Viewing Year: 1984

Tabell’s Market Letter – January 06, 1984

Tabell’s Market Letter – January 06, 1984

Tabell's Market Letter - January 06, 1984
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– TABELL'S MARKET LETTER 909 STATE ROAD, PRINCETON, NEW JERSEY 08540 MEMBER NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE, INC MEMBER NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF SECURITIES DEALERS, INC (609) 924-9660 –.r.– – .. . . ''''''''–January6;– -f98i1 …-.. -!.;1o ….. . – J — It is unavoidable that this letter possesses some resemblance to letters which have ushered in past New Years. The reason for this is that our last issue of each year has, for some 20 years now, discussed the ubiquitous year-end rally and the near inevitability of that rally's continuing into January of the following year. Indeed, until six years ago, we would not have had to use the qualifying adjective near in the previous sentence since, until January, 1977, such a continuance had been the universal case for as far back as the Dow-Jones Industrial Average had been comp- uted. That year and the subsequent one constituted a two-year break in a tradition which has, happily, resumed. Thoe! of us aware of this fact were, therefore, hardly surprised at the stock- market excitement which ushered in 1984. From the technician's point of view, the performance was not without its impressive features. It is doubtful that, based on the week's action, the stock-market patient can be pronounced com- pletely cured, but he has, at least leapt from his hospital bed and is dancing down the aisles. The most impressive feature of all was, of course, the widely-heralded volume record with activity on Thursday setting a newall-time peak of almost 160 million shares. As has been widely noted, bull markets are fueled by volume, and, on Thursday, we got precisely that. The Wednesday and Thursday action of the averages was also reasonably persuasive. Wednesday's 16. 31-point advance in the DJlA was the best in over a month and was the largest point-change,save for six sessions, since the market desuetude set in last June. Even more impres- sive was the 2.7 4–point rise in the S & P 500, a fi gure which had been exceeded but twice, and only by small amounts, during the enitre- year 1983. Breadth, as every writer of a technical mar- ket letter in the industry has been pointing out, has been the weak sister of the trading pattern since June, and, in this lig!t, the ability to string together two consecutive days on which more – t-han1'200–;ssuesdvatrced-must-be-Viewedoptimistically-.,…-.mdeed,thisparticular-developmenhhas'-,,,….,,,-J not occurred since November of 1982, a time when the bull market was still in the giddy era of its youth. The patient is thus much improved, if not yet ready for release. First of all, neither the Dow or the S & P 500 have yet reached new highs, and the ability to do so would be encouraging. The senior average remains half a dozen points below its November 29 closing peak of 1287.20. Ability of the S & P 500 to reach new highs would be even more encouraging. That index,now around 168,posted its all-time high in October at 172.65, failing to reach new peak levels on the November rally. Unlike the Dow, which has presented a pattern of rising bottoms since last August, it had returned late last month to a twice-tested low around 161. Thus further strength here would be even more crucial than in the case of the Dow. Breadth, of course, is even more critical. As noted above, the existing divergence has been widely heralded. It continued through the last week in December, when the breadth index exceed- ed its November 7 low, despite the fact that the Dow held some 30 points above its comparable bottom. The two rallying days brought daily breadth to a level just under that attained on Novem- ber 29, when the Dow reached its high, and a couple of days of decent strength could bring it above that level and provide the first real sign of improvement in seven months. More time, and a great deal more strength would still be required before the divergence, which goes back to last June, could be erased. Finally, it seems to us, a healthy market would have to see some improve- ment in the comparatively disastrous action which has occured over the counter. A slight glimmer of light was provided when the OTC Industrial Average, in mid-December, managed to hold its November low, a low which culminated a 23 decline. However, the relative strength lines of the OTC Industrials, compared both to the Dow and the S & P, were reaching new lows as recently as December 28. There has been some recoverysince , but a vigorous market would require secondary and tertiary issues to demonstrate their natural volatility on the upside. Our own forecast, of course, expressed two weeks ago, is that at least some of these phe- nomena of improving health will manifesttliemselves and the market, at least during early 1984, will move on to new highs. Whether, along the way, enough vigor will be manifested to suggest a full-scale resumption of the cycle is a question which remains, for the time being, unanswered. AWTrs ANTHONY W. TABELL DELAFIELD, HARVEY, TAB ELL IN!. Dow-Jones Industrial Average (1200 p.m.) 1281. 51 S & P Composite (1200 p.m.) 168.76 Cumulative Index (1/5/84) 2066.66 , 1 No statement or e)l'preSSlon 01 opInion or any other mailer herem contained IS, OilS 10 be deemed 10 be directly 01 indirectly, an offer or the sollcllaUon 01 an offer to buy olsen any security referred toor mentioned Ttle mailer IS presented merely for the convenience 01 the subscriber Whl!ewe believe thcsources olour Information to beretlable, we In no way represent or guarantee the accuracy thereol nm 01 the statements made herein Any action \0 be tak.en by the subscriber should be based on his own inVestigation and inlmmatlon Delalleld, Harvey, Tabell tnc, as a corporatIOn and Its ollicers or employees, may now have, or may later lake, poSllions or trades In respect to any securities mentioned In thiS or any future Issue, and such poslHon may be different from any views now or hclealterepressed In thlSOf any other Issue Delalleld Harvey Tabell tnc which IS registered with the SECas an Investment advisor may give adVice to Its Investment adVisory and other customers Independently 01 any statements made m thiS 01 m any other Issue Further fnlormallon on any security menlloneo herem IS av8l!able on request

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Tabell’s Market Letter – January 13, 1984

