,———————————————————- — – – – – – – – – – – – TABELL'S MARKET LETTER 909 STATE ROAD PRINCETON, NEW JERSEY 08540 DIVISION OF MEMBER NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE MEMBER AMERICAN STOCK EXCHANGE October 16, 1970 O, nce to every man and nation comes the moment to decide, In the strife of Truth with Falsehood, for the.good()r.evil- soi.de. James Ru-ssell L owell . The st')ck market, too, has its moments of decision. Periods arise when the various forces acting on the market appear to be converging, and there exists a high degree of probability that the short-term course of prices will determine their intermediate and longer term course as well. Such appears to be the case at the moment. The decision is not whether the 1968-1970 bear market is over; we pronounced that epitaph two months ago. The question which may well be resolved fairly shortly is whether or not the 197 – 197 bull market has begun. Why is the present particularly crucial After having risen to a new post-May high at a closing price of 783.68 on October 7, the Dow proceeded to erase its entire gain in subsequent trading reacting to a clOSing low of 760.06 on Tuesday. The Index has thus returned to the broad 745-770 area within which, with the exception of three or four days at the height of the early-October rally, it has remained since mid-August. The pattern on the broader S&P 500 is only slightly different. The August-September trading range on this average was between 81 and 83 and the subsequent rise to 87 was longer and steeper than that of the Dow. Even so, at its week's low of 83.02, it was close to the upper part of the August-September sideways pattern. The lows of these trading ranges, then, 745 on the Dow and 80 on the S&P 500, now have a great deal of significance. If the work that has been done in these ranges turns out to be distribution, it is distribution more substantial than we have seen in some time. A decisive downside penetration of 745 on the Dow would indicate 710 with a possible lower objective if the pattern broadens. In the case of the S&P 500, the downside objective is probably around 76 level. -.- – – – — — ….. …..- Now a decline to 710 in the Dow, it must be noted, is hardly the end of the world. To put it in perspective, it would mean a drop of a bit more than three points from present levels in the average Dow stock. We are moreover, as we have indicated, becoming daily more con- vinced that any decline of much greater magnitude than this (i. e., continuation of the bear market) is a more and more remote possibility. The underpinnings of technical strength which have developed since May are, we think, simply too strong. What a decline to the 700 level would, of course, do, is validate the basic thesis toward which we have leaned for six months — that the market will require a more lengthy period of base building before it can mount a sustained bull move. A decline to that area would deci- sively destroy the uptrend that has been in effect since May and would indicate that every- thing that has taken place since that time was, rather than being a major uptrend. part of a broad consolidation area. So much for the evil side. What about the good one Ability to hold above 745, and then rally, would maintain the uptrend that started last Spring, and would mean that the recent decline was nothing more than another one in the series of minor interruptions which stalled the advance at various points since June. What is most important, we think, is the effect that another leg up in the general market would have on the complexion of individual stock patterns. As part of our normal routine, we analyze individually, on a weekly basis, the technical patterns for llOO listed stocks. These issues are divided into four categories, stocks that are-in long.term confiimeciuptrendsor downtrend;;, and stocKS wnich navedeveloped sufficiently large bases and/or tops so as to be considered to be potential uptrend or downtrend candidates. As of the May low, only six stocks were in confirmed uptrends and fewer than 150 had bases large enough to be considered in potential uptrends. As of last week, the situation had altered radically. 95 stocks were in uptrends, but this was not particularly im- pressive since that total constituted less than 9 of the list. However, 550 stocks had moved in t 0 the potential uptrend category. That is, they had formed sufficiently large bases so that upside penetration would indicate an advance of intermediate-or-longer term proportions. Another upswing in the overall market would undoubtedly move a substantial number of these stocks into the uptrend category, and, for the first time in a good many years, the market would have the of poteptial leadership necessary1Dmake a worthwhile major advance. Dow-fones Ind. \1100 a.m.) 767.18 ANTHONYW. TAB ELL AS&WPT(m1n00 a.m.) 84.72 DELAFIELD ' HARVEY , TAB ELL No stafement or expression of OPInion or anv other matter herein confOlned IS, or Is to be deemed 10 be, directlv or indirectly, on .offer or the 50licltotlon of an offer to buy or sell any security referred to or mentioned The matter Is presented merely for the convenIence of the subSCflber While we believe the sources of our Information to be rehable we in no way represent or guarantee the accuracy thereof nor of the statements mode herein Any adlon to be taken by the sub- SCrIber should be bosed on his own mvest,gatlon and Information Montgomery, Scott & Co, as a limited partnership, and Its or employees, may now have, or may later take, poSitions or trades in respect to any seCUrities mentioned In this or any future lSue, and such pOSItion may be different from any views now or hereafter exprened in this or any other issue, Montgomery, Scott & Co, which IS registered wllh the SEC as on Investment adVisor, may give adVice to lIS Investment advIsory and other customers mdependently of any statements made in thiS or In any other Issue

.—————————–,– TABELL'S MARKET LETTER , J 909 STATE ROAD. PRINCETON. NEW JERSEY 06540 DIVISION OF MEMBER NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE MEMBER AMERICAN STOCK EXCHANGE October 22, 1970 TOY MANUFACTURING COMPANY Current Price 43 We have commented in the past on the growing – -, 1-;40 -;demand'for — ' Current Yield 3.3 important fact of American economic life in the early Long-Term Debt 36,501,619 part of the 1970' s. We have also noted the wide diver- Common Stock 4,629,859 shs. sity of investment vehicles affording the investor, in Sales-1970 Est. 270,000,000 one form or another, participation in the favorable en- Sales-1969 243,310,000 vironment created by this demand. One such vehnicle, Earn. Per Sh. 1970-E 2.80 which provides representation in three different areas Earn. Per sh. 1969 2.55 — all related in one way or another to the growing need Mkt. Range 1970-68 53 1/2 – 25 3/4 for energy — appears to be Toy Manufacturing Company. (Fiscal Year Ends Sept. 30) Let us consider, for a moment, some of the effects the energy shortage is likely to produce