TABELL'S MARKET LETTER 909 STATE ROAD, PRINCETON, NEW JERSEY 08!540 DIVISION OF MEMBER NEW 'tORI( STOCK EXCHANGE. INC MEMBER AMERICAN STOCK EXCHANGE October 25, 1974 – We outJine'l il1)lstweIJ)'2;,rtJ;s.'.ghthat the behavi,r of ShegJones.Jndustial.Icve.!ag– m the rough 650-680 area would be Important and suggested that the market's continued ability to hold – in that range would be constructive. It did not quite manage to do so in last week's trading,dropping to a closing low of 636.26 on Thursday and an intraday low as low as 624.30. We are nonetheless not all that discouraged by the week's behavior, and close scrutiny of mdividual chart patterns for major listed stocks, in our view, lends a good deal of encouragement to one's market outlook. In nervous and volatile markets (and this one approaches setting records in both categories), it is often unwise to spend a great deal of time trying to pinpoint short-term targets either for the aver- ages or for individual stocks. The basic question facing the investor at this point in time, it seems to us, is whether the wild fluctuations which have characterized September and October, 1974, con- stitute nothing more than a way station on the road to disaster, as the widely-publicized gloom-and- doom proponents would have us believe, or whether they constitute part of a process which will ul- timately lead to a worthwhile revers a 1. Rational examination of the market's action must, in our opinion, mcline the analyst toward the latter view. We suggested in this space last week that the momentum of the six-day advance of October 7-14 was historically almost unprecedented and that it was necessary to go back to the 1930's to find rallies of equal magnitude. It was advances of this degree that characterized the bottoms of 1932 and 1938. As we admitted last week, there were three rallies of similar strength during the mar- ket's sickening slide during the 1929-32 period, and we are perfectly willing to acknowledge that, if one sincerely believes a lJlajor depression is in the offing, he can point to these as evidence that the past couple of month's market action is essentially meaningless. Not being ourselves inclined toward – -that-view-,-we-tendAG,th-in-klthassomewhat-more–s-ignH-ica-nce-. .. It is really, as we suggested above, to the action of individual stocks that one must turn if he wants to gain some insight into the rather amazing things that have been taking place in the market- place of late. Not only was the velocity of the Dow's reversal unprecedented for the postwar period, but the advances of individual stocks were equally amazing. We compiled recently a study measur- ing the percentage advances of major NYSE and ASE issues from their lows for the week ended Wednes- day, October 9, to their highs of the week ended October 16. We eliminated from the study all stocks selling under 15 a share, since lower-priced stocks tend normally to demonstrate a high degree of volatility. It turned out that during the period, a short 6-10 trading days long, a total of 153 issues advanced 30 or more, with 46 advancing more than 40, twenty more than 50, and five better than 60. This sort of thing, it seems to us, is more than simply evidence of market frenzy. It seems to suggest a fairly high degree of latent demand for stocks at current levels, and, in some cases at least, a lack of any sort of meaningful supply. More subjective measurements pOint m the same direction. As one goes over individual chart patterns, he cannot fail to be impressed not only by the sharp reversals that have taken place but also by the number of instances where the downward movement of 1974 to date has been replaced by lateral action. A fairly Significant number of stocks, it seems to us, has fluctuated back and forth sufficiently over the past few months to form potentially meaningful base formations or at least to make a start on such formations. So, for that matter, has the DJIA itself. The Dow closed, 42 days ago, on August 26, 1974, at 688.13,51.87 pOints above its close of last night. If one adds up the total of the hour-to-hour – changes'forthbse'42 di',ys;–howev-er;'onefinds that they total an astroriomical-944.S5poirits7Y 446 points up and 498 pOints down. In 42 days, in other words, the Dow has managed to post total hour- ly fluctuations almost 1 1/2 times as great as the total value of the index. There is, in sum, something going on out there and it IS, Significantly enough, going on at a time when equities, on an historical basis, represent as good value as they have at any time m the past 30 years. Market reversals take'many forms and many shapes,and we think it would be foolhardy to try to predict the exact shape of the ultimate turn out of the current downswing. The point is that the evidence in favor of an aggressive attitude toward the stock market seems to us today a great deal more compelling than it ha s been in some time. Dow-Jones Industrials (1200 p.m.) 636.50 S & P Compo (1200 p.m.) 70.32 ANTHONY W. TABELL DELAFIELD, HARVEY, TABELL Cumulative Index (10/24/74) 391.84 AWT/jb No stotement or expression of opmlon or any olher matter herein contOlned IS, or IS 10 be deemed 10 be, directly or ,ndlrec1Ir,' on offer or the soiecllollon of on offer 10 buy or sell any secunty referred to Or menlloned The mlllier IS presented merely for the converlence of the subScriber Whl e Ne belIeve Ihe sources of our informatIon to be reliable, we In no way represent or guo ron tee the occuracy thereof nor of the stotements mude herein Any aCTion to be taen by the subscriber should be bor.ed on hiS own investigation and InformaHon Janney Montgomery Scotl, Inc, os 0 corporation, ond Its officers or employees, may now have, or moy later toke, p05ltlon or trades In respect to any seCUrities mentioned In thiS or ony future Issue, and such posllJon may be dIfferent from any views now or hereafter expressed In II'us or ony other ISsve Janney Montgomery Scott, Inc, whIch IS regIstered WIth the SEC as on Investment adVisor, may give odvlce to Its Investment adVisory and other customers Independently of ony statements mode In thiS or In any other Issve Further information on any secury mentioned herein IS available on request