Tabell’s Market Letter – January 13, 1984

Tabell's Market Letter - January 13, 1984
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TABELL'S MARKET LETTER 909 STATE ROAD, PRINCETON, NEW JERSEY 08540 MEMBER NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE, INC MEMBER NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF SECURITIES DEALERS, INC (609) 9249660 L..-. -'- –'- .. .JJ!rJ.!!!!!'y13,1984 —,…- It is- thehistoric function-of this -letter to cominenton the technical aspects-ofthe stock market. For this reason our readers are exposed to precious little economic analysis. This is not all a bad thing. Had we devoted a great denl of time to analyzing the economic prospects, visible around, say, August, 1982, we would have been a great deal more confounded than was otherwise the case by the stock-market explosion WhICh started in that month. It has. however, never been our contention that the stock market sails along oblivious to the state of the U. S. economy or that economic analysis is irrelevant to invest- ment management (although it may be less relevant thm. many suppose). At the moment, therefore, a few comments on the current state of the American economy appear appropriate. Obvious facts are often the ones most worth knowing, and there eXIst at the moment three such facts that should be totaUy familiar to any reader of a half-way decent busmess page. 1. A sUbstantial economic recovery has been in progress for the past 15 months. 2. The disastrous rates of inflation of a few years ago have been dramaticaUy reduced. 3. There exists and WIU probably continue to exist a massive federal budget deficit. Analysis of the above may be summarized by the phrase Two out of three ain't bad. In the words of the weU-known cliche. let us take the good news first. The annual percentage change in real GNP was 9.7. one of the higher figures on record. in the second quarter of last year and has continued at a respectable rate since. The year-to-year percent change of 6.1 is the best since the early 50's. Real per-capita disposable personal income, which had been declining since 1981 has reached a new high. The Increase in industrial production as of mid-summer also reached a level better than any seen in the past 30 years. Meanwhile. inflation, which approached effective zero at the start of the recovery, still remains, a year int.. that recovery, in the vicinity of the rates of the late 1960's and weU under half that rate of a few years ago. T.he..remarkablefactishow-JiH1e -of-t-hiss-fI'eCast. – It-dsnot-.-eur-tlsk-to-engage-in-political–.—f commentary or even to decide whether the present administration has any responsibility whatsoever' for what has transpired. However, those with a political ax to grind, were, a year ago, assuring us of the failure of Reaganomics, based on a set of forecasts for a turgid recovery which have, in the light of actual facts, proved incredibly short of the mark. Any rational analysis of the performance of the U. S. economy in 1983 must credit it with being one of the best of the past half century. The best forecaster of all, of course, was the stock market which, with a three-month lead on the recession trough, proceed- ed to post one of the most dynamic rises of that same half-century. The budget deficit. of course. persists. In the view of the pessimists, it is indeed likely to get worse rather than better. This has, also, produced some rather delicious political ironies. The Demo- cratic opposition, obviously in need of an issue on which to seize, has suddenly become a pillar of fiscal rectitude. Those of us old enough to remember the 1930's recall that we grew up listening to plaintive Republican wails that Franklin D. Roosevelt could not spend us into prosperity. Mr Roosevelt proceeded to win four consecutive elections. We doubt that this particular issue will do any more for the Democrats than it did for the GOP fifty years ago. We like to think of ourselves as being as fiscally prudent as the next man. and no claim is being made here that the deficit can be blithely ignored. Indeed. the scary fact is that. as of the third quar- ter of this year it reached an amount equivalent to net annual personal savings. The massive new gov- ernment debt required to finance the deficit has created a demand for capital which. coupled with relativ- ely low inflation, has produced some of the highest real interest rates in history. This factor, of course, is not unrelated to the stock market, and the existence of high real rates explains the equity market's sensitivity to interest-rate prospects. The credit market must now be considered a highly viable compet- itor of the equity market on a rate-of-return basis. What of the future It was only the supply side optimists among economic forecasters who were anywhere near on target a year ago in assessing the prospects for 1983 There was also, howyer, implIcit in their forecast, the concept that a dramatic increase in personal savings would substantially ameliorate the deficit problem. ThiS has emphatically not yet happened. However, time lags are uneer– tain, and we personally feel that the more wildly pessimistic deficit projections are highly suspect. As far as inflation is concerned, we think the dramatic reversal of the past couple of years has built deflatIonary elements into the economic structure which will keep prIce increases, for the time beIng, at least, within satisfactory limits. Meanwhile, there is eVIdence to suggest that the recovery, especially in terms of corporate profits, might still be in ItS,early stages. This could help make the stock market more comp- etitive with high real interest rates which are, it must be admitted, unlikely to go away over the near term. This interpretation of the available facts. at any rate, explains why the stock market, at this writing, is engaged in flirting with new highs. AWTrs ANTHONY W. TABELL DELAFIELD, HARVEY, TABELL INC. Dow-Jones Industrial Average (12.00 p.m.) 1273.03 S & P Composite (1200 p.m.) 167.99 Cumulative Index (1/12/84) 2084.47

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Tabell’s Market Letter – January 20, 1984

Tabell’s Market Letter – January 20, 1984

Tabell's Market Letter - January 20, 1984
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TABELL'S MARKET LETTER 909 STATE ROAD, PRINCETON, NEW JERSEY 08540 MEMBER NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE, INC MEMBER NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF SECURITIES DEALERS, INC (609) 9249660 January 20, 1984 1984, as the press will shortly make us excruciatingly aware, is a presidential year, We 'haverackethe;behavio.r ofthe'stockarket-in-suchyearsback'1othgeginning qf-the.century, and the results are shown below. The table shows each election year since 1900, the president elected, and his party, followed by the average price of the S 8. P 500 for each month during the year expressed as a percentage of the previous December's close (i.e., 110 means the market was up 10; 90 means jt was down 10). .- Year T9llO Wf 99R Jman Feb Ilr3' Mmar ol Jun –gg -J-uglg Ag Sep 97 1904 Roosevelt R 102 99 99 101 99 99 103 107 112 1908 Taft R 105 100 105 111 117 117 123 126 125 1912 Wilson D 100 99 102 106 105 105 106 109 109 1916 Wilson D 99 98 97 96 98 99 98 99 102 1920 Harding R 99 91 97 9 91 89 89 86 89 1924 Coolidge R 103 104 102 100 99 101 101 113 112 1928 Hoover R 99 98 103 110 113 108 108 112 120 1932 Roosevelt D 103 101 102 76 66 59 63 89 102 1936 Roosevelt D 102 108 112 112 104 108 116 118 120 1940 Roosevelt D 99 98 97 98 85 76 80 82 86 1944 Roosevelt D 102 101 105 101 105 109 112 110 108 1948 Truman D 97 92 94 101 106 110 108 104 103 1952 Eisenhower R 102 100 100 100 100 102 105 106 104 lJlji-&-Eis!!nho.l\'.,—R 97 98 104 ,105 103 102 107 106 103 1960' – KimilEldy D 99 98 92 9 92 96 '93 '94 92 1964 Johnson D 102 103 105 107 109 108 111 110 111 1968 Nixon R 98 94 92 99 101 104 104 101 105 1972 Nixon R 101 103 105 107 105 106 105 109 107 1976 Carter D 107 112 112 113 112 113 116 115 117 1980 Reagan R 103 107 97 95 100 106 111 114 117 lncumbent party did not control Congress. Incumbent party not re-elected Oct 100 118 126 109 105 89 110 123 88 126 87 111 106 104 102 91 113 108 107 113 121 mNov Drnec 125 126 134 138 108 103 107 103 85 77 115 119 131 132 87 82 130 128 88 85 110 115 100 99 105 109 10,O0L…,…, 93 97 115 112 109 110 113 115 112 116 126 124 Presidential election years show a mildly bullish bias. Only three of them (1920, 1932, and 1940) are distinct bear markets. Thirteen of the 21 years are bull markets, and five showed a flat trend. Another noticable tendency appears to be flatness or moderate weakness in the first half. Twelve of the 21 years showed little market change through June. It is worthy of note that a downward bias tends to occur on two sorts of occasions. The first is when the incumbent party does not control Congress, which we know currently to be the case. The second is when the in- cumbent president loses the election. Only in 1976, when that occurred, was the market up more than 6 in the first half. Thus, the direction of the market over the next few months may be a good indicator of Mr. Reagan's chances in November. An interesting figure to watch will be the average price in April. There have been eight election years in this century where that price was lower or the same as the previous year end. In six of those eight years the incumbent president was replaced. , Also interesting is the distinct tendency toward a strong second half In 17 of the 21 years the average price for December was higher than the average price for June. This appears to be true regardless of the election results and even in bear-market years where, in the past, the market has rallied in the second half from the June lows. In only two years, 1920 and 1948, were there significant declines between June and December. The election year pattern, therefore, calls for little change in the market during. the first half, although some firmness is likely if Mr. Reagan is to be reelected. This history of election years, however, suggests that the second half of 1984 should produce a rallying phase. AWTrs Dow Jones Industrials 0200 p.m.) 1261. 51 S & P Composite (1200 p.m.) 167.01 Cumulative Index (/19/84) 2082.58 ANTHONY W. TAB ELL DELAFIELD, HARVEY, TABELL INC. No statement or e,pres510n 01 opinion or any other mailer herein contained IS, or IS to be deemed to be, directly or mdlrec1Iy, an offer or the soliCitation of an offer to buy or sell any security referred toor mentioned Tho mailer IS presented merely forthe convenience 01 the subscriber While we believe the sources of our information to berehable, weln no way represent or guarantee 1M accuracy tMreo! nor of the statements made herein Any action to be taken by the subscriber Should be based on hiS own investigation and mtorma\lon Delafield, Harvey, Tabell Inc as a corporation an(! Its ollicers or employees, may now have, or may later lae, positions or trades In respect to any securities mentioned m thiS or any future ISSue, an(! such POSition may be different from any views now or herealler e)lpressed In thiS Of any other Issue Delafield, Harvey, Taboll Inc whiCh IS reglstere(! with Ihe SEC as an Investment adVisor, may give adVIce to lIs Investment a(!VISOry and other customers Independenlly of any statements made In this or In any other Issue FUrther Informa\lon on any secufliy mentioned herem IS available on request

