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Tabell’s Market Letter – September 06, 1974

Tabell’s Market Letter – September 06, 1974

Tabell's Market Letter - September 06, 1974
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p– TABELL'S MARKET LETTER 909 STATE ROAD, PRINCETON. NEW JERSEY 08540 DIVISION OF MEMBER NEW VORk STOCk eXCHANGe, INC MEMBER AMERICAN STOCK EXCHANGE – September 6, 1974 '— . -, Herewith a'warning7'-This -l-etter 'isgotng'to'bealmose'exclu-si velyconc-erned' witlffigures ; Tiles e – .., who are turned off by numbers, therefore, need read no further. The warning also applies to those whose attitude is, Don't confuse me with facts; my mind is made up, and there are, unfortunately, a few investors in this category, investors who prefer the construction of elaborate economic scenarios of gloom and doom to painstaking study of the realities of the marketplace. With this caveat out of the way, we continue. In precipitously plunging markets, such as those in the last few weeks, the first task of the technician is to determine whether the preconditions for reversal In fact exist. We have, fortunately, numberous benchmarks to guide us. Painful as they are, down markets are nothing new. There are plentiful examples from the past, and they can be studied and measured. One Simple and obViOUS measurement of the severity of a decline is the rate at which various moving averages are dropping. For example, as of last Wednesday, a ISO-day moving average of the Dow was declining at a rate of .17 per day. This rate of decline, Interestingly enough, has been equaled or exceeded only on three occasions in 28 years of market history, June, 1962, August, 1966 and May, 1970. All three, in- vestors will recall, constituted major bottoms. On a shorter term basis, a 25-day moving average, as of Wednesday, was moving down at the rate of .64 daily. This is the approximate figure reached a few days prior to the bottom in 1970 and also on one occaSion In June of 1962. In 1966 the down- swing never attained the short-term rate of decline that the present one has shown. Still another measurement of whether a decline is reaching historical maximum severity is the ratio of the Dow to its own moving averages of various lengths. The ratio of the D1A to its own 25-day moving average, for. example, has been below 0.9 on four,occasions ,over the ,past few-,-eks. Her,, — – – ——'— . – – – – , – – – ————- .–.-,– —–'. again, we have a level attained on only three occasions in 28 years — September, 1946, May, 1962 and May, 1970, all recognized by hindsight to have constituted major bottoms. A third measurement of whether a market is sufficiently oversold so that a major bottom may be considered in prospect is market breadth. The ten-day advance-decline oscillator, consisting Simply of a cumulative total of advances minus declines for the past ten days, is a widely-used tool and appears in many stock market publications. The raw figure IS useless for comparison over long periods of time, but such comparisons may be made by running a ten-day total of the ratio of the net differ- ence to totallssues traded. That figure moved down to a level of -3.18 last week. This level has been attained on 14 separate occasions in the past, each one fairly close to a bottom of either Inter- mediate term or major proportions. There are a few cautions to be derived from a study of this figure, however. There is ample past precedent for its moving lower than its current level and, therefore, based on this indicator, another short-term down leg cannot be ruled out. Such a down leg, however, would move the ratio to a level which has characterized major bottoms in the past. We could bore the reader with more numbers. We maintain and study at least a dozen other simi- lar series, the purpose of which is to measure the severity of a decline against historical bench- marks. They all pOint, however, to the inevitable conclusion that the recent decline has been sharp enough to set up the preconditions for a major reversal. We emphasize our use of the word preconditions. At the moment the stage is only set, and the actors have yet to make their appearance. Once the preconditions are met, first-stage upside rever- sal evidence must present itself. Such evidence is often provided at an early stage by breadth and volume. Here, again;-we return-to numbers .One general characteristic-of,true market reversals in the past has been the occurrence of days on which 80 or more of all issues traded advanced or when volume expanded to 150 of its own 25-day moving average. In these terms, Thursday's 22-point rally in the Dow must be termed disappointing. A bare 55 of all traded issues moved upwards, and volume was just barely above its average for the pnor 25 days. No series that we maintaIn, it must be admitted, has shown convincing evidence of true reversal momentum. Now the above, like most statistical presentations, has been dry as dust, but we make no apolo- gies therefor. Obviously in times like the present it is easy to become prey to emotion and be haunted by the spectres of unreality. It is at just such times that It is helpful to return to the harsh, cold reality of numbers. Dow-Jones Industrials (1200 p.m.) 675.77 S & P Compo (1200 p.m.) 71.46 ANTHONY W. TABELL DELAFIELD, HARVEY, TABELL Cumulative Index (9/5/74) 391.52 AWT/jb No statement or expression of opinIon or ony other moiler herem contolned IS, or IS to be deemed to be, directly or indirectly, on oHer or the OIICllollon of on offer to buy or sell any security referred 10 or mentioned The moiler 15 presented merely for the conver'lence of the subCrlber While we believe the sources of our Informo hon to be relioble, we In no way represent or guarantee the accuracy thereof nor of the sto;ements m)de herein Any OelIOn- to be token by the subSCriber should be bosed on hiS own investigation and Information Janney Montgomery Scott, Inc, as a corporation, and ,ts officers or employee may now hove, or may laler toke, positions or trades In respect to any securities mentioned In thiS or any future Issue, and such position may be different from ony views now or hereafter eypressed In thiS or any other Issue Janney Montgomery Scali, Inc, which IS registered With the SEC as on Investment adVisor, moy give adVICe to ItS Investment adVisory and othel cvstomers Independently of any stotemenll mode In thiS or In any other ISsue Further information on any security mentioned herein IS oVOllable on request

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Tabell’s Market Letter – September 13, 1974