over the next decade. One obvious one is an increased demand for coal, which suffered in the 1960's from below-average exploration efforts. Development of new coal properties will be of direct benefit to Toy, almost half of whose sales are accounted for by mining equipment. In the oil area, drilling, and most especially offshore drilling, is likely to increase and, here again, some 10 of Toy sales have been in the area of ore beneficiation and oil tool products. Finally, and most fascinating, growing fuel consumption will demand increased effort in the control of air pollution. Environmental control constitutes another 10 slice of Toy's 1969 revenues. This equipment includes electrostatic precipitators, centrifugal collectors, filter systems, wet .. Thcompanyhasalso announc.,d thaLit – – ing a maior-move water pollutio;. Remaining sales from various industrial and – general products. The present price of Toy hardly appears to reflect an excessive premium, considering the attractiveness of the areas mentioned. The company is expected to report earnings in the Vicinity of 2.80 per share for the fiscal year ended September 30, and the current price of 43 represents a multiple of Just over 15 times those earnings. The 1.40 dividend provides a 3.3 yield, and the balance sheet is strong with net current assets, at the end of fiscal 1969, re- presenting more than three times long-term debt. Toy's record historically has been a good one. Aggressive management efforts- to improve the company in the early 1960's resulted in sales increasing 2 1/2 times over the period 1962- 1966. Much more dramatic, however, was the improvement in profit margins which rose from less than 3 to more than 15 in the same time span. The combination brought about a nine- fold increase in per-share earnings from 36 to 3.09. The adjusted price of the stock rose from 7 to over 50. 1967 and 1968, however, proved to be lean years. Sales growth slowed, and margins con- tracted with 1968 results plummeting to 2.02. Recently, however, there is real evidence of recovery. Profit margins last year rose to 12.7 from 10.8 in 1968 on a small increase in sales, and this trend has continued in the first three quarters of fiscal 1970, with pre-tax in- come having increased almost 15 on a 10 sales gain. For the nine months, the company has reported results of'2.06 vs. 1.85 – – -. Much of this improvement has reflected a change in the product mix. Industrial equipment sales are gradually decreasing in relative importance as environmental control and oil well equipment become larger sales factors. Furthermore, profitability in the environmental control area could well improve, as the company moves into higher-margined products in this field. While it is early to estimate per-share results for the year just started, an increase to the 3.25 level for 1971 certainly does not appear to be an impossibility. The technical pattern generally reflects the improving outlook. After reacting to strong support at around 35 last May, the stock rebounded sharply and has spent most of 1970 forming what appears to be a base in the 35-47 range. Eventual upside penetration of this base would indicate a price objective in the 80-90 area. Strong support is eVident throughout the low 40's. Further information is available on request. Dow-Jones Ind. (1100 a.m.) 758.01 S&P (1100 a.m.) 83.49 ANTHONY W. TABELL DELAFIELD, HARVEY, TABELL AWTmn No statement or expreSSion of opmlon or any other moIler herem contained IS, or IS to be deemed to be, directly or an .offer or the soliCItation of an offer to buy or sell any security referred to or mentioned The moiler .s presented merely for the convenience of the subSCriber While we bel.eve the sources of our .nformotion to be rehoble, we In no way represent or guarantee the accuracy thereof nor of the statements made herein Any acllon to be token by the sub SCriber shovld be based on hiS own InvestigatIon and mformatlon Montgomery, ScaN 8. Co, as a llmlfed porlnenhlp, and Ih' partners or employees, may now hove Of may later toke posilions or trades .n respect to any securities mentioned In thiS or any future Inue, and such POSItion may be different from any views now 'or hereafter expres;ed In thiS or any other Issue Montgomery. Scolt & Co, whICh .s registered With the SEC as on investment adVisor, may give adVice to Its Investment adVISOry and other customers lOdependently of any statements made In th.s or In any other Issue

\ TABELL'S MARKET LETTER 909 STATE ROAD, PRINCETON NEW JERSEY 08540 DIVISION OF MEM6ER NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE MEMBER AMERICAN STOCK EXCHANGE October 30, 1970 We suggested in this space two weeks ago that a moment of decision was probably about to be reached in the stock market fairly shortly. Vie pointed out that the Dow-Jones Industrial Av-erage h-aC!', -of traaea7 for'tJ1host 'pilri';' oetweeri an -intraday'–' low of 740 and an intra-day high of 770 and that this trading range, by then, had sufficient significance so as to make its ultimate penetration fairly important in determining the inter- mediate-term course of prices. So far, unfortunately, the market has stubbornly refused to give us an answer. For the past two weeks, the Dow has remained in the range mentioned above and continues to hover around the lower limits of the uptrend channel maintained since the May 26 low. Periods such as this one are, admittedly, frustrating. But there is no point in trying to read into the market that which is not there. The answer as to the intermediate term direction of prices will be resolved as the pattern develops further, and the only sensible course for the forecaster is to sit back and allow it to develop. As the averages have moved sideways, there has been a noticeable change in the complexion of individual stock patterns. Short-term distributional formations have, in a significant number of cases, been formed and, moreover, in a number of cases, these forma- tions have been penetrated on the downside. What is also interesting, however, is that in a number of cases where short-term tops have, in fact, been formed, downside objectives have been or are close to being reached. In some cases, of course, patterns indicate no short- term distribution whatsoever. The growing number of minor downtrends which have manifested themselves seems to be s,cal1lr;ed, more orJess In, some cas es, certain bank stocks — wou'ld- be notable examples, minor downtrends are taking place within -the -ccmtext of n – favorable long-term patterns. In other instances, not surprisingly, the short-term weakness is developing in cases where the long-range picture was never particularly favorable in the first place. Particular vulnerability appears to exist in those high-multiple issues which have produced third-quarter earnings disappointments. All of which leads us to a few reflec- tions on the subject of technical analysis and its uses. Technical work is thought of by many investors as a s-hort-term timing device or a device for stock