TABELL'S MARKET LETTER —– – —,I 909 STATE ROAD, PRINCETON, NEW JERSEY 08540 DIYISION OF MEMBER NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE, INC MEMBER AMERICAN STOCK EXCHANGE November 1, 1974 A term familiar to those with even the most superficial knowledge of technical analysis is head-and-.-' -should ersfprmatlon-,,sed .to-lefer to..elther.a .bottom.ortop,reversa 1.,l'art oLthis..!a mlliarity .results, from the simple but graphic name which makes the formatlOn so easy to recognize on- a chat. A;other reason — , – for the familiarity is the fact that the formation has been discussed by some of the earliest writers on technical action, with references having appeared as early a s the 1920' s. As market analys is- ha s become more sophisticated, there has been some latter-day scepticism as to the predictive validity of the formation. One academic is reputed to have had his students reproduce it on a chart by flipping coins, an exercise whlch, if nothing else, should raise the question of just what those who are paying 6,000 a year for a college education are receiving for their money. In any event, the phenomenon of the head-and-shoulders formation is a well-known one in the financial field. As we said above, the formation has been discussed by many early writers, and it is described at some length in what, to many, is the bible of technical work, Technlcal Analysis of Stock Trends, by Robert D. Edwards and John Magee. Reproduced below, in the left-hand column, is Magee and Edwards' description of a head-and-shoulders bottom and, in the right-hand column, is a corresponding discussion of the action of the Dow-Jones Industria I Average in recent months. A. A decline, culminating a more or less extensive On July 24, the Dow reached a high of 805.77 down trend, on which trading volume increases not- and declined to a low of 627.19 on September 13. ably followed by a minor recovery on whICh volume Volume tended to run around 10-11 million shares runs less than it did during the days of final decline through mid-August building up in late August and and at the bottom. This is the 'left shoulder' early September to above 16 million shares on five separate occasions. Volume on the reversal day reached 18 million shares. The market then staged I–''''',—,.,.'.,,-''',…,,—……….-…..,.,……—''..,…-ee-3-dey7recovery-to67,7-.88withwolumeontheHFst two days running 13.7 and 11 million shares, respectively. B. Another decline which carries prices below the bottom of the left shoulder, on which activity shows some increase (as compared with the preceding recovery) but usually does not equal the rate attained on the left shoulder decline, followed by another recovery which carries above the bottom level of the left shoulder and on which activity may pick up, at any rate exceed that on the recovery from the left shoulder. This is the 'head ' From the 677.88 high of early September the Dow declined irregularly to a level of 584.56 on October 4. Volume on the final three days of the decline was 12.2, 13.1 and 15.9 million shares, respectively. This was followed by a sharp 6-day recovery to 673.50 (versus the September low of 627.19) culminated by three days of clos e to 20-million share volume, Including October 10, the highest volume day of the year when 26.4 million shares changed hands. C. A third decline on deCidedly less volume than accompanied the making of either left shoulder or head, which falls to reach the low level of the head before another rally starts. This is the 'right shoulder I From October 15 through October 28 another irregular decline ensued, with the Dow reaching a low of 633.84 just above the 627.19 low of September 13. Volume dropped off sharply on this decline, reaching a low of 10.5 million shares on the final day of the drop. D.- Finally ,-anadvanceOnwhich activity Increas- -,. Th-ere followed' a -2 1/2-day rally on'Tuesday;– —– es notably, which pushes up through the neckline Wednesday and Thursday morning of this week with and closes above it by an amount approximately e- the Dow reaching an hourly high of 678.82 on quivalent to 3 of the stock's market price, with a October 31. Volume picked up markedly on the rise conspicuous burst of activity attending this pene- with 20.1 million shares trading on Wednesday trati,on. This is the 'confirmation' or 'breakout'. and 18.8 million on rhursday. If there is any correlation above, it is, obviously, intended. Indeed, a large part of Magee and Edwards'description, with the exception of the last part of paragraph D, has already been fulfilled. This portion remains to be accomplished and, of course, the Dow pulled back sharply from its high on Thursday afternoon and Friday morning. In the case of the Dow, a level three percent above the neckline, obvious- ly around the 677 level would be 697. Were that level to be attained on continued rising volume, the con- clUSion, for anyone having any degree of faith in historical technical work, would be fairly obvious. Dow-Jones Industrials (1200 p.m.) 667.40 S & P Compo (1200 p.m.) 74.12 ANTHONYW. TABELL DELAFIELD, HARVEY, TABELL Cumulative Index (10/31/74) 399.29 A,orT/jb No statement or e)'presslon of optnion or any other maHer here.n contotned is, or IS to be deemed to be, directly Of Indirectly, on offer or the s.ohcltoflon of on offer to buy or sell any secuflty referred fa or mentioned The motler IS presented merely for the convel'lenee of the subertber While oNe believe the s.ources of our tnformahan fo be relloble, we In no way represent or guarantee the oceurocy thereof nor of Ihe statements mude herein Any oellon 10 be toen by the subscriber should be based on hiS own mvestlgotlon and Information Janney Montgomery Scott, Inc, os 0 corporation, and Its officers or employees, may now hove, or moy later toke, positions or trades In respect to any seCurities menTioned In thiS or ony future Issue, and such POSition moy be ddferent from ony views now or hereoher e1pressed In thiS or any other bsue Janney Montgomery Scott, Inc, which IS regIStered With the SEC os on Investment adVisor, may give adVice to lis Investment adVISOry and olher customers Independently of ony statements mode tn thIS or In any other ISsue Further Informotlon on any seOJrlty mentioned herein IS available on request

TABELL'S MARKET LETTER 909 STATE ROAD, PRINCETON. NEW JERSEY 081;540 DIVISION OF MEMBER NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE, INC. MEMBER AMERICAN STOCK eXCHANGe -. ……….-'——;.—''- 4 It is occasionally our privilege to appear on portfolio Noyember-,,-8..,19 -……—-,-,.—,1,stratgy paels held- by thNe;' YorkSclety- of Security Analysts, and we enjoyed that privilege once more yesterday. The burden of our own re- marks was based on the following syllogism — the current level of stock prices is apparently dis- counting all economic possibilities with the exception of a worldwide depression. Therefore, if one does not expect such a depression, an aggressive attitude toward stock prices is warranted. One of our panel colleagues, an eminent Wall Street economist, was, properly in our view, less sanguine on the prospects for the economy than were we regarding the stock market. He looks for the probability of a continuing recession perhaps running through mid-1975 with corporate profits down on the order of ten percent for 1975 as a whole. He also conceded the possibility (approximately a 30- percent chance) that the actual 1975 economic scenario might be something worse than that. Now, in our opinion, as we have indicated repeatedly in the past, that something worse would have to be pretty bad in order to justify the current level of equity prices. However, if we postulate the more likely forecast suggested above, it is then necessary to try to project the possible effect of such a scenario 'On the stock market. To begin with, the fact that we are in a recession, and probably have been since the beginning