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Tabell’s Market Letter – April 29, 1977

Tabell’s Market Letter – April 29, 1977

Tabell's Market Letter - April 29, 1977
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TABELL'S MARKET LETTER I . J 909 STATE ROAD, PRINCETON, NEW JERSEY 08540 DIVISION OF' MEMBER NEW VORK STOCK EXCHANGE, INC MEMBER AMERICAN STOCK eXCHANGE April 29, 1977 .,,-. ,The.stock .market)ast .weekJepeaJ.d g,paJtrnJbathas.reCjl.ntly.become alL too famil- -toiar. That pattern began to be traced out on Monday as the Do; eacied c-las-e aT'9'l4 -60 , -d;w; — . 12 1/2 pOints to a new IS-month low. The market's reaction to that conventionally bearish new low was one which, as we suggested above, has been of late common — it promptly turned around and went up. Following a desultory session on Tuesday, in which an early rally was erased in late trad- ing and a new intraday bottom was posted, the Dow scored an eight-pOint advance in Wednesday's trading and followed that up with strength throughout most of Thursday. We suggested two weeks ago that the Simple-minded follower of breakouts on the Dow has had a hard time of it since last September. Last week's action did not make it any easier. In efforts to describe the rather strange market environment that has existed since last fall, one finds the word frustrating gaining increasing currency. We, ourselves, are becom- ing somewhat tired of repeating the obvious facts. We suspect, also, that our readers are bored with having uS tell them that the average stock is acting better than the Dow or the S & P 500, that the Transportation Index, in contrast with the two indices mentioned above, is acting extremely well or that the glamour stocks are taking a severe pasting, thus somewhat distorting the overall market picture. All of the above statements are true and, indeed, have been true since the first of the year. The difficulty is that they tell us little, at least in the terms we are used to, about the stock market. There is little doubt that one of the reasons the current market frustrates many inves- tors is that it is very difficult to place a handy label on it. The terms bull market and bear mar- ket are familiar ones and give a sense of place. The current market, unfortunately, cannot, on the basis of currently available data, be labeled with either appellation. .-.,. –,–.- T'he-last-time-we were-able-t-o'state-with'absolute-certainty.that-abull market..extsted was on September 21st of last year. At that point, the Dow had attained a new closing high at 1014.79, a 75 advance from the December, 1974 low. By definition, a bull market existed on that day. Since that time, for 156 trading days, seven long months, the Dow has failed to score a new high. Over those seven months, therefore, the applicability of the bull-market label has been called into ever-more-serious question. There exists a Simplistic school of thought which maintains that, if a bull market is not underway, a bear market must be. This particular either-or approach has never gained much favor in this quarter. We think the historical record demonstrates that the characteristics of a bear market include a fairly substantial percentage decline, coupled with a relatively sharp degree of steepness. Neither condition has existed to date. On a percentage basis, the Dow is off 9.87 from its high of last September through Monday. It is difficult to characterize a decline of this mag- nitude as being much more than intermediate-term in scope. Such declines have, at fairly numerous times in the past, taken place within the context of ongoing upswings, About the last adjective, furthermore, that can be applied to the drop is steep. If one computes the slope of the downtrend from last September to this week, one finds it declining at the rate of only .23 pOints per day On the Dow. To put this in context, the market could go on declining for another year at an equivalent rate and produce a drop of only 57 Dow pOints. Since the index's variability about the central trend is about 80 points, the upper limit of a trend channel extended out a year into the future is, roughly, at the same level as the Dow today. Clearly, conventional bear market standards have not yet been met. – Wedoriot; in6ther'words;-feel'it iSPossilile-at tllls- stage-to-afflX a label to the– present market. Based on its shape to date, it is possible that it may constitute simply a correction within what will someday come to be known as a continuing market upswing. With a bit more of a decline, it could equally well be set into the context of a full-scale correction of the 1974-76 bull market and the prelude to a new major advance. We intend to resist for a bit longer the temptation to pin labels and let events tell their story. Dow-Jones Industrials (1200 p.m.) S & P Composlte (1200 P. m.) Cumulative Index (4/28/77) AWT/jb 927.24 98.27 650.03 ANTHONY W. TABELL DELAFIELD, HARVEY, TABELL No statement or eprenlon of opinion or any other motter herein contained IS, or IS 10 be deemed to blL', directly or Indirectly, on offer or Ihe 501lcltollon of on offer to buy or ell any setIJf1ly referred 10 or mentioned The moiler 15 presented merely for the converlencc of the lvbscrtber While oNe believe the sovrces of ovr InformotlOn to be relloble, we In no way represent or guarantee Ihe accuracy thereof nor of Ihe statements meade herein Any ochon 10 be token by the subscnber shovld be based on hu own mvestlgotlOn and mformahon Janney Montgomery Scofl, Inc, as 0 corporal/on, and tts offtcen or employees, rnoy now have, or may loler lake, poslhons or Irodes In respect to ony secvrlhes menttoned In thiS or any fulvre ISSVe, and svch pOSition may be different from any Views now or hereafter exprened tn thiS or any other ISSUe Jonney Montgomery ScalI, Inc, whICh IS registered wllh the SEC as on Investment adVisor, may give adVice to lis Investment adVisory and olhel customers Independently of any statements mode In Ihls or In any other Issve Fvrlher information on ony secl,trlly menlloned herein IS available on request –.

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Tabell’s Market Letter – May 06, 1977