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Tabell’s Market Letter – January 27, 1984

Tabell’s Market Letter – January 27, 1984

Tabell's Market Letter - January 27, 1984
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.-. TABELL'S MARKET LETTER 909 STATE ROAD, PRINCETON, NEW JERSEY 08540 MEMBER NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE, INC MEMBER NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF SECURITIES DEALERS, INC (609) 924-9660 -'000 -.– . January 27, 198 The -marKet willbecc-down- a year- from tOday. -Why Because;t1ieLOs KngelRaidelS—- decimated the Washington Redskins in last Sunday's Super Bowl. We hasten to say that we do not believe this. We are sure that you, our readers, do not believe this. Indeed, it is a fair statement that anyone in possession of all his marbles does not believe this. Yet, in our disbelief, we are flying in the face of one of the most sta- tistically accurate stock- market indicators in the entire library of such tools. This leads us, or should lead us. to some reflections on the limits of statistics. . ' For those not familiar with it, let us pause to review the history of the infamous Super Bowl Indicator, a conception, we hasten to add, not original with us, having been long since remarked by a number of other analysts. The rule states that, if an original National-Football- League team wins the Super Bowl, the market will be up at the time of the subsequent contest, and, if an original American-Football-League team is the winner, the market will be down. Ridiculous, what Yet it has worked in 16 of the past 17 years. Its only failure was in 1970 when the Kansas City Chiefs trounced the Minnesota Vikings, thus forecasting a down market. Even in that year the market collapsed in the first five months and eventually rallied to be only modestly higher the following January. The rule kept the investor out of the 1969 bear market (New York Jets), the 1973-74 debacle (Miami Dolphins) and the 1977 and 1981 bear markets (Oakland Raiders). Now standard statistical testing would tell us the probability of any indicator's achieving such a result by pure random chance is somewhere in the vicinity of one in 1000, yet it is, on a moment's reflection, easy to see how the anonymous discoverer of the Super Bowl Indicator could have come up with it. The answer is that he had an infinite number of candidates for 1he-periecLstock-markeLindicB.tfromwhichto choose. Let us take S20rts alone. He could have tried Worid Seris resuhs, -Stanley Cup winners or left-handed finalists at -Wimbledon Anyone familiar with sports is aware of the multiplicity of statistics which are available to the diligent searcher. Havine- fixed on the Super Bowl, it was even necessary to fudge that one a bit, with the business about original NFL and AFL teams, regardless of their present affiliation. This was necessary to allow for four wins by the Steelers and one by the Colts of the AFC, all followed by good market years. The uncanny accuracy of the indicator is, therefore, easily explicable. When it comes right down to it, however, there is a much more persuasive reason that we should not sell all our stocks today and sit in front of our television sets next January to see if we should buy them back again. The reason for disbelief in the Super Bowl Indicator is that it makes no sense. There is absolutely no rational reason why the results of a sports contest should determine the outlook for the stock market. It is obvious that the two phenom- ena are totally unrelated. All of which leads us, as we promised above, to some remarks on the limitations of sta- tistical analysis. There exists a school of thought, most of our readers are aware, which posits that the stock market is efficient. This suggests, in other words, that all information, known or knowable, is instantaneously reflected in a stock's price and that, therefore, any attempt to achieve superior results via analysis is doomed to failure. It is based on statistical evidence a' great deal more extensive, but certainly no more persuasive than the evidence for the Super Bowl Indicator. A major body of evidence has now accumulated, of course, which refutes large portions of the theory via statistical evidence, but the ultimate reason, we think, for refusing to believe in the efficient market hypothesis is the same as that for skepticism regarding the Super Bowl Indicator. It simply does not make sense. All of us familiar with Wall Street are aware of the fact that an infinite number of decisions are made totally without regard for avail- able information, for reasons that are unrelated to the stock market and for reasons which may often be irrational. There is no justification, once having realized this, for imposing theoretical standards of efficiency on the equity market. The investor is as well advised to forget about these theoretical standards of efficiency as he is to forget about the results of the Super Bowl. AWT rs ANTHONY W. TABELL DELAFIELD, HARVEY, TAB ELL INC. Dow-Jones Industrials (12 00 p.m.) 1228.85 S & P Composite (12 00 p. m. ) 164.05 Cumulative Index (1/26/84) 2049.01 No statement or cpreSSlon of opinion or any other mattcr herein contained Is or Is to be deemed to be, directly or indirectly an oller or the soliCitation 01 an offer to buyor sel! any secunty referred to or mentioned The malter Is presented merely for the converllcnce of the subscnber While we believe the sources 01 our Information to be reliable, we In no way represent or guaranlee the accuracy thereot nor 01 the slalements made herein Any action to be taken by the subscriber should be based on hiS own investigation and Intormatlon Delafield, Harvey, TaooU Inc, as a corporation and Its officers or employees, may now hilve, or may laler take pOSlhons or trades m respect to any securities mentioned In thiS or any tulure Issue and such pOSition may be dillerent from any views now or hereafter epressed In thiS or anyolhet Issue Delafield, Harvey Tabel! Inc which IS regIStered w!lh the SECas an Investment advisor, may give advice to liS Investment adVISOry and othercuslomers Independently of any statements made In thiS or In any other Issue Further Informal Ion on any secunty mentioned herein IS available on request

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Tabell’s Market Letter – February 03, 1984