market trading. It is, indeed, useful in these endeavors, but it is not these particular aspects which have fascinated us the most in our own 17 years of expenence with stock market statistics. To our mind, the most productive use of technical work is to sort out those issues in which the long-term upside potential is greatly in excess of the apparent risk. Charles Dow, who is, after all, the father of technical analysis, was the first market student to recognize that short-term fluctuations were, in the first place, essentially random and difficult to predict, and a great deal of the market analysis technique that has developed since then has centered around attempts to smooth out price fluctuations so that the under- lying long-term trend could be recognized. It is our feeling that a number of industry groups have, since May, developed patterns indicating sizeable long-range upside potentials. Just a few of the groups in this category are tobacco, natural gas, textile, oil, bank, food chain, building, and some utility issues. Quite obviously, a number of mdivldual stocks not in the'above 'categories ai-so have -similar patterns We'indicated' above our thinking that the – immediate course of the market is unclear. We also think that we have reached a stage where attempts to guess this course are more or less irrelevant. The major task facing the investor at the moment, is to adjust his portfolio so as to give heavy weight to the sort of stock mentioned above — where ultimate profit opportunlties far outwelgh the shorter-term risk factors. We continue to feel that a portfolio aggresslvely committed to issues of this sort represents the best possible investment stance under uncertain intermediate conditions. Dow-Jones Ind.(lIOO a.m.)753.42 S & P (11 00 a. m .) 83.08 AWTmn ANTHQNY W, TAB ELL DELAFIELD, HARVEY, TAB ELL No statement or expr05s,on of opinion or Clny other matler herein contained IS, or Is to be deemed 10 be, directly or indirectly, an oHer or the soliCitation of an offer 10 buy or sell ony security referred to or mentioned The motter IS presented merely for the convenience of the subscriber. While we believe the sourct!s of our Informohon to be rehoble. we In no way represent or guarantee the accvracy thereof nor of the stotements made herein Any action to be token by the sub sCriber should be based on hiS own Investigation and information Montgomery, Scolt & Co, as a limited partnership, and Its partners or employees, may now have, or may later take, positions or trades In respect to any seCUrities mentioned In thiS or any future issue, and such po.sitlon may be different from any views now or hereafter expressed In thiS or any other Issue Montgomery. Scoll & Co, which 15 registered with the SEC as an Investment adVisor, may give adVice to liS Investment adVISOry and other customers Independently of any statements made In thiS or In any other Issue

II,'I , / /.' -. .. ,/' '/ (t ,'(,'.1'. .JOg STAT, rOAD PfHNcrTON, KW J.ERSEY 0851,0 tllvlS10t Of' IH STOCI' f XCHA'I;a; November 6, 1970 We hQve in recent lssues of this letter, on the theme that ;tock se\ectlon is, in most C,Jses, a far more Impc.ital't ingredIcnt of invc–'stment success than guesses as to the course, often not foreseeable, of the market J. whole. It IS (-1 lesson easIly forgotten, especially at I a tIme like the present v/llen l11t- market ouUcor. IS, at best, c.louded. Yet It is one that can easlly he reenfcrced statlstlcally. I For example, we have now only partially recovered from the severest bear market of the past four decades. Yet it wouJd have been quite possIble to have purchased a portfolIo of stocks at the very top of that bear m.)rlct and tlll have a respectable profit today. Tne follovllng table, based on Standard & Poor's group mdices sho\…s the performarce of the best actll1CJ 20 Qut of 91 groups from theIr average , pnce of Decen1ber, 1968, tile monih the TiJmk0t made its hIgh, to the end of lost month. Cha1l2…. F/58-JO!(1 Change 12!6G-JO/70 12/68-10/70 Chan.9.12!G8-JO!70 I 0 ;, FollutioJControl 35.3 MAil Order ClectriculEquip. -4.3 Brewers -6.8 Coul 28.9 Soft ..rink.s 4.2 Au Conditioning -5.0 AppllanC'E's -8.1 C03metlcs Vt'lrietyStoreb -3.7 -5.1 Nat'IGilsDISt. 10.7 S02lPS -12.4 Mobile Homes -5.2 Nat'l Gas PipeL -10.4 DJ ugs 5.9 HetalJ Stores -2.4 Packaged Foods -6.6 Grocers -11.2 It Is an mtcresl.lng t6.Duta1wn. The best perfOlming nine arc actually up for the period. The toptcn show Q 10 aV12fug0 gain, anrl the group ao., .l '111101e shows a 2 average proht–a reasonably cum- mEndable perJOlmance the marh.0J environment. Nuw the above comments may be justly cnticized on th'e bosis that they are, after all, hmdslgbt, but they me not entlrely an cyercise. Let us suppose, that, in May, 1970, the investor had deClded that an mtermedwte hal been and had sought to construct a list of purchasE's. Let us suppose, morcover, that he arbltranly ;dected the tVIE'l1ty groups that had gone down the least if the bear market. The selE'ctions ;'u1d have been the group', in the table below t which shows -pch c;mup's bear mcuket decline, hs pGrcentage advance from M,y to date, and its performance rank out of all 91 groups from May to du.te. ;; Cbilnqe lUG(l-S!/Q .!!Z7 0-Juirj nun)' Cnanqc Chunge J2/6&-5/70 0/70-10/70 Rank Blewero; 6.5 -10.4 88 Soaps -14.4 ;)9.5 22 Pollution Control .J 6. 3 ., 27.3 11 Pilckog9d 'oc.ds -1(.5 9.2 48 -0.5 12.9 38 Variety St01 C,3 -16.6 24.4 14 Drugs -6.3 1- 3.0 37 Leud & Zinc -8.7 86 Goal BiscUlt Bacry -11. 0 44.8 3 -12.4 1.0 J 75 El ectrical IqUlp. -17.7 Retell Stores -18,7. 16.3 30 24 Db1iJ1ers Air Cond1tioJllDQ -13.0 -13.5 ). J 9.8 19 44 Merals-M,sc. BUSiness I…1ach. -18.4 -19.0 ;7.8 9.0 54 51 Mail Order 8.1 4 Telephone -19.2 -6.1 83 CIgarettes -13.7 -128.2 8 Nat'l Gas Dist. -19.7 12.2 41 The results shov.fn by Hns rather SImple-minded rr,ethod are ImpressIve. The investor would have cho,s(m four of the top ten industry Groups based on subsequent. performance ano twelve of the groups chosen would have been in the upp8r 5090. The average gain of 111 would h.1ve been eminently re- spectable. ., The performance would, of C0l'rS3, not hnvc been Bf.. good as couJd have been ilchlevcd by perfect foreEnght. Tho twenty groups uctllally performinq best from May to date, vnth an average 31 gal'l, are ' shown belm';. J, Chi3nge Chcmgc 0- Change 5/7U-Date lvTobile Homes 2L70-Dte 5/70-Date 2L70-Date 85.9 Vending Macil, r-29. 2 Pollution Control of 27.3 Leisure Tlmc 23.3 .,' OJ – Crude Coal Soft Drinl-.s t57. 4 44.8 33.1 Oil Woll Much.; 2 B. 9 Gold Mlllln'J Cig,lIttes 12 B. 2 011 – DomestlC' Srn.ingc; &LOdn -127.9 Variet'y Gtorc 26.4 ROOlOg Wallbd 23.2 – ;5.5 Mall Ordcr 1-22.0 24.4 Appliances 21.4 ,. Oil Int' 30.0 Home rum. 27.6 Dl!.count Stores 23.1\ Rubber 19.9 Yet — a suggested in rhe leave — superior marlet uctlOn tends to persist over tllTlE' and abovc tables arc useful for man'! than hlstoflcal purposes. It is, 111 lIkely, bused on the record, tnal from the above llsts of above-average ,the market Jeaders of the conung months may well mcrge.. 1l,NTH 0 NY W. TAB IL L Dow-Tones a.m.)771.43 S&P (1100 a.m .. 04.08 DELF,JlELD. HARVeY, TI\BE!.!. AViT'mn ,) L tlo Sh, t t . r, 0- , .., , .. I C ,..,to ,/)ed' .,..!f ., k bv, ' vl ' 'o.y ,n I,' I'f '''I'' t-'! -,., v ,. r , 1 1,,- ,h (,,,,v ,,.he f,., or 'I.r r … Y h,l.. 11 c r'!,,,c Ihn w,eB ,','r .. … r'-,',. I u. 11.1 JL'L ,. 0 … t ,-.,..,,' ;. 1 'h, , .. Air' ,,,,'e .. … An. CKOO i.)., .'., rt…… ,''yI,, \ 0,',, ,, I ,1.'' ',- ' I , Jf ,,,, I ,', P'( 0,' .J'. ''', P' , n,t …. 'I 0. C,.., B J I ' ',11 'f ' 'I Itj,r I n.1 II, , 10, n,,' OM.\, ,n 'ty h) ff'fu,1 ,om CI,( f., ,.! .I ,VJ' Y I ,1'-, I 1 h, r 'Ill – '\ tI j n. 1 C. h I, ,'0. I, 'he 0 llu!-''nl aJv'lcr, mdY aJy, '(, ,, ,,' Iy, 'I d ,IrN C1,C'.. .,' I'V ny QI,' ,11 ,nil.)' Ir (r 'n ;….., C11,01 iJ'l .. – –