Tabell’s Market Letter – September 13, 1974

Tabell's Market Letter - September 13, 1974
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. – – – I–'– TABELL'S MARKET LETTER t, t –,- – –'I …… – 909 STATE ROAD, PRINCETON, NEW JERSEY 08540 DIVISION OF MEMSER New YORI( STOCK EXCHANQE. INC MEMBER AMERICAN STOCK EXCHANGE September 13,1974 The precipitous plunge of the stock market to new lows has awakened money managers, how– -,everbelatedly ,-tQ-afatherelementaryfact -that ,peiodica-lly.s eemsAo, get.focgotten,-.-,-the fact that, by their very nature, stocks carry a high degree of risk, at least over the intermediate term. Yet, declining stock markets or not, capital exists and is required to be invested somewhere. Thus the investment world has been looking assiduously, in recent years, at other forms of investment. Some of these have been entirely outside the area of securities markets, such as real estate and precious metals. The problem, of course, is that even these markets are beginning to devel- op some of the symptoms with which those of us who have watched the stock market for many years are familiar. That risk attaches to real estate is a sad fact that a good many real estate investment trusts are beginning to discover, and ,if the recent behavior of gold stocks is any harbinger, those who have been assiduously socking away gold coins may shortly come to the same awakening. Closer to the securities field, there was a rash of interest about a year ago, in long-term bond funds as a potential public investment medium. It then became apparent that interest rates, even when high, can go still higher and bond prices, though low, still lower. There have been fewer recent long-term bond fund offerings. At the moment, short-term money market instruments are enjoying a deserved popularity, since current money-market conditions, where II-plus per cent yields can be obtained with almost ab- solute safety, are a rarity in financial history. All in all, there appears to be very little doubt that the existence of the alternative investment media mentioned above constitute at least a par- tia l-ex-plana-t-ion-of-the-eurrent-depres's-ecllevehof-stockpriees – – ' ' -, – – – , . . – — ., – – Yet problems remain. The current level of short-term mterest rates is hardly likely to be per- manent and, while pleasant to have around at the moment, is unlikely to be an answer to the problems of long-term investment. Long-term bonds Perhaps. We are, let us recall, in a period when every American, from the White House on down, appears agreed that the major prob- lem facing the country is inflation. We have studied in detail in this letter in the past the effect of inflation on long-term bond prices. Without going through the mathematIcs once more, it can be noted that the effective real dollar return to the investor after taxes on a 10, 20-year bond is less than 1, assuming a 6 rate of inflation which is a bit more than one-half of the current rate. There was a conventional wisdom that existed many years ago which hypothesized that Common stocks were the single medium that constituted an effective inflation hedge. Wall Street has spent the last 20 years effectively laying that myth to rest. The lesson that hyper-inflationary periods in the past have had a depressing effect on corporate earnings and hence, indirectly, on stock prices, has by now been well learned. However, in any economy the rules of the game change continually, and the rule changes can result in yesterday's myths becoming today's reality. We suggested in this space earlier this year that we were undergoing, in 1973-74, the first postwar experience in which the rise in corporate profits exceeded the inflation rate. It is a simple fact that,in our view,few analysts have given much attention. The market, certainly, is ignoring it completely. For the 12 months ended June 30,the DJIA -earned 93. 26;and it'ls'now-selling'for exactly the same'multiple'it'sold at the nadliof inVestor confidence in 1949. Current profits are a fact. The market's skepticism about future profits is clear. It must also be admitted that stock income has not in the recent experience kept pace with inflation. The current dividend paid on the Dow of around 38 reduces to 22.74 in 1958 dollars, less than the 27.95 return that the investor in the Dow received in 1958. The record on fixed income securities, however, is a great deal more dismal. All this simply underscores the insidiousness of inflation, an unpleasant fact the American public is finally beginning to realize. And yet lf, over the long term, capital is to be protected from the ravages of inflation, it may well be that equities will, in fact, provide a vlable vehicle. Dow-Jones Industrials (1200 p.m.) 634.86 ANTHONYW. TABELL S & P Compo (1200 p.m.) 65.91 DELAFIELD, HARVEY, TAB ELL Cumulative Index (9/12/74) 370.42 AWT/jb No statement or expression of oplnton or (Iny other matter herein onlolned I or 15 10 be deemed 10 be, directly or indirectly, on offer or the solicitation of on offer 10 buy or sell ony security referred 10 or menlloned The motter IS presented merely for Ihe converlena of the subscriber While we believe Ihe sources of our information to be reliable, we In no way represent or guarantee Ihe accuracy thereof nor of the stotements mude herein Any actIOn to be taen by Ihe subscriber should be based on hiS own Investlgollon and Information Janney Montgomery Scott, Inc, as a corporalton, and Its offlcer or employees, may now have, or may later toke, poslhons or trades In respect to ony securities mentioned In this or any future Issue, and such posl\ion may be different from ony views now or hereafter expressed In this or ony other Issue Janney Montgomery 5col1, Inc, which IS registered wllh Ine SEC as on Inveslmenl advl5ar, may give adVICe to .ts Investment adVISOry and othel customers Independently of any statements mode In thiS or ' any olher luue Further infOrmation on ony secur,ly mentioned herem IS ovallable on request

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Tabell’s Market Letter – September 20, 1974

Tabell’s Market Letter – September 20, 1974

Tabell's Market Letter - September 20, 1974
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————– ————————————– —-, TABELL'S MARKET LETTER 909 STATE ROAD, PRINCETON, NEW JERSEY 08540 DtVISION OF MEMBER NEW VORl( STOCI( eXCHANGE, INC 'EMBER AMERICAN STOCI( E)cCHANGE September 20, 1974 If it did nothing else last week, the stock market at least provided us benumbed tape watchers opportunitytoo watchit-do .s-omething–other-thansink,like, a.stone .-It did ,.,-m,fact ,stage' an upside performance of moderately impressive proportions. Early weakness in the first hour of Mon- day's trading was soon erased,and the day ended with a 12 1/2 point advance. That rally continued through Tuesday afternoon before some of the gains were given up,but a 9 point rise on the day was still recorded. In Wednesday's trading the market remained lower most of the day, but a late- afternoon advance pulled it ahead to a 3-point gain, and finally, Thursday's action produced a sus- tained 22-point rally on 17-milliol1-hare volume. Thus a temporary respite, at least, from one of the most vicious short-term declines on record. Historically, we have been accustomed to set a 20 decline as the test of whether a downswing constitutes a major bear market. In just 35 trading days from its fuly 24 close of 805.77, the Dow dropped 178 pOints to 627.19 on September 13, an almost 22 dip. In four trading days since then a 46-point rise has retraced a quarter of the drop. The question is, of course, does all of this represent the denouement of the painful process we have been undergoing over the past year We discussed this question two weeks ago, even be- fore the market had completed its final plunge to a closing low of 627.19 of September 13. We noted at that time that the velocity of the decline to date had provided the preconditions for a re- versal, but we said, At the moment the stage is only set, and the actors have yet to make their appearance. The stage is still bare, albeit, perhaps, with a bit of rustling in the wings . Technical analysis, it seems to us, must always consist of a combination of hard statistical fact and a certain amount of intuition. There are those, unfortunately, who practice the latter al- 'W,'-1-rrlO!; teJ0-ltls';ve l-yand4hey-ha ve -oHenrju st-l-y-;-we -thl-i-nk.,-beE!ncI'i-Heized,,,,,- cl onc)t-o,,o,,e'ver ,,,,,,,,…,.I-, think a certain dose of intuitive reasoning can be ruled out of the process entirely. As far as statistical fact is concerned, there is, unfortunately, little comfort to be gained from last week's performance. Impressive as it was, the rally did not meet the standards of breadth and volume which have been set by most major reversals of previous market history. The cold- hearted statistician, therefore, can state, and quite correctly, that there is, based on this evi- dence, a high degree of probability that last week's rally dId not Signalize a major low. The trouble with the pure statistical approach is that it stops right there. We said above that the rally did not meet the standards set by most major bottoms in the past. 'There have been ex- ceptions. Where an intuitive approach is required is in determining whether it is more likely than normal that September, 1974, will constitute one of the exceptions. One major cause for optimism lies in the fact that, at the lows of a week ago, large numbers of downside objectives, many of which had seemed implausible to us as the related distributional tops were being formed at the beginning of this year, were, in fact, being reached. The Dow, for example, had a downside target of 620, reached at Monday's intraday low. More interestingly, a number of market leaders, names of the caliber of IBM, Eastman Kodak, Sears Roebuck, etc., were, last week, fulfilling the downside counts of their major distributional tops. With almost everything else in the marketplace having been thoroughly sold out long before the first-tier stocks underwent their blood bath of the past few months, it is possible to argue that the market may have run out of downside leadership. Yet all this -is;'as we said, intuitive. -Little reversalevidence has'been provided In four short — days of market action, although it may well be forthcoming In the future. The market's technical position at the moment, however, is unlike that of, say, May, 1970. At that time we said in this space, three days after the low, We think, in sum, the effechve bottom has been reached. We quote this, not to suggest that we happened to be right on a particular occasion, but to illustrate that 1970 was a market bottom where all of the numbers fell neatly into place, and it was possible to suggest a high probability of reversal. This is not happening in September, 1974, and It would, therefore, be well to treat it more gingerly. Dow-fones Industrials (1200 p.m.) 664.89 S & P Compo (1200 p.m.) 69.27 ANTHONYW. TAB ELL Cumulative Index (9/19/74) 381.16 DELAFIELD, HARVEY, TAB ELL AWT/jb Note Comments on all issues based solely on techmcal factors. Further informa- hon available on request. No stalement or e)(pr&SSlon of opinion or ony other matter herein contained IS, or IS 10 be deemed 10 be, directly or Indirectly, on offer or the sol,cltotlon of on offer to buy or sell ony security referred 10 or menhoned The motter IS presented merely for the converumce of the subscriber While -Ne believe the sources of OUf Informo- tlon '0 be ,el,oble, we In no way represent Of guorontee Ihe accuracy thereof nor of the Maternenls mude herem A.ny ocllon 10 be token by Ihe subSCriber should be bosed on hiS own Investlgot,on ond information Janney Montgomery SCali, Inc, as 0 corporation, ond I officers or employees, may now have, or may later lake, POSitiOns or trodes In repecl loony securities mentioned In th,s or ony future Issue, and such pOSition dlffcrent from Clny views now or hereafter eypressed If! thiS or ony other Issue Janney Montgomery Scoll, Inc, which IS registered wllh Ihe SEC os on may give advl;e to liS Investment adVisory and othel customers mdependently of any statements mode In thiS or In ony other Issue further mformollon on mentioned herem IS available on requet