Tabell’s Market Letter – May 06, 1977

Tabell's Market Letter - May 06, 1977
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j , iil.G CE fl..!l. ' S lRfr! & . RH'A; Gi.J PI1'Ub! 909 STATt RO …. O. PRINCLTON NLW JEUEV OHl.. .,O ntvr .. r. or t.'!Ff';t.P. NLW OKL1UC' 1 C,)ANUt JNL MEMOER AMERICAN STOCK EXCHANGE May 6, 197'-'-l A good deal of recent market discussion has centered around the difference in per- I formance of various market averages. We intend, therefore, as space permits, to discuss some aspects of the more widely-followed indicators. As a start on that process, we rec(mtly compiled the following table which shows the 30 Dow stocks, with their weight In that average, and the 30 heaviest-weighted stocks In the S & P 500. The list for each average shows the stock's weight in the other average and the difference in those two weights. 30 DDwJOtS STOCKS STOCK T IN OJlA .0 UIFf . I 30 AVltST.EIGHTED 1 1 1 .O D.II . ST OC &P 500 STOCKS X T IN S&P a l IT IN D0 JlA O.IF'F' , . ! d i 1., .j 1 OU POT DE NEMOuW 'Ide 1,00 li,li! 1 ! B i PflUCH F. GAMblE 5.71 1.07 4.bll 1 AMRICAN Tf & TtL GEERAL MOTORS CORP ,'Il 3,cl I .71 1 t.XXON CORP EATrA KOnAK CO 4,6t 1.78 3.06 I GeAl MOTORS COR MtNICAN TEL TEL 4, b,23 -1.11 I GENeRAL tLECTQIC CD SEARS kOEUCK CO ' n 1,57 2,80 I EASTMAN KODAK CO UNIO tAIU COP 4,lb a,!)!! 3,58 1 SEA5 IOEI'UCK CO ALUMINUM CO Of AMt N 4,011 0,32 3,J7 I STANDAID all IOIANA ITtNATluNAL PAE 1l.0 0,3 3.0 1 ROYAlOUTCH f'OLEU OWS lLLlOIS INL 3,'11 0,15 3,6 I HXACO l!C EHO CORP !.b!) .5, T1- O,Ob 1 MOBIL LOkI' MINNtSuTA MINING M 3,b2 0,\15 2.b7 1 DOw CHtMICAL CO GlNEkAL ELtCTRIC CD 3,5'1 1,64 1 ,14 I STAuAka OIL CALif UNITtD STATts STEEL 3,2'1 O,bl a,b6 I PROCH & ('AMALE AMH'JCA\ ekAr.,liS Jolt 0, 1!j r.,96 1 au PONT DE NtMOUNS ALLIu CHtMICAL CO 3,10 a,co 2,'10 1 MINNeSOTA MlING MFG AMEIC.N CAt CO c,S'I 0,12 2,71 I GULF all CORP STANOAO vIl CALIF i!.j 1,09 1 , T 1 ATLANTIC ICHFIEO UNITt TECHNOLDulES c.'1'1 0, 1 2.34 1 ORO MOTO CO bElhLtMtM STEEL COk .'1b O,e 2.21 I SCHI.UMfIGtR INTtNATNL ARVE5TE c,'1l 0,1 b 2,21 1 EVf.HHAutSE CO coJONS ANVILlE CORP 2,31 0,11 2.20 1 S'UL OIL GENEkAL FOUnS COMP c.ea O.eb 2,0' 1 AMfR1CAN HOME PROD INCU 2.eO 0,.51 1.8S 1 CATERPILLAR TAC10H ESMAK INC c,ttO 0,09 ., oil I COCA COLA CO TEUr.O INC 1, '13 1,1'1 0,7'1 1 HILLIPS pETROLEU wOllLoOklt F CO 1,11'1 0,12 GOUUYEA TIR & RUbR 1. 0.24 Cl1kY5ltF! ('OHP 1,SoS 0.16 1 .72 I MEkCt( 1\ co l/'C ,c1 1 I GEN TEL ELECTRONIC I.! 1 KRESGE S 5 CO lSTINGHOSE ELECT 1.21 O,e5 I.O.! I JOHNSON JOHhSON b,14 0,00 &,14 b,23 .52 1 ,71 3,11 3,&5 0.0& 3,ci 4,111 01,11 1,84 J,II -1,74 1,18 ,6b -3,08 1,7 ,37 -2.80 1,ii! 0.00 I, c2 1. C!0 O.ClO 1.20 1,1 1,'13 0,14 1,1& 0,00 I, 1& 1,15 0,00 1,15 1. 0'1 .83 -1,14 1,07 5,71 -4.&/1 I, 00 ',12 -!l.12 0.5 3.&2 -2,&1 O,eq 0,00 0,89 0,6'1 0,00 0,6'1 0,65 0.00 O,5 0.e3 0,00 O,B3 0,81 0,00 0,81 O,6/) 0.00 0,60 0.16 0.00 1'1,78 0,17 0,00 0.11 0,7& 0,00 0,76 O,bQ 0,00 O,&q D,b8 0,00 0,18 0,05 0,00 0,65 O,b5 0,00 0,&5 0,&11 0,00 0.&4 TOTAL That there should be differences in the performance of the two indicators is hardly surprising. The table for the Dow stocks shows that they account for only 28 of the weight of the S & P 500 and that 28 of the 30 carry a heavier weight in the Dow than they do in the S & P (largely due to the fact that the Dow contains fewer stocks and weights, effectively, by price). On the other hand, while the 30 most lmportant stocks in the capital-weighted S & P 500 account for 45 of the total weight in that average, 19 of these stocks are not in the Dow, including IBM, the most heavily-weighted company In the S & P. Furthermore, 9 of those 11 are weighted more lightly in the S & P than in the Dow. We will be commenting in future Issues on the construction of these and other Indices and the implications thereof for Investment pollcy. Dow-Jones Industrials (1200 p.m.) 937.58 S & P Composite (l200 p.m.) 99.61 ANTHONYW. TABELL DELAFIELD, HARVEY, TABELL Cumulative Index (5/5/77) 663.86 AWT/lb ,- .1 ;-j —————– ——————————– ! 1. I. 1'1 I ' ,. , ' I f , ,II ,01' I, ., I,t,'. j F, ,1. J,.. , I I ! . d r ,.. ' , I, . , .\, – ' ' I 1 ,I( , I. j y , 11 '. , ''''' ,,' .I I. , ,I, ,,,.I Ii. '''''!il' P'''I,tl wi I,,, II,.. r ,' ,., ,, II,,,1. , \' \VII. ' I, I .., I,,, ,I''', tol, ,,) 1101, f' I. , I. I' I ' , ,. 'I' I/. I ,II, I ' I. I ' , (.1, ' ,,/ I, ' ,\,,1' H,' 1., I I' l.t' I),,, 1,,' ,I, t -,J,,,),j J,,, 1.,1.1,,, ,,,11'01,,,,'1,,1 . t. 1,,,,,,.'.1,, . , . , , , I oI'Oj .,,',' I I , , . ' . ' I . ',.. I ,I, ' f 1,.k ' ''I I I y . ' ,,,,.,,,,,.,,, 1 , tI. i I,,, ,. ', ''',,( .I. I' ,',., ' I. I,ll., ' to .., 1 . ,,1. i ,I, I' ..1 ' ''I'\'.,\ ,,' ''''1'''',.,( ,- c' h,,,,,.v,\ '''Y ., II I .lill I I, I. '1'''.1 ,1111 110. ,II ,,,' ,,,.' ''' III ,,., '''' . ,,,I,,, I. III ,-, . I ,f.. .,(, ,,1 ,I, L. ' – -,. ,,' ' .. , i ! ' ,., ' ' ' . , I ' … ' I ' I , ' .I, ,II.' I i , ,. I ,I ,d i. I I

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Tabell’s Market Letter – May 13, 1977