Tabell’s Market Letter – February 03, 1984

Tabell's Market Letter - February 03, 1984 page 1
Tabell's Market Letter - February 03, 1984 page 2
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I ! TABELL'S MARKET LETTER 909 STATE ROAD, PRINCETON. NEW JERSEY 08540 MEMBER NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE, INC MEMBER NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF SECURITIES DEALERS, INC (609) 9249660 February 3, 1984 Having already, last week, broken the December 15, 1983 low of 1236.79, the Dow-Jones Industrial eI'agontjl1\1.ed.io…l)'0I'k. lower this week, closing on Thursday at 1213.87. – . . . – lenow becomes appiirerft tli.rt 'hie-'usnaf yearen(f rally 'bas7uhitscOurse'i.lbeit r\ot' a .Iong o n e – – recording a high on January 6, of 1286.64, While registering a gain of only 4.03. Since this recent' high a 5. 78 correction has been recorded to date. As readers of this leiter have been made aware, the inability of the market to rally from the December low by 10 or continue the rally into February / March has had long-term bearish, historical implications. As has been previously noted, in years when the December low has been broken, the subsequent trend has been downward two-thirds of the time. This action, however, for the first month of 1984, should not necessarily be cause for concern if viewed from whence we came, that is, August 12, 1982. Since that time the DJIA has gone from a low of 776.92 to a high of 1287.20 on November 29, 1983 or an increase of 65.68 in a period of 375 trading days. While the bull market can certainly be described as mature both in extent and duration, it does not, by hist6rical precedence, need to be over. In this current market environment what new areas of leadership might evolve The illustration on the reverse page shows the performance of the best and worst acting Standard & Poor's groups for the first four weeks in each of the last four years. The year-to-date results of these best and worst per- forming groups are also shown. An initial inspection enables us to draw some obvious observations. On an absolute basis invest- ing from the end of January to year-end in the ten best acting groups when the market has been up for the year (1980, 1982, and 1983) has indeed produced some remarkable results. However, in order to properly measure the performance of these best and worst acting S & P 1 l\jClH,1 loA ';'; groups it is, of course, necessary to measure the '' … p .00 uIN/LU3J GAl NhuSS groups' action to the stock market as a whole. 1();'7S Using the S & P 500 Index as a proxy for te same JA.N 3 11)) 11.5 … 4 5. Zj I time intervals reviewed, we find, on a relative … ., ;, J 1.;5.7. —-basis,tnvg4nteps-in-three-O.lf—-J.,-'C;6i'3O.j4;–3''1 the four years reviewed would have relatively out- c C 20 1;1' 122. 30 -l; n5 performed the S & P 500 Index, 1983 underperform- J j.\ .. 1 1'1,J i. .L 1 5. -, ' ing by the smallest of margins. The same positive .1. , 1,.; ''4!..'t relative performance was found in the ten worst JA' ….t J.Jtj i4i.4 0.2, groups in three of the four years. The major l C ., J , 0 , .; .. 7.003 exception, however,-being 1980 where the ten JJ,. oJ … JJ '64.;4 -0.30 worst groups underperformed the S & P 500 by a factor of five. Therefore. a strategy could have been developed by purchasing the ten best groups after the first month of each year, or by purchasing both the ten best and the ten worst groups for the same period in each of the last four years. This would have resulted in a relatively positive per- formance versus the S & P 500. X CHANGES FROM EC 2. 1983 NAHE PRICE OIU INTEGRATED DOMESTIC 3040.70 HOSPITAL MANAGEMENT COMPANIES 5'1.92 OIL COMPOSITE 285.80 SAVINGS , LOAN COMPANIES 35.33 NATURAL GAS PIPELINES !35.51 COAL BITUHINOUS 316.40 TELEPHONE (NEW) 99.46 DIU CRUDE PRODUCERS 732.00 FERTILIZERS 18.84 BAHI\S(NEW VOR' CITY) 65.41 10 llEST GROUF AVnAGE TO J(jN !S 1981 PF,ICE F.NI\ ; CHANGE 386.40 1 13.4136 60.39 2 9.9599 311.50 38.34 253.62 J 8.9923 8.5197 5 7.6897 339.50 6 7.3009 106. 16 780.60 20.06 7 6.7364 6.6393 9 6.4756 69.63 10 6.4516 8.21790 CONTAINER PAPER 444.50 415.30 .S -6.5692 COPPER 56.07 2.37 .6 -6.5989 COMMUNICATION EOUIP/HFF.S 39.72 36.92 .7 -7.09 .e RETAIL STORES COHOSITE 159.16 147.60 ——7.2631 BROII.ERAGE FIRMS 52.S! 48.57 .9 -7.5209 GENERAL HEKCHANOISE CHAINS 13.74 12.61 90 -8.2242 RETAIL STORES DEPARTMENT 342.50 314.30 91 -8.2336 TRUCHRS 19.25 174.63 92 -100100' TEXTILE APPAREl HFRS. 78.28 67.80 9J -13.3878 POLLUTION CONTROL 64.87 54.69 9. -15.6929 10 WOfoST GKOUP AVERf'lIOE -9.0604 If we were going to incorporate this same strategy for 1984 we can now identify above the ten best and worst groups for the first four weeks in January. It is interesting to note the concentration of the energy sector in the ten best groups and the representation of the retail/consumer area in the ten worst groups. It is very possible these ten best and worst groups could relatively outperform the market in 1984. RJS rs Dow-Jones Industrials (12 00 p. m.) S & P Composite (1200 p.m.) Cumulative Index (2/2/84) 1214.30 163.93 2015.76 ROBERT J. SIMPKINS. JR. DELAFIELD, HARVEY, TABELL INC. No statement or e)rpresslon 01 opinion or any other matter herem contained IS or IS to be deemoo to be directly Of mdlrectiy, an offer or the solicltatlo'l of an offer to buyor sell any secunty referred to or mentIOned The matter IS presented merely for the conveOlence of the subscflber While we believe the sources of our mformatron to be reliable, we In noway represent or guar8ntee the accuracy thereof nor ot the statements made herem Any aCllon to be taken by the subscnber should be based on hiS own investigation and Information