the stock market was. at one point. just such a battleground. The poor investor. in those bad old days. must have felt like a peasant who was unfortunate enough to have a war being fought back and forth across his farm. Every once in a while. even today, a market emerges in which the battleground analogy appearJLespeciallyap.t..-M.ode.l'n day.,Jlcarfare., we have learned., moreover. tends to' be.of the guerrilla variety. and this analogy, also. app'ears appropriate for the present day. How else. for example. to visualize the action of April 12th For most of that day. we saw a market lazing along sleepily. Suddenly. an ambush by bullish forces drove the Dow up 20-plus points in an hour and a half on extraordinary volume. The surprise attack remained successful until early the following morning. At that point. it was equally easy to visualize the bear forces regrouping and driving prices sharply lower the next day. A miniature version of the same attack and repulse occurred on Tuesday and Wednesday of this week. This view of NYSE trading as a battle to take and retake territory can be extended to some of the basic precepts of technical analysis. As opposing forces sweep back and forth over the same ground. battle lines become defined. Technical work has recognized this fact from its earliest days and has attached great significance to upside and downside breakouts from long trading ranges. just as the military tends to recognize the significance of a decisive penetration through a long-held enemy front. In today's market. for instance. it is fairly easy to see the army of bulls having dug their trenches at the 1130 level on the Dow with the bear front line existing at around 1190. Many years ago. this sort of information might have had the status of a military secret. known only to the professional intelligence corps of market technicians. However. in today's environment. the location of the two opposing battle lines is well known to anyone who looks at the daily chart in the Wall Street Journal. At some point or another. one of the two lines will be breached. We confess we would have a greater belief in the validity of an upside breakout. since it would be in accord with our present scenario of an intermediate-term correction which should. before too long. come to an end. We do not. however. regard a move to new lows as an unlikely possibility. nor would we view it as necessarily disproving this scenario….. Such a' move might well be the last push by the bearish forces prior to their finally running out of ammunition. AWTjt ANTHONY W. TAB ELL DELAFIELD. HARVEY. TABELL INC. Dow-Jones Industrials (Close) S & P Composite (Close) Cumulative Index (4/18/84) 1158.07 157.15 1954.11 NO statement or epresslon 01 opinion or anyotMr matter herein contained IS, or IS 10 be deemed 10 be, directly or indirectly, an olfer or the soliCitation 01 an offer to buy or sell' any seC1Jrlty referred 100r mentioned The matter IS presented merely for the convenience of the subscrlbor While we believe the sources of our mformatlon lobe reliable, weln no way represent or guarantee the accuracy thereof narof the statements made herem Any action 10 be taen bv Ihe subscriber should be based on hiS own Investigation and Information Delafield, Harvey, Tabel! Inc, as a corporahon and Its oltlccrs or employees, may now have, or may later take, positions or trades In respect to any securities mentioned In thiS or any lulU/e Issue, and such pOSItion may be dillerantirorn any Vlews now or herealtefeprcssed In this or anI,' other Issue Delafield, Harvey, Tabell Inc, which IS registered With the SEC as an mvestment adVisor, may give advice to lis Investment advisory and other customers Independenlly of any statements made m thiS Olin any other Issue Further mlormatlon on any secuflly mentioned herem IS available on reQuest

TABELL-S MARKET LETTER 909 STATE ROAD, PRINCETON, NEW JERSEY 08540 MEMBER NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE. INC MEMBER NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF SECURITIES DEALERS. INC. (609) 9249660 April 27, 1984 . . . It ..ossible (althoug-,,-we',9ul'Ln()t.wgnJ .t().phthi('. distinctiol.1QQ..JJu'Ltp.!i'l1id5! techmcal analysIs mto two general approaches .. The first of these is the historical approach. This discipline maintains that, if a study of the historical record reveals that the market has behaved in a certain way'in the past, it will be highly likely to do so in any current similar instance, An example, appropriate to today's market, would be the statement that major bull markets in this cen- tury have had an average length of some two and a half years, and that it is, therefore, unlikely that the recent bull market topped out after 15 months. The second