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Tabell’s Market Letter – September 27, 1974

Tabell’s Market Letter – September 27, 1974

Tabell's Market Letter - September 27, 1974
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, , c , , , , i I I ( TABELL'S MARKET LETTER . . . jc c 909 STATE ROAD. PRINCETON. NEW JERSEY 08540 DIVISION OF MEMBER NEW VOAK STOCK EXCHANGe, tNC MEMBER AMERICAN STOCK EXCHANGE no du ' September 27, 1974 ' 'azd eou Itory mark ,et–''''''-''''''''''''''''…….,..,..,.,.,,,,,,,,-…,.,,,,…–,…,…………-,……'Ii .,.,.. On the Prime Rate — Last week's market action can be likened — if one can visuallze the sce- nario — to one of the old Western movies where, as the wagon train 1S surrounded by Indians, the cavalry, flags flying and bugles blowing, suddenly appears at the pass — and then gallops headlong over the nearest cliff. We had been assured for some months that the prime interest rate was the key to the stock market and that the one thing really needed to turn the market around was a lower prime rate. On Wednesday we got one, and it turned the market around for something like three hours. In a wild frenzy, with a late tape, buyers turned a sharp selloff into a 13-point rally, which phenomenon petered out by noontime with the major averages actually winding up down on the day. The whole thing reinforces our content at being employed in technical work and thus not being forced to explain the market in terms of current news events. The unfortunates who have been devoting reams of type to exC plaining every recent market change in the light of interest rates will now, sad to say, have to return to their drawing boards and find another convenient simple-minded explanation for why the market is behaving as it is. On the Economic Summit Conference — Since we consider ourselves, at least parenthetically, economists, we find it difficult to work up a high degree of optimism as to what the forthcoming conference will, per se, achieve. In our experience, the easiest way to get three conflicting opinions is to force two economists into an argument. The thought of fifty or so of these gentlemen coming up with a coherent prescription for curing inflation boggles the mind. And yet, just as the English were famed for muddling through, we could, by happy accident, come out of the conference with something which '…..,….'c.1..,..m1.1(aghcmt work .W..e.ha'ee,,en.heen.tr.a ted.in.th e summiLprev'ie.wto Drs.,M ilton ,Fdedmanand.John Kenneth Galbraith agreeing on the need for restrictive fiscal policy. Now, anybody who has read even one chapter by either of these gentlemen must be aware that they reached this agreement from philosophical positions that differed by 180 degrees, The whole thing suggests, though, that an officious consensus policy is at least possible. What is absolutely guaranteed is that the formulators of that pollcy will not agree afterward a s to just why it did or did not work. On the Roids on the Cabuie — No, we were certainly not bright enough to coin that phrase. It was coined by a clever and humorour observer of the financial scene, Martin Sosnoff, in a recent Forbes magazine article. For the uninitiated, what are being referred to are the Polaroid options traded on the Chicago Board Options Exchange, and that exchange is apparently following the ancient and, to us, endearing, securities-industry custom of coining its own particular argot. Which brings us to the fact that options volume on the Chicago Board reached 44,140 contracts on Wednesday, a new record by about 10. This, incidentally, represents contracts for 4,414,000 shares of stock which was approximately one-quarter of the number of shares traded on the NYSE on the same day, despite the fact the options trading at the moment is restricted to 32 issues, or slightly under 2 of the total number of issues listed on the NYSE. We are duly informed by conventional wisdom that the publlc has left the market and that there is no further interest 10 speculation. To paraphrase Butch Cassidy and the Sundance Kid, Who those guys out there in Chicago On Odd Lotters — Another class of investors, one that can be shown statistically to have been – leaving the market in droves for four years, appears to be showil)H a minor renaissane.With a single – exception-;- therechad beer(ilci day since i970 until recently 'when the odd lot trader was a net purchaser of common stock. Yet it happened a couple of times in January of this year, and the phenomenon has been repeated no less than five times in recent weeks. This odd-lot buying, moreover, has been con- trasted with strong evidence of institutional seillng on the same days. It is an article of faith, and one borne out by historical experience, that this should be bearish. And yet, we wonder. It was the odd lotter who was a heavy net seller in all those years when astute professionals were rushing out to buy first-tier growth stocks at two to ten times their current prices. It was the odd lotter who was a net seller in a market that we now know, by hindsight, to have been one of the most difficult ones in which to achieve an above-average return since the 1930's. Could it be that the poor, innocent is smarter than we give him credit for being Dow-Jones Industrials (1200 p.m.) 631.49 ANTHONY W. TABELL S & P Compo (1200 p.m.) 65.87 DELAFIELD, HARVEY, TABELL Cumulative Index (9/26/74) 371.47 AWT/jb I NQ stotemenl or expreulon of opinion or any other matter herein contained 15, or IS 10 be deemed to be, directly or IndHectly, on offer Of the soliCitation of on offer to buy or sell ony security referred 10 or mentioned The moiler IS presented merely for Ihe convellence of Ihe subScriber While 'He belteve the sources of our tnformo tlon to be reliable, we In no way represent or guarantee Ihe accuracy thereof nor of Ihe stolements mude herein Any oellon to be token by the subscriber should be bosed on hiS own investigation ond Informotlon Jonney Montgomery Scott, Inc, os a corporotlon, and Its officers or employees, may now hove, or moy later toke, posItions or trades In respect to any securilles mentioned In thiS or any future Issue, and such position may be different from any views now or hereafter e)pressed In L. t,h,nomor'anmydo'theOrd'IsOsueYOfJaOnOnYey''MOonmtg.om,e'rmyoSdc.omll,'hIn,;,,ow'hmuohoy.sor'ehg.i'stier,e,d.WFithhth.e'SmEfCoo'smoo'n,oInovoesotmoeonyt,ad.V'isotr, ymma.y,gi'voeoa'ddVh.ic,.e.too,,ItsovInovesotmbe',ntoood,v,lqsor.y,o,nd othe. . J

