Viewing Month: March 1984

Tabell’s Market Letter – March 02, 1984

Tabell’s Market Letter – March 02, 1984

Tabell's Market Letter - March 02, 1984
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TABELL'S MARKET LETTER 909 STATE ROAD, PRINCETON, NEW JERSEY 08540 MEMBER NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE, INC MEMBER NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF SECURITIES DEALERS, INC (609) 9249660 March 2, 1984 Announcements from the government concerning one of the most stunning economic turnarounds in U. S. history on the one hand. and the widening federal budget defIcit on the other. begin to sound to – u s .. like Tlnewspeak t he-'official…J.anguageof Oceanic.. devised-py ,,-George JO rwellsome-35-,-years ,.ago ;In–..his novel,' 1984. -Orwell coined ,the termtrdoublethin'kn 'the power of holding two contrailictory beliefs in ones mind Simultaneously and accepting both of them. This brings us to the current 1984 stock market. We have argued in this letter and still support the thesis that the recent decline of 11. 89 to date in the DJIA from its November, 1983 high of 1287.20 represents an intermediate-term correction in 8 bull market. At the same time. however. the weakness in the Over-the-Counter sector has clearly been sIgnificantly greater. The NASDAQ industrial index peaked prior to the DJIA on June 24. 1983 at 408.40 closing last week at 278.50. This represents a 31. 81 decline. reaching full-scale bear market proportions by any measure. The chart below, utIlizIng a semi-log scale. attempts to place this decline into longer-term perspective. The two upper lines are the DJIA and the NASDAQ industrial index. The lower line is the ratIo of the two which move upward when OTe issues are outperforming the Dow and vice versa. DOW ,IONlS INOUSIRIRL RVlRPGl 00 Oft/OIlR With minor interruptions the OTe IDJIA ratio has bascially reflected an uninterrupted bull market from the mid-1970's through April. 1981 at which point the OTC index together with the DJIA declined. The spectacular advance in the overall market from the August. 1982 low to June, 1983 brought the ratio to a new peak. The NASDAQ industrial index, for example, increased 129.83 which is 1. 5 times greater than any previous advance in this index. Since then, a significant divergence has occurred. While the DJIA moved on to slightly higher levels before its recent correction from November, 1983. the aTe sector simply collapsed. There have been greater percentage declines in the OTe index such as the periods ending October, 1974 (-39.62) and August. 1982 (-35.31). Measured by the ratio. however, the dechne is now greater than any of the previous periods discussed and could even test the 1982 lows on a relative basis. As unlikely as this seems, further deterioration of the long-term OTC sector could be possible within the confines of an ongoing bull market. Remember, this is 1984 and doublethink would allow us to accept two contradictory events happming at the same time. RJS rs Dow-Jones Industrials (1200 p.m.) 1171. 59 S & P Composite (1200 p.m.) 159.43 Cumulative Index (3/1/84) 1948.63 ROBERT J. SIMPKINS. JR. DELAFIELD, HARVEY, TABELL INC. No statement or expresSion of opinion or any other matter hereIn contained IS, or IS to be deemed 10 be, directly or indirectly, an offer or the soliCitation of an offer to buyor sell any secunty referred to or mentioned The mal1er IS prcsented merely forthe convenlenceot the subscriber While we believe the sources of our Information to be reliable, weln no way represent orguaranleethe accuracy thereof nor of the Statements made herein Any action to be taken by the subscriber Should be based on hiS own InveStigation and Inlormatlon Delafield, Harvey, labell Inc, as a corporation and Its officers or employees, may now have, or mav later taye POSitions or trades In respect to any seCUrities mentioned In thiS or any luture Issue, and such positIOn may be different from any views nower hereafter e)(pressed In this or any other Issue Oelafleld, Harvey labell Inc which IS registered With the SEC as an Investment adVisor, may give adVice to Its Investment adVISOry and other customers Independently of any statements made In thiS or In any other ISSue Further Information on any security mentioned herem IS available on reQuest

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Tabell’s Market Letter – March 09, 1984