school may be characterized as the indicator approach, which says, in effect, that certain sorts of behavior tend to precede up or down markets and that occurrence of such behavior should engender optimism or pessimism as the case may be. An example, also valid for the current market, would be to say that poor breadth action has been displayed for the last 10 months and that such behavior has tended to precede bear markets. It is always necessary to synthesize the two approaches, It is futile, for instance, to remain obdurate about an historical scenario when indicators of what is currently happening stub- bornly refuse to confirm that scenario. This letter, it must be admitted, has recently leaned on the approach of placing the current market in its historical context, but it is certainly necessary to remain convinced that current indicator action is consistent with that historical context. Among the historical patterns we have been citing in this space are the following Major cycles, since 1896, have averaged just under four years in length and have spent, on average, some 60 of their lifespan in advancing. It is therefore logical to suppose that the major high for this cycle, rather than having occurred last November, is likely to occur at some time in the future. most probably sometime around early 1985. A second historical analogy is the election-year pattern (which. in recent years, has tended to coincide with the four-year cycle, although this has not always been the case). This – – .pattern-suggemnlfe-likelihoou-of-flatness-or-modEirate-weakrressili.-th'e–r;i'Stha1fortne year, a forecast which has been confirmed so far. followed by strength in the second half. We have, for example. pointed out that. in 17 of the 21 elections years in this century, the average price for December has been higher than the average price for June. A shorter-term historical pattern is the tendency, albeit ever so slight. for market weakness in May-June followed by the stronger tendency toward the well-advertised summer rally. A synthesis of all these patterns of historical behavior tends to suggest a market in which short- term weakness might continue, possibly over the next six weeks to two months. but where that weakness should be followed minimally by a test of previous highs. It should be noted that none of the above historical theses contravene the likelihood that, on the move from 776 to 1287. the Dow had already accomplished the major proportion of its ultimate rise. The question is whether the indicator approach. the observation of current market behavior. fits in with the above market scenario. Market breadth, as we noted above, has been poor for 10 months, and a breadth divergence has existed since either June or September. (This is the sort of fine point over which technicians like to quibble.) Much of this weak breadth action is the product of the abysmal behavior of secondary, particularly OTC, stocks which have been in their own private bear market ever since last June. To determine whether such behavior is consistent with the historical framework. it is necessary, however. to look at lead times. The breadth divergence. indeed, exists, and it is highly unlikely that it will be erased before the end of the cycle. It may, however, be dated back only to last summer and the average lead time of divergences over market tops since Worl(l War II has been 16 months, with three cases of two years or more on record. As good a measure as any of secondary stock activity is the speculation ratio, or the ratio of S & P Low-Price to High-Grade indices. This, of course, peaked in June. but, in most cases. the ratio peak has led market highs 'by 1332 months. There exists a myth that bull markets end in a flurry of speculative-stock activity. a statement which was true in 1968 and 1976, but has been false in most other bull markets including. contrary to popular impression. 1929. In short, the behavior of most market momentum indicators for the past 10 months has been abysmal, and it is not our intent to obscure this fact. Such behavior is. nonetheless, in our view. consistent with the historical scenario we have outlined above. –.I J AWTrs ANTHONY W. TAB ELL DELAFIELD, HARVEY, TABELL INC. Dow-Jones Industrials (12 00 p. m.) 1170.96 S & P Composite (12 00 p. m. ) 160.44 Cumulative Index (4/26/84) 1955,56 NO statement or oxpresslon of opinion or anyolhet mailer herem contained IS, or IS 10 be deemed to be, directly or Indirectly. an oHer or the sol1cltatlon of an oller to buy or sell any secunty referred to or mentioned The matter IS presented merely lor the convenience of the subscriber While we believe the sources of our information to be reHable, we In no way represent or guarantee the accuracy theroof nor