TABELL'S MARKET LETTER 909 STATE ROAD, PRINCETON, NEW JERSEY 08540 DIVISION OF MEMBER NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE MEMBER AMERICAN STOCK EXCHANGE – November 13, 1970 What determines stock prices The apparently-simple-minded questIon has a number of fairly complex answers. A number of academic savants would have us believe that prices con- 'stHute- a–basically wheel. – The more orthodox view is that prices are, after all, determined by fundamental developments, i. e., earnings, dividends, and the level of economic activity. The naive answer — that prices are, quite simply, determined by supply and demand — tends to occur to very few other than market technicians. Market commentators ignoring this simple explanation are thus pressed to find reasons in news events for everything the market does. The 1962 decline, for example, had to be explained In terms of some unkind things the late President Kennedy had to say about U. S. Steel, and the subsequent recovery, in turn, was Justified by the successful ending of the Cuban missile criSiS, whereas, in fact, neither of these things had much to do with the market action of that year. By contrast, in the past month, there has been abundant news truly sig- nificant for the course of the economy in 1971. The general level of stock prices, however, is precisely where it was last August. Let us recount some of the finanCial developments of the past thirty days. As we moved into October, major corporations began to release third-quarter earnings figures which were, in general, disappointing. The market began to move lower to an intra-day low of 746 at the end of the month, then promptly reversed itself and moved up sharply. The reversal took place at exactly the point where any sensible analYSis of the demand and supply forces could have said it should have occurred. Having failed to go down in response to bearish news, the market then had two bullish events to stimulate it — the settlement of the GM strike and the –'''Tongawaitea''CIroinrr-th,nl1scounttalef61lowed–by- -an- eight-point rally early Wednesday — preCisely to the top of the trading range which had con- tained it for three months — and then fell back, dropping 23 points from mid-day on Wechlsday to early Friday. The fact — disconcerting as it may be to those who make their living analysing such things as quarterly earnings, auto strikes, and the rediscount rate — is that these factors are totally irrelevant to the short-term course of stock prices. Demand and supply forces have been in balance for the past three months, holding the market steady at a level roughly between 740 and 790 on the Dow. They have held it there, despite the plethora of fundamental develop- ments which could have, under different circumstances, moved prices sharply one way or the other. The 740-790 price level, as a matter of fact, has perSisted even longer. This is also the general area that contained prices from mid- January to the end of April, earlier this year. In other words, with the exception of May, June, and July, demand and supply have been in balance at this level for all of 1970. Now, sooner or later, one of two things will happen. Either demand for stock at these levels will exhaust the up-until-now-inexhaustible supply, and prices will mover higher. Or, alternatively, the suppliers of stock, largely unwilling so far this year to accept lower prices, will become willing to do so. As we have noted before, there is little point in guessing, in the absence of clear evidence, which event will occur. We can, however, make some estimates as to the possible extent of a move in either direction. – -Oidhe-dowiiside;-'the-risk is-;-leCus te-st of By'thfs we do-not mean, necessarily, the intra-day low of 627.46. What we do mean is a move back to the May- June trading range of 728-665, where the Dow held for all but five days last summer. On the upside, it must be noted, the prospects are a good deal more substantial. As we suggested above, the present price level is one that extends back almost a year now. If this whole year has, in fact, constituted accumulation, a substantial upward move in prices is indeed in prospect and indeed, a move to all-hme highs would be feaslble. The resolution of the current impasse will be provided by the development of individual patterns as they unfold. A substantial minority of stocks, including a great many marginal glamour issues, have patterns suggesting that the lows of last summer may be tested. A number of patterns, however, suggest relatively little downside risk and, in some cases, sub- stantial upside potential. Whatever develops, however, the risk/rewarq ratio for common stock purchases appears favorable at the present time and would increase greatly were the market to move lower. Dow-Jones Ind. (1100 a.m.) 762.80 ANTHONYW. TAB ELL S&P (1100 a.m.) 83.70 DELAFIELD, HARVEY, TAB ELL \M T ff1 R . No or eXpre'IOn of opmlon or any other malter herein contamed IS, or 's 10 be deemed to be, directly or Indirectly, an ,offer or the OIlCIIOllon of on offer to buy or sell any security referred to or mentioned The moiler IS presented merely for the convenience of the subSCriber While we believe the sources of our mformatlon to be reliable, we In no w.ay represent or guarantee the accuracy thereof nor of the statements mode. herein Any action to be token by the sub ,cnber should be based on hIs own investigation and Information Montgomery, Scott &. Co, as a limited partnership, and Its partners or employees, may now have, or may later toke, pOSitiOns or trades m respect to any securlhes mentioned In thiS or any future Issue, and such pOSition may be different from ony.vlews now or hereafter expressed In thiS or any other Inue Montgomery, Scott & Co, which IS registered With the SEC as on Investment adVisor, may give adVice to Its Investment adVisory and other customers mdependently of any statements made In thiS or In any other Issue – – –