Tabell’s Market Letter – March 09, 1984

Tabell's Market Letter - March 09, 1984 page 1
Tabell's Market Letter - March 09, 1984 page 2
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TABELL'S MARKET LETTER 909 STATE ROAD, PRINCETON, NEW JERSEY 08540 MEMBER NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE, INC MEMBER NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF SECURITIES DEALERS, INC (609) 9249660 March 9, 1984 The JlewS.or1!.Stock .lixcl1/tTlge .l'Iill.sh2Jty release rnontIDyi!gure.Jor Februaryn tl1eXSE firms carrying customers' stock margin accounts which should' show continual expansionof the NYSE margin debt. Since these figures have been avsilable, debit balances of margin accounts in aggregate terms have generally moved in the same direction as stock prices but at a more exaggerated rate. The single exception is the period from the 1976 high to the 1978 low on the DJIA, when margin debt increased with minor interruptions to new highs through June, 1981. This correlation with the long-term trend of the market can be clearly seen from the chart on the opposite side. Margin customers of NYSE member firms increased their margin debt in January by 150 million to 22.87 billion, the largest monthly figure recorded to date since the start of the present series which began in 1965. The New York Stock Exchange also reported the number of stock margin accounts in a debit status to be at an all-time new high level of 840,000. This, in spite of a recent decline of 11.85 perc'ent from the January high of 1286.64 on the DJIA, and the high cost of broker loans to finance stock purchases, is indeed remarkable. It now becomes apparent, during the rise in the stock market from the fall of 1982 to date, that margin debt provided for the individual investor an accessible source of new funds for investing which he clearly utilized. This can be seen on the chart on the reverse side. From September,1982, margin debt rose from 10.950 billion to 22.870 billion in January, 1984, more than doubling in the short period of sixteen months. EXHIBIT Margin Debt (mil) Total Market Value Percentage Date Dow-Jones June, 1968 High 6690 641037 1.043 11/29/68 985.08 J.ulyc, 9.7.0.Low .. o. 37.80….,,-53107,7-'.'.''–.U2;f5-J/'lJil2JJ -!.6!.JI1—- ;,. Dec., 1972 High 7900 872000 .906 1/11/73 1051.70 Dec., 1974 Low 3910 511054 .765 12/6/74 577.60 June, 1981 High 14870 1224000 1.215 4/27/81 1024.05 Sept., 1982 Low 10950 1120000 .978 8/12/82 776.92 Jan., 1984 High 22870 1605000 1.425 11/29/83 1287.20 In the exhibit above we try to put these figures in perspective. This is done by analyzing the customers' stock market debt compared to the total market value of equities listed on the NYSE. Treated as a ratio the historical parameters are instructive. From 1965 to date the range of the percentage of margin debt to total NYSE market value has been 1. 53 percent high in October, 1978 and .597 percent low in January, 1971. The observations seem to conclude the higher percentage of margin debt to market value, the higher the averages, and, conversely, the lower the percentage the lower the averages. It is interesting that the current ratio has increased sharply and is now at the highest level since 1978, 1. 