of the statements made herein Any action to be taen by the subscriber should be based on hiS own investigation and information Delafield, Harvey, label! tnc, as a corporallon and lis officers or employees, may now have, or may taler lake, positions or trades In respect to any securities mentioned In this or any future Issue, and such pOSition may be dlfferenllrom any views nowor hereafter expressed In this or any other Issue Delafield, Harvey 1aOOl1 Inc, which IS registered With the SEC as an Inveslment adVisor, may give advice to Its Investment adVISOry and other customers Independently at any statements made In thiS or In any other Issue Further Information on any security mentioned herein IS avallable on reQuest

TABELL'S MARKET LETTER 909 STATE ROAD, PRINCETON, NEW JERSEY 08540 MEMBER NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE, INC MEMBER NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF SECURITIES DEALERS, INC (609) 924-9660 May 4, 1984 In contrast to the change of the seasons, changes in the stock-market climate are often abrupt. H-isnecessaryonly- to recsll–midA ugust ,-1-982-;–whcn;- int-hespace 'ofafew,,short-daysTthe-stock-market weather was transformed from a tepid drizzle to the brightest of sunshine. Such has not been the case recently, however. The stock-market climate has, indeed, of late, been improving somewhat, but the improvement has been a good deal more Uke the weather. Indeed, it resembles, in many ways, the arrival of spring this year in the northeast, with the occasional sunny day being followed, almost regularly, by a return to cold and damp. Let us try to recapitulate what has happened so far. The bullish news has been provided over the past couple of weeks of trading by the action of the broad-based indices, the S 8. P 500 and Industrials and the NYSE Composite and Industrials. All four of these indices have now broken decisively out of the trading ranges in which they had been contained since their lows of February. The following table shows their Thursday close, what appear to be the most plausible upside objectives, and, for reference, their previous sll- time highs. 'c S & P 500 S & P Industrials NYSE Composite NYSE Industrials 5/3/84 161. 20 182.76 92.83 109.24 Objective 170-177 198-203 99-100 115-117 Old High 172.65 19.84 99.63 116.42 A cursory glance at the above figures reveals a certain uniformity. The objectives for all four indices are just about at, or ever so slightly above, their old highs. They are, moreover, hatldly far enough above current levels to imply that a new era of instant riches is in immediate prospect. Furthermore, what the table-does not shew is the existence, in all four cases of heavy overhead supply, start- ing not too far above present prices and continuing all the way to the objectives in question, suggesting —-t-hat-t-he-at-t-ainment—f-ev-en4heee-limit-ei—t-arget-s-is-not–going-to—be—-all-t'het–e8Sy' Meanwhile, a great many of the more widely followed averages are still waiting in the wings, confined within their February-May trading ranges. The table below lists four such indices with the same information as above, together with their breakout points, figures that have yet to be attained. Dow-Jones Ind. Dow-Jones Trans. Dow-Jones Util. NY SE Financial 5/3/84 1181. 53 514.40 125.48 89.39 Breakout 1190 530 130 91 Objective 1290-1300 575-590 ,134-135 96 Old High 1287.20 612.63 140.70 104.14 A few points regarding this second table may be noted. The Dow Industrials have' a pattern roughly similar to the broader-based indicators, with objectives in the neighborhood of the old high. In a sense, their pattern is even more constructive since the heaviest overhead supply does not get in the way until the 1225-1250 level. It is interesting to note, though, that neither the Transport, Utility, or Financial indices have broadened bases sufficiently to suggest a return to the areas of their old highs. Therefore, should a decent rally materialize at this stage, a potential serious divergence could result. We had not, as our readers have noted, expected that the improvement would occur this early on, and we would still not discount the possibility of a pullback into the original trading ranges, much as springwoother, in Princeton,New Jersey, at least, has failed to prevail for any length of time. Our original timetable had called for weakness extending into May-June. Nonetheless, as noted, positive action in some indicators, at least, has emerged as May begins. The relatively better action of the broad-based indices is, moreover, an unexpected bullish factor. The ratio of the S & P to the Dow-Jones, for example, is at the moment, extremely close to posting a new bull-market high. Ability to do this would be