TABELL-S MARKET LETTER 909 STATE ROAD, PRINCETON, NEW JERSEY 08540 DIVISION OF MEMBER NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE MEMBER AMERICAN STOCK EXCHANGE November 20,1970 In a generally sloppy performance, the stock market moved sideways to lower last week with the major averages remaining in the oft-cited trading range that has contained them since August. The commonly noted reason for the weakness 'wa-s-a sharp drop irFth-.l'FRB industrtaJ–production index, — – – – — causing a number of commentators to express doubts as to whether the powers that be are sufficiently sensitive to rising unemployment and other deteriorating e con 0 m i c indicators. Sue h com men t s, in our view, reflect an improper understanding of the effects of monetary and fiscal policy on the economy. The tools work — but not instantaneously. The results of applied policy do not manifest themselves until sometime after the application, and the time lag with which various economic indicators respond varies. It is, for example, a matter of history that stringent monetary restraint was applied throughout most of 1969. It is equally a matter of record that money has been easier since the beginning of 1970. The sensitivity of various economic sectors to alternate restraint and stimulus has been diverse. The most sensitive sector was the stock market which responded to monetary restraint by declining sharp- ly last May and which, under monetary stimulus, has since recovered. The rate of inflation, just now beginning to decline, was the next major sector to respond to monetary stringency. The last, unfor- tunately, will be unemployment, which has continued to rise to new highs and will probably continue to do so for most of 1971. Finally, however, the results of continued monetary expansion will be felt here also. It is at least an arguable premise that the administration has some understanding of this sort of timing, coupled with a rather strong vested interest in seeing an improving economy in 1972, when it will again present itself to the voters. If one theorizes that, at some point in 1971, when the outlook for the following year becomes clearer, the stock market will begin to look ahead, then 1971 could amarJet-y'earThls-ha'beenth1cas-e-fnprevious regimes as stuay of — – –'– the stock market in the four years of each presidential administration since World War I shows. The percentage change in the Dow-Jones Industrial Average for each year since 1917 is set forth in the following table, with the column headings referring to the first, second, third, and fourth years of each presidential administration. FIRST YEAR SECOND YEAR THIRD YEAR FOURTH YEAR 1917 -28.73 1918 17.45 1919 28.32 1920 -31.76 1921 10.53 1922 21.68 1923 – 3.09 1924 22.69 1925 33.87 1926 1.71 1927 28.75 1928 48.22 1929 -17.17 1930 -33.77 1931 -52.67 1932 -23.07 1933 66.69 1934 4.14 1935 38.53 1936 24.82 1937 -32.82 1938 28.06 1939 – 2.92 1940 -12.72 1941 -15.38 1942 7.61 1943 13.81 1944 12.09 1945 26.65 1946 – 8.14 1947 2.23 1948 – 2.13 1949 12.88 1950 17.63 1951 14.37 1952 8.42 1953 – 3.77 1954 43.96 1955 20.77 1956 2.27 1957 -12.77 1958 33.54 1959 16.76 1960 – 9.34 1961 18.71 1962 -10.81 1963 17.00 1964 14.57 .8189 1966 -18.94 1967 15.20 1968 4.27 Average 3.88 Average B.Ol Aerage 4.49 – – –0 The average stock market-year-to-year performance-in-the 55 years since 1917 has been a 6.4 advance, and the median performance an 8.4 rally. As the table shows, however, the average advance for the third year of each presidential administration has been considerably above this I average and, indeed, nine of the 13 years since World War I have produced advances above the median. The recent record is even more interesting. The market has advanced, with one exception, in the third year of every administration smce the first Roosevelt term and in every year since 1951, the advance has been a healthy one. It is, by contrast, in the first and second years of most administrations that stock market damage has tended to be done. Since 1929, every major bear market, i.e., 1929, 1937,1946,1953, 1957, 1962, 1966 and 1969, has begun in the initial years of an admmistration. Since present economic policy suggests an upturn beginning somewhere late in the second half of 1971, it will be interesting to see whether the pattern of the bullish third year again holds good. Dow-Jones Ind. 0100 a.m.) 756.16 ANTHONY W. TABELL S&P (1100 a.m.) 82.97 DELAFIELD, HARVEY, TAB ELL AWTmn No statement or expreSlon of oponlon or (lny other molter herein conlolned IS, or to be deemed to be, directly or Indirectly, an offer or the sollcltollon of on offer to buy or sell any secvrlty referred to or mentioned The matter 15 pre5ented merely for the convenience of the subscriber we believe the sourccs of our Information to be reliable, we in no W(JY represent or guarantee the accurocy thereof nor of the statements mode herein. Any octlon to be taken by the sub Scriber should be based on hl5 own Invcstigallon and information Montgomery, Scott & Co, os 0 limited partnership, and .Is partners or employees, may now hove, or may later take, posillons or trades respect to any securities mentioned In thIS or any future Issue, and such position may be .dlfferent from any views now or hereafter expressed In this or any other Issue. Montgomery, Scoll & Co , which IS registered With the SEC 0 on Investment adVISor, may give advlCfl to Its Inveltment adVISOry and other customers mdependenlly of any statement! mode In this or In any olher Issue

TABELL'S MARKET LETTER 909 STATE ROAD, PRINCETON, NEW JERSEY 08540 DIVISION OF MEMBER NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE MEMBER AMERICAN STOCK EXCHANGE November 27,1970 Mr. Eric Hoffer, the distinguished longshoreman-philosopher, has a provocative article in – — …-l .- York TimesM''igjlzine. .- – – – – It is part of Mr. – — Hoffer's thesis that –A-me. rica-,… in……t-he second half of the Twentieth Century, is entering 01'1 a post''industrial age. The mid-19th Century through the mid-20th Century, he feels, constituted the era of industrial revolution, a revolution of which this country was in the vanguard and which resulted in unprecedented levels of affluence measured in terms of production of goods. This revolution, however, may now be complete and, having mastered its techniques, we may be in the process of reverting to many of the cultural patterns of pre-industrial society. In Hoffer's words We are returning to the rutted highway of history, which we left 100 years ago in a mad rush to tame a savage continent and turn it into a cornucopia of plenty. We see all around us the lineaments of a pre-industrial pattern emerging in the post-industrial age. We are rejoining the ancient caravan, a caravan dominated by the myths and magic of elites, and powered by the young . There is statistical substantiation for much of Mr. Hoffer's thesis. Industrial production has, in the past 30 years, become a less and less important component of our economy. Total manufacturer's sales, as a percentage of G. N. p have been declining ever since World War II, and a smaller and smaller percentage of the American work force is now engaged in the tradi- tional blue-collar occupations. Meanwhile, the provision of services rather than goods tends to assume a greater and greater role on the economic scene. The transition is even greater than that reflected in the available statistics. Many of today's fastest growing occupational categories bear an interesting similarity to the crafts which characterized pre-industrial society. Consider, for example, the computer programmer ,..,..