425 percent. From these studies recent history tells us that the current position of margin debt, although high on an absolute basis, is not unusual or necessarily bearish. The major question to be resolved is will the market behave like the June, 1981 period when margin debt peaked out after a market high was reached a few months earlier, like previous periods such as June, 1968 and December, 1972 when the margin debt figures peaked out prior to a market top, or like the 1976-1978 period and increase to new highs without a correction. A subset of figures released by the NYSE concerning margin debt is the customers carrying margin accounts under 40 percent equity. In simplest terms this tries to measure the quality of credit. This figure currently equals 10 percent of the total margin accounts. Taken by itself is fine, DUt this data represents an alarming 43 percent of the total margin debt, a figure in excess of 9.78 billion. This means the quality of margin continues to gradually deteriorate. Although there have been few margin calls to date, it should be remembered that in the fall of 1974 this ratio reached a high of 23 percent, a series record, representing 58 percent of total margin debt. At those levels, it was thought to have triggered the decline in 1974. We should, therefore, continue to pay close attention to the current margin debt statistics, as they could provide an important clue to the future behavior of the stock market. RJSlt ROBERT J. SIMPKINS, JR. DELAFIELD, HARVEY, TABELL INC. Dow-Jones Industrials (1200 p.m.) 1136.61 S & P Composite (1200 p.m.) 154.23 Cumulative Index (3/8/84) 1929.84 -,/ No statement or expresSion of opinion or any otner matter herein contained,s or IS to be deemed to be, directly or indirectly an oller or the soliCItation of an offer to buyor sell any security relerred to or mentioned Tho malter IS presented merely for tht' convenience of the subSCriber While we oclleve Ihe sources of our information to be reliable we In no way represent Of guarantee the accuracy thereof norolthe statements made herein Any acllon 10 be taken by the subSCriber should be based on hiS own Investigation and Information Delafuld, Harvey, TaOOll Inc, as a corporation and I\S officers or employees, may now have, or may laler lake, posItions or trades In respecllo any secunlles menhoned In thiS or any future Issue, and such posH Ion may be different from any views nowor heleafler e;opressed In thiS or any other Issue Delafield Harvey. Tabell Inc which IS registered With the SECas an Investment advisor, may give adVice 10 115 InveStment adVISOry and other customers Independently of any statementS made In thiS or In any other Issue Further mformatlon on any security mentioned herem IS avallabte on request ,–,,–.-,,-,–.-.,-,–,,–.–.'-.–.-r1300 1200 1100 1000 900 800 700 WL-L L-L————-600 11 17 1G 15 14 13 12 11 10 -9 8 7 6 5 I (SC I Il3. 119G8 11969-'7119N70m-11971-'11972-r11.973'-11 g74–11975–11T97G.n1H-l77-IH1778 Nm11-979 !J1B9T80 I1I 1198.1 -1198,2 -1198-3 -1984 3 I ,, .;;,