Tabell’s Market Letter – May 13, 1977

Tabell's Market Letter - May 13, 1977
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, . — — – – j TABELL'S ! MARKET LETTER 1 JI 909 STATE ROAD, PRINCETON, NEW JERSEY 081540 DIVISION OF MEMBER NEW VORK STOCK EXCHANGE, INC MEMBER AMERICAN STOCK eXCHANGE May 13, 1977 We began last week a discourse 9n the composition of some of the more widely-followed – market.verIges withthe npte ,that wein!el1d9.1o,;c.optinue. hisdiscuss ion,in future-1etters. Our.;;.. …- 1–work with averages at this time is motivated by a bit more than the Simple desire to fill up space in a rather dull stock market. As readers will be aware, there has been growing interest of late in a technique called indexing. This latest of panaceas to gain a following among professional money managers involves the construction of a portfolio so as to duplicate, as precisely as possible, the performance of a given market average — in most cases, the S & P 500. We will have some thoughts on this subject before we are done. Before discussing the concept, however, it is worthwhile to have some idea of the criteria used to index a portfolio. Hence, some further discussion of the two most popular indicators, the Dow-Jones 30 Industrials and the S & P SOD-Stock Index. The anomalies in the Dow have been pointed out by many writers. They start out with the fact that the average sells for over 900 despite the fact that no one of the 30 components sells for anywhere near that price. This stems from the method used to adjust for splits, additions and deletions since the average was first put together in its present form in 1928. The computation of the average simply consists of adding up the closing prices of the 30 indiVidual issues and dividing by a constant divisor. When a split or other adjustment takes place, it is that divisor which is changed, not the process of cumulating the prices of one share of each stock. After almost 50 years of adjustment, the divisor is now 1.474, thus producing the current high level of the average. Strangely enough, it is not the divisor itself but the technique of using the price of just one share of each stock which causes the distortion in the index. The method causes high-priced stocks to be weighted more heavily than low-priced ones. Thus, Dupont accounts for 9 of the Dow Simply by virtue of its currently having the highest price while Chrysler is the least lmportant component by reasOnof b-elnc;i tlierowest'-pficed'iSStfE;7'WeteDuP6Iit to spliCterlforone-; it wOulalmmediatel'Y' change from the most important factor in the index to the least important one by a considerable margin. Most portfolios, obviously, are constructed around equal market value holdings of all component stocks, certainly not on the basis of an equal number of shares. Yet, it is precisely this basis on which the Dow is put together. The need for a broader and more scientific index led to the origination, over 20 years ago, of the S & P 500. Paradoxically, the S & P, despite its 500 components, is not a broad index at all. The reason for this, again, lies in the details of computation. The method essentially is to take the price of each of the components and multiply it by the total number of shares outstanding. The resultant total market value is then diVided by a base — originally calculated to make the index equal to 10 in a 1941-43 base period. The result is, to paraphrase George Orwell, that some stocks wind up being a great deal more equal than others,and the larger companies bear a disproportionate weight in the index. The table below illustrates the phenomenon. With this capital-weighting, IBM and American Telephone between then account for the same weight in the index as the 283 lowest-ranked companies. 1st 2 stocks 1st 4 stocks 1st 11 stocks 1st 22 stocks —1st 37 stocks Weight in 500 Weight in 500 13 Lowest 100 stocks 1.4 20 Lowest 200 stocks 5.8 30 Lowest 300 stocks 14.8 40 Lowest 400 stocks 30.0 -. – -50—-' -Lowest.,450 stocks-'-'-43-6 — –.- The above remarks sound more critical of the two market indicators than they are, in fact, meant to be. They are meant only to point out the fact that both indicators have limitations for statistical purposes, and it is best to be aware of these limitations before proceeding further, let alone measuring portfolio performance on the action of these averages. The fact is, quite simply, that there is no such thing as a perfect market average nor will there ever be. The appropriateness of a given average is solely dependent on the use to which it is being put. Whether a given index is an adequate measure of portfolio performance will depend, moreover, on the characteristics of the portfolio for which it is used as a benchmark. This is a point to which we intend to return in future discussion. Dow- Jones Industrials (12 00 p. m.) S&P CompOSite (1200 p.m.) Cumulative Index (5/11/77) AWT/jb 927.49 98.88 662.66 ANTHONY W. TABELL DELAFIELD, HARVEY, TABELL No statement or expreSlon of opinion or ony other matter herein conlolned IS, or IS 10 be deemed to be, directly or IndHectly, on offer or the Ol,cltollon of on offer 10 buy or sell ony securrty referred 10 or mentioned The motler 15 presented merely for The convel'tence of The subscriber While -He believe Ihe sources of our information 10 be reliable, we In no way represent or guarantee Ihe accuracy thereof nor of the statemenTS mude herein Any action to be laken by the subSCriber should be based on hiS own Investigation and 'nformatIon Janney Montgomery SCali. Inc, as a corporation, and ,ts offICers or employees, may now have, or may laler tke, palllon! or Irades In respect to any secUrities mentioned In thiS or any future Issue, and such POSition may be d,fferenl from any views now or hereafter expressed In Ihls Of any other Issue Janney Montgomery Scali, Inc, which IS regluered With the SEC 05 an Investment adVisor, may give adVice 10 liS Investment adVISOry and athel customers ,ndependently of any STatemenls made In thIS or In any other ISsue Further Information on any security mentioned herein IS available on request

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Tabell’s Market Letter – May 20, 1977