-..,,,….1 – skills are ap'plicable in almost any and his tends toward those skills rather than toward his employer. He is, in essence, a skilled laborer, not at all unlike the journey- man carpenter of the 18th Century. Now societal change is inevitably reflected in the stock market, and the decreasing importance of industrial production is no exception. It is probably no accident that the Dow- Jones Industrial Average has performed worse than the market as a whole for a good part of the past five years. Moreover. as classic heavy-industry stocks assume a less and less important investment role, the investor increasingly is being offered participation in a whole host of service industries, industries not available in the public market place a decade or two ago. It is now possible to purchase equity mterests in advertising agencies, stock exchange firms, tax preparation services, computer software concerns, and real estate brokers, and it will probably be not too long before doctors and law firms are permitted to incorporate and offer securities to the public. As securities of this nature become more and more prevalent, it becomes incumbent on the investor to recognize both the potentialities and the problems. Let us consider for a moment, purely as an example, H. & R. Block, Inc., the tax preparation service. Over the past ten years, the company's revenues have increased more than 100 times. Earnmgs per share have moved from 2 to 1.17, and the price of the stock 1S 200 times its price at the beginning of the decade. It should also be noted, however, that Block, now selling in the market place -for 55 per,share-,-had a.book,value,-as of last April'30throf-I,S9;- – -, — — Thus, both the opportunities and the pitfalls become obvious. A serV1ce company unlike, let us say, an electric utility, has little need for capital. The opportunity for growth in an industry which requires large amounts of brick and mortar is, of necessity, limited by the ' equity d11ution ultimately necessary to pay for those bricks and mortar. Such a limitation is not present in a company which, with a fixed capital requirement of a few square feet and some desks, can turn out a highly expensive product. On the other hand, should the demand for given service be reduced or the service itself be obsoleted — or, and this is a totally new factor in security valuation, should key personnel leave — the stock holder is left with only a miniscule asset value to protect his investment. We are, in short, creating a whole new class of security in which both the rewards and risks are inherently greater than those to which we have become accustomed. The challenges. that this sort of security possesses for investment policy will be formidable indeed. Dow-Jones Ind. (1100 a.m.)774.64 ANTHONY W. TABELL S&P (1100 a.m.) 85.13 n1ArT'fflfl DELAFIELD HARVEY TAB ELL I, l I '40 statement or expression of Opinion or any other molter herein conlcllned IS, or IS 10 be deemed to be, directly or indirectly, on offer or the s.ollcllol10n of an offer to buy or sell any security referred fa or mentioned The molter IS presented merely for the convenience of the subscriber While we bel,eve the sources of our information to be rehable, we In no way represent or guarontee the accuracy thereof nor of the statements made herein Any action to be token by the sub- SCriber should be based on hiS own InvestigatIOn and information Montgomery, Scott & Co, as a limited portnershlp, and Its partners or employees, may now have or may later lake posilions or trades 1n respect to any secuflltes menl!oned In this or any future Inue, and such pOSItIOn may be different from any views now 'or hereafter In this or any other Issue Montgomery, Scoll &. Co, which IS registered with the SEC as an llvestment advIsor, may give advice 10 Irs Inveslment adVISOry and other customers tndependently of any statements mode In Ihls or In any other issuo

TABELL'S MARKET LETTER 909 STATE ROAD, PRINCETON, NEW JERSEY 08540 DIVISION OF MEMBER NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE MEMBER AMERICAN STOCK EXCHANGE December II, 1970 Now that the dust has settled, it is possible to stand back and take a look at the rather amazing stock market action of December, 1970 and try to assess its probable significance. As we all are awa re by now, during the last week in,November and the first uP.–PWther'more;-umntupalot. OnNovember'rS;–just we ov ek er ;f December, 1970, the Dow closed at 754.24. It advanced for the next 12 consecutive days reaching a closing high on Mon- day of this week of BIB. 66 for a total percentage rise of almost B. On none of the last 11 days of the rally were there fewer than BOO advances on the NYSI;, and on two days the number ot advances exceeaed 1000. The 1244 rising stocks on November 30 set an all-time one-day record. Volume on the rise approached record levels and dally volume twice exceeded twenty million shares. In the process, the industrial index moved to a new high for the year, making it likely that 1970 may go down In history as an advancing year, a prospect which, In May, seemed, to say the least, remote. Comment on the performance was mixed. There is a school of thought, admittedly dWindling, which seems to feel, that, for some reason, It is Immoral for the stock market to go up at this point, and commentators of this persuasion tended to shrug off the performance. The more bullish were inclined to proclaim a new era. The true Significance of the rally can, we think, be understood by placing It in historical context. In order to do this, it is first necessary to answer two questions. (1) Was the advance really unusually large by historical standards (2) If the answer Is yes, what has been the past Significance of rallies of this magnitude In answer to the first question, the best measure of the magnitude of any short-term rise is the peak average dally advance. In the present instance, this was chalked up for the 10-day period ending December 4, during which time the daily average advance was .797 on the Dow. Scanning stock market history since 1942, we find that this is only the twentieth time in 2B years that any rally has posted an average daily advance greater than .7 for an B-12-day period. Thus, the rally was quite clearly unusual in a historical sense. — – tlle-ilistorlcalsignificance;' tiien;hat has been th-e aftermath' of upswJ;;'gS(;f -thi; type The following table lists all of the 20 rallies cited above, together with the market action which followed. PEAK AVERAGE DATE OF RALLY LOW & HIGH IN DJIA DAILY ADVANCE SUBSEQUENT MARKET ACTION !)June-July 1942 102 – 108 .73 Bull Market Ending At 212 in June 1946 2) Mar-April 1943 3)Aug-Sept 1945 4)January 1946 5) November 1954 129 – 136 160 – 178 189 – 203 353 – 3BB .74 …B3 .7''' .B2 Bull Market Ending At 525 in April 19 56 6)March 1955 7)November 1955 391 – 415 454 – 487 .74 .B8 8)December 1958 466 – 499 .73 Bull Market Ending At 744 in Nov. 1961 9) November 1960 575 – 612 .74 Final Phase of 1961 Bull Market to 744 I OJune-July 1962 535 – 590 1.14 Bull Market Ending atlOOO in Feb.1966 I lOct-Nov 1962 558 – 630 1.04 u 12) Nov-Dec 1963 13)Oct-Nov 1966 711 – 767 749 – B20 .B6 .70 Bull Market Ending at 985 in Dec. 196B 14)January 1967 785 – B47 .77 15)Mar-April 1968 I 6) October 1969 825 – 910 820 – B60 .97 .B2 Market RallIed, Then Declined to 631 In May 1970 17)May-June 1970 – 27 Rally to BI8'ln-Dec;-'1970 – – , – 18)July 1970 669 – 735 1. 