Delafield, Harvey, Tabell Inc, as a corporatIOn and liS officerS Or employees, may now have or may later take, poSitions or trades m respect to any secunhes mentioned In thiS or any future Issue and such pOSition may be dIfferent from any views now Of heleaftor eApressed In this Of any other Issue Delafreld, Harvey Tabell Inc, which IS registered With the SEC as an Investment adVisor, maygwe advice to Its Inveslment adVISOry and othol customers Independently of any statements made In thiS or In anyolher Issue Further mfOlmallon on any security menhoroed herein Is available on requesl .0— —–;– -. Z CHANGES FROM DEC 26 1979 NAME COPPER BRO!l.ERAGE FIRMS AEROSPACE METALS MISCELLANEOUS ALUMINUM GOLD MACHINE TOOLS OIU INTEGRATED DOMESTIC STEEL MULTI-LINE INSURANCE SOFT DRIN!l.S TOBACCO COSMETICS TEXTILE APPAREL MFRS. RETAIL STORES COMPOSITE GAMING COMPANIES GENERAL MERCHANDISE CHAINS PERSONAL LOANS AGRICULTURAL MACHINERY SAVINGS & LOAN COMPANIES PRICE 39.80 11 .42 138.t 5 76.17 120.43 172.30 106.00 264.60 39.40 17.86 TO JAN 23 1980 PRICE RANK 51.45 1 14.53 2 171.90 3 91.50 4 143.01 S 201.80 6 123.96 298.90 44.10 ,7 a 19.95 10 10 BEST GROUP AVERAGE CHANGE 29.2714 27.2329 24.43.00 20.1260 18.7495 1701213 16.9434 12.9630 11.9289 11.7021 TO DEC 31 PRICE 47.00 25.10 210.60 106.84 150.48 321.40 164.27 445.20 49.41 20.35 1980 CHANGE 18.0905 119.7900 52.4430 40.2652 24.9523 86.5351 54.9717 68.2540 25.4061 13.9418 19.04690 SO.46490 94.98 84.83 54.64 44.09 73.83 17.6-4 6.84 B6.73 78.64 28.49 92.58 82.66 53.05 42.64 70.93 16.68 6.34 79.45 71.71 2S.SS 10 WORST GROUP AVERAGE as -2.5269 96.73 1.8425 a6 -2.5581 107.95 27. 2545 a7 -2.9100 55.92 2.3426 .,aa -3.2887 49.52 12.3157 a9 -3.9279 68.72 -6.9213 90 -5.4422 12.83 -27.2676 -7.3099 5.65 -17.3977 .2 -9.3939 73.74 -14.9775 '3 -8.8123 -10.3194 79.20 0.7121 24.97 -12.3S52 -5;S4892 -3.44518 ; CHANGES FROM DEC 31 1980 ,NAME AIR TRANSPORT BEVERAGES BREWERS RESTAURANTS TRUCKERS TEXTILE APPAREL MFRS. CANADIAN OIL & GAS SHOES CHEMICALS AUTO PARTS-AFTER MARKET INVESTMENT COS.ROND FUNDS) AGRICULTURAL MACHINERY 9ROKERAGE FIRMS METALS MISCELLANEOUS OFFSHORE IRILLING SAVINGS & LOAN COMPANIES HOTEL/MOTEL AEf\OSPI\CE GOlli GAMING COMPANIES INVESTMEH COMPANIES — ….. – CHANGES FROM DEC 30 1981 NAME EXCLUDING GEN. MOTORS COMPUTER' BUS. EOUIP. LEISURE TIME ENTERTAINMENT SOAPS ELECTRONIC MAJOR COS. INVESTMENT COS.(BOND FUNDS) ELECTRONICS-INSTRUMENTATION GENERAL MERCHANDISE CHAINS ELECTRIC COMPANIES PRICE 40.97 38.74 33.23 83.88 49.52 22.48 60.31 61.55 14.81 7.26 TO JAN 28 1981 PRICE RANK 45.91 42.53 2 35.94 88.97 52.36 3 S 23.71 6 63.51 64.71 15.36 7 9 7.48 10 10 BEST GROUP AVERAGE X CHANGE 12.0576 9.7832 8olSS3 6.0682 5.7351 5.4715 5.3059 5.1340 3.7137 3.0303 TO DEC 30 1981 PRICE Z CHANGE 38.30 -6.5170 47.62 22.9220 41.83 25.8802 100.13 19.3729 41.16 -16.8821 21.73 -3.3363 65.48 8.5724 56012 -8.8221 15.47 4.4565 6.97 -3.995 6.44548 4.16521 79.20 25.10 106.84 215.35 24.97 74.07 210.60 321.40 12.83 72.34 70.75 22.18 94.14 189.68 21.94 64.49 181.50 274.50 10.87 60.87 10 WORST GROUP AVERAGE .s -10.6692 .6 -11.6335 a7 -11. 8869 aa -11.9201 .,a9 -12.1346 90 -12.9472 -13.8177 .2 -14.5924 .3 -15.2767 -15.8557 -13.07340 49.20 30.59 109.47 201.35 18.83 70.06 134.49 235.90 11.99 60.90 -37.8788 21.8725 2.4616 -6.5011 -24.5895 -5.4138 -36.1396 .-26.6024 -6.5472 -15.8142 -13.51520 PRICE 9.78 97.30 76.19 290.80 156.79 92.02 6.97 43.12 5.74 29.41 TO JAN 27 1982 PRICE RANK 10.73 1 102.50 2 79.21 300.30 161.24 94.35 7.08 43.59 5.80 3 5 7 ,a 29.67 10 10 BEST GROUP AVERAGE X CHANGE 9.7137 5.3'1-43 3.9638 3.3356 2.8382 2.5321 1.5782 1.0900 1.0453 0.8841 TO DEC 29 1982 PRICE X CHANGE 26.49 170.8590 146.10 50.1542 76.29 0.1313 281.60 -3.1637 223.69 42.6685 151.56 64.7033 8.47 21.5208 70.66 63.8683 10.47 82.4042 36.21 23.1214 3.23252 51.62670 FOREST PRODUCTS COAL BITUMINOUS RAILROAD EQUIPMENT INVESTMENT COMPANIES OIL INTEGRATED DOMESTIC TRUCKERS GOLD SAVINGS , LOAN COMPANIES OFFSHORE DRILLING CANADIAN OIL , GAS 19.76 395.20 78.08 60.90 341. 30 100.13 235.90 18.83 201.35 21.73 17.14 340.50 67.17 52.33 291. 50 85.12 195.40 15.17 162.03 17.38 10 WORST GROUP AVERAGE as -13.2591 a6 -13.8411 a7 -13.9728 .,aa -14.0723 a9 -14.5913 90 -14.9905 -1701683 .2 -19.4371 93 -19.5282 -20.0184 -16.08790 24.86 274.90 75.67 72.58 274.70 139.93 333.60 34.14 111.87 15.56 25.8097 -30.4403 -3.0866 19.1790 -19.5136 39.7483 41.4159 81.3064 -44.4400 -28.3939 8.15849 t CHANGES FROM DEC 29 1982 NAME MACHINE TOOLS GOLD ELECTRONICS (SEMICONDUCTORS/COMPON EXCLUDING I.EI.M METALS MISCELLANEOUS FERTILIZERS COPPER MACHINERY INDUSTRIAL/SPECIALTY OIL CRUDE PRODUCERS TRUCKERS —— PRICE 151.33 333.60 38.12 261.70 105.74 12.85 58.76 133.74 528.10 139.93 TO JAN 26 1983 PRICE RANK 173.50 1 375.90 2 42.18 285.50 114.81 3 S 13.93 6 63.43 7 144.05 568.60 150.10 a 10 10 BEST GROUP AVERAGE CHANGE 14.6501 12.6799 10.6506 9.0944 8.5776 8.4047 7.9476 7.7090 7.6690 7.2679 9.46507 TO DEC 2a 1983 PRICE CHANGE 205.63 35.8818 313.90 -5.9053 59.28 55.5089 300.80 14.9408 130.17 23.1038 18.84 46.6148 56.07 -4.5779 159.73 19.4332 732.00 38.6101 194.25 38.8194 26.24300 SHOES AUTOMOBILE HOSPITAL MANAGEMENT COMPANIES PUfiLISHING (NEWSPAPERS) AUTO PARTS-AFTER MARKET TIRES & RUltBER PROPERTY-CASUALITY INSURANCE HOME BUILDING PERSONAL LOANS SAVINGS I LOAN COMPANIES 106.99 78.36 62.71 57.10 22.65 222.15 170.76 48.34 95.93 34.14 98.92 72.41 57.71 52.50 20.74 201.68 154.41 42.22 82.37 !8.84 10 WORST GROUP AVERAGE as -7.5428 a6 -7.5932 a7 -7.9732 aa -8.0560 a9 -8.4327 .,'0 -9.2145 -9.5748 .2 -12.6603 .3 -1401353 94 -15.5243 -10.07070 112.12 101.42 54.92 64.72 23.79 210.41 183.17 47.77 126.41 35.33 4.7948 29.4283 -12.4223 13.3450 5.0331 -5.2847 7.2675 -1.1792 31.7732 3.4857 7.62114 – – —