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Tabell’s Market Letter – October 04, 1974

Tabell’s Market Letter – October 04, 1974

Tabell's Market Letter - October 04, 1974
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TABELL'S MARKET LETTER 909 STATE ROAD, PRINCETON. NEW JERSEY 08540 DIVISION OF MEMBER NEW YORk STOCK eXCHANGE. INC MEMBER AMERICAN STOCK EXCHANGE I – October 4, 1974 All right, let's put it this way. Let's say you are thinking of buying a candy store. You have – on-e'pickedout;'a s amatter -of'fact-It ch-asthe-'f,-gst'lo-ian6niiit-(jwfi;-ana;–a s!1eaY'''a-s- you- can– – –,-II figure out, has for quite some time been doing close to half of the candy business in the entire area. The store, showcases and other equipment which you would be buying cost about 16,000 originallY,although they have been depreciated on the books to around 9, 000. The previous owner has done a good job of maintaining the property. As a matter of fact, over the past ten years he sunk a little better than 10,000 into the business. The store has something over 3, 000 in the bank and that bank account would come along with the business. Another 3, 000 is owed to it by some of the best families in town who maintain charge accounts with the store. Also coming along with the business is about 5,200 worth of eminently saleable inventory of candy and like goods sitting in the back storeroom. About 1, 000 of this year's expenses have been prepaid. You would be asked to assume some liabilities. The store has accounts payable to candy suppliers and other near-term liabilities of about 6,200 ,and there is a small mortgage of 756. You look at the past ten years operating record for the store, and it is pretty interesting. Last year, in fact, was its best year ever, and it sold more than 36, 000 worth of candy. That is more than twice the amount of candy that it sold ten years ago. Its operating income also set a record of 4,500 before taxes, and over the past decade.its record has been fairly consistent It has never prodd an operatingTe ofless than'3;'060 in a-ny -ye-r ,furtng- th-;-past ten, except for one year when the employees went on strike. In addition to operating income there was, last year, 900 of additional cash flow from depreciation. Operating income is, of course, figured after paying the manager a salary comparable to what he would earn elsewhere. 1- This year figures to be somewhat of a problem. The people in your town have gotten dietconscious and aren't likely to buy as much candy as they used to. Sales will probably be off some 20, and earnings before taxes may drop under the 3, 000 level for the first time in ten years except for that one strike year. You think this problem is largely temporary, though, and you expect an adequate earnings recovery in 1975. O. K. Now look at the above figures again. What would you be willing to pay for this business — 16,000 in property at original cost, 6,200 of working capital, negligible debt, earnings which in good years exceed 3,500 before taxes, cash flow which, last year, was well over 5,000. Would 10,000 be a fair price It would certainly seem so. Now, take all of the above figures and multiply them by one million. Change the business from candy to automobiles. What we have just given is an essentially accurate description of General Motors,and it can, indeed, be bought for one million times 10,000, the value of its -287,617,041 shares at 351/4 being approximately 10.14 billion. There is a simple point to this exercise. Benjamin Graham has repeatedly suggested, and has again reiterated in a recent article, that, In a large area of the present stock market, we could return to a very old-fashioned but nonetheless useful criterion for equity investment –namely the value of the company as a private enterprise to a private owner, irrespective of market quotations for the shares. We chose General Motors above, not to recommend it specifi- cally, but Simply because it is the largest company in American industry. It is simply used to make the point that it is just one of hundreds of listed companies whose securities are available at prices which appear patently absurd if the underlying companies are viewed as on-going concerns. Dow-Jones Industrials (1200 p.m.) S & P Compo (1200 p. m.) 577.99 61. 56 ANTHONY W. TABELL DELAFIELD, HARVEY, TAB ELL Cumulative Index (9/3/74) 355.80 AWT/jb No totement or expression of Opinion or cny other matter herein contomed IS, or IS to be deemed to be, directly or indirectly, on offer or the SOIICI'otlon of on offer 10 buy or sell any security referred to or menTIoned The motter IS presented merely for the converlence of the subSCriber Whde He believe the sources of our informa- tion to be reliable, we In no way represent or guarantee the accuracy thereof nor of the statemena mude herein Any action to be taken by the subSCriber should be based on hiS own investigation and information Janney Montgomery Scott, Inc, as a corporation, and lIs officers or employees, may now hove, or moy later take, 1Il.'- 1IIl'L- poSitions or tradc, In respect to any securities mentIOned In thiS or any future ISsue, and such position may be different from any views now or hereafter expressed In this or any other Issue Janney Montgomery call, Inc, which IS registered With the SEC as on IOvestment adVisor, may give adVice to Its Investment adVISOry and ather ruom''d'P'd','YOfOY''om','mod','h,,o,,oyo'h''''Fh'',fo'mooOOy,,ru..,ym,,,o'dh''''ovo'ob',o''q'-J

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Tabell’s Market Letter – October 11, 1974