constructive, since, in most cases, such action takes place only under ongoing bull-market conditions. The poor action of the non-industrial averages, however, is not terribly surprising. It is no secret that leadership, going all the way back to last summer, has been narrow and growing narrower. We have not attempted to ignore this fact. It is simply our view, as we have noted, that this action is typical of a mature bull market, and thus more or less to be expected. Whether more harbingers of a stock-market spring will emerge is still a question. Indeed, if they do, to push the metaphor to the ultimate, they will probably be more indicative of an Indian Summer. We will be commenting in this space on such improvements as they emerge. AWTrs ANTHONY W. TABELL DELAFIELD, HARVEY, TABELL INC. Dow-Jones Industrials (1200 p.m.) 1173.68 S & P Composite (12CO -p.m.) 161. 07 Cumulative Index (4/3/84) 1969.74 No statement or expression of opInion or any other matter herem contained IS, Of Is to be deemed to be, directly or Indirectly, an offeror thesohcltatlOfl of an offer to buy or sell any security referred to or mentlOn('d The matter IS presented merely for Ihe con …emence of Ihe subscriber While we beHeve Ihe sources 01 OUf mformallon to be reliable, we In no way represent or guarantee the accuracy thereot nOf of Ihe statemonts made herem Any action to be laken by Ihe subscriber should be based on hiS own Invesllgatlon and information Oelahetd, Harvey, Tabell Inc. as a corporation and lts officers or employees may now have, or may later take, poSitions or trades In respect to any securities mentioned In thiS or any future Issue, and such positron may be dlfterent from any ViewS now or hereafter expressed In thiS or any other Issue Delafield, Harvey, labell tnc, which IS registered With the SEC as an Investment adVisor, may give advice tolls investment adVISOry and other customers Independently of any statements made in this or In any other issue Further mformahonon any security mentioned herein Is available on request

I' TABELL'S MARKET LETTER 909 STATE ROAD, PRINCETON, NEW JERSEY 08540 MEMBER NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE, INC MEMBER NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF SECURITIES DEALERS, INC (609) 9249660 May 11,.984 Aair !Dount of newspaper 'space 'was-devote(i';-sorfierO '1iayS,,-go;'tolhe-'release- Ofthe-Com merce Department's Index of Leading Economic Indicators, showing that Index down slightly for the month of March. The market's response was paradoxical. It went up — on the theory that a cooling off of the economy was bullish. This flows in the face of the conventional interpretation of such an event which suggests that a cooling-off economy is bearish for stock prices. This historic interpretation, however, tends to lead to certain difficulties in practice. The leading indicator composite was designed by the B.E.A. to turn down in advance of the economy and, indeed, has, since 1948, uniformly done so. Relating this to the stock market, however, presents difficulties. First, the market also tends to turn down in advance of the economy. .Secondly, the economy and the stock market have not always shown a perfect correlation. Six of the nine cycle bear markets since World War II were associated with economic contractions. One, however, took place entirely without such a contraction; one recession (April, 1960-February, 1961) produced only ah inter- mediate-term market decline and another, the mini-recession of 1980, could not be correlated with the stock market. These cases are eliminated in the accompanying tables. The table at the right shows the PEAKS date of seven expansion peaks in the Monthly economy, the stock market, and the Leading Lead () leading indicator index. In four of the Economy Stock Market Indicators Lag (-) seven cases the leading composite, 11/48 6/48 1/48 5 while it led a downturn in the economy, 7/53 1/53 3/53 -2 did not lead the peak in the stock 8/57 7/57 9/55 20 market and most recently lagged it by 4/60 1/60 5/59 7 as much as five months. A further 12169 12/68 4/69 -4 limitation on the indicator's practical 11/73 1/73 3/73 -2 – – usefulnessisthat'it-'-often-'-turns'down.- -' 7/81 -4'/81 tl-!I'8110''''''—-5- for one or two-month periods and then reverses itself, and it is, additionally, released a month late. The turndown, therefore, often cannot be recognized until as much as three months after the fact, mak- ingthe indicator relatively useless unless the lead time is fairly long. As shown, this is seldom the case. About the only useful thing that can be said about the action of the leading-indicator composite at the moment, is that, if the turndown continues — and this is not at all certain —, it would be 'consistent with a cycle stock-market peak having been reached last November. PEAK With all the space devoted to the leader Monthly index, almost none was devoted to two in- Coinc. /Lagging Lead () dices, also maintained and released by the Economy Stock Market Ratio Lag (-) Commerce Department, which are designed to 11/48 6/48 1/48 5 be coincident with and to lag economic turns. 