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Tabell’s Market Letter – February 10, 1984

Tabell’s Market Letter – February 10, 1984

Tabell's Market Letter - February 10, 1984 page 1
Tabell's Market Letter - February 10, 1984 page 2
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r——-j———————————————————————————————— TABELL'S MARKET LETTER 909 STATE ROAD. PRINCETON, NEW JERSEY 08540 MEMBER NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE, INC MEMBER NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF SECURITIES DEALERS, INC (609) 9249660 February 10. 1984 , The stock market. as measured by the Dow-Jones Industrial Average, continued downard this week – closing ata.l!wof1l52 .7 on.Thurs'!!lY ,,,,This. sharp decline. oLappr9ximately 134p-oint–.fr,o,m .the. Janu;. ary 6th high of 1286.64 represents a 10.41 decline to date.- This corrctiorl'has occurrecl. in theshert time span of 25 trading days currently reflecting a relahvely sharp. oversold condition. One of the technical tools we have used to measure the long-term oversold condition of the market is the Short Term Trading Index (TRIN). This index is a correlation of the ratio of advances to declines to the ratio of advancing volume to declining volume. In other words, whether changes in the relationship of advances and declines are taking place faster or slower than changes in the general volume movement of the market. The ratio is computed as follows (advances/declines) /(advancing volume/declining volume). The chart on the reverse page shows a ten-day moving average of the Short Term Trading Index of the New York Stock Exchange from May. 1964 to date. As can be seen from the chart, the ten-day moving average tends to smooth the wild daily gyrations of the TRIN. Historically, when the ten-day average of the TRIN reaches a figure of 1. 5, indicated by the dotted line, a major buy signal is indi- cated. There have been five such signals since May, 1964. They occured on October, 1966, May, 1970, December, 1974, March, 1980, and August, 1982. Underlined in the exhibit below, the average gain from these five signals was in excess of 25 before a minor correction of 5 occurred. Obviously, the market in some of these instances. after a minor correction of at least 5. resumed its upward movement the most recent example, August, 1982 has advanced from a total of 65.68. OATES OF SINGLt DAY STTI ) 2.5 DATE STTI OJIA JUN 24 1965 2.82 857.76 OCT 3 1966 2.99 757.96 MAR 14 1968 3.16 830.91 MAY 4 1970 3.50 714.56 MAY 26 1970 2.64 631.16 I..,.-If….-'MSAERP 28 1974 27-1974 22.5841 854.35 -621.95 sua SEQUENT LOW DATE LENGTH CHG JUN 28 1965 2 2.00 OCT 7 1966 4 1.80 MAR 21 1966 5 0.70 MAY 26 1970 16 11.67 MAY 26 1970 0 0.00 MAT 29 1974 OCT 4 IJ74 42 5 6.90 6'.01- NEXT RALLY DJIA LENGTH tCHG 840.59 157 18.4 744.32 145 22.2 825.13 73 11.9 631.16 18 14.1 631.1, 18 14.1 795.37 8 8.1 584.56 – 6 n7z-,,,—I- NOV 18 1974 OEC 2 1974 AUG 19 1976 UCT 14 1976 OCT 31 1978 MAY 7 1979 OCT 9 1979 MAR 24 1980 OEC 8 1980 AUG 24 1981 JAN 5 1982 AU 4 1982 OCT 25 1982 FEB 8 1.84 4.25 2.74 2.59 2.06 2.55 3.06 3.17 3.93 2.86 3.67 4.10 2.69 4.45 2.78 624.92 603.0L 983.80 935.92 7.2.45 833.42 857.59 755.44 933.70 900.11 865.30 803.46 995.13 1156.30 OEC 6 1974 DEC 6 1.74 AUG 26 1976 NOV 10 1976 NOY 14 1978 JUN 1 1979 NOY 7 1979 MAR 27 1980 DEC 11 19O SEP 25 1981 MAR 8 1982 AUG 12 1982 NOY 23 1382 AYERAGE 13 4 5 18 10 18 21 3 3 23 43 6 21 13 7.57 4.22 2.38 1.27 0.91 1.47 7.10 0.71 2.70 8.45 8.07 3.30 0.42 3.88 577.60 577.6D 960.44 924.04 785.25 821.21 796.61 759.9 908.45 824.01 795.41 776.92 990.9 68 36.2 68 36.2 17 5.7 35 8.7 50 9.5 88 9.3 67 13.5 123 28.2 16 10.6 9 6., 43 9.3 58 37.1 9 6.7 53 16.1 On Wednesday, daily TRIN closed at 2.78. Although not as conclusive as the above statistics, in- spection of single days when climax selling is in eVIdence, i.e., a high TRIN. provides us with some interesting observations on the behavior of the market. Our colleague, Kenneth Tower developed the above exhbit which shows every instance since May, 1964 when the TRIN closed above 2.50 together with the performance of the market after these levels were reached. To date, there have been 21 such obser- vations. These are marked on the chart on the reverse page at the time they occurred on the DJIA. From these high TRIN levels the market reached a subsequent low. The date, length, and percentage change of these corrections are recorded. This is then followed by a rally measuring the length and ex- tenLof the market until a 5 correction occurs. What conclusions can be drawn from this exercise It becomes clear that the TRIN can reach high levels in both bull and bear markets. However, rallies from major-market lows .. like those mentioned earlier J tend to outperform the other signals. The average decline of the 20 observations after high, single-day TRIN occur is 3.88 occurring in an average time of 13 trading days. By applying these figures to our current market, the following scenario could be developed. Assuming we are in a correct- ion phase within a major bull market, it would be logical from the above evidence to expect a short-term rally from this oversold condition to begin shortly. ThIS rally should occur within two weeks and with- in 4 of current levels. Again, using the above exhibit, an average 16 rally could carry the averages from current levels probably into overhead supply in the high 1200 area or even into new high territory, completing the rally some time in early spring. It will be interesting, indeed, to see if and how this scenario develops. RJS rs ROBERT J. SIMPKINS, JR. DELAFIELD, HARVEY, TAB ELL INC. Dow-Jones Industrials (1200 p.m.) S & P Composite (1200 p.m.) Cumulative Index (2/9/84) 1159.76 156.14 1937.69 No slatement or cxprSlon of Opinion or any other matter herem conlamed IS, or IS to be deemed to be, directly or Indirectly, an offer or the solicitation of an offer to buy Of sell any security releHed 10 or menhoned The maltcr IS presented merely for Inc convenience of the subSCriber White we believe the sources 01 our Informatton to be reliable, we 10 no way represent or guarantee the accuracy thereof nOf of the statements made herem Any acllon 10 be tlken by the subscriber should be based on hiS own Investigation and Information Delafield, Harvey, Tabelt Inc. as a corporatIOn and Its officers or employees, may now have or may later take poSlllons or \fades Ifl respect to any secunt1es mentioned In thIS or any future Issue, and such pOSIUon may be different from any ViewS now or hereafter ewpressed In thiS or any other Issue Delafield, Harvey labelt Inc which IS registered With the SEC as an invostmentadvlsor, may give advice 10 lIS Investment adVISOry and other customers Independently of any slalf'ments made In thiS or In any other Issue Further information on any security mentioned herein IS available on request ,,

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Tabell’s Market Letter – February 17, 1984

Tabell’s Market Letter – February 17, 1984

Tabell's Market Letter - February 17, 1984
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— TABELL'S MARKET LETTER 909 STATE ROAD, PRINCETON, NEW JERSEY 08540 , MEMBER NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE, INC MEMBER NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF SECURITIES DEALERS. INC (609) 924-9660 February 17, 1984 Years ago Lyndon Johnson used to ask if there was such a thing as a one-armed economist be….. – 'cause- he' cold never-ask' a' quest-ion-con;l!;'r!,lngAheconomy withouta .replyincludip gthe .pl1r!!s'm…. the other hand. Recently, market technicians seem to be guilty of the 'same -type -of 'response -when — – — asked to comment on the current condition of the stock market. In order not to be guilty of such an accusation, it is perhaps worthwhile stepping back and trying to reassess the longer-term picture of the stock market. The chart below attempts to do this. It shows our interpretation of what constitute the major swings in the S & P 500 from June, 1949 to date. It is drawn to scale both hOrizontally and vertically with the vertical scale being logarithmic so that equal percentage charges show up as equal vertical distances. The horizontal scale is based on trading days and covers some 8805 days ending at the recent February 13 closing low. \II, 1953 MAJOR MARKET 5WfNGS – 5&P sao 1177 OATS JUNE 19119 – DATE 1080 DRlS 1101 DRlS The length of each completed cycle in days is shown at the bottom of the chart, the cycles being measured from low to low. The consistent length of the swings to date is quite interesting and explains the popular, if not quite exact, concept of the four-year cycle, there being approximately 1020 trading days in a four-year period. Most analysts would agree, we think, with the interpretations shown on the chart through 1982. For the most recent period, not surprisingly, all the evidence is not yet available. We have chosen the date August 12, 1982 as the end of a completed cycle, 1122 trading days in , length. 0 This is somewhat longer than the others but not out of'line when contrasted with the experience – of the entire century. If our interpretation is correct, the new major cycle which began on August 12, 1982 is now only 381 trading days old. As the chart shows, this is barely over one-third of its expect- ed length of 1053 days based on the average of all the completed cycles shown. To our mind, the crucial issue is interpreting the cycle which we date as beginning less than two years ago. As the chart quite clearly shows, the four cycles through 1966 spent the bulk of their time in advancing phases. The four completed cycles since have tended to peak around the middle of their term. If the current cycle follows the pattern of those four recent ones, an imminent or even past peak is a logical expectation. If, on the other hand, it conforms to the earlier cycles and spends the bulk of its life in an advancing phase, a great deal more room lXmn. on the upside. We, therefore, intend to try to dissect this cycle further next week. RJSrs Dow-Jones Industrials (12 00 p. m.) 1159.55 S & P Composite (1200 p.m.) 156.26 Cumulative Index (2/16/84) 1928.47 ROBERT J. SIMPKINS, JR. DELAFIELD, HARVEY, TAB ELL INC. No statement or expression of opinion or any other matler herein conlalned IS or IS to be deemed to be, directly or Indirectly an oller Or the soliCitation of an offer to buy or sell an secunly referred 10 or menlloned The mailer IS presented merely for the convenience of the subscriber While we beheve fhe sources of our Information to be reliable, we In no way represent or guarantee the accuracy thereof norof tM statements made herem Any action to be taken bytne sUOscnbershould be based on tliS own Investlga/ion and Information Delafield, Harvey, Tabel( Inc, a; a Corporation and Its officers or employees may now have 01 may later take, poSitrons or trades In respect to any seCUrities mentioned In thiS or any luture Issue, and such posItion may be dlllerent from any Iews nOwor heleafter e)'pressed In this or any other Issue Delafield, Harve, Ta1I tnc which IS regIstered With the SEC as an mvestmen! adVisor, may glveadvrce to lIS Investment adVISOry and other customers Independenlly ot any statements made In thiS or m any other Issue Further mformalion on any security mentioned herem IS avaltable on request