of 1974, is not, perforce, an argument against purchases of common stock. The table below lists the last four identified recessions in the U. S. economy and gives the timing of the related stock price decline. As can be seen, stock prices began declining 5 to 15 months before the recessions started. Thus, if, in early 1974, when real Gross National Product began its decline, we entered into a reces- sion, the peak In stock prices in January, 1973, is a perfectly normal phenomenon. More interesting – . is Hie leat!of previousStock marketboftoms on recesslc;n-trou-ghAsca!lbes-eenthemarkBt;–inthe- four previous recessions, bottomed from 6 to 11 months prior to the economy. If we are then willing to accept the forecast that the current recession will bottom in mld-1975, the thesis of a stock market bottom In the fall of 1974 Is entirely in line with historical experience. Recession Recession Length Stock Months be- Stock Months be- Start End in Months Peak fore Start Bottom fore End July 1953 Aug. 1954 14 Dec. 1952 8 Sep. 1953 11 July 1957 Apr. 1958 10 Apr. 1956 '15 Oct. 1957 7 May 1960 Feb. 1961 9 Jan. 1960 5 Sep. 1960 6 Nov. 1969 Nov. 1970 13 Dec. 1968 12 May 1970 7 Jan. 1974 () June 1975 () 19 Jan. 1973 13 Nor Is the prospect of a decline in corporate profits of necessity an argument that stocks should move lower. For the twelve months ended June, 1974, the Dow-Jones Industrial Average earned 93.26, and an estimatedflgure for the 12 months ended September would be around 96. Hazarding a guess as to the fourth quarter is a bit iffy, but, in all probability, the figure will be relatively flat. If the fore- cast above is correct, earnings should turn down with the first quarter of 1975 and probably continue down on a 12-month basis throughout most of the year. However, there is absolutely no reason, on an historical basis, why this should necessarily pro- duce lower stock prices. In 179 quarters, from 1930 to date, earnings have advanced in 119 instances and declined in 60 cases. In 35 of the 60 quarters in which earnings declined, the market actually ad- vanced during the quarter. .c , ' … .-,- . . The reason for this is a phenomenon which we have documented in past issues of this letter — that multiples placed on earnings tend to move in the oppOSite dl rection from earnings themselves. Thus, in the 60 quarters when earnings declined, in 46 cases the multiple accorded those earnings rose from that of the previous quarter. The converse of this is most dramatically demonstrated by re- cent history, where earnings, since the 3rd quarter of 1971, have advanced some 80 percent, whereas the multiple given those earnings has declined from 16.6 to 6.3. Historically, in the 119 quarters which have shown rising earnings, multiples have declined in 81 instances. The cloudy corporate- profits picture is cited by many as a reason for not taking advantage of the current level of stock prices. This contention would hardly appear to be borne out by the historical record. Dow-Jones Industrials (1200 p.m.) 667.40 ANTHONYW. TABELL S & P Compo (1200 p.m.) 74.77 DELAFIELD, HARVEY, TABELL Cumulative Index (11/7/74) 406.037 AWT/jb No siolemenl.o( exptesslon'of opinion or any olher maHer herein conlolned IS, or IS 10 be deemed 10 be, directly or Indirectly, on offer or the ollcltollon of on offer to buy or e11 any securrfy referred to or mentioned, The moiler 1 presented merely for the COnvef'lence of the subSCriber While Ne beheve the 50urces of our 'nforma tlon 10 be relJ1lble, we In 1\0 way represent or guarantee Ihe accvracy thereof nor of Ihe statements mude herein. Any action to be laken by the subcnber should be based 6n hiS own Investlgallon and information Janney Montgomery Scolt, Inc, as a corporation, and In officers or employees, may now have, or may later toke, P051lronl' or k-ades- (rt respett to any lecUfltles mention.ed In thl (If an.y future IHue, artd such POSition may be different from ony VleW now or hereaFter el(prened In tl'lIS or any.other 1ssl.JoC. 'Jann.eY Montgomery Scott, Inc, whIch 15 reg!5terod With Ihe SEC as on I1westment adVisor, may give odvlce to Its Investment adv,sory and other euslomCtl Ind.tpendcnl.ly 'f any, staternents mode In tn15 or In any other Issue Further information on any security mentioned herein IS aVOIlable an request – -'

TABELLWS MARKET LETTER J 909 STATE ROAD, PRINCETON, NEW JERSEY 08540 DIVISION OF MEMBER NEW VORK STOCK EXCtANOE, INC MEMSER AMERICAN STOCK eXCHANGE November 15, 1974 A consensus is now being reached (having extended last week all the way to the Office of the – Pres ident of the U'S) that'theU ;'Seconomy is 'now'inarecession'9'o'manyrthatsuch a'con-'- OF census is necessary will be a surprise, since it is widely believed that economists have a clearly defined set of rules as to what a recession is. Such is not, in fact, the case. A recession is arbitrarily defined as such, usually well after the fact, by the prestigious National Bureau of Economic Research, and these gentlemen are generally uncommunicative about the criteria used. Veteran NBER-watchers, however, have come up with a rule of thumb. They have noted the fact that every time in the postwar period that real Gross National Product has declined for two consecutive quarters, the NBER has later defined that period as a recession. Since real GNP has now declined for three quarters, all of 1974 to date, it is thus agreed that the NBER will at some point in time get around to defining a 1974-7 recession. Yet in many ways it is a unique one. The following table shows the changes in current-dollar Gross Domestic Product, real Gross Domestic Product, and the price deflator for the 1929-33 de- pression, three of the four postwar recessions and the current period. (All figures are in billions ,and GNP is used for 1973-4). The differences are rather striking. In 1929-33, of course, physical output was declining sharply and prices were also declining, albeit not at a rate sufficient to keep pace with the decline in output. In 1953-54 and in 1957-58 current-dollar output was declining steadily,and rising prices Simply accelerated the stated decline in real output. In 1969-70, how- ever, and again today, we have a very different sort of an animal. In both cases current-dollar output was rising. It was the fact that prices were riSing at a faster rate, especially in 1973-74, that caused real-dollar output to decline. -What we are suggestin;f; of coUrse, is'that the major culprrtfiT'ine currenCinstan-c-e is not'fall.. ing output but riSing prices. In other words, inflation rather than recession. Whatever curative measures are considered, it seems to us, should take this factor into account. Current Dollar Change Real Gross Change Price Deflator Gross Domes- Annual Domestic Annual Change Year Quarter tic Product Rate Product .ocRca…te- Annual Rate 1929 1930 1931 1932 1933 Full Yr. 102.3 89.6 75.3 57.7 55.3 -12.4 -16.0 -23.4 – 4.1 202.2 181.9 167.9 142.9 140.3 – 7.7 -14.9 – 1. 8 – 2.6 – 9.0 -10.0 – 2.4 1953 1954 2 3 4 1 2 366.1 364.6 359.5 359.1 358.8 – 1. 