Tabell’s Market Letter – October 11, 1974

Tabell's Market Letter - October 11, 1974
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.- – – – – – – ——, TABELL'S MARKET LETTER I L – – – —- 909 STATE ROAD, PRINCETON, NEW JERSEY 08540 DIVISION 01 MEM8ER NEW VORK STOCK eXCHANGE, INC MEMBER AMERICAN STOCK eXCHANGE October 11, 1974 The stock market finally got around th,s week to turning in a reasonably exciting performance!c-.;,al- ,..I …- h0ii9fllii many ways -,t caiihardtybe' sald t,ilaVebeensur'Pii'Sfi1g.In-aii'y2ase;'theDawopenecttl1e week with a 23-point rise and, after a mild retracement on Tuesday, scored its best advance in SlX- teen months on Wednesday w,th a 28-pomt rally. This nse was further extended through midday Thurs- day, when profit-tabng set in, but Thursday's close, nonetheless, still showed a 17-point improve- ment on the day. All in all, from last Friday's intraday low of 573.22 to the Thursday mtraday high of 664.03, the total advance was some ninety pOints, or a nse of 15.8 in a four-day period. – We said above that the performance was hardly surpnsing. This is true in a sense that it obviously was going to take place at some time and some place, the only questlOn being when and where. The spectacle of a deeply oversold stock market probing for a bottom is in no way new and has been re- peated in essentially the same fashion for as long as markets have eXlsted. In this sense, at least, the week's action, for all the fireworks, was famlliar to the paint of being dreary. Whether the low of a week ago will ultimately turn out in the light of history to have been the low of the 1973-74 bear market is a question we do not think can be answered with certamty at the moment, although the probabilities of th,s bemg the case are perhaps better than they have been at any time so far. Thursday's advance, during which 26 million shares changed hands, met the volume standards which have characterized major turning paints in the past. Breadth, on the other hand, was disappOint- ing. Neither the 1301 advances of Monday, the 1220 advances of Wednesday or Thursday's 1338nsing issues met the standards of prior major turning pOints. Such a standard at the moment would call for a slightly over 1400 advanCing issues, a performance we have not, as yet, been able to achieve. Also disappointing was the renewed appearance, on Wednesday and Thursday, of the sort of strong selling 'I'p';re-sWs!u1raeCsiswpheirchhahpas ve turned well-to-)( back previous eep lD mlnaaY rally fliis ' attempts stage tstf ieaafr-lhioetrttohm,sS,yheiasrt.o ri c a U f , ' li a v e – a s suiile1i-dif– ferent forms and different shapes. For example, May 29, 1962, for many stocks, constituted the effective bottom of the 1962 bear market as the Dow touched an intraday low of 552. After a two-day rally, it fell again to an intraday bottom around 525 in June before reversing sharply. It then returned to the May low four months later in October, at the t,me of the Cuban missile crisis. In 1966, two successive lows' were made, the first m August and the second in October, and m this mstance the second low was moderately lower than the first. In 1970, of course, the May 26 low was never really tested, and, as it built its base for the 1970-73 advance, the market edged slowly higher. Such was also the case in 1957-58. Thus, wh'le history shows it is dangerous at this early stage to try to predict the course of the averages, it is hlghly possible that, in the case of a good many individual stocks, important bot- toms may already have been reached. The action of the market from here on out wlll be interesting and probably, in addltion, highly infor- mative. What most of the major indices have now done is to return to trading ranges which have a good deal of potent,al significance. The Dow-Jones Industrials, for example, traded m a range roughly be- tween 650 and 680 during the latter two weeks in August and early September. While this month of tradmg is not particularly slgnificant from a time point of view, it assumes a high degree of technical importance, due to the volume and pnce actiVlty that took place. The recent rally, of course, has brought the average back into this range, and the most constructive action it could possibly show would be to remain within the confmes of the 650-680 area and ultlmately penetrate ,t on the upside. Were this sort of action to ensue, something that could deservedly be called a bull market could appropriate- ly be foreca st. . The Transportation and-Utility mdices have patterns which are the s-arriein prln'ciple;- aHhough some- what different in specifics, These two indices did not make new lows on the recent downswing (The Transportation index did do so, but only fractlOnally) and are now moving toward the trading areas of late July and early August. They still have some d,stance to go to reach these areas, 150-160 on the Transportation index versus the present level of 145 and 68-72 on the Utilities versus a current level of 67. However, as is the case with the Industrials, could these levels be attained and held, the action would have to be considered constructive. It is best, at times Ilke the present, to remember the Blbllcal injunction that we see only through a glass darkly. As patterns like the present one slowly unfold, the specifics become clearer and a more rational forecast becomes poss,ble. Last week's action, however, must be regarded as a possible initial link in the constructive chain of events. Dow-Jones Industmlls (1200 p.m.) 646.59 S & P Compo (1200 p.m.) 69.80 ANTHONY W. TABELL DELAFIELD, HARVEY, TABELL Cumulative Index (10/10/74) 387.27 AWTjc No statement or exprenlon of opinion or any olher malter herein contOlned IS, or IS 10 be deemed to be, directly or mdnec1ly, on offer or the OIICllotlon of on oHer to buy or sell any secunty referred to or menlloned The mOiler IS presented merely for The convellenc of Ihe subSCriber While -Ne believe the sources of our Informotlon 10 be reliable, we In no way represent or guarantee the accuracy thereof nor of the statements mode herein Any adlon to be To!.en by the subSCriber should be bosed on hiS own investigation and Informallon Janney Montgomery Scott, Inc, as a corporation, and 11 officers or employees, may now have, or may later lak;.-, positions or trades In respect to any SeCUrities menllaned In thiS or any fuTure Issue, and such position may be different from any Views now or hereafter eJOpressed In ThiS or any other Issue Janney Montgomery Scott, Inc, which IS regisTered With the SEC as on Investment adVisor, may give adVice to ItS Investment adVisory and othel customers Independently of any uotements mode In thiS or In any other luue Further information on any security mentioned herein IS available on reque

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Tabell’s Market Letter – October 18, 1974