Tabell’s Market Letter – May 20, 1977

Tabell's Market Letter - May 20, 1977
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TABELL-S MARKET LETTER 909 STATE ROAD, PRINCETON. NEW JERSEY 08540 DIVISION OF MEMBER NEW YORK STOCK eXCHANGE, INC MEMBER AMERICAN STOCK EXCHANGE May 20, 1977 '- ..,…..,..- -Ithas -to- end'S0met-i-me;– What-we-are-referr-ing-to,–of'course-;-is. the-torpor-beingdis–. . played by the equity market which, on a macro basis, has been locked at essentially the same level for what is now longer than 15 months Expressed in terms of the Dow-Jones Industrial Average, the market has held between, approximately, 920 and 1020 ever since February of 1976. To be sure, as is almost always the case when the market remains in a protracted trading range, there have been individual areas which have proved themselves either rewarding or painful. During the past five quarters, both transportation and utility issues have been edging in the direction of new highs with s orne cons istency while, at the sa me time, the action of the growth favorites of a few years ago has been something just short of catastrophic. These crosscurrents have tended to cancel each other out, so that the sideways action of the Dow more- or less fairly describes the market as a whole albeit, perhaps, with a slight downward bias. Fifteen months is, after all, a long time, and the trouble is that we are getting used to this sort of thing. We tend to forget, therefore, that this sort of action is contradictory to the great bulk of historic stock market experience. HIstorically, the market has spent the bulk of its time moving — with some rapidity and sense of direction — from one price level to another, often quite disparate, price level. It is, therefore, almost axiomatic to suggest the likelihood of a move to some price level quite different from 920-1020 on the Dow before too much more time has elapsed. Given the above rather obvious statement, it would be helpful, to say the least, to have some idea as to what the direction of that next move might be. One of the frustrating facets of .– …,.-the recentmarketisthatit -has ,..bYtechnicala ctton-tn-date, provided4.ittlein'the- wayOf such an idea, and what clues there have been tended to be contradictory, confusing and vacillating. It is, perhaps, worthwhile, therefore, to view the latest evidence. Recent market action has provided us with a few tentative gestures in the direction of the ups ide. Through Wednesday of this week, the Dow had edged ahead in four consecutive trading sessions after digesting a fairly solid advance in late April-early May. At the Wednesday intraday high of 947.34, the Dow had returned to a level approximating its May 5th high of 949.46 and the earlier April 14th high of 956.07. Internal action was once more impressive. Our Cumulative Index, at a high of 672, was only two points away from the bull market peak scored last January, and breadth indices were continuing, as was the case last winter, to diverge positively from the Dow. The downtrend in the Dow, as measured from the year-end 1976 high, is close to being broken and would be decisively penetrated were any firmness to take place this week. The stage, in a sense, is set, but it has been set a number of times in the past 15 months without the a'udience ever having shown up. Being optimists at heart, we would like to think more positively than the above paragraphs suggest, but, on the basis of current scanty evidence, we are unable to do so. The most impressive arguments in favor of the upside at the moment are negative ones. Postulating, as we have above, an ultimate decis ive move from current levels, it is difficult, in our view, to build a persuasive downside case. Where, one may well ask, is downSide leadership to come from It has centered, so far, around the growth stocks. That these issues might trend — somewhat lower-isplausible,and thatthey might- not-move up verymuch–even more plausible.Expecting them to produce major bear-market leadership from these levels, however, appears rather far-fetched. We are, at current levels, moreover, enjoying an historically low level of stock prices at a time when what may well be a protracted earnings recovery appears underway. This sort of thing is hardly a precursor of a typical bear market. As we have reiterated almost to the point of distraction, all of the evidence regarding the market's direction is not yet in. Yet, it would be unwise, in our view, consciously or unconsciously, to project the last year's action indefinitely into the future. Dow-Jones Industrials (l200 p.m.) 930.72 S & P Composite (1200 p.m.) 99.47 Cumulative Index (5/19/77) 669.38 AWT/jb ANTHONY W. TABELL DELAFIELD, HARVEY, TABELL No statement or IIxpresslon of opln!on or any other mal1er herein conlcllned IS, or IS to be deemed 10 be, directly or Indirectly, on offer or Ihe solicitation of on offer to bvy or sell anv security referred 10 or me'llioned The motter IS presented merely for the conveJ'!nnce of the subSCriber. While .JVe believe Ihe sources of our Informa tlon to be reliable, we In no way represent or guaranlee the accuroty thereof nor of the stotement mude herein Any action 10 be token by the ubcrlber should be based on hiS own mvestlgatlan and mformallon Janney Montgomery Scott, Inc, as a corporollon, and Its officers or e'T1ployecs, may now have, or may lotcr toke, poslt'OM or trades In respect 10 any seCUnties menlloncd In thiS or any future Issue, and such poslllOn may be different from any views now or hereofter expressed In thiS or any other Issue Janney Montgomery Scott, Inc which 1 registered With the SEC as an Investment adVisor, may give adVice 10 lis mvestmenl adVISOry and othel customeu Indcpendenlly of any stolemen! mode In this or In any other Issue Further informatIOn on cny security mentioned herein IS oVOIloble on request

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Tabell’s Market Letter – May 27, 1977

Tabell’s Market Letter – May 27, 1977

Tabell's Market Letter - May 27, 1977
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TABELL'S MARKET LETTER 909 STATE ROAD, PRINCETON, NEW JERSEY 08!540 DIYISION OF MEM8E' NEW VORK STOCK EXCHANGE, INC MEMBER AMERICAN STOCK EXCHANGE May 27, 1977 I…., -c hara- cter i zeWd tehealrlruidajebdr last week to the rather obvious fact 'stock-mai'Keeaverages-for-the'besrP that the sideways action which had art'bf 1976;;77 -would is-omeday;,cb-me- – — to an end. This week's action tended to suggest that that someday was still off at some in- definite point in the future. On Wednesday, May 18, the Dow closed around the 942 level. At that price, it was flirting with a breakout from the calculated downtrend channel measured from the December 31, 1976 high, and a number of stock market areas were showing some signs of underlying firmness. Bullish hopes, however, were soon dashed as the Index, in the next five trading sessions, ptunged some 40 points to return again to around the 900 level. We are once more, apparently, back at square one. It is, perhaps, worthwhile to see if we can put what is going on into historical per- spective. The Dow, at Wednesday's low, was down just over 10 from its 1976 closing high of 1004.65. Measured from the three-month-earlier September high of 1014.79, to date the absolute high for the current cycle, the decline was just under 11. Neither of these figures should be too terribly startling. Stock market history in the post-Worid-War-ll period finds itself well supplied with examples of market drops which have extended to the 10-plus level without having developed to the 20 threshold generally used to categorize major bear markets. The 1946-49 period, one not without resemblances to the current one, contained no fewer than three such drops. Most major bull markets in the period in question have been interrupted at least once during their course with intermediate-term declines of around the current magnitude. One, indeed, has occurred already during the course of the current upswing, the Dow having dropped off 11. 07 —–OetWeen JuryanaOctoJ5er, r97The last previous-Sun market-, that of 1970'73, was interrupted- by a 16 per cent drop during the middle part of 1971. We are, thus, in one aspect,at least, on not totally untrodden ground. Market swings, however, as we have often pointed out, have two attributes — those of amplitude and time. It is the latter of these two attributes that lends a somewhat dif- ferent quality to the current decline. Measured from the December high, it has gone on for 102 trading days and from last September, a dreary 172 trading days. The deep sleep actually has gone on for even longer. Although the Dow did, indeed, make a new high last fall, the current period of sideways action, by many market measurements, began sometime in February of 1976. It is this 15 months of inaction that tends to distinguish the current stock market period from so many of its predecessors. For example, the 1975 decline referred to above burned itself out in just 55 trading days, and the one in 1971, somewhat longer, was over in 146 days measured from high to low. To find a period roughly comparable to the present one, it is necessary to go back much farther into history. In 1953, the Dow took 176 trading days to go down 13, and between June, 1948 and June, 1949, it required 281 trading days to decline by 16 (Saturday sessions explain the fitting of that many trading days into a one-year period). In any case, the modest downward bias exhibited over the past year or so stands out fairly clearly as something not all that common. The central question, of course, remains. Does this week's weakness signify noth- ing more. than the continuance of this relativly modest erosion, or are w.e experiencing, with.the currentdownswing;the beginning of an accelerating drop leading into a major bear market phase — the familiar downSide breakout from an important top formation. For reasons discussed at length in prior issues, we incline toward the former view. The failure to follow through on the upside certainly suggests the possibility, nay, indeed, the probability, of somewhat lower prices. We think, however, these lower prices if they occur will fit squarely into the context of the rather dreary stock market environment which we entered some 15 months ago. Dow-Jones Industrials (1200 p.m.) S & P CompOSite (1200 p. m) Cumulative Index (5/26/77) AWT/jb 903.32 96.62 651. 81 ANTHONY W . TABELL DELAFIELD, HARVEY, TABELL No statement or exprenlon of opinion or any olher motler herern contolned IS, or a 10 be deemed to be, directly or indirectly, on offer or 'he OIiCIIOllon of on offer 10 buy or sell any security referred to Or menlloned The moiler 15 presented merely for the convef'ience of the subscnber White He belIeve the sources of our mformahan to be rei table, we m no way represent or guarantee the accuracy thereof nor of the statements mude '-Ierem Any achon 10 be taken by Ihe subscrtber should be based on hn own InveSligotlOn and Informahon Janney Montgomery Scott, Inc, as a corporation, and Its ofhcers or employees, may now have, or may loter lake, POSItions Of trades In respect ta any seCUflliei mentioned m thIS or any future Issue, and such POSItion may be different from any Views now or hereafter expressed In thh or any other Issue Janney Montgomery Scali, Inc, which IS regIstered With the SEC as an Investment adVisor, may give adVice to Its Investment advISOry and other customers Independently of any statements made In Ihls or In any ather Issue FUr1her mformatlon on any secunty mentioned herem IS available on request