7 – 5.4 – 0.4 – 0.3 415.0 412.4 407.5 401.4 400.6 – 2.4 – 4.7 – 5.8 – 0.8 0.7 – 0.7 5.7 0.4 1957 1958 – 1969 1970 3 444.0 4 439.5 1 432.8 3 – 937.6 4 944.8 1 954.0 2 966.5 3 982.5 4 986.8 – 4.0 – 6.0 3.1 3.9 5.4 6.8 1. 7 453.0 446. 435.7 ..725.3, 721. 3 717.1 718.5 723.2 715.1 – 5.9 – 9.1 – 2. – 2.3 0.8 2.6 – 4.4 1.9 3.5 – 5.4 6.4 4.5 4.1 6.4 1973 4 1344.0 1974 1 1358.8 2 1383.8 3 1411.6 Dow-Jones Industrials (1200 P.m.) S & P Compo (1200 p.m.) 4.5 7.6 8.3 650.03 72.14 845.7 830.5 – 7.0 12.3 827.1 – 1.6 9.3 821. 1 – 2.9 11.5 ANTHONY W. TABELL DELAFIELD, HARVEY, TAB ELL Cumulative Index (11/14/74) 402.14 AWT/jb No statement or e)(prenlon of opinion or eny other motter herein contained IS, or IS to be deemed to be. dlreClly or indirectly, on offer or 'he sollcltollon of on offel to buy or sell ony security referred to or mentlonod The motter IS presented merely for the COnVef'lenCE of Ihe subscriber While He bellevo the sources of our information 10 be reliable, we In no way represent or guarantee the accuracy thereol nor of the statements mude herein Any action to be loken by the subSCriber should be based on hiS own Investigation and Information Janney Montgomery Scott. Inc, as a corporation, and Its officers or employees, may now have, or may later toke. posllloM or trades In respect 10 any securities menhoned In Ihls or any future lSue. and such position may be different from any views now or hereafter expressed In this or any olher Issue Janney Montgomery colt, Inc, which IS registered With the SEC as on Iflveslmenl adVisor, moy give adVice to lIs Investment adVisory and other customers Independently of any statements mode In thiS or 1M any alher Issue Further IMformotlon on any security mentioned herein IS aVailable On request

TABELL'S MARKET LETTER 909 STATE ROAD, PRINCETON, NEW JERSEY 08540 DIYISION OF MEMBER NEW YORK STOCI( EXCHANGE. tNC MEM8ER AMERICAN STOCK EXCHANGe November 22, 1974 ' I-I-….,Th'estock-!!la..!ket,has a nasty habit of shattering the hopes of those who wish to squeeze it in- – to neat little categorfes, and it dfdSo once aga'in in last week s t'ld-ing. We -had dlscui;-s-ed-In this space three weeks ago the possibility that the Dow-Jones Industrial Average was forming an almost classic head-and-shoulders base formation with a potential right shoulder in, roughly, the 630-680 range. That particular possibility was disposed of last week, as what might have been a right shoulder was penetrated sharply on the downside. Viewed as a distributional top, the formation implied a test of the October 4 low, 573.22 on an intraday basis, which test was indeed taking place at week's end as the average flirted with the 600 level. 1 It is now, of course, necessary to ask what, in fact, has been altered by the week's market weakness. Certainly not the various indicators of market psychology which suggest a pervasive state of peSSimism — pessimism of the sort normally accompanying important lows. The weakness does not alter the fact, for example, that mutual fund cash position remained at record levels for the third month in a row in October, after reaching an almost astronomical 13.5 percent of total assets in September, this, incidentally, after adjusting for the presence of money-market funds. Nor does this week's downswing cancel out the unusually high levels of short selling recorded as the market rose during October. In three of the four weeks of that month, short sales were in excess of 10 percent of total volume, again, a level normally attained at important lows. Nor can the weakness alter what has already taken place, such as the astonishing reversal -' '- mf!1enumotthe Oc!obr,!9.pe.!iod ,1iVhich ,we have1Jcu.ssednthis spaGe n the past. ing that it is the sort of thing characteristic of past bottoms. '- t- The question which really needs to be asked at this juncture is whether last week's market downturn alters the basic conclusion that the market moved, in early October, out of a downtrend into what eventually will turn out to be an accumulation area of some sort. We do not, in sum, think that that conclusion is changed by last week's action. The only change, we think, is in the shape and timing of the potential base. Rather than rebounding from the 630-680 level as we might have hoped it would do, it now becomes obvious that further accumulation must take place at lower levels, levels around, or perhaps even slightly below, the low of October 4. There is ample historical precedent for this sort of thing. In May, 1970, the last major market bottom, it is true, the Dow, after rebounding from the 630 level to over 700, reba sed at the 680-720 level and then moved ahead on the upside, never seriously testing the May low. Similar action took place in the period October, 1957-April, 1958. In 1966, however, after reaching a climactic low in August at around the 760 level, the Dow, after rallying to approximately 820, plunged to a new low of 736 before completing its base formation. Likewise, in 1962, the May low around 550 was penetrated on two separate occasions, first in June and then again in October before a market advance finally ensued. What.we are.saying, of course, is.that, throughout market his!ory, base formations have taken many varied shapes, and there is no way of predicting what shape the current one will assume. We are suggesting, moreover, that a slight penetration of the early-October lows would not, of necessity, be a cause for alarm. The real question is whether or not we are now in a ba sing process. We think that the psychological factors referred to above, plus the obvious downtrend penetrations by a large number of individual issues, strongly suggest that sort of process is currently under way. Dow Jones Industrials (1200 p.m.) 615.77 S & P Camp. (1200 p.m.) 68.98 Cumulative Index (11/21/74 378.53 AWT/jb ANTHONY W. TABELL DELAFIELD, HARVEY, TABELL No statement or expression of opinion or ony olner motler herem Con/Dined 1, or '10 be deemed 10 be, directly or indirectly, on offer or the sol1cllollon of on offer to buy or sell ony security referred 10 or mentioned The matter 1 preented merely for Ihe convef'lenn. of the subscriber While we believe Ihe sources of our InForma- tion ta be reliable, we m no way repres(!nt or guarantee the accuracy thereof nor ot the slOi(!ments mude herem Any actIOn to be token by the subscnber should be based on hiS own InveshgOllon and information Jonney Montgomery Scott, tnc , as a corporation, and Its officers or employees, may now have, or may later talo-e, posItions Of trades In respect to any seCUrities mentIoned In thiS or any Future Issue, and such pOSitIOn may be different from any views now or hereafter expressed In thIS or any other Issue Janney Montgomery Scali, Inc, whICh IS registered With Ihe SEC as on Investment odvisor, may give adVIce To Its mvestment adVISOry and other customers Independently of Clny slotement mode In thiS or In ony other Issue Further Informotlon on any securrty mentioned herein IS available on request