23 19)August 1970 707 – 765 . B9 20)Nov-Dec 1970 754 – BIB BO 1\.0 the tAble hows, large short-term rallies have tended to occur almost exclusively at major bottoms, or in the early stages of bull markets. There are only two exceptions, January, 1946, when a rally occurred fairly near the top of a four-year upswing, and, most recently, in October of last year where a sharp rally preceded the decline to the May lows. The November, 1960 advance occurred fairly close to the end of the 1961 bull market, but It preceded that market's most dynamic phase. It is also in- teresting to note that a series of advances of magnitude equivalent to this one have occurred since the lows of last May. A repeated series of powerful short-term rallies has, recently, tended to occur around market bottoms, i.e., 1962 and 1966-1967. We thus feel that the present rise Signifies not an unhealthy condition, but the sort of latent buying power which, in the past, has fueled bull markets. We think that the strength shown In recent weeks strongly suggests a highly' 'positive market environment for 1971. Dow-lones Inc. lilOO a.m.) B25.5B ANTHONY W. TABELL SA&WPT(m1n00 a.m.) 90.18 DELAFIELD, HARVEY, TABELL No statement or expression of opinion or any other maller herein contained IS, or IS to be deemed to be, directly or mdlfectly, em offcr or the soliCitation of on offen to buy or sell any sncunty referred to or mentioned The matter IS presented merely for the convcnlence of the subSCriber While we believe the sources of our ,nformatlon 10 be reliable, we In no way reprcsent or guarantee Ihn accuracy thereof nor of the statnments made herein Any action to be talen by the subSCriber should be based on hiS own Investigation and Informatlon Montgomery, Scott & Co, as a limited partnership, and Its portnnrs or employees, may now have, or may later take, positions or trades In respect to any seCUrities mentioned In thiS or any future Issue, and such position may be different from any views now or hereafter expressed In thiS or any other Inue, Montgomery, Scott & Co, which 1 regIstered w1th the SEC as an Investment adVisor, may gIve adVice to lis Investment advISOry ond other customers Independenffy of any statements mode In thiS or In any other Issue

,———————————————————————————————— ., I TABELL'S MARKET LETTER —J 909 STATE ROAD, PRINCETON, NEW JERSEY 08540 DIVISION OF MEMBER NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE MEMBER AMERICAN STOCK EXCHANGE December 18, 1970 Like any other profession, that of market-letter writing has its traditions and one of them – . isth.e..monttuo consult.the orac;les il.Jld put together a forecast…….,.,.. . . . .- .-.- — .-r.——' -…-0– …. – -.. for the upcoming year. This letter has traditionally divided this exercise into two parts — the first of which discusses the market action of the previous year, while the second attempts to look forward. The initial segment, a glance back at 1970, is offered herewith. A forecaster, it seems to us, must be ready, as his readers certainly are, to poke a bit of fun at his own forecasts, and we are, therefore, wryly amused at our own efforts of a year ago. Our thoughts centered around the fact that, as of that time, S&P 500 Stock Index was down 19 from its November 1968 high. We noted the fact that declines of this size had occurred on four previous occasions in the post-war period, and indicated that, subsequent to these declines, the market was, at worst, about the same a year later and, in most cases, considerably higher. We suggested, therefore, that the aftermath for 1970 might be, in fact, similar, and that, by the end of 1970, the Dow could well be at the same level or a bit higher than it was in December, 1969. Lo and behold, the forecast proved correct and, the Dow, then at 780, is now at 820. We would prefer, obviously, to forget the circuitous detour via 631 over which the Dow traveled in order to arrive at our forecast figure. We raise the point here for two reasons. The first is, that it constitutes, we think, an object lesson of the value of keeping one's cool even through the most trying of market times. Investors who refused to succumb to panic in the Spring of this year have, in all probability, fared better than those who quaked at the imminent end of the world last May. The second -reason-is- that–i-t-is- market .action since.,….. this pattern will, largely, determine the outlook for 1971. Let us, therefore, review the year once more. The year began with the Dow having declined sharply from a late 1969 level in the mid- 800's. As 1970 commenced, the market stabilized and the first three months constituted a series of swings back and forth between 790-800 and 740-750. There was some eVidence at that time that the monetary stringency, characteristic of the previous year, had been relaxed, and the possibility that the Dow might begin a long, slow base formation in the 750-800 range had, at least, to be considered. Then, however, panic took over, with the Penn Central bank- ruptcy and concomitant fears of a liquidity crisis being the operative events connected there- with. The l70-point slide of April-May constituted the typical final liquidation phase of a bear market — the denouement of yet another era in which investors had to learn — the hard way — that the stock market was not a royal road to riches. The recovery was also typical, and, with the August rally, the Dow was back again at the general level where it had started the year. Repeated attempts to drive below 750-740 in September-October were all turned back by evident demand at that level just as they had been in January-March. The final triumphant capstone to the year, of course, was the November- December rally in which the major indices sailed ahead to new highs for the period. Now, even the novice technician will recognize the textbook definition for the sort of action ,of'course,-the familiar bottom And ;-it – is a common formation simply because the psychological factors which caused its formation in 1970 repeat themselves with regularity. A demand level exerts itself, is temporarily over- come under the impetus of irrational fear and, on the inevitable rebound, the same demand is again manifest at the previous level. It is, in summary, our opinion that the 1970 action