7/53 1/53 10/52 3 This is surprising, since an indicator based 8/57 7/57 5/55 26 on these two indices has proved more useful 4/60 1/60 4/59 9 than the leading-indicator index at past eco- 12/69 12/68 11/68 1 nomic peaks. That indicator is the ratio of 11/73 1/73 3/73 -2 the coincident index to the lagging index. 7/81 4/81 3/81 l This ratio's turning down indicates a slow- down in the rate of expansion and, as the table above shows, its lead time, both on the economy and the stock market, tends to be a great deal better than that of the leading-indicator index. It has led the market six times out of seven, and its eventual lead time has been better than the alternate indicator in every case. Little notice has been paid to the fact that this indicator, so far, has peaked as of January, declining in both February and March. Now the practical use of this index as a stock-market tool is subject to the same limitations discussed above, in addition to the fact that it is more volatile than the leading-indicator index and has also given at least one major false signal, in the early 1950's. It would, nonetheless, at this stage of the game, be appropriate to watch this fairly obscure ratio. If it remains below its January peak, the interpretation would have to be pessimistic. However, since the ratio normally shows a rather good lead time, that January peak would not be inconsistent with a stock-market high to be made later this year. AWTrs ANTHONY W. TABELL DELAFIELD, HARVEY, TABELL INC. Dow-Jones Industrials (1200 p.m.) S & P Composite (1200 p.m.) Cumulative Index (5/10/84) 1160.07 159.18 1961. 05 No statement or expressIon of opinIon or any other matter herem contained Is. or is to be deemed to be, directly Of Indirectly, an oller or the soliCitation 01 an ollerlo buy or sell any secunty referred to or mentIOned The maHer IS presented merely for the convenience of the subscriber While we believe the sources of our information to be reliable, we In no way represent or guarantee the accuracy thereof norol the statements made herein Any action to be taken by the subscnber should be based on his own Investlgallon and Information Delafield, Harvey, Tabelt Inc, as a corporation and Its officers or employees may now have, or may later take, POSitions or trades In respect to any securities menhoned In thiS or any future Issue, and such POSition may be dillerent from any views now or hereaftere)(pressed In thiS or any other Issue Delafield, Harvey, Tabetl Inc, which IS registered with the SECas an Investment adVisor, may give advice to Its Investment advisory and othercuslomets Independently of any statements made In this or In any other Issue Further Information on any securUy mentioned herein IS available on reQuest

TABELL'S MARKET LETTER 909 STATE ROAD, PRINCETON, NEW JERSEY 08540 MEMBER NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE, INC MEMBER NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF SECURITIES DEALERS, INC (609) 924,9660 1— – May 18, 1984 It has not been a particularly good two weeks for the stock market, with the Dow Jones Inoustriall,-havin'g refrliated's6file-45points s-;ncereaching'a ,I11gh'of-H8eI'5,6 .on- May,2 r;S,even''of-the- 11 trading days since that time have been down days, and included a 14-point whack on May 4, followed by a rather tepid two-day rally, a further 11 point drop on May 9, and, finally, an additional 10-point loss on Thursday of this week, Predictably, all this was concomitant with credit market weakness. long bond prices reaching new lows early this week from which they have, so far, demonstrated little desire to recover, Two weeks ago, before the market began its most recent slide, we took the opportunity, in this space. to point out the fact that the broad-based averages, at least, had broken out on the upside of their February-May trading ranges, although some of the other indicators, notably the Dow Industrial and Transport l)verllge., had failed to do so. We left ourselves with a small loophole in that letter by suggesting that strength in early May was at some variance with the scenario we had been envisioning most of the Spring, which, on a seasonal basis, suggested that the market might once more test its lows, very probably sometime around May-June. Something like such a test did seem to be emerging in this week's trading. Indeed, the Dow-Jones Transport average, a particularly