TABELL'S MARKET LETTER 909 STATE ROAD. PRINCETON. NEW JERSEY 08540 DIVISION OF MEMlte NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE, INC MEMBER AMERICAN STOCK eXCHANGE November 29, 1974 -'Often anencoufaging signinth'EistocK ma-rKeifis'theaoility to'llOldih'tJ1e-dbwiiSldeonJectTve – of a previous distributional top rather than exceeding that objective by a considerable margin. For the time being, at least, the stock market did just that last week, reaching the 610-580 level which had been the downside objective of the distribution formation at 680-630 and rebounding sharply on Tuesday and Wednesday to close reaching a Wednesday intraday high of 633.45. While mildly encouraging, the week's action does not alter the uncertainties outlined in last week's letter. Although we can reaffirm the probability that the market, as of early October. entered a basing phase, it is still too early to predict what the shape of that base will be or where its lower limit will ultimately wind up. Equally difficult to predict is the eventual timing of the ul- timate ups ide breakout. One possible set of grounds for optimism, however, lies in the season into which we are en- tering, i. e., December. The table below gives the closing Dow-Jones Industrial Average for December 10, December 20 and December 31 of each year from 1926 to 1973, expressed as a per- centage of the November close. (Where the market was closed on the date, the previous close is used.) There is, as can be seen, a pronounced tendency toward an upside market in the month of December, particularly in the first third and the latter third of the month. In 37 cases out of the 48, the market closed higher in December than it had in November, and in 38 cases out of 48 it was higher at the close than it had been on December 20. In 31 instances the market was up between the November close and the tenth of December. However, there is sgme,ten.cie!H;yt9't1ar(t.YI'ea!c!ls.. q1 Itlid-month .'fItth .tlle .mSlIkethaying,.been dO'l1 from the tentlL!Q…. the twentieth in almost half of the cas'es .'- ' Year 12/10 12/20 12/31 Year 12/10 12/20 12/31 1926 101.96 102.68 100.42 1950 99.87 101.58 103.43 1927 99.08 101.37 102.11 1951 102.34 102.37 103.05 1928 89.97 96.12 102.26 1952 100.31 101.01 102.91 1929 109.73 96.63 103.99 1953 99.12 100.77 99.83 1930 94.87 92.38 89.74 1954 100.86 102.73 104.56 1931 87.84 86.02 82.99 1955 100.91 99.71 101.06 1932 108.70 104.31 106.35 1956 104.32 103.74 105.65 1933 104.87 97.09 101.79 1.957 97.64 94.96 96.85 1934 99.83 96.75 101.07 1958 101.36 102.96 104.89 1935 99.97 98.00 101.25 1959 102.06 102.65 103.06 1936 99.43 96.94 98.19 1960 102.29 102.95 103.13 1937 102.62 104.54 97.87 1961 100.92 100.13 101.32 1938 98.99 100.43 103.30 1962 99.35 99.88 100.43 1939 101.54 102.36 103.12 1963 102.50 101.54 101.66 1940 1941 1942 100.28 95.43 101.31 98.37 94.38 103.71 100.10 97.14 104.28 1964 1965 1966 98.60 100.64 102.71 99.23 100.58 100.38 99.85 102.38 99.25 1943 1944 1945 1946 1947 1948 1949 104.22c 102.70 102.18 103.55 98.99 103.04 101.63 105.04104.88 102.21 103.39 98.90 100.76 104.69 104.30 100.93 100.98 103.29 103.56 102.96 104.48 –1967,' -,-101.3L 1968 99.25 1969 96.51 1970 103.40 1971 103.06 1972 101.47 1973 103.51 Average 100.77 ,101.27 98.16 97.24 103.61 106.46 98.69 100.71 100.28 103.35 95.80 98.53 105.65 107.08 100.18 103.48 101.37 Dow-Jones Industrials (1200 p.m.) 616.16 S & P Compo (1200 p. m.) 69.70 Cumulative Index (11/27/74) 382.12 AWT/jb ANTHONY W. TABELL DELAFIELD, HARVEY, TAB ELL No statement or expression of opInion or cny other motler herem contained IS, or IS 10 be deemed to be, directly or Indirectly, on offer or the SOllellolion of on offer to buy or sell ony security referred 10 Or mentioned The moiler 1 presented merely for the converlence of the subSCriber While oNe believe the sources of our informatIOn 10 be relloble, we In no way represent or guarantee Ihe accuracy Ihereof nor of the stotemenls mude herein Any action 10 be laken by Ihe subscriber should be bosed on hiS own inVestigation and Informotlon Janney Montgomery Scott, Inc, 05 (I corpoml1on, and 11s officers or I!mploye-es, moy now have, or may later lake, pos.hons or Ifodes In respect to any seUrlt.cs menlloned In thiS or any future Issue, and such positIOn may be d,ffl!rent from any views now or hereoftl!r eypreued In thIS or any other Issue Janney Montgomery Scali, Inc, which .s registered With the SEC as on Investment OdVIS(H, may give adVice 10 Its Investment advlory and other customers Independen11y of clOy stalements mode ,n this or In any olher Inue Further information on any security mentIOned herein IS aVOIlable on request

TABELL'S MARKET LETTER 909 STATE ROAD, PRINCETON, NEW JERSEY 081540 DIVISION OF MEMBER NEW YORK STOCK eXCHANGE, INC MEMBER AMERICAN STOCK EXCHANGE – – The-was c;-;inlY little tr about in lastweek's-'ae;ktt!d!rmaii-e-.-T'h-e- DC;;-'- led off the week with a IS-point decline, followed it with desultory action on Tuesday and Wednesday, and plunged again in late Thursday's trading and early Friday's through its October 4 low of 584.56 to its lowest level in 12 years. All this was accomplished on reduced volume in the 11-13 million share range. The impression given was not so much of a rush to sell equities, but of the lack of anyone with the inclination to buy, even at the week's reduced 'price levels. Certainly there was precious little stimulus in the week's financial news to awaken interest in common stocks. The 1974 recession, the probable existence of which was apparent to a small coterie of economists some six months ago, finally became a page-one news event, having attained the ultimate accolade in becoming the subJ ect of cover stories in the leading newsweeklies. There is implied here no criticism of TIME magazine for reporting on a subject which is admittedly newsworthy. In doing so, it is simply performing its journalistic function. We have in the past, however, tried to draw the distinction between journalism and forecasting, and we are inclined to feel that once an event attains the status of a TIME cover story, it is pretty well discounted as far as the stock market is concerned. Indeed, we tried to document statistically a few weeks ago the fact that a recession which began in early 1974 and may end in mid-1975, is entirely consistent with the prospect of a stock market bottom in 1974's final quarter. Indeed, if the economic scenario turns out to be as suggested above, the fourth quarter of 1974 is precisely the time the stock market should'bottom; –,— .