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Tabell’s Market Letter – February 24, 1984

Tabell’s Market Letter – February 24, 1984

Tabell's Market Letter - February 24, 1984
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TABELL'S MARKET LETTER 909 STATE ROAD, PRINCETON, NEW JERSEY 08540 MEMBER NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE, INC MEMBER NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF SECURITIES DEALERS, INC (609) 924-9660 r— February 24, 1984 In this space last week, we examined the record of eight major stock-market cycles from June, 1949 to date and attempted to justify the contention that a new cycle did, in fact, begin on August 12, – – 198-2.-T-he–purpoe–Ofhis-week!8 ..Jetter .. willbe–toexamine .. ourinterpr..etation…oJ.these-4-psteight.Lcycles……–. -in greater detail relative to the new emerging cycle which we feel began'a year' and one-half ago. The chart below shows the recent cycle with the major component swings in the S & P 500 from August 12. 1982 to date. Using a 10 filter, the high and low points are drawn to a uniform horizontal scale. The other data on the chart attempts to place in perspective the present cycle compared to the previous eight cycles discussed, The horizontal lines drawn through the upper part of the chart shows the length in trading days in each of the previous eight cycles. ClCLE PERIOD LOW-HIGH RDVRNCE PERK Cfelt DRIE JUN 1949-SEP 1953 5EP 1953-0CT 1957 OCT 1957-JUN 1962 JUN I962-0CT 1966 OCT 1966-MRr 1970 MAr 1970-0CT 1974 OCT 1974-HAR 1978 MRR 1978-RUG 1982 196.751 JRN 1953 1119.021 AUG 1956 186.351 OEC 1961 179.781 , FE8 1966 148.051 NOV 1968 173.531 , JAN 1973 173.141 , 5EP 1976 161.701 NOV 1980 ..1.Il 172.65 OCT 1 1983 ..l2O. ..lSO. I- .571 — …l.'Ill ..l3ll ..l2O. — – 1 .571 F.EB 198Y – 15268 – — – -SEM MRR lIh OCT 1966 OCT JUN 1962 AUG 19B2.. ..1.lll AU 1982 .42 .J!lL MRr 19.Z(L OCT 1!l1l1. A comparison of the length of these lines to the current cycle obviously shows that each cycle has lasted a considerably longer period of time. Even were the present cycle to duplicate the short lengths of the 1966-70 or 1974-78 periods, there could still be well over two years remaining in the new cycle. Cycles are measured from low point to low point and a key question is whether the high of October 10, 1983 constituted the peak for the current cycle. The relative times of the previous cycle peaks again drawn to scale on the chart, are indicated by date and shown by the vertical tick marks on each of the cycle lengths. Once more, it becomes apparent from the evidence presented in terms of relative length of time from cycle low to cycle peak that a possible further high could still be achieved. However, also shown on each cycle length is the percentage increase from cycle low to cycle peak. The recent percentage increase of the S & P 500 from a cycle low to cycle peak is 68.57. This increase, although low in terms of the average advance of approximately 80 for the eight cycles e- has, -in fact, exceeded two previous periods;- 1966-70 and 1978-82.. – The market is at a critical stage and there are important questions to be resolved. Because of the short length of time from August. 1982 to date, cycle analysis at this time would describe the current decline in the market as an intermediate-term correction in an ongoing bull market. Can we pinpoint the level of the next low as a normal downward phase of a typical four-year stock-rnarket cycle To date, the decline (11.57) has not approached relative levels of previous lows based on percentage declines from their previous respective highs. These comparable figures are indicated on the lower right-hand side of the above chart. We know the market is oversold on a short-term basis and conceivably could be near or at an effective low. Can a subsequent rally carryon to new peaks and thus represent a continuation of the cycle The next few weeks should give us a clue to the above questions. Dow-Jones Irrdustrials (1200 p.m.) 1144.05 S 8; P Composite (12'00 p.m.) 155.19 Cumulative Index (2/23/84) 1896.26 ROBERT J. SIMPKINS, JR DELAFIELD, HARVEY, TABELL INC. No statemont or expression of otunlon or any olher mailer herein conlalned IS, or IS 10 be deemed 10 be directly or Inchrectly, an oller Of the sohCltalton of an ofter to buyor soli any secunty rctened to 01 montlOned The matter IS presented merely tOI the convenlenceot thesuhscnber While we beheve the sources 01 our informatIOn to be reliable, we In no way represent Of guarantee the accuracy thereot nor of the statements made herem Any action to be taken by the Subscllber should be based on hiS own mvest'gal,on and mformallon Dela/leld Harvey, Tabell Inc, as a corporatIOn and 1\5 ollicers or employees, may now have, or may lalertake poSitions or trades In respect 10 any secullltcs mentioned In thiS or any tUlure Issue, and such pOslt1On may be dillerent from any views now or helealte! expressed InthlS or any other Issue OelaftCtd Harvey, Taban Inc which IS reglsteredwlh the SEC as an Investmenl adVisor may give advice to Its mll(lSlment adVISOry and other customers Independently 01 any statements made In thiS or In any other Issue Further mformatlon on any secullty mentioned herein IS avallabte on reQuest -!

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Tabell’s Market Letter – March 02, 1984

Tabell’s Market Letter – March 02, 1984

Tabell's Market Letter - March 02, 1984
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TABELL'S MARKET LETTER 909 STATE ROAD, PRINCETON, NEW JERSEY 08540 MEMBER NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE, INC MEMBER NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF SECURITIES DEALERS, INC (609) 9249660 March 2, 1984 Announcements from the government concerning one of the most stunning economic turnarounds in U. S. history on the one hand. and the widening federal budget defIcit on the other. begin to sound to – u s .. like Tlnewspeak t he-'official…J.anguageof Oceanic.. devised-py ,,-George JO rwellsome-35-,-years ,.ago ;In–..his novel,' 1984. -Orwell coined ,the termtrdoublethin'kn 'the power of holding two contrailictory beliefs in ones mind Simultaneously and accepting both of them. This brings us to the current 1984 stock market. We have argued in this letter and still support the thesis that the recent decline of 11. 89 to date in the DJIA from its November, 1983 high of 1287.20 represents an intermediate-term correction in 8 bull market. At the same time. however. the weakness in the Over-the-Counter sector has clearly been sIgnificantly greater. The NASDAQ industrial index peaked prior to the DJIA on June 24. 1983 at 408.40 closing last week at 278.50. This represents a 31. 81 decline. reaching full-scale bear market proportions by any measure. The chart below, utIlizIng a semi-log scale. attempts to place this decline into longer-term perspective. The two upper lines are the DJIA and the NASDAQ industrial index. The lower line is the ratIo of the two which move upward when OTe issues are outperforming the Dow and vice versa. DOW ,IONlS INOUSIRIRL RVlRPGl 00 Oft/OIlR With minor interruptions the OTe IDJIA ratio has bascially reflected an uninterrupted bull market from the mid-1970's through April. 1981 at which point the OTC index together with the DJIA declined. The spectacular advance in the overall market from the August. 1982 low to June, 1983 brought the ratio to a new peak. The NASDAQ industrial index, for example, increased 129.83 which is 1. 5 times greater than any previous advance in this index. Since then, a significant divergence has occurred. While the DJIA moved on to slightly higher levels before its recent correction from November, 1983. the aTe sector simply collapsed. There have been greater percentage declines in the OTe index such as the periods ending October, 1974 (-39.62) and August. 1982 (-35.31). Measured by the ratio. however, the dechne is now greater than any of the previous periods discussed and could even test the 1982 lows on a relative basis. As unlikely as this seems, further deterioration of the long-term OTC sector could be possible within the confines of an ongoing bull market. Remember, this is 1984 and doublethink would allow us to accept two contradictory events happming at the same time. RJS rs Dow-Jones Industrials (1200 p.m.) 1171. 59 S & P Composite (1200 p.m.) 159.43 Cumulative Index (3/1/84) 1948.63 ROBERT J. SIMPKINS. JR. DELAFIELD, HARVEY, TABELL INC. No statement or expresSion of opinion or any other matter hereIn contained IS, or IS to be deemed 10 be, directly or indirectly, an offer or the soliCitation of an offer to buyor sell any secunty referred to or mentioned The mal1er IS prcsented merely forthe convenlenceot the subscriber While we believe the sources of our Information to be reliable, weln no way represent orguaranleethe accuracy thereof nor of the Statements made herein Any action to be taken by the subscriber Should be based on hiS own InveStigation and Inlormatlon Delafield, Harvey, labell Inc, as a corporation and Its officers or employees, may now have, or mav later taye POSitions or trades In respect to any seCUrities mentioned In thiS or any luture Issue, and such positIOn may be different from any views nower hereafter e)(pressed In this or any other Issue Oelafleld, Harvey labell Inc which IS registered With the SEC as an Investment adVisor, may give adVice to Its Investment adVISOry and other customers Independently of any statements made In thiS or In any other ISSue Further Information on any security mentioned herem IS available on reQuest