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Tabell’s Market Letter – June 03, 1977

Tabell’s Market Letter – June 03, 1977

Tabell's Market Letter - June 03, 1977
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TABELL'S MARKET LETTER 909 STATE ROAD, PRINCETON. NEW JERSEY 08540 DIVISION OF MEMDEII NEW YORK STOCK eXCHANGE, INC MEMBER AMERICAN STOCK. EXCHANGE – June 3, 1977 Readers of this letter by now are familiar with our view of the current dull stock market environment. The market continues to experience an erosion which to date has corrected the Dow- – – ..-.-; – – – – – – —– , – – – ..r- ……….. -'- –'' . approximately 11 from its September, 1976 high of 1014779. -In spite of the Dow'Jone's Inaustria-r— Average recently penetrating the 900 level reaching a cloSing low of 898.66 on Monday, it is diffi- cult for us to recognize this weakness as a precursor to a major bear market phase. Confirmed watchers of the Dow-Jones Industrial Average will immediately take issue with the above statement as clearly a downSide breakout from an important top formation has occurred. In the past, occasional reference has been made to Murphy's Law which states, If anything can go wrong, it will. More recently, atten- tion has been directed to O'Toole's Law which, Simply stated, says, Murphy was an optimist. Where could the Dow Watcher go wrong It is often maintained, as this letter has recently discussed, that the popular market averages because of a limited number of issues and weighting factors have been giv- ing a distorted picture of the stock market's true picture. The Cumulative Index, we feel, clearly underscores this. Started on May 1, 1964, this Index shows the average day-to-day percentage price change for all issues traded on the New York Stock Exchange. It, baSically, is computed by adding the daily percentage change of all stocks and dividing by the number of issues traded. We compute our Index by cumulating these percentage changes. In order to make the Index compatible to the DJIA, we used the DJIA April 30, 1964 close of 810.77 as a base. The Index, we feel, gives a reasonable proxy of the performance of the average New York Stock Exchange issue. Documenting the action of the Cumulative Index in relation to the DJIA can be a more valuable tool in formulating a forecast than merely relying on the DJIA. Utilizing a 20 filter on the Cumulative Index, the table below gives the value of the Cum- ulative Index at major market turning pOints since its inception, and the corresponding level of the Dow —..,c..-…,.,…….for. the. sa me .date,.toget!!E.'N,lth l'rclltag,Q!!an.ges4between el cIlpp)li,nt,. ——' 1- – Cumulative — -…,.-' Days Dow-Jones Date Index Change This Swing Industrials Change April 30, 1964 810.77 0.00 0 810.77 0 February, 1966 High 1095.03 35.06 452 995.15 22.7 October, 1966 Low 803.42 -26.63 164 744.32 -25.2 December,1968 High 1455.59 81.17 524 985.21 32.4 July,1970 Low 681.40 -53.19 390 669.39 -32.1 April, 1971 High 1060.13 55.58 205 950.82 42.0 November,1971 Low 827.06 -21.99 146 797.97 -16.1 March, 1972 High 1044.70 26.32 74 950.18 12.1 December,1974 Low 345.61 -66.92 703 577.60 -39.2 May, 1977 High 669.84 93.81 735 943.44 63.3 June 1, 1977 Low 649.37 – 3.06 9 906.55 – 3.9 A number of observations are apparent. It is interesting to note the number of trading days in each of the last two major swings. From the 1972 high to the 1974 low, a total of 703 days were ob- served, while the subsequent rally from the 1974 low to the recent May, 1977 high took 735 days. Hectic Wide swings in relatively short periods of time reminiscent of the late sixties-early seventies has given way to more orderly, albeit more lethargic, markets, not unlike recent months. If you accept the premise that the Cumulative Index is a proxy for the performance of the average NYSE issue, we find that in every case the Dow understates the extent of this performance. For example,the,Cumulatiye Index intheshort.period of,sixyears from its 1968 high'of-l'45559'foits – 1974 low of 345.61 has lost an incredible 76.26. In other words , we have seen a market which has seen the average stock lose three-fourths of its value over a Six-year period. The DJIA from its Dec- ember, 1968 high of 985.21 corrected to 577 .60 in December, 1974, a correction of 41.37 or approx- imately one-half that of the Cumulative Index. I n addition, from as recently as the March, 1972 high of 1044.70 on the Cumulative Index to its 1974 low of 345.62, a decline of 66.92was registered. What the Cumulative Index seemS to be saying is the speculative excesses of the late sixties has, in fact, been dramatically corrected. This excess has not been properly reflected in the DJIA. Conversely, the same is true in up swings. Since the October, 1966 low of 803.42 to the 1968 high of 1455.59, an advance of 81. 17 was registered in the Cumulative Index versus an increase of 32.4 in the Dow. More recently, the Cumulative Index, since the December, 1974 low of 345.61, advanced Significantly to the May, 1977 high of 669.84 resulting in a gain of 93.81. The DJIA for the same period has ap- preciated 63.3 from its December, 1974 low of 577.60 to a recent high in May, 1977 of 943.44. Dow-Jones Industrials (1200 p.m.) 909.01 ROBERT J. SIMPKINS, JR. S & P Composite (1200 p.m.) 97.09 DELAFIELD, HARVEY, TABELL Cum\/j1A;t;;r\ti';n or cny ma-t(Onlamed orRJS ether IS, IS to be deemed to be, directly or indirectly, on offer or the soliCitation of on offer I buy or sell any seaJflty 'ton 10 be reliable we In referred no way to or mentioned The matter IS presented merely represent or guarantee the accuracy thereof nor for of the the conver'lenCC of the subscriber stotements mude herein Any V'/llile we belIeve oct Ion to be token btyhethseo usu' ' b sscrolfbeorulrs hnf'dbou k e based on hi! own 'lnvesllgatlan and Informatlo(l Janney Montgomery posItions or trades In respect Ic any securities mentioned In thiS or any Scott, futuro tnc, 05 a 11S(le, and corporatIOn, and Its officers or such pOSitIOn may be different erflployees, may from any views now now ohra vhee,reoardf tmeraye.aprleedrsetthein, thiS or any other Issue Janney Montgomery Scolt, Inc, which IS registered With the SEC as on Investment adVisor, may gIVe adVice to ItS Investment 0 visoryon 0 er customers Independently of ony statements mode ,n Ih,s or en any other Issue Further Information on any securIty mentioned herein IS ovollable on request