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Tabell’s Market Letter – March 16, 1984

Tabell’s Market Letter – March 16, 1984

Tabell's Market Letter - March 16, 1984
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TABELL'S MARKET LETTER 909 STATE ROAD, PRINCETON, NEW JERSEY 0B540 MEMBER NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE, INC MEMBER NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF SECURITIES DEALERS, INC (609) 924-9660 March 16, 1984 We offer ,- i1re;iili, a gratuitous piece of ammunition to thoriticswhl; -they;;;s -'- have been skeptical of the forecasting record of this letter. All they need to do is correlate market activity with those times we have chosen to take vacations. A year and a half ago, in the midst of a market that was posting a series of new lows in a rather desultory fashion, we took the opportunity to spend a week in the White Mountains. In the middle of that week, August 17, 1982, there occurred one of the largest rallies in stock-market history and the one that marked the start of the strongest bull market in a couple of decades. For the beginning of 1984, we scheduled a six-week cruise to Antartica. Prior to our departure, in late January, the Dow had moved down marginally from a high of 1286.64 on January 6, within an ace of its all-time high at 1287.20 in November, and what appeared to be only a minor interruption of a typical year-end rally was occurring. Unfortunately, as we headed South, the market did the same thing. By February 22, the DJIA had posted a closing low of 1134.21, down just over 11. 8 from the double top formed in November-January. It fell to our colleague, Robert Simpkins, to interpret for our readers this first crack in the generally euphoric atmosphere which had characterized the market since summer of 1982. In the process, he drew attention to what seems to us to be the crucial factor in analyzing the current market environment. That factor is time. It is patently obvious that a major stock-market cycle commenced precisely on August 12, 1982. Such cycles have, ovel the years, produced an average length measured from low to low of four years. They have tended to spend at least 50, and often a – greaLdeaLmor.a,-OLtbe;r lifetime-in-anadvancingphase.-ILisextremelydifficulttosquare'-I this historical pattern, as Bob aptly pointed out in a series of charts in this space, with the market's posting its ultimate top in November, 1983, only 15 months after the rise began. Something, however, is unquestionably going on. A decline of 11.8 in the Dow, while not the end of the world, is, to say the least, unsettling. The drop, moreover, was noticeably broad with almost all groups participating to a greater or lesser degree in February's weakness. However, a decline of the proportions of the recent one, indeed of even greater proportions, is hardly without precedent within the context of an ongoing bull market. Indeed, every bull market of the post World-War II era, with a single exception of June, 1961!-February 1966 has been punctuated by at least one decline approximately equal to, or in many cases, greater than the m!,gnitude of the current case. We think a case can be made, and we will be developing it further in future issues, for placing the current weakness in this context, with similarities to, for example, summer 1956, early 1960, or late 1967-early 1968. Such periods of weakness have, in the past, possessed certain common characteristics. They tend to occur, first of all, in the maturing stages of bull markets — not particularly disquieting at the moment, since noone is pretending the current upswing is still in the full bloom of youth. Secondly, they have often persisted for protracted periods of time, certainly longer than January to date and generally longer than from November to the present. We are, thus, led to the question of whether the current process is, in fact, over. We would hesitate at this stage to say that such was the case. There is some persuasive evidence that an effective bottoming process began with the February low. Whether or not that low will be the ultimate bottom is another question. In any case, sufficient technical damage has beEn doneso that a basing process is almost a necessity before substantial upside progress can be made. Friday's strength could indeed be part of that basing process. With the foregoing caveat in mind, we suspect that the cycle upswing, which began in August, 1982, has not yet breathed its last. AWT rs ANTHONY W. TABELL DELAFIELD, HARVEY, TABELL INC. Dow-Jones Industrials (12 00 p. m.) 1187.60 S & P Composite (1200 p.m.) 160.04 Cumulative Index (3/15/84) 1948.00 No statement or expresSIOn of opinion or any other maUer herem contained 15. or IS to be deemed to be dlrectlv or Indirectly, an offer or the soliCitation of an offer to buyar sell any secunty reterred to or mentioned The matter IS presented merely for the convenience 01 the subscriber While we believe the sources of our mformalton to be reliable, we In no way represent or guarantee the accuracy thereof nor of the statements made herein Any aClion to be taken by the subscnber should be based on hiS own fnves\lgallon and information Delafletd, Harvey, Tabelt Inc, as a corporation and ItS officers or employees, may now have, or may later take, positions or trades In respect to any secunlles mentioned In thiS or any future Issue, and such pOSlllon may be dlflerent from any views now or hereafter expressed In thiS or any other Issue Delafield, Harvey, Tabell Inc, whiCh IS registered With the SECas an Investment adVisor, may gIVe advIce to Its inVestment adVISOry and other customers Independenlly of any statements made In this or In any other Issue Further information on any security rnenlloned herein IS available on request