weak feature of weakness on Thursday pulled back to a closing low of 480.35, exceeding its April 6 low of 484.16 by a fairly significant margin. Actually, all of this has not, to date, substantially altered the pattern which existed a couple of weeks ago. The broader indicators, notably the S & P 500 and the S & P Industrials have simply pulled back once more into the trading ranges from whence they emerged, and it still appears plausible that these trading ranges constitute base patterns which, evidently, will broaden still further. In saying this. we do not preclude the possibility of a new low below the 1130 level for the Dow. It is certainly conceivable that the kind of pessimism which such a downside thrust would engender is needed before the market can mount .,sort of meaningful turn. Indeed, a ,,!e pointed out a highs, an -,';'pide prospect hardly calculated to set hearts By the time the current process is complete, there might well exist bases suggesting something more meaningful. The real question we are raising, from a technical point of view, is whether or not a typical volume selling climax is necessary to turn the market. Volume, until just recently, had been one of the marginally positive elements in the picture ever since lows were posted at the end of February. Consistently, through the two months following that low, upside volume had exceeded downside vol- ume,and, as has been widely noted, many of the recent downthrusts were accompanied by some of the lowest volume levels of the year. This pattern has been altered slightly in the past four of five days, as a certain amount of downside volume has entered the picture. However, even at Thurs- day's close, short-term downside volume indicators had failed to approach anything like their peaks of February. Whether a selling climax is required remains an open question; given the change in character of today's markets. The most recent major bottom in August, 1982 occurred, of course, entirely without one. On the other hand, We have had two fairly recent intermediate-term bottoms, 1978 and 1980, both of which featured selling climaxes with almost textbook characteristics. We would not want to hazard a guess as to whether one is required here. Climax conditions, interestingly, may already have appeared in the bond market, which, of course, has been the focus of most recent headlines. It is difficult to track bond markets as pre- cisely as the stock market, since volume figures are not available and back history tends to be lack- ing. However, it is possible to trace the percentage changes in, for example, individual long-term treasury issues. Such an 'oscillator shows Treasury 8 3/4's of 2003-2008 down in excess of 5 over a 10-day period at their Monday levels. During the short history available, such a level has gener- ally denoted what, can be called a deep oversold condition. Interestingly; as'oi-Monday, this issue, at its bid price of 65' 29/32 was down 24 from its high on May 6, 1983 of 86 28/32. During exactly the same period. the S & P 500 had declined from 166.10 to 157.50 a drop of only 5.1. So much for the safety of bonds versus stocks, at least in the recent market environment. It can be said, indeed that the stock market has held up fairly well given the abysmal credit market conditions. If bonds are currently truly oversold, a turn in this area could well turn the equity market without conventional panic-selling conditions emerging. AWTrs ANTHONY W. TABELL DELAFIELD, HARVEY, TABELL INC . Dow-Jones Industrials (1200 p.m.) 1136.31 S & P Composite (1200 p.m.) 156.30 Cumulative Index (5/17/84) 1921. 29 NO statement or expression of Opinion or any other matter herein contained IS, or 15 to be deemed to be. directly or indirectly, an oller Of the solicitation of an offer to buyor sell any secunty referred to or mentioned The matter IS presented merely lor the convenience of the 5ubscrlbor While we beheve the sources of our Itlformatlon to be renable, we In no way represent or guarantee the accuracy thereof nor 01 the statements made herein Any action to be taken by the Subscnber should be based on his own Investigation and Information Delafield, Harvey, labell Inc, as a corporation and lis olllcers or employees, may now have, or may later take POSitions or trades In respect to any securities mentioned In Ihls or any future Issue, and such pOSition may be dillerent from any views now or hereafter epressed In thIs or any other Issue DelafIeld, Harvey, Tabell Inc. whiCh IS registered with the SEC as an Investment advisor. may give adVice to lIs Investment adVISOry and other customers mdependently of any statements made In this or m any other Issue Further mformatlon on any security men\loned herein IS available on request