Tabell’s Market Letter – October 18, 1974

Tabell's Market Letter - October 18, 1974
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r..— — —–'- – -…….. TABELL'S MARKET LETTER – 909 STATE ROAD, PRINCETON. NEW JERSEY 08540 DIVISION OF MEMBER NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE. INC. MEMBER AMERICAN STOCK EXCHANGE -1-…..'…-.-T-n-e,-s.to-c-k''7m'a-,rk.e.t,.',p,i,c.t.u..re.conti,n,u..e.d..,t-o,–u..m..c.i,l.a-th i s -w eek .wS2ffchto-abne-ra1st8o,n 197,;.4,,,isfiing aild ( as-w il l be dl S – ' – cussed below) unprecedented rapidity. We suggested in last week's letter that the action of the Dow as it approached the 650-680 area would help to provide a clue as to future market action. We indicated that the most bullish possible course of action would be for the average to fluctuate back and forth in that trading range for some period of time and eventually penetrate it on the upside, thus completing the familiar head-and-shoulders type basing action. Last week's trading saw no fewer than four distinct and separate moves across that range. Monday's continuation of last week's rally brought the index to an hourly high above the 680 level, and a decline starting Monday afternoon and continuing Tuesday morning carried to the mid660' s. An intraday rally on Tuesday brought the average up again, before a drop on Tuesday afternoon and Wednesday carried it down to a 642.29 Wednesday close, moderately below the range we had suggested. The strength on Thursday and Friday morning, however, brought the average back into the projected trading range. As we indicated last week, continued ability to hold within this area would suggest that the base formation for an advance may be completed around current levels rather than involving a test and possible penetration of the lows of two weeks ago. / Returning again to our letter of last week, we made an attempt to be somewhat blase about the sharp advance of a week ago suggesting that it was no more than one of many examples of an over- sold stock market probing for a bottom. This, of course, is at least partially true Since, in genera-lTma eket -Gha ra Gter-i s tic sha-verema,in edu ncha ng ed.for.centurie s….,.xet,c los erexa mina tionrev-ea Is that, in some aspects, we were present, during the week of October 7-11, at an event of historical proportions. The percentage advance on the Dow for that week was just under 12.6, and there has been no percentage rally of that magnitude in any given trading week since 1938. Prior to that it is necessary to go back to the 1929-32 period to find weekly advances of greater percentage. There were three on the way down during 1929-32 and eight after the market had turned in 1932-33. Markets in the postwar period had never been able to achieve a weekly advance of better than 6 1/2 until this week. Actually, the total length of the rally was six days, and, over the six-day period ending Monday, the Dow posted a 15.2 advance. Again, this advance has been exceeded over a sixday period on only nine prior occasions Since 1926, eight of them in the 1929-32 period and one in 1938. We have suggested in the past that it is necessary to return to the 1930's to find a benchmark with which to compare the current decline. It is apparently also necessary to return to that area to find a comparison for the market's current volatility. Nor is the action of a week ago the only instance in the recent past of unusually wide market fluctuations. The decline from the January, 1973 high was punctuated by two rallies, one of 16 in August-October, 1973, lasting 46 days, and a 67-day advance of 13 in December, 1973-March, 1974. Rallies of this magnitude within an ongoing bear market are essentially unprecedented by postwar standards. We are not sure what value the above statistics possess for forecasting purposes, but they – raise some rather interesting questions about the nature of the current stock market. Essentially, they constitute another link in a long chain of evidence which suggests that the equity market has become more volatile,both on the upside and the downside,than has been the case at any time with- in the experience of most investors. If this is indeed the case, flexibility in investment manage- ment, including ability to move rapidly as conditions change, will be at a premium. It is interest- ing to speculate as to the extent to which such flexibility indeed exists in a market coming to be dominated by larger and larger investment-decision makers. Dow-Jones Industrials (1200 p.m.) 657.62 ANTHONY W. TABELL S & P Compo 11200 p.m.) 72.13 DELAFIELD, HARVEY, TABELL Cumulative Index (10/17/74) 393.06 AWT/jb No stctemenl or expreSSion of opinion or any other maIler herein Contolned IS, or IS to be deemed to be. directly or Indirectly, On offer or the SOI'Cllotlon of on offer to buy or sell ony security referred 10 or mentioned The mottC!f Is presented merely for the corwerlence of the subscriber While Ne believe the sources of our 1Oforma han to be reliable, we 10 no way represent or guarantee the accuracy thereof nor of the statements mude herem Any (lctlon to be taen by Ihe subSCriber should be based on hiS own 1Ovestlgohon and InformallOn Janney Montgomery Stott, Inc, as a corporation, and lIs officers or employees, may now have, or moy later toke, poSitions or trades In respect to any securlhe mentioned In th' or any future Issue, and such pOSition may be different from ony views now or hereofter expressed In thiS Of any other Issue Jonney Montgomery Scott, Inc, which IS regiStered With the SEC as on Investment odvlsor, may give adVice to Its Investment adVisory and other rus/omers Independently of any stotements mode In Ih,s or In ony other Issue further 1Oformol!on on any security mentioned herein IS ovodoble on request

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Tabell’s Market Letter – October 25, 1974

Tabell’s Market Letter – October 25, 1974

Tabell's Market Letter - October 25, 1974
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TABELL'S MARKET LETTER 909 STATE ROAD, PRINCETON, NEW JERSEY 08!540 DIVISION OF MEMBER NEW 'tORI( STOCK EXCHANGE. INC MEMBER AMERICAN STOCK EXCHANGE October 25, 1974 – We outJine'l il1)lstweIJ)'2;,rtJ;s.'.ghthat the behavi,r of ShegJones.Jndustial.Icve.!ag– m the rough 650-680 area would be Important and suggested that the market's continued ability to hold – in that range would be constructive. It did not quite manage to do so in last week's trading,dropping to a closing low of 636.26 on Thursday and an intraday low as low as 624.30. We are nonetheless not all that discouraged by the week's behavior, and close scrutiny of mdividual chart patterns for major listed stocks, in our view, lends a good deal of encouragement to one's market outlook. In nervous and volatile markets (and this one approaches setting records in both categories), it is often unwise to spend a great deal of time trying to pinpoint short-term targets either for the aver- ages or for individual stocks. The basic question facing the investor at this point in time, it seems to us, is whether the wild fluctuations which have characterized September and October, 1974, con- stitute nothing more than a way station on the road to disaster, as the widely-publicized gloom-and- doom proponents would have us believe, or whether they constitute part of a process which will ul- timately lead to a worthwhile revers a 1. Rational examination of the market's action must, in our opinion, mcline the analyst toward the latter view. We suggested in this space last week that the momentum of the six-day advance of October 7-14 was historically almost unprecedented and that it was necessary to go back to the 1930's to find rallies of equal magnitude. It was advances of this degree that characterized the bottoms of 1932 and 1938. As we admitted last week, there were three rallies of similar strength during the mar- ket's sickening slide during the 1929-32 period, and we are perfectly willing to acknowledge that, if one sincerely believes a lJlajor depression is in the offing, he can point to these as evidence that the past couple of month's market action is essentially meaningless. Not being ourselves inclined toward – -that-view-,-we-tendAG,th-in-klthassomewhat-more–s-ignH-ica-nce-. .. It is really, as we suggested above, to the action of individual stocks that one must turn if he wants to gain some insight into the rather amazing things that have been taking place in the market- place of late. Not only was the velocity of the Dow's reversal unprecedented for the postwar period, but the advances of individual stocks were equally amazing. We compiled recently a study measur- ing the percentage advances of major NYSE and ASE issues from their lows for the week ended Wednes- day, October 9, to their highs of the week ended October 16. We eliminated from the study all stocks selling under 15 a share, since lower-priced stocks tend normally to demonstrate a high degree of volatility. It turned out that during the period, a short 6-10 trading days long, a total of 153 issues advanced 30 or more, with 46 advancing more than 40, twenty more than 50, and five better than 60. This sort of thing, it seems to us, is more than simply evidence of market frenzy. It seems to suggest a fairly high degree of latent demand for stocks at current levels, and, in some cases at least, a lack of any sort of meaningful supply. More subjective measurements pOint m the same direction. As one goes over individual chart patterns, he cannot fail to be impressed not only by the sharp reversals that have taken place but also by the number of instances where the downward movement of 1974 to date has been replaced by lateral action. A fairly Significant number of stocks, it seems to us, has fluctuated back and forth sufficiently over the past few months to form potentially meaningful base formations or at least to make a start on such formations. So, for that matter, has the DJIA itself. The Dow closed, 42 days ago, on August 26, 1974, at 688.13,51.87 pOints above its close of last night. If one adds up the total of the hour-to-hour – changes'forthbse'42 di',ys;–howev-er;'onefinds that they total an astroriomical-944.S5poirits7Y 446 points up and 498 pOints down. In 42 days, in other words, the Dow has managed to post total hour- ly fluctuations almost 1 1/2 times as great as the total value of the index. There is, in sum, something going on out there and it IS, Significantly enough, going on at a time when equities, on an historical basis, represent as good value as they have at any time m the past 30 years. Market reversals take'many forms and many shapes,and we think it would be foolhardy to try to predict the exact shape of the ultimate turn out of the current downswing. The point is that the evidence in favor of an aggressive attitude toward the stock market seems to us today a great deal more compelling than it ha s been in some time. Dow-Jones Industrials (1200 p.m.) 636.50 S & P Compo (1200 p.m.) 70.32 ANTHONY W. TABELL DELAFIELD, HARVEY, TABELL Cumulative Index (10/24/74) 391.84 AWT/jb No stotement or expression of opmlon or any olher matter herein contOlned IS, or IS 10 be deemed 10 be, directly or ,ndlrec1Ir,' on offer or the soiecllollon of on offer 10 buy or sell any secunty referred to Or menlloned The mlllier IS presented merely for the converlence of the subScriber Whl e Ne belIeve Ihe sources of our informatIon to be reliable, we In no way represent or guo ron tee the occuracy thereof nor of the stotements mude herein Any aCTion to be taen by the subscriber should be bor.ed on hiS own investigation and InformaHon Janney Montgomery Scotl, Inc, os 0 corporation, ond Its officers or employees, may now have, or moy later toke, p05ltlon or trades In respect to any seCUrities mentioned In thiS or ony future Issue, and such posllJon may be dIfferent from any views now or hereafter expressed In II'us or ony other ISsve Janney Montgomery Scott, Inc, whIch IS regIstered WIth the SEC as on Investment adVisor, may give odvlce to Its Investment adVisory and other customers Independently of ony statements mode In thiS or In any other Issve Further information on any secury mentioned herein IS available on request