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Tabell’s Market Letter – March 23, 1984

Tabell’s Market Letter – March 23, 1984

Tabell's Market Letter - March 23, 1984
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,.. TABELL'S MARKET LETTER 909 STATE ROAD. PRINCETON, NEW JERSEY 08540 MEMBER NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE. INC MEMBER NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF SECURITIES DEALERS. INC (609) 9249660 March 23, 1984 rWe tried, in this space last week, to put together our thoughts on the market after return- ;. – -ing -from- prolractea-vacation. Tl1e bal;icconl!lusion-swe'reached-1'arr,b – summarized-as-followSi- . (1) Based on historical precedent, there was persuasive evidence for regarding the market weakness from November through February as part of a bull-market correction rather than a cycle bear mar- ket. (2) There existed, however, real cause to doubt that the corrective process was complete. (3) It was likely that, before the process came to an end, further base-building action would be required. Last week's action was consistent with that view. A week ago, the Dow had moved up 4.4 from its February low and a great many intermediate-term indicators were poised to produce buy signals on further strength. That strength totally failed to materialize, and the Dow retreated to a low, as this is written, of 1150.33 va. the February 22 low of 1134.21. We regard this as construct- ive. A significant move at this stage would have been premature and probably could not have gen- erated enough power to move through the overhead supply at year-end levels. We noted last week that, based on 1984 action so far, a new sort of process was Obviously under way. If one applies a 5 filter to the action of the Dow since August, 1982, one finds five declines prior to the present one. The largest was under 7 ,and the longest lasted 36 trading days. The present case has produced a 11. 89 decline so far and has lasted 58 trading days through the February low and 80 days to date. We suggested a week ago that such drops, rather than being without precedent, had been normal features of bull markets in the past. We attempt to document this fact in the following table, which shows the statistics for the largest correction in each of the nine bull markets since 1949 Largest Correction Change to Next High No. of Days Bull Mkt Breadth r'rom P,ev. From From Start Start Date Decline …. 6.f-1-3.J-49.f1-2-l50 -l-a.a5 Decline 2..-87 Days From Low 22 48-.-1-9 High Low 28 .64.r6-B3 High 7.05 9/14/53 8/26/56 -12.69 – 8.50 132 14.50 – 0.03 104 236 10/22/57 115/60 -17.42 – 9.28 205 29.83 7.16 284 489 6/26/62 5/14/65 -10.54 – 6.51 30 18.39 5.90 157 187 10/7/66 9125/67 -12.51 – 7.67 122 19.40 4.46 154 276 5/26/70 4/28/71 -16.07 -11.22 146 31.80 31.79 285 431 12/6/74 7115/75 -11.07 – 6.44 55 29.41 15.06 246 301 2/28/78 2/13/80 -16.01 – 6.93 46 34.90 13.29 256 302 8/12/82 11/29/83(1) -11.89(1) – 3.80(1) 59'80(2) (1) Todate (2) 58 days to 2/22; 80 days to 3/23 The first two columns of the table show the start date for each bull market followed. by the start date of that bull market's largest correction. All of them produced, somewhere along the line, corrections either approximately equal to, or in some cases significantly greater than, the present one. There were two instances of 16 declines and, in 1960, a 17.4 drop. Something on this order of magnitude would take the Dow to 1080. For purposes of comparison, the breadth-index decline (adjusted to issues traded) is shown for each correction. It can be noted the; drop in breadth is minor so far, and this could well tend to suggest more room on the downside. In terms of length, the current decline has been shorter, to date, than many of the pre- vious corrections. The 1960 correction was 205 days long, the 1967 drop lasted 122 days, and the 1971 decline consumed 146 days. Were we to move into this range, the ultimate low might not be reached until sometime during the summer. On the constructive side, however, it must be noted that, following the previous corrections, significant advances were invariably seen. The-1950 case is probably 'unusual but the other seven rallies range from 15 to 35 from their lows. Measured against the previous highs, they range from equaling the old high in 1956 to moving above it by fairly Significant amounts. As the final two columns show, most such rallies, again eliminating 1950, continued for six months to a year after their low and, in most cases, somewhat over a year beyond the previous high. This would extend the ultimate bull-market high into sanetime in early 1985 and would be consistent with both normal cycle theory and the election-year pattern. Thus the view of the present as a correction typical of a mature bull market is, we think, a not implausible scenario. AWTrs Dow-Jones Industrials (12 00 p. m.) 1150.33 S & P Composite (1200 p.m.) 156.72 Cumulative Index (3/22/84) 1969.18 ANTHONY W. TABELL DELAFIELD, HARVEY, TABELL INC. No statement 0' e)(press!on 01 opInion or any other malter herein contained IS, or IS to be deemed 10 be, directly or mdlrec1ty, an offer or the sollCllaUon 01 an ofler to buy or sell any secunty referred to or mentioned The matter IS presented merely lor tho convenience of the subSCriber While we bcllcve the sources of our information to be reliable, we In no way represent or guarantee the accuracy theroof nor of the statements made heroin Any action to be taken by the subscnber should be based on his own investigation and information Delafield, Harvey, label! Inc, as a corporation and Its officers or employees, may now haye, or may later take, posItions or trades In respect to any secuntles mentioned In thiS 01 any future Issue and such position may be different from any views nowor hereafter CJlpressed In thiS or any ether Issue Delafield, Harvey label! Inc, which IS registered With the SEC as an Investment advisor, may give advice \0 Its Investment adVISOry and ether customers Independently 01 any statements made In thiS or In any other Issue Further Information on any security menloned herein IS available on request

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Tabell’s Market Letter – March 30, 1984