– – – —- With the word recession having become front page news, the nasty word depression is being heard mentioned in more rarefied circles. We have conceded in the past that elements which could lead to a contraction justifying this appelation are, in fact, present. We have also noted that if, indeed, they were not present, it would be very difficult to explain away the current level of stock prices. By any objective historical standards, current price levels now allow for anything short of total economic disaster in 1975. Part of the reason for the market's current confused state, it seems to us, is that the ana- lytical techniques which Wall Street has developed over the past few years find themselves singularly ill-equipped to handle 1975 prospects. Analysts are agreed that corporate profits should be lower, certainly in the first half of next year, and that the bulk of listed companies will probably spend most of the upcoming year reporting unfavorable earnings comparisons. Yet modern analytical theory has centered on trying to focus on those companies which were report- ing consistent quarter-to-quarter earnings growth. Indeed, the characteristic lunacy of the 1968-72 period was the delusion that companies which were able'to exhibit such growth were worth almost any price. As we move into 1975, however, we find ourselves in a period when most companies will not be reporting quarter-to-quarter earnings growth — in fact, just the opposite. This is a hard economic fact and it must be faced. Yet, it should be obVious the common stocks of these companies are worth something. It is the business of putti ng a precise numerical tag on that something which current analytical technique finds difficult. And yet;' the -delus ion that' declining earnings are worth nothing is the mirror image of, and comparable in irrationality to the delusion of a couple of years ago that rising earnings were worth anything. Thus, the dilemma, and it is, in part, we think, the reason for the market's desultory be- havior. Yet, like all other market eras, this one, too, shall pass, and we will be forced to come to grips with a conception of fundamental value that does not depend on quarter-to-quarter earnings comparisons. Judged by such standards, we think current prices will be found in the future to have been, on a long-range basis, bargains indeed. Dow-Jones Industrials (1200 p.m.) 581.27 S & P Compo (1200 p.m.) 65.45 Cumulative Index (12/5/74) 366.85 AWT/jb ANTHONY W. TAB ELL DELAFIELD, HARVEY, TABELL No statement or expression of opInion or any other matter here,n contained IS, or , to be deemed to be. directly or mdlrectly, on offer Of Ihe SOIH;llohon of on offer to buy or sell /lny security referred 10 Or mentioned The matter IS presented merely for Ihe COnVef'lenCIl of the subscnber Wtnle we believe the sources of our Informo. t.on to be rellCJble, we m no woy represent or guarantee the accuracy thereof nor of the statements mude herem Any ac110n to be taen by Ihe subscnber shOuld be based on hiS own Investlgotlon and Information Janney Montgomery SCali. Inc, as a corporation, and lIs officers or employees, may now have, or moy later toke, positions or trades In respect to alty securities meMlaned lit thiS or any future 'Sue, and such posrtron may be drfferent from any views now or hereafter expressed In th.s or any other Issue Jonney Montgomery Scott, Inc. wtllch .s registered With the SEC as on .nvestment adVisor. may give adVice to Its mvestment adVISOry and other customers mdependently of any statements mode m thiS or In any other Issue Further InformatIOn on any security mentioned herein IS avarloble on request

– TABELL'S MARKET LETTER 909 STATE ROAD, PRINCETON, NEW JERSEY 08540 DIYISION OF MEMIlEA NEW VORK STOCK EXCHANGE, INC MEMIlER AMERICAN STOCK eXCHANGE ' – . – – – – – – – – – – – – – – '–.–….,, ….. – —- – ….-.,…- -.,… —.,.- – . December 13, 1974 – …. …….,.. -'—- – . –.- Since inflation has been much in the news of late and there was, at one time, at least, a con- ventional wisdom that common stocks provided a means of protecting capital against inflation, we completed this week a study which traces the history of the Dow-Jones Industrial Average plus its earnings and dividends from 1929 through the third quarter of 1974, expressed in constant-iollar terms, the adjustment factor being the Gross National Product deflator with a base period of 1958. The results of the study are interesting. As of September of this year, the actual Dow figure of 607.87 was only 353.62 when expressed in constant 1958 dollars. This compared, interestingly enough, with a constant-dollar high in the third quarter of 1929 of 678.74 and a more recent con- stant-dollar peak of 869.29, achieved in the final quarter of 1965. Expressed in constant-dollar terms, in other words, the Dow has been gradually trailing off to its current low level for the past nine years. An explanation for the decline, however, does not lie in Dow earnings,even when those earnings are adjusted for inflation. Constant-dollar earnings for the Dow in 1929 were 39.35. The 99.60 earned by the Dow for the twelve months ended September, 1974, adjusts to 60.16, an all-time peak. Indeed, real-dollar corporate profits have given a good account of themselves over the past 25 years. Throughout the 1950's and early 1960's, they remained reasonably constant around the 35 level except for the occasional recession trough. In the relatively inflation-free period of the mid-1960's, they rose to a peak of 50.76 in the third quarter of 1966 and then declined to a low of 37. 71 in the fourth quarter of 1970. The recent recovery, however, ha s rega ined a II of the groundtost;and;asnoted above the-60 16 figure 6f'1974'-stlilrd quafterrepresentsanantime- -,,- record. Since payout ratios have declined, dividends have not kept pace with inflation as well, thus, perhaps, providing some explanation of the current low level of prices. For example, in 1964 the Dow paid 28.66 in 1958 dollars as dividends. For the twelve months ended September, 1970, it paid only 22.81 in 1958 dollars. Yet, despite the recent dismal record, the study suggests that stocks have managed to show a positive constant-dollar return over the years. If return is defined to include dividends plus capital appreciation, an investment in the DJIA at the 1928 close would have appeciated, with divi- dends reinvested, some 388.6 percent as of the third quarter of 1974. This works out to an annual real-dollar interest rate of around 3.5 percent. However, this figure, it must be recalled, meas- ures from a peak to a trough. If we measure from 1929 to the high of 1972, for example, the 1928 Dow investment, dividends reinvested,would have appreciated 783 percent for an annual return of around 5 percent in real dollars. And measured from 1949 to date, the annual real-dollar return on the same basis works out to better than 6 percent. On an annual basis the total return on the DJIA, including dividends and capital appreciation, has been positive in eighteen of the past twenty-five years. The table below lists this percent- age return since 1950, the 1974 figure being for the twelve months ended September. 1950 21.17 1955 24.09 1960 – 7.86 1965 12.43 1970 3.67 1951 15.59 1952 3.32 1956 2.83 -1957 -11.51 1961 21.32 1962 – 8.47 1966 -18.63 -1967 15.17- 1971 6.13 197-2.