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Tabell’s Market Letter – November 01, 1974

Tabell’s Market Letter – November 01, 1974

Tabell's Market Letter - November 01, 1974
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TABELL'S MARKET LETTER —– – —,I 909 STATE ROAD, PRINCETON, NEW JERSEY 08540 DIYISION OF MEMBER NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE, INC MEMBER AMERICAN STOCK EXCHANGE November 1, 1974 A term familiar to those with even the most superficial knowledge of technical analysis is head-and-.-' -should ersfprmatlon-,,sed .to-lefer to..elther.a .bottom.ortop,reversa 1.,l'art oLthis..!a mlliarity .results, from the simple but graphic name which makes the formatlOn so easy to recognize on- a chat. A;other reason — , – for the familiarity is the fact that the formation has been discussed by some of the earliest writers on technical action, with references having appeared as early a s the 1920' s. As market analys is- ha s become more sophisticated, there has been some latter-day scepticism as to the predictive validity of the formation. One academic is reputed to have had his students reproduce it on a chart by flipping coins, an exercise whlch, if nothing else, should raise the question of just what those who are paying 6,000 a year for a college education are receiving for their money. In any event, the phenomenon of the head-and-shoulders formation is a well-known one in the financial field. As we said above, the formation has been discussed by many early writers, and it is described at some length in what, to many, is the bible of technical work, Technlcal Analysis of Stock Trends, by Robert D. Edwards and John Magee. Reproduced below, in the left-hand column, is Magee and Edwards' description of a head-and-shoulders bottom and, in the right-hand column, is a corresponding discussion of the action of the Dow-Jones Industria I Average in recent months. A. A decline, culminating a more or less extensive On July 24, the Dow reached a high of 805.77 down trend, on which trading volume increases not- and declined to a low of 627.19 on September 13. ably followed by a minor recovery on whICh volume Volume tended to run around 10-11 million shares runs less than it did during the days of final decline through mid-August building up in late August and and at the bottom. This is the 'left shoulder' early September to above 16 million shares on five separate occasions. Volume on the reversal day reached 18 million shares. The market then staged I–''''',—,.,.'.,,-''',…,,—……….-…..,.,……—''..,…-ee-3-dey7recovery-to67,7-.88withwolumeontheHFst two days running 13.7 and 11 million shares, respectively. B. Another decline which carries prices below the bottom of the left shoulder, on which activity shows some increase (as compared with the preceding recovery) but usually does not equal the rate attained on the left shoulder decline, followed by another recovery which carries above the bottom level of the left shoulder and on which activity may pick up, at any rate exceed that on the recovery from the left shoulder. This is the 'head ' From the 677.88 high of early September the Dow declined irregularly to a level of 584.56 on October 4. Volume on the final three days of the decline was 12.2, 13.1 and 15.9 million shares, respectively. This was followed by a sharp 6-day recovery to 673.50 (versus the September low of 627.19) culminated by three days of clos e to 20-million share volume, Including October 10, the highest volume day of the year when 26.4 million shares changed hands. C. A third decline on deCidedly less volume than accompanied the making of either left shoulder or head, which falls to reach the low level of the head before another rally starts. This is the 'right shoulder I From October 15 through October 28 another irregular decline ensued, with the Dow reaching a low of 633.84 just above the 627.19 low of September 13. Volume dropped off sharply on this decline, reaching a low of 10.5 million shares on the final day of the drop. D.- Finally ,-anadvanceOnwhich activity Increas- -,. Th-ere followed' a -2 1/2-day rally on'Tuesday;– —– es notably, which pushes up through the neckline Wednesday and Thursday morning of this week with and closes above it by an amount approximately e- the Dow reaching an hourly high of 678.82 on quivalent to 3 of the stock's market price, with a October 31. Volume picked up markedly on the rise conspicuous burst of activity attending this pene- with 20.1 million shares trading on Wednesday trati,on. This is the 'confirmation' or 'breakout'. and 18.8 million on rhursday. If there is any correlation above, it is, obviously, intended. Indeed, a large part of Magee and Edwards'description, with the exception of the last part of paragraph D, has already been fulfilled. This portion remains to be accomplished and, of course, the Dow pulled back sharply from its high on Thursday afternoon and Friday morning. In the case of the Dow, a level three percent above the neckline, obvious- ly around the 677 level would be 697. Were that level to be attained on continued rising volume, the con- clUSion, for anyone having any degree of faith in historical technical work, would be fairly obvious. Dow-Jones Industrials (1200 p.m.) 667.40 S & P Compo (1200 p.m.) 74.12 ANTHONYW. TABELL DELAFIELD, HARVEY, TABELL Cumulative Index (10/31/74) 399.29 A,orT/jb No statement or e)'presslon of optnion or any other maHer here.n contotned is, or IS to be deemed to be, directly Of Indirectly, on offer or the s.ohcltoflon of on offer to buy or sell any secuflty referred fa or mentioned The motler IS presented merely for the convel'lenee of the subertber While oNe believe the s.ources of our tnformahan fo be relloble, we In no way represent or guarantee the oceurocy thereof nor of Ihe statements mude herein Any oellon 10 be toen by the subscriber should be based on hiS own mvestlgotlon and Information Janney Montgomery Scott, Inc, os 0 corporation, and Its officers or employees, may now hove, or moy later toke, positions or trades In respect to any seCurities menTioned In thiS or ony future Issue, and such POSition moy be ddferent from ony views now or hereoher e1pressed In thiS or any other bsue Janney Montgomery Scott, Inc, which IS regIStered With the SEC os on Investment adVisor, may give adVice to lis Investment adVISOry and olher customers Independently of ony statements mode tn thIS or In any other ISsue Further Informotlon on any seOJrlty mentioned herein IS available on request