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Tabell’s Market Letter – June 10, 1977

Tabell’s Market Letter – June 10, 1977

Tabell's Market Letter - June 10, 1977
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TABELL'S MARKET LETTER 909 STATE ROAD. PRINCETON. NEW JERSEY 08540 DIVISION OF MEMBER NEW VORK STOCK eXCHANoe. INC MEMBER AMERICAN STOCK eXCHANGE – June 10, 1977 , o-f-its19 77,Jt'r.ahd.e-i-nm.g-arrakne-tgeco,-nattinl–ue-ea- ss- t its schizoph –i.n—-s-o–far as-.t renic behavior, this time in the v he'Dow-J…..-t….-.-……. o-n-es-I-ndus..tr-i.a'l-A.. v-E!-r,ig'e icinity of the low end is-concerne'd;-'The, p6st'- Holiday market of May 31st saw that Index drop below 900 for the first time this year. However, the drop was quickly followed by a tepid rally which brought the average back up above that figure. It is no news to anyone that the market since the first of the year has remained in a rela- tively narrow trading range. The shape of that range, however, varies widely, depending on the aver- age at which one looks. Trading ranges are, after all, defined by J!ighs and lows, and the patterns of highs and lows have differed between the major averages. There have, during 1977, thus far, been five separate up-down cycles for the market with a sixth possibly now underway. The following table based on intra day figures, attempts to examine separately the highs and lows for each of the three major Dow-Jones Averages, the Industrial, Trans portation and Utility. HIGHS – 1977 The pattern of successive highs for the Dow-Jones Industrials shows an unrelievedly doleful pattern. No rally since the first of the year has been able to equal the high achieved by the previous one, with the average now almost 100 pOints below the year's high. For the Transportation Index, the picture is somewhat brighter. Neither the March or April rally equaled the January peak, but the early- May short-term rise brought that Index to new highs as did the subsequent advance into mid-May. A consistent pattern of higher peaks has been maintained ever since March. The best pattern, however, is shown by the Utilities. With the exception of March, every single rally has taken that average to new highs and, indeed, the intra day peak for Wednesday of this week constituted yet another yearly high, this achieved within a week of a new low by the Industrials and the day after a minor low made by the Trans portation Average. Strangely enough, the pattern of lows made by the indiVidual indices is somewhat unlike the pattern of highs. This is not true of the Utility Average which has maintained an unbroken uptrend with each successive minor low being higher than the last one, a formation similar to that of the in- dividual highs. For the Transportation stocks, successively higher lows have been posted ever since March-April, although that pattern apparently has been broken with the recent move to a new low below the May 9th bottom. It is the Industrials, however, that show the greatest discrepancy between peaks and troughs. — – -, Although'ea-ch'hew'IlIdustrial 'll'eak'nas'been-appreciablylower than the last,the'average'managed,to '-'- hold its April 5th low until just recently and, indeed, penetrated that low by only a minor amount. Thus, the Industrial pattern has been more or less one of a descending triangle — not, historically, a notably bullish formation. It is not quite clear what is to be made of this disparity in patterns. For this year, at least, the Utilities have shown a tendency to lead the other two indices, and, in this sense, the recent new high must be conSidered as being bullish. On the other hand, a similar leading tendency on the part of the Transportation Index appears to have disappeared in the recent decline, and whether it will reemerge remains to be seen. We have, in any case, one more set of numbers which strongly suggests the disparity which has existed in the marketplace during the past year. Dow-Jones Industrials (1200 p.m.) 908 ..75 S & P Composite (1200 p.m.) 98.15 ANTHONYW. TABELL DELAFIELD, HARVEY, TABELL Cumulative Index (6/9/77) 658.51 AWT/jb –I , No statement or expression of OpInion or any otner motter herein contOlned IS, or IS 10 be deemed to be, dtrectly or indirectly, on offer or the solicltotlon of on offer to buy or sell any secunty referred 10 or menhoned The molter Is presented merely for the convertence of the Sl,IbKrlber WhIle Ne believe the sources of our InformatIon to be reliable, we m no woy represent or guarantee the accuracy thereof nor of the statements mude herem Any action to be laken by the subscriber should be based on hiS own mvest,gat,on and mformotlon Janney Montgomery Scott, Inc. as a corporat,an, and Its officers or employees, mol now have, or may later toke, pOSitions or trades In respect 10 any seCUrities mentiOned In Ih,s or any future Issue, and such POSition may be different ffom any views now or hereafter expressed In Ih,s or any other Issue Janney Montgomery Scott, Inc, whICh IS registered WIth the SEC as on investment adVisor, may give odvlce to Its Investment adVisory ond othel customers Independently of any slotements mode In thiS or In any other Issue Further information on any sccuoty mentIoned herein IS available on request

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Tabell’s Market Letter – June 17, 1977