-14 15- 1953 1.52 1958 35.98 1963 19.14 1968 3.67 1973 -19.23 1954 48.90 1959 18.81 1964 16.89 1969 -16.23 1974 -38.95 Over the short term, obviously enough, the market may continue to fluctuate but the study shows that in the long run common stocks have been able to protect and enhance capital even in inflationary periods. Dow-Jones Industrials (1200 p.m.) 597.78 S & P Compo (1200 p.m.) 67.63 Cumulative Index (12/12/74) 360.53 AWT/jb ANTHONY W. TABELL DELAFIELD, HARVEY, TAB ELL No stalement or expresSion of opinion or any other matter herein conlClined 15, or Is to be deemed to be, directly or IndHectly, on offer or the solicitatIOn of on offer to buy or sell any security referred to or mentioned The molter IS presented merely for the convellenctl of the subscriber While we believe the sources of our mforma- han to be reliable, we In no way represent or guarantee the accuracy thereof nor of the statements mude herein Any actIOn to be token by the subKrlber should be based on hiS own investigation ond information Janney Montgomery Scott, Inc, os a corporation, and Its officers or employees, may now have, or may later toke, positions or trades 1M respect to any seCUrities mentioned m thiS or any future luue, and such position rT\(y be ddferent from ony views now or hereafter eypressed In Ihls or any olher Issue Janney Montgomery Scott, Inc, which IS registered With the SEC 05 on Investment adVisor, may give adVice to Its mvestment adVisory and other ctJstomers Independent!y of any statements mode In thiS or In any other Issue Further mformotlon on ony secunty mentioned herern IS available on request

TABELLS MARKET LETTER i -1 909 STATE ROAD, PRINCETON, NEW JERSEY 08540 DIVISION OF MEMBER NEW VORK STOCK EXCHANGE. INC MEMBER AMERICAN STOCK EXCHANGe December 20, 1974 One day as I sat musing, sad and lonely and without a friend, a voice came to me from out of the gloom, saying, 'Cheer up, things could be worse.' So ..-.. –'- ..-…qlq-,-1ru pn9…U.! ep9QI thJ.ng.ggt…V!.9'''''''' Anon . F It is Our custom each year to divide our year-end forecast into two parts, the first part being a review of the year just ended — setting the scene, as it were, for our forecast for the upcom- ing year. When we devoted ourselves to this task about a year ago, we noted at the time that it was somewhat of an exercise in masochism. We pointed out that the Dow-Jones Industrial Average, at its low of early December, 1973, had decllned some 25 from its January, 1973, high of 1051. 70. We suggested, moreover, that that statistic did not tell the entire story of the decllne. We noted that our Cumulative Index, an unweighted average of all issues traded on the NYSE, had dropped from a January high of 979.26 to a low of 555.02, suggesting that the average NYSE issue during 1973 had posted a 43 loss. We were forced to note, in addition, that the 1973 deCline, as measured by the Olmulative In- dex, was part of an on-going process, since the high in that Index had been made back in 1968 at a staggering level of 1455. This average, in other words, had, a year ago, lost almost two-thirds of its value over a three-year period. All this, we noted, had brought the market to a period of al- most unprecedented skepticism with regard to earning power, and we noted that, at its low of December, the Dow had been selling for approximately 9.6 times esti mated 1973 earnings, pOint- ing out this was the lowest level which had existed since 1951. Then things got worse. The Dow, already down 25 in 1973, had by October 4, 1974, taken another 31.3 percent loss, and the S & P 500 had decllned 36. I percent. Our Cumulative Index performed, for a change, about the same as the S & P, reaching a low of 355.80 in October for an additional 37.9 percent –.dclIne,,Tis r!,-oJ,lh !hese market av.,,g2.s ha;otsted tJelr tobeJ.Qs1'he Q!GmbElf…d,,-qle to 577.60 in the Dow Industrials to below the 12-year low of 584.56 recorded on October 4, and the recent new low of our Cumulative Index at 354.92 posted on December 16, has not been, to date, conflrmed by the broader based market indices such as the S & P Industrials and Composite Index or the NYSE Composite. . The market's total disinterest in record levels of corporate earning power became even more pronounced. Dow earnings, S86.15 for the year 1973, had increased to just under the SIOO annual rate by September, 1974. We painted out a year ago that the 9.6 multiple being accorded 1973 earnings had not been exceeded on the downside all the way back to 1951. The multiple under six times eatnings now being applied to the Dow has been exceeded, since earnings flgures for the average have been available. This includes periods such as 1932, 1938 and 1949, an era previously regarded by market historians as the absolute nadir of investor confidence. 1974, moreover, was the phase of the bear market when the mania for investment in growth stocks at any price finally collapsed under its own weight. Through the middle of 1973, most of the major institutional growth favorites had been able to resist the market's decllne. In 1974, the inevitable flnally took place, as the following table which gives the December 31, 1973, close and the current price of eight representative growth favorites shows. 12/31/73 12/19/74 Change Avon Products 633/4 27 5/8 – 56.7 Coca-Cola Eastman Kodak 126 1/2 116 50 1/2 603/4 – 60.1 – 47.6 IBM McDonalds. PolarOid Sears, Roebuck 246 3/4 57 69 7/8 80 1/4 169 30 1/4 19 1/8 48 5/8 -31.5 46.9 – 72.6 – 39.4 Xerox 122 3/4 52 1/2 – 57.2 It has, in short, not been a pleasant year for those of us charged with managing equity invest- ments. We concluded our Jetter of a year ago by saying, We start 1974, in other words, with equity markets in general in a more profound state of demoralization than has existed 10 the adult lifetime of most investors. As we said above, we think it is this fact that is central to any market forecast for 1974. As we suggested, that state of demoralization is now even more profound. Just as the existence of that state was central to our forecast of last year, it is eVen more central to our forecast for 1975. We will discuss this point in next week's letter. A VERY MERRY CHRISTMAS TO ALL Dow-Jones Industrials (1200 p.m.) 600.75 ANTHONY W. TABELL S & P Camp. (1200 p.m.) 67.20 DELAFIELD, HARVEY, TABELL Cumulative Index (12/19/74) 355.70 AWT/jb No statement or exprelon of opInion or any other matter herein conlalned Is, or Is 10 be deemed 10 be, dlreclly or Indirectly, an offer Or Ihe sollCllotion of an oHer to buy or sell any security referred to or menlloned The matter IS presented merely for the converlenCIli of the subSCriber While He believe the urces of our Informa- lion to be reliable, we 10 no way represent or guarantee the accuracy thereol nor of the statements mode herein Any action to be token by Ihe subscriber should be based on hiS own investigation and Informohon Janney Montgomery Scott, Inc, as a corporation, and 115 officers Or employees, may now have, or may later lake, positions or trades In respect fo any SeCurities mentioned In thiS or any future Issue, and such position may be dlffererrt from any views now or hereafter expressed In this or any other Issue Jonney Montgomery Scoll, Inc, which IS registered With the SEC as on inVestment adVisor, may give adVice to Its Investment adVISOry and oth!!1 C1Jslomers Independently of any statements mode 10 thiS Or 10 any other Issue Further mlormahon on any security mentioned herein IS available on request