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Tabell’s Market Letter – November 08, 1974

Tabell’s Market Letter – November 08, 1974

Tabell's Market Letter - November 08, 1974
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TABELL'S MARKET LETTER 909 STATE ROAD, PRINCETON. NEW JERSEY 081;540 DIVISION OF MEMBER NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE, INC. MEMBER AMERICAN STOCK eXCHANGe -. ……….-'——;.—''- 4 It is occasionally our privilege to appear on portfolio Noyember-,,-8..,19 -……—-,-,.—,1,stratgy paels held- by thNe;' YorkSclety- of Security Analysts, and we enjoyed that privilege once more yesterday. The burden of our own re- marks was based on the following syllogism — the current level of stock prices is apparently dis- counting all economic possibilities with the exception of a worldwide depression. Therefore, if one does not expect such a depression, an aggressive attitude toward stock prices is warranted. One of our panel colleagues, an eminent Wall Street economist, was, properly in our view, less sanguine on the prospects for the economy than were we regarding the stock market. He looks for the probability of a continuing recession perhaps running through mid-1975 with corporate profits down on the order of ten percent for 1975 as a whole. He also conceded the possibility (approximately a 30- percent chance) that the actual 1975 economic scenario might be something worse than that. Now, in our opinion, as we have indicated repeatedly in the past, that something worse would have to be pretty bad in order to justify the current level of equity prices. However, if we postulate the more likely forecast suggested above, it is then necessary to try to project the possible effect of such a scenario 'On the stock market. To begin with, the fact that we are in a recession, and probably have been since the beginning of 1974, is not, perforce, an argument against purchases of common stock. The table below lists the last four identified recessions in the U. S. economy and gives the timing of the related stock price decline. As can be seen, stock prices began declining 5 to 15 months before the recessions started. Thus, if, in early 1974, when real Gross National Product began its decline, we entered into a reces- sion, the peak In stock prices in January, 1973, is a perfectly normal phenomenon. More interesting – . is Hie leat!of previousStock marketboftoms on recesslc;n-trou-ghAsca!lbes-eenthemarkBt;–inthe- four previous recessions, bottomed from 6 to 11 months prior to the economy. If we are then willing to accept the forecast that the current recession will bottom in mld-1975, the thesis of a stock market bottom In the fall of 1974 Is entirely in line with historical experience. Recession Recession Length Stock Months be- Stock Months be- Start End in Months Peak fore Start Bottom fore End July 1953 Aug. 1954 14 Dec. 1952 8 Sep. 1953 11 July 1957 Apr. 1958 10 Apr. 1956 '15 Oct. 1957 7 May 1960 Feb. 1961 9 Jan. 1960 5 Sep. 1960 6 Nov. 1969 Nov. 1970 13 Dec. 1968 12 May 1970 7 Jan. 1974 () June 1975 () 19 Jan. 1973 13 Nor Is the prospect of a decline in corporate profits of necessity an argument that stocks should move lower. For the twelve months ended June, 1974, the Dow-Jones Industrial Average earned 93.26, and an estimatedflgure for the 12 months ended September would be around 96. Hazarding a guess as to the fourth quarter is a bit iffy, but, in all probability, the figure will be relatively flat. If the fore- cast above is correct, earnings should turn down with the first quarter of 1975 and probably continue down on a 12-month basis throughout most of the year. However, there is absolutely no reason, on an historical basis, why this should necessarily pro- duce lower stock prices. In 179 quarters, from 1930 to date, earnings have advanced in 119 instances and declined in 60 cases. In 35 of the 60 quarters in which earnings declined, the market actually ad- vanced during the quarter. .c , ' … .-,- . . The reason for this is a phenomenon which we have documented in past issues of this letter — that multiples placed on earnings tend to move in the oppOSite dl rection from earnings themselves. Thus, in the 60 quarters when earnings declined, in 46 cases the multiple accorded those earnings rose from that of the previous quarter. The converse of this is most dramatically demonstrated by re- cent history, where earnings, since the 3rd quarter of 1971, have advanced some 80 percent, whereas the multiple given those earnings has declined from 16.6 to 6.3. Historically, in the 119 quarters which have shown rising earnings, multiples have declined in 81 instances. The cloudy corporate- profits picture is cited by many as a reason for not taking advantage of the current level of stock prices. This contention would hardly appear to be borne out by the historical record. Dow-Jones Industrials (1200 p.m.) 667.40 ANTHONYW. TABELL S & P Compo (1200 p.m.) 74.77 DELAFIELD, HARVEY, TABELL Cumulative Index (11/7/74) 406.037 AWT/jb No siolemenl.o( exptesslon'of opinion or any olher maHer herein conlolned IS, or IS 10 be deemed 10 be, directly or Indirectly, on offer or the ollcltollon of on offer to buy or e11 any securrfy referred to or mentioned, The moiler 1 presented merely for the COnvef'lence of the subSCriber While Ne beheve the 50urces of our 'nforma tlon 10 be relJ1lble, we In 1\0 way represent or guarantee Ihe accvracy thereof nor of Ihe statements mude herein. Any action to be laken by the subcnber should be based 6n hiS own Investlgallon and information Janney Montgomery Scolt, Inc, as a corporation, and In officers or employees, may now have, or may later toke, P051lronl' or k-ades- (rt respett to any lecUfltles mention.ed In thl (If an.y future IHue, artd such POSition may be different from ony VleW now or hereaFter el(prened In tl'lIS or any.other 1ssl.JoC. 'Jann.eY Montgomery Scott, Inc, whIch 15 reg!5terod With Ihe SEC as on I1westment adVisor, may give odvlce to Its Investment adv,sory and other euslomCtl Ind.tpendcnl.ly 'f any, staternents mode In tn15 or In any other Issue Further information on any security mentioned herein IS aVOIlable an request – -'

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