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Tabell’s Market Letter – March 09, 1984

Tabell’s Market Letter – March 09, 1984

Tabell's Market Letter - March 09, 1984 page 1
Tabell's Market Letter - March 09, 1984 page 2
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TABELL'S MARKET LETTER 909 STATE ROAD, PRINCETON, NEW JERSEY 08540 MEMBER NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE, INC MEMBER NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF SECURITIES DEALERS, INC (609) 9249660 March 9, 1984 The JlewS.or1!.Stock .lixcl1/tTlge .l'Iill.sh2Jty release rnontIDyi!gure.Jor Februaryn tl1eXSE firms carrying customers' stock margin accounts which should' show continual expansionof the NYSE margin debt. Since these figures have been avsilable, debit balances of margin accounts in aggregate terms have generally moved in the same direction as stock prices but at a more exaggerated rate. The single exception is the period from the 1976 high to the 1978 low on the DJIA, when margin debt increased with minor interruptions to new highs through June, 1981. This correlation with the long-term trend of the market can be clearly seen from the chart on the opposite side. Margin customers of NYSE member firms increased their margin debt in January by 150 million to 22.87 billion, the largest monthly figure recorded to date since the start of the present series which began in 1965. The New York Stock Exchange also reported the number of stock margin accounts in a debit status to be at an all-time new high level of 840,000. This, in spite of a recent decline of 11.85 perc'ent from the January high of 1286.64 on the DJIA, and the high cost of broker loans to finance stock purchases, is indeed remarkable. It now becomes apparent, during the rise in the stock market from the fall of 1982 to date, that margin debt provided for the individual investor an accessible source of new funds for investing which he clearly utilized. This can be seen on the chart on the reverse side. From September,1982, margin debt rose from 10.950 billion to 22.870 billion in January, 1984, more than doubling in the short period of sixteen months. EXHIBIT Margin Debt (mil) Total Market Value Percentage Date Dow-Jones June, 1968 High 6690 641037 1.043 11/29/68 985.08 J.ulyc, 9.7.0.Low .. o. 37.80….,,-53107,7-'.'.''–.U2;f5-J/'lJil2JJ -!.6!.JI1—- ;,. Dec., 1972 High 7900 872000 .906 1/11/73 1051.70 Dec., 1974 Low 3910 511054 .765 12/6/74 577.60 June, 1981 High 14870 1224000 1.215 4/27/81 1024.05 Sept., 1982 Low 10950 1120000 .978 8/12/82 776.92 Jan., 1984 High 22870 1605000 1.425 11/29/83 1287.20 In the exhibit above we try to put these figures in perspective. This is done by analyzing the customers' stock market debt compared to the total market value of equities listed on the NYSE. Treated as a ratio the historical parameters are instructive. From 1965 to date the range of the percentage of margin debt to total NYSE market value has been 1. 53 percent high in October, 1978 and .597 percent low in January, 1971. The observations seem to conclude the higher percentage of margin debt to market value, the higher the averages, and, conversely, the lower the percentage the lower the averages. It is interesting that the current ratio has increased sharply and is now at the highest level since 1978, 1. 425 percent. From these studies recent history tells us that the current position of margin debt, although high on an absolute basis, is not unusual or necessarily bearish. The major question to be resolved is will the market behave like the June, 1981 period when margin debt peaked out after a market high was reached a few months earlier, like previous periods such as June, 1968 and December, 1972 when the margin debt figures peaked out prior to a market top, or like the 1976-1978 period and increase to new highs without a correction. A subset of figures released by the NYSE concerning margin debt is the customers carrying margin accounts under 40 percent equity. In simplest terms this tries to measure the quality of credit. This figure currently equals 10 percent of the total margin accounts. Taken by itself is fine, DUt this data represents an alarming 43 percent of the total margin debt, a figure in excess of 9.78 billion. This means the quality of margin continues to gradually deteriorate. Although there have been few margin calls to date, it should be remembered that in the fall of 1974 this ratio reached a high of 23 percent, a series record, representing 58 percent of total margin debt. At those levels, it was thought to have triggered the decline in 1974. We should, therefore, continue to pay close attention to the current margin debt statistics, as they could provide an important clue to the future behavior of the stock market. RJSlt ROBERT J. SIMPKINS, JR. DELAFIELD, HARVEY, TABELL INC. Dow-Jones Industrials (1200 p.m.) 1136.61 S & P Composite (1200 p.m.) 154.23 Cumulative Index (3/8/84) 1929.84 -,/ No statement or expresSion of opinion or any otner matter herein contained,s or IS to be deemed to be, directly or indirectly an oller or the soliCItation of an offer to buyor sell any security relerred to or mentioned Tho malter IS presented merely for tht' convenience of the subSCriber While we oclleve Ihe sources of our information to be reliable we In no way represent Of guarantee the accuracy thereof norolthe statements made herein Any acllon 10 be taken by the subSCriber should be based on hiS own Investigation and Information Delafuld, Harvey, TaOOll Inc, as a corporation and I\S officers or employees, may now have, or may laler lake, posItions or trades In respecllo any secunlles menhoned In thiS or any future Issue, and such posH Ion may be different from any views nowor heleafler e;opressed In thiS or any other Issue Delafield Harvey. Tabell Inc which IS registered With the SECas an Investment advisor, may give adVice 10 115 InveStment adVISOry and other customers Independently of any statementS made In thiS or In any other Issue Further mformatlon on any security mentioned herem IS avallabte on request ,–,,–.-,,-,–.-.,-,–,,–.–.'-.–.-r1300 1200 1100 1000 900 800 700 WL-L L-L————-600 11 17 1G 15 14 13 12 11 10 -9 8 7 6 5 I (SC I Il3. 119G8 11969-'7119N70m-11971-'11972-r11.973'-11 g74–11975–11T97G.n1H-l77-IH1778 Nm11-979 !J1B9T80 I1I 1198.1 -1198,2 -1198-3 -1984 3 I ,, .;;,

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