– – –.—- – …. ———- TABELL'S MARKET LETTER 909 STATE ROAD, PRINCETON. NEW JERSEY 08540 DIYISION OF MEMBER NEW YORI( STOCK EXCHANGE, INC MEMBER AMERICAN STOCK EXCHANGE December 27, 1974 We undertook last week the melancholy task of reviewing the year 1974 In preparation for a forecast for 1975. We were forced to point out that the Dow-Jones Industrial Average had taken a 31 shellacking on -. —top of a-25 decl-Ineln973.andthat-our-Gumulativeindexln-our-vlew-a more-accurate measure-of-the – true performance of 'the average NYSE stock, had lost more than three-quarters of its value since its high of 1968. It Is against this background of almost total carnage that we must survey the outlook for the year ahead. Before venturing a prediction, a cautionary word regarding attitude appears appropriate. Bernard Baruch once remarked that one of the most useful exercises for the investor was to continually repeat to himself that 2 plus 2 equals 4. Baruch, actually, was referring to the irrationality that normally accompanies bull market tops. However, as technicians are well aware, tops and bottoms are often mirror images of each other, and we think the advice is equally appllcable In the sort of slough of despond In which the stock market now finds itself. It Is all too easy for the investor, bruised and battered by the lambasting he has taken over the past couple of years,to forget the fact that stocks have been and w1ll be again vehicles for ca pita 1 appreciation. Those who have studied markets are only top well aware that a substantial rebound from the ultimate low, wherever and whenever that low may occur, is a virtual certainty. The problem, of course, lies In the timing and Identification of that low. In one sense, the Investor with resources and patience can afford to be unworried, even about the timing. We Indicated last week that the current earning power behind the DJIA can today be bought at the lowest price In recorded history. Regardless of what may take place In the interim, we think, a s we have repeatedly stated, that the prices at which high-grade equities are currently avallable wlll prove, in the light of history, to have been amazing bargains. In order to put together a 1975 forecast, 1t is necessary to look at both the technical and fundamental outlook. The consensus economic forecast developing for 1975 calls for a deepening recession with the decline of perhaps 20 In overall corporate profits and a drop of, perhaps, 10 in the earnings of – the–8- &-P500-.-Gu1te–clearlymar-ketvalulngthelat-estJ.2months-eamings aLthe-figufe-itjiscurrently . valuing them, is worried about something a good deal worse. And yet, we know of few reputable voices talking about anything substantially worse than the above scenario. The spectre of worldwide depression is, admittedly, there, but It would hardly seem to be the foregone conclusion the market is saying it is. Without venturing Into the murky waters of economic forecasting, we should only Ii ke to point out that it has been profitable, at most times and In most places, to bet against the apocalypse. It Is also worth pointing out that, In the light of hindsight, the most profitable times to buy stocks have been those when whatever economic hobgoblins were bullt Into the market's price structure have failed ultimately to mater- ialize — I.e., the inev1table postwar depression of 1949. From a technical point of view, there are various factors to be considered In looking into the upcoming year. Not the least is the decennial pattern, unusually reliable at this point in the decade. It will be re- called that this pattern tells us that all years ending In 5 in this century have been up years for the stock market. It Is worth noting, also, that 1976 is a presidential election year, an occurrence which has also tended to favor rising markets. We have also suggested In this letter in the past that many of the precon- ditions for a market bottom have recently been present, such as a record level of institutional cash posi- tion. What has been absent so far, at least, in terms of obvious clarity, are the signs of a sort of selling cllmax which has terminated in so many bear markets In the past. We have also noted, however, that m deeply soldout periods, such as the present one, such a climax Is not a necessary precursor to a market turn. Also relevant to a forecast is the action of Individual stocks, which suggests that, in many cases, despite the move of market averages to new lows, earlier lows, some going as far back as 1971, are, In a number of cases, being held. Individual chart patterns suggest that a number of Issues, perhaps a fairly -substantial number,- are, at least;-runningoutofsteam(;m the downside; –;. ,.. ,' … – -r- Thus, a forecast for early 1975 must, It seems to us, call for continued testing of the recent lows possibly Including some slight penetration of those lows. It seems, however, sensible to expect that the long, two-year bear market, If not already ended, wlll come to an end sometime fa1rly early in 1975. This does not necessarily call for an Immediate advance. It should be noted that the process of rebuilding in- dividual base patterns will be a long and arduous one. It therefore seems illogical even If the market 1S to make a low In early 1975 to expect any sharp rally, at least in the early part of the year. Depending on how qUlckly bases form, however, the outlook for the latter part of 1975 could be conSiderably better. The prophet Isaiah reminds us that to everything there is a season. 1975, in our view, w1ll be the sea- son for planting of the stock market profits of the second half of the 1970's. WE WISH YOU ALL A HAPPY AND PROSPEROUS NEW YEAR. Dow-Jones Industria Is (12 00 p. m.) 603. 18 ANTHONY W. TABELL S & P Compo (1200 p.m.) 67.40 DELAFIELD, HARVEY, TABELL Cumulative Index (12/26/74) 353.39 AWT/jb No slotement or eXpreS510n of opInion or ony olner matter nereln contained IS, or IS to be deemed to be, directly or indirectly, on offer or tne SoliCitation of on offer to buy or sell any security referred 10 or mentioned The motler IS pre.sented merely for tne convellenc of the subSCriber Wnlle we believe tne sources of our information 10 be reliable, we In no way represent or guorontee tne occurocy thereof nor of the .statements mude nereln, Any actIOn to be token by the subSCriber nould be bo.sed on hiS own IIlvestlgatlon ond ,nformotlon Jonney Montgomery ScOll, Inc, os 0 corporotlon, and liS officers or employees, may now hove, or may later toke, posItions or trode.s III respect to ony securities mentioned In tnls or any future Issue, ond sucn position may be dliferenl from any views now or nereafter exprened In thl5 or any otner l,SSve Janney Montgomery Scott, tnc, WnlCn IS registered wltn tne SEC 0 on onvestment adVisor, moy give adVice to Its onve5lmen! odvlsory ond otner customers Independently of ony stotements mode on tnls or In any otner Issue Furtner onformatlon on ony secvrlly mentioned herein 1 ovolloble on reque5t