Tabell’s Market Letter – March 30, 1984

Tabell's Market Letter - March 30, 1984
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TABELL'S MARKET LETTER 909 STATE ROAD, PRINCETON, NEW JERSEY 08540 MEMBER NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE, INC MEMBER NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF SECURITIES DEALERS, INC (609) 924-9660 March 30, 1984 I . — QfteJ1tbebestw.ay.ofde.;;tling\ViththestQckmrlg'ti.)ostl'I't).Yffil'Inga.Lairlyongtr'!' view of events well in the past and then narrow do to a shorter-range-view- of the-'more recent pattern. With the full benefit of 20/20 hindsight, we now know that June 16, 1983 was a watershed date. As of that day, ten months ago, the party was over. The Dow close was 1248.30, the aver- age having anived at that juncture via a sixty-percent, almost uninterrupted advance which had started in August, 1982. New highs were yet to be posted by the widely followed averages, but not by all that much, and, for the OTC averages, June, 1983 was the absolute peak. The Dow, after declining to 1163 in August, posted a new high at 1284 in October, exceeded it by some 2t points in November (its actual all-time high to date), and reached 1286 in January of this year. For three months following the October high, it never moved below the lower 1200's. Such was the situation as 1984 began. It was a market that had made little or no upside pro- gress for half a year, but had also proved resista;1t to decline. Then, in January and February, the break came. The Dow fell almost 12, to a closing low of 1134.21 on February 22. This moved the index well below the bottoms that had been posted ,back in August, November, and early Dec- ember. It was also, as we examined at some length last week, by far the biggest downswing in the bull market to date. The dilemma the technician must resolve is how to treat the June-January trading range and the subsequent drop from that range. One such interpretation is to view the entire period as a massive top of cyclical proportions. We do not deny that such an interpretation is plausible. We have chosen, however, not to take this view, for reasons outlined in recent issues of this letter. First of all, as we have pointed out at some length, the timing is wrong. Cycle theory sug- gests a low probability of a major top beginning to form so short a time after an obvious major — bo1tomjn…August….19B2.–,-Asw.e..,.pointedollLlasLweek.D1Lbu11marlet in tbemodern.,.er!Lhas–'!ea,c!-,- ed its ultimate high without completing and erasing at least one intermediate-scale correction. What has been described above is the first and only plausible occurence of such a correction since the upswing began. Finally, we can see no justification for the levels of undervaluation which would occur were the Dow to reach the objectives suggested by the conventional reading of late 1983 as a top, objectives which could be as low as the low 900's. If we are correct in our refusal to accept the conventional analysis, however, such a refusal must be justified by subsequent action. A month is now past since the low in February was post- ed, and the evidence is mixed. On the plus side, the February low has held. Both the Dow and the S & P 500 successfully tested their February lows on March 9 and completed what could be described as a second test early this week, following which, the Dow produced its 20-point advance on Wednesday. The breadth of the recovery, however, has been somewhat less than impressive .. The ten-day advance-decline difference reached minus 4400 in mid-February, an appropriate level for an intermediate-term boltom. Since then, this indicator has been able to move only into moderate plus territory, without ever reaching levels which could be called over-bought. The market's inability to mount any reasonably broad short-term rally since the February low must thus be considered a negative. Volume statistics, on the other hand, have been more impressive. Ten-day downside volume in mid-February reached 620 million shares and has been declining ever since, dropping under 300 million late !!\t week. Upside v01ume has expanded only moderately, but nonethe1ess has managed to remain significantly greater than downside through most of March, suggesting underlying willing- ness to buy market weakness. From the conventional chart point of view, a base has been formed, but not one which would suggest a rally of any meaningful proportion. The best readable upside objective for the Dow would be somewhere around 1250, at which level six-months worth of overhead supply exist. We have suggested for the past three weeks that broadening of this base is needed, and this still continues to be the case. Further, such broadening, however, followed by rallying action with meaningful breadth, could well vindicate our reading of the present period as an intermediate-scale bull-market correction. AWTrs ANTHONY W. TAB ELL DELAFIELD, HARVEY, TAB ELL INC. Dow-Jones Industrials (12 00 p. m. ) 1167.82 S & P Composite (1200 p.m.) 159.33 Cumulative Index (3/29/84) 1984.92 No statement or eoresSjon of opInion or anyolher matter herein contained IS, or Is to be deemed to be, directly or Indirectly. an oller or the solicItatIon of an offer to buyor sell any security relerred to or mentIoned The maller IS presented merely lor the convenience of the subscnber While we believe the sources 01 our tnformatlon to be reliable we In no way represent or guarantee the accuracy thereof norof the statements made herem Any action to be taken by the subSCriber Should be based on hiS own InvestigatIon and mformatlOn Delafield, Harvey, Tabell Inc as a corporatIOn anellts olltcers or employees may now have or may laler take, poSitions or trades m respect to any seculltles mentioned 10 thIS or any future Issue, and such pOSlllon may be different from any views nowor heleafler e.pressec! In thiS 01 any other Issue DelafIeld, Harvey, Tabell tnc whIch Is registered With the SEC as an Investment adVisor, may give adVice to Its Investment adVISOry and other customers mdependently of any statements made In this or 10 any other Issue Further information on any secuntymentloned herein Is available on request

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