of the equity markets constitutes an instance of just this sort of reversal and, in order to formulate a forecast for 1971, it is necessary to understand the implications of this pattern. We intend to discuss them in next week's issue. Dow-Jones Ind. (1100 a.m.) 822.36 S&P (1100 a.m.) 90.10 ANTHONY W. TABELL DELAFIELD, HARVEY, TAB ELL AWTmn A VERY MERRY CHRISTMAS TO ALL No statement or expression of opinion or any other matter herein contolned 15, or IS to be deemed to be, directly or indirectly, on offer or the 5OIUllollon of on offer 10 buy or sell any seC\lrlly referred to or mentioned The molter IS presented merely for the convenience of the subSCriber While we believe the sources of our Information to be rehab Ie, we in no way represent or guarantee the accuracy thereof nor of the statements made herein Any action to be taken by the subscriber should be based on hiS own Investigation and information Montgomery, Scott & Co, as a limited partnership, and Its partners or employees, may now have, or may later take, positions or trades In respect to any secunhes mentioned In Ih,s or any future ISsue, and such posllion may be different from any VieWS now or hereofler expressed In Ih,s or any other Issue Montgomery, Scott 8. Co , which IS registered with the SEC as on Investment adVisor, may give advice to Its Investment adVisory and other customers Independently of any statements mode ,n this or In any other Issue

TABELL'S MARKET LETTER 909 STATE ROAD. PRINCETON, NEW JERSEY 08540 DIVISION OF MEMBER NEW YORK STOCK EXCH ….NGE MEMBER AMERICAN STOCK EXCHANGE December 23, 1970 The stock market forecast for 1971 presents, it seems to us, a fascinating paradox. The – itseH;'l.t opfimistic'Yet; hand-,the- very nature of the forecast raises some fascinating questions about changes in the investment environment for the entire decade of the 1970' s. Let us first of all dispose of the outlook for the coming year. All the data, as we indicated above, seem to suggest that it will be a good one. In the early part of 1970, the monetary stranglehold which had been maintained on the economy was released, and, during the year, the money stock has been allowed to grow at a normal, or slightly above normal, rate. We think it axiomatic that this growth will be reflected in an expanding GNP and a better corporate profits environment by the end of 1971, albeit that growth in the first part of the year will un- doubtedly be slow and accompanied by continued rising unemployment. The existence of a substantial gap between actual and potential GNP, moreover, augurs well, in our view, for a continued expansion in 1972. This outlook is reflected perfectly, it seems to us, in the technical pattern of the stock market. We indicated last week our belief that all of 1970 constituted a head-and-shoulders accumulation formation on the DJIA. Applying classical point-and-figure analysis to this accumulation area results in a number of upside objectives, but the most plausible one seems to be a projection of 1065 or a level slightly above the all-time high posted in 1966. When might this level be reached If one projects the upward slope of the average since May forward into the future — a reasonably valid statistical procedure with an upswing as -. – well'defineoastlfe-pres ent 'th might be achieved sometime in the first quarter of 1972. This is a prospect which, it seems to us, jibes rather naturally with the economic outlook suggested above. Technical work, in other words, suggests strongly that we are now in the relatively early stages of a fairly typical bull market. This is confirmed in almost classic fashion by the type of market leadership we have been having and are apparently likely to have for the foreseeable future. Since May, the best performing issues have been those of relatively high quality, a manifestation normally, associated with the transition from bear to bull market and the initial stages of a new rise. As time goes on, and this will undoubtedly occur sometime during 1971, leadership should shift to cyclical, medium-grade issues, and, later on, of course, to secondary and tertiary speculative items. Indeed, the first faint glimmers of such a shift can now be seen on the market horizon. We are, in summary, saying that the- most plausible 1971 forecast calls for almost a text- book sort of a bull market and yet, placed in a longer term context, this forecast, as we said, raises some rather interesting questions. We indicated the probability of a modest new high on the Dow — this high possibly being reached in early 1972 — in other words, an upswing of about 60 lasting a bit under two years. It must be noted that this is in sharp contrast with the sort of upswing typical of the period between World War II and the mid 1960's. At that time, advances tended to last three to four years and involve rises of around 100. Our fore- – cast'environment -is 'more s imilar-tothe '1966-1968 upswing-in which-a3 2- advance'covered a 26-month period. It is also worthy of note that, if our forecast is correct, the Dow at the end of the year will have remained in a trading range between 600 and 1000 for a seven-year period — action quite dissimilar from the post-war experience. We think, in other words, that there is evidence to suggest that the basic market environ- ment which has characterized the post-war period is slowly changing. This new environment could well be characterized by shorter and less dynamic swings in the overall market together with a lack of support from the secular uptrend which was the basic force associated with the market for a 20-year period. We are convinced that, in this sort of environment, investment opportunities will abound but that the opportunity to achieve growth by inaction — a technique which worked surprisingly well for a long period — may well no longer be present. Dow-Jones Ind. 823.11 S&P 90.10 AWTmn ANTHONY W. TAB ELL DELAFIELD, HARVEY, TAB ELL WE WISH YOU ALL A VERY HAPPY NEW YE'AR – ,- No statement or exprCSlon of Opinion or any other mailer herem contolned is, or IS to be deemed to be, directly or Indirectly. an offer or the SOIlCIlolion of on offer to buy or sell any security referred to or menfroned The moiler 15 presented merely for the convenIence of the subWlber Wnlle we believe the sources of our Informalion to be relioble, we m no way represent or guarantee the accuracy thereof nor of the statements mode herem Any adlon to be token by the sub scuber hould be based on hiS own Investigation and Information Montgomery, Scott & Co, as a limited partnership, and Its partners or employees, may now have, or may later toke, pasilions or trades in respect to ony securilies mentioned m thiS or any future Issue, and such pOSlhon may be different from any views now or hereafter expressed m thiS or any other issue Montgomery, Scott & Co, which Is registered With the SEC as on Investment advisor, may give adVice to Its Investment odvlsory and other cusfomef5 independently of any statements made m thiS or In any other Issue