TABELL'S MARKET LETTER 909 STATE ROAD, PRINCETON. NEW JERSEY 08540 DIVISION OF MEMBER NEW VORK STOCK EXCHANGE, INC MEMBER AMERICAN STOCK EXCHANGE August 9, 1974 It seems to us impOSSible, from any rational pOint of view, to view the events which culminated la st.nightand. today. with anyfeeling other tha n-sadnesS We' find-ourselves Tn addition -;- in 'agree– ment with those commentators who have expressed admiration for the viability of the Constitutional structure. Beyond that, we do not think it is the province of this letter to comment on those events except insofar as they relate to securities markets. The response to the first rumors of resignation, it