Tabell’s Market Letter – June 17, 1977

Tabell's Market Letter - June 17, 1977
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TABELL'S MARKET LETTER 909 STATE ROAD. PRINCETON, NEW JERSEY 08540 DIVISION OF MEMBER NEW VOAK STOCI( EXCHANGe, INC MEMBER AMERICAN STOel( EXCHANGE June 17, 1977 One of the more perceptive and lucid wrlters regularly appearing in the Wall Street – . 10urilarisDr.- Irvlng Ktistol;-'res1dents-cholar a1 ther'A-merican EnterpriseInstitute and a—member'— of the Journal's Board of Contributors, which position ensures his regular appearance on the editorial page of that publication. His latest article, which appeared last Tuesday, is entitled, The Foxes vs. the Hedgehog, and it likens the current apparent disparity between the stock market and the economy to the ancient distinction between the hedgehog and the fox The clever fox knows a lot of little truths whlle the wise old hedgehog knows only one big truth. And adding up all those clever little truths never does bring one close to the one big truth — the simple wisdom — that counts. Dr. Kristol draws the distinction between the consensus economic forecast, at the moment unreservedly bullish, and the behavior of the market which, he says offers only melan- choly price/earnings ratios … and .. appears to foresee minimal economic growth (or none at all) and the probability of greater inflation. He goes on to note the prospect of a substantial increase in the 1978 Federal defiCit, the fact that consumer spending is being fuelled by debt rather than by increased purchasing power, and that productivity lags whlle Government-induced ',- inflation and high tax rates continue. The stock market, Dr. Kristol says, notes all these facts and incorporates them into its underlying theory which is hardly a theory at all, but simply an old-fashioned diagnosis of the conditions of economic growth. This is the one big truth the stock market knows the 'secret', of growth—which is no secret at all, except from certain economists and politicians. Now, we have little with which to quibble about Dr. Kristol's basic thesis, and we would hate to be put in the position of defending the rationale behind some of the economic think- , ing now coming out of Washington. As market technicians, a basic tenet of our faith has always – I -oeen thanhematKefltseU'!s-'''r!ghe'-moreoftentfian1ns'''wrong'';'i!ndwehegtlarly-p6intea.—-.–.-.1 out the utter futility of using economic forecasts to predict the stock market, since we are fully ,I, aware of the fact that the market has a far better predictive record than most forecasters. However, ; while the market often has an almost oracular record as a predictor, it often speaks in accents that are less than clear. Hence, it is probably worth some effort to decipher what the stock market is currently trying to say. I I .- – Let us take, to begin with, price/earnings ratios. They are, admittedly, historically low but they have, on the other hand, been so for some four years and, indeed, reached their low as far back as the end of 1974 — from which level they have recovered, albeit modestly. That low was reached after a high made in 1962, 15 years ago. Anyone who has studied the phenomenon is aware that the price that the market is willing to pay for a dollar of earning power tends to change over long (25 year) cycles. It is, thus, somewhat unfair to explain the current low level of this statistic totally in terms of skepticism as the prospects for economic recovery, however well-founded that skepticism might be. A much more important question is whether the long-cycle low for earnings multiples was, in fact, reached in 1974, a question to which the answer, even after three years, is not yet clear. The last time multiples reached their current levels was, of course, in the latter part of the 1940's, and conditions then were not totally disSimilar to those of today. As in the present case, recovery was underway, and, then as now, the market was evincing skepticism about that recovery, skepticism based at that time on the Depression that was supposed to follow World War II. It was the failure of that Depression to materialize that produced one of history's great bull markets. .,' . . – '—– The'problem'for-sTockniarket anilIYSls';'of course, s -noteconomic'foieiastlng7'Th-at I , i I ,i r I j ,,,. ! j activity, as Dr. Kristol rightly pOints out, is an uncertain one at best. It is, rather, the determina- tion of investment odds. Those odds shift in the investor's favor to the extent that potentially unfavorable developments become bullt into the market's price structure. Thus, whether the spectres that haunt Dr. Kristo1 — and, undoubtedly, the stock market — wlll, indeed, materialize in the present instance is a question we do not profess the competence to answer. Yet, while the market's current languor may be frustrating, we must confess our preference for a price structure obviously aware of potential trouble to one where, as was the case a decade or so ago, such trouble is blithely ignored. Dow-Jones Industrials (1200 p. m.) 920.45 ANTHONYW. TABELL S&P CompOSite (1200 p.m.) 99.88 DELAFIELD, HARVEY, TABELL Cumulative Index (6/16/77) 668.64 I I i 1 1 I ! j AWT /jb No statement or expressIon of opinIon or any alher matter herem contolned IS, or IS to be deemed 10 be, dIrectly or Indlrec1Ir.' on offer or the soliCitation of an offer to buy or selJ onr. security referred to or mentioned The matler IS presented merely for the convertenc;e of the subscriber Whl e e believe the Ources of our Informahon to be rehob e. we In no way represent or guarantee the occurocy thereof nor of the statements mude herein Any action to be token by Ihe subrlber should be based on hIS own If\veshgotlan and InformallOn Jenney Montgomery Scolt, Inc, as a corporation, and Its offIcers or employees, may now have, Or may rater tol.e, positions or trades In respect to ony secuntle, menltoned In thiS 0- any future Issue, and such POSitIon may be drfferent from any VleoNS now or hereafter expressed In this or any other luue Janney Montgomery Scolt, Inc. which IS registered With the SEC os on IfIveslmenl advisor, may give adVice to Its Ir\Vestment advnary and other C\Jstomen Independently of ony stalements mode In thts or In any other Issue further information on any secunty mentioned herein IS available on request

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Tabell’s Market Letter – June 24, 1977

Tabell’s Market Letter – June 24, 1977

Tabell's Market Letter - June 24, 1977
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TABELL'S MARKET LETTER 909 STATE ROAD, PRINCETON, NEW JERSEY 08540 DIVISION OF MEMBER NEW VOAI( STOCK EXCHANQE, INC MEMBER AMERICAN STOCK EXCHANGE June 24, 1977 Trend lines have been a major weapon in the technician's arsenal for many years. – HlstoffcallY7ihese lii'ies-haveoeerldfawnUSr;tlieeyeoa11 -inetliod;,,slmply'by'ifpplylng-a–niler- -. – and pencil to a stock price chart. The advent of computer-stored price data allows employment of a more sophisticated technique — mathematical computation of a channel describing price action between any two points in time. The method involves choOSing a given prior-high and low, computing a channel which describes price action between these two pOints and projecting that channel to the present to ascertain whether it is still descriptive of current price action. The technique has been applied in the chart below. INTERMEDIATE &MINOR COMPUTED OOWNTRENDS – DJIA .J.nE 22. 1m f f — OCT ,.,. … ' Ff81m '971 -' 177 We have, in recent history, two recognizable highs for the Dow-Jones Industrial Average, that of 1014.79 on September 21, 1976, and the year-end high of 1004.65. The most ,-;orecent low is,.of course,898.66 on May.31,1977. The,chart presentsg,computed channels —-.,' drawn from each high to that low. – – As can be seen, both channels have largely contained price action since their in- ception. The wider one, from the September high, is declining at the rate of .28 DJIA pOints per day and is some 78 pOints wide. The more recent, dropping at some. 53 points per day, is 52 pOints wide. The upper limit of the first is now around 961 and the latter at 932. Both channels have now been established long enough and fit the data closely enough to assume, in our view, some importance. We think eventual upside penetration of the two channels (to be decisive that penetration must last for a few days) will constitute an impor- tant first indication of reversal of the market's current slow downtrend. Dow-Jones Industrials (1200 p.m.) 928.77 ANTHONYW. TABELL S & P Composite (1200 p.m.) 100.99 DELAFIELD, HARVEY, TABELL Cumulative Index (6/23/77) 677 ; 23 pWT/jb No totement or expression of opinion or any olher moIler herein (Contolned IS, or IS to be deemed fa be. directly or indirectly, en offer or Ihe SollCllotlon of on offer to buy or sell ony security referred 10 or menlloned The motler 15 presented merely for the conveltlence of the subscriber While oNe believe the sources of our Informa- han to be relioble. we In no way represent or guarantee the accuracy thereof nor of the statements mode herein Any octlon fa be token by the slJbscnber should be bosed on hiS own mvestllJotlon and infOrmotlon Janney Montgomery Scott. Inc. as a corporation, and Its officers or e'l1ployees, moy now hove, or may later toke, poslhons or trades In respect to any securltlE!S mentioned In thl or ony future Isue. and such pOSition moy be different from ony views now or hereofter expressed In thiS or ony other Issue Janney Montgomery xott, Inc, which IS registered With the SEC as on Investment adVisor, may gIVe odvlce to lIs inVestment adVisory ond other customers Independer'ly of (my statements mode In thiS or In any other ISsue Further information on ony security mentIOned herein IS avalloble on request

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Tabell’s Market Letter – July 01, 1977

Tabell’s Market Letter – July 01, 1977

Tabell's Market Letter - July 01, 1977
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TABELL'S MARKET LETTER – 909 STATE ROAD, PRINCETON. NEW JERSEY 08540 DIVISION OF MEMBER NEW VOAK STOCK eXCHANGe, INC MEMBER AMERICAN STOCK eXCHANGE — …. –July …. r-,.0- …. –,.- 4. ..–..- –Y – ………. -r l;;l-977—'—-..;,;- -F-r Independence Day eve is an appropriate time for our traditional examination of the widely- heralded summer rally. Herewith, then, that examination with the usual cautionary notes. Ending Month January February March April May June July August September October November December Total ONE-MONTH PERIODS Advances Declines Avg. Chg. 34 17 1. 24 28 23 0.04 28 23 -0.08 28 23 0.93 26 25 -0.81 25 26 0.93 33 18 1.90 33 18 1.47 22 29 -1.36 28 23 -0.24 29 22 0.40 38 E 1.37 352 260 0.48 TWO-MONTH PERIODS Advances Declines Avq. Chg. 34 17 2.58 29 22 1. 28 25 26 -0.14 31 20 0.93 30 21 0.35 25 26 0.08 32 19 2.78 35 16 3.53 30 21 0.07 25 26 -1. 56 31 20 0.20 ..1! E 361 251 1.80 0.99 The table above shows the action of the Dow-Jones Industrial Average in every one-month and two-month period from 1926 to 1976. For each period the number of instances when the market ad- –..-.vanced-and-declinedis-shown,together-with-the average'PercentageChange;for–theper-i)d.-A-pre- '….,;'- liminary look at the table, indeed, supports the notion of a probable summer rally. The average monthly advance for the Dow over the period has been .48, whereas the average performance in July is an advance of 1.90, almost four times as great. Likewise, the average advance of 3.53 for the two months ended August is a good deal larger than the average two-month advance. It would, Indeed, appear that the expectation of an advancing market during July and August has some solid grounding in fact. Having made this statement, however, a few doubts must be raised. The first factor which needs to be pOinted out is that a large part of the high average advance for the summer period rests on the accident of the 1932 bottom's having occurred at the end of June. Thus, July and August of that year produced the largest two-month advance In stock-market history, an astounding 70 rise. If this single year is eliminated from consideration, the results for July and August are much closer to normal. Secondly while it Is true that July and August do show significant pluralities of advancing months over declining months, It must be remembered that advancing periods tend to outnumber declin- Ing ones over the 51 years by almost three to two. When standard tests of statistical Significance are applied, the period with the clearest seasonal action Is the month of December, wblch is why this letter has always emphasized the Importance of the year-end rally. Likewise, the tendency, toward a declining market in September Is statistically more significant than that of a rise in July or August. Interestingly enough, none of the other months show any discernible seasonal pattern what- soever. Lastly, in looking for seasonal patterns, it Is wise to examine the most recent data to see-If it seems to be deviat-lng from-the past,and'ilndeed'i thisis apparently the-Gase–T-he,eleven – – -'- 'C-t years between 1966 and 1976 have produced three rallies and eight declines in July and five rallies and six declines In August, and the two-month period ended August has produced four rallies and seven declines with an average percentage change of -1.63. Interestingly enough, a new seasonal tendency, not heretofore apparent, seems to be emerging — that of a decline In May-June. Every May, from 1965 through 1977, with the exception of 1972 and 1975, has produced a declining market, and twelve of the thirteen years since 1965 have shown a two-month drop in May-June. The moral of the whole exercise, we suppose, Is that the stock market is a difficult and changing beast, and, while certain seasonal tendencies are apparent, they constitute only one factor In what is Invariably a highly complex equation. Dow-Jones Industrials (1200 p.m.) 910.96 ANTHONYW. TABELL So. P CompOSite (1200 p.m.) 100.06 DELAFIELD, HARVEY, TABELL Cumulative Index (6/30/77) 681.22 AWT/lb No talement or e)(preS510n of opinIOn or cny other matter herem contained 1S, or IS 10 be deemed to be, dlrediy or indirectly, on offer or the SoilCllotlon of an oHer to buy or sell any security referred to or mentioned The matter I presented merely for the canver'lencc of the subscriber While He believe the sources of our Information to be reliable, we m no way represent or guarantee the accuracy thereof nor of the statements mode herein Any action to be token by the subSCriber should be based on hiS own mvesl1gatlon and information Janney Montgomery Scott, Inc, as a corporation, and lIS officers or employees, may now have, or may later lake, positions or trades 10 respect to any seCUnlles mentioned 10 thiS or any future ,ssue, and such poslhon may be different from any views now or hereafter e)'pressed '1'1 thiS or any other Issue Janney Montgomery Scali, Inc, whld! 15 registered WIth the SEC as on Invcstment adVisor, may 9,ve advlf;e to Its Investment adVIsory and other customers mdependently of ony statements mode In thiS or In any other Issue forther information on ony seC\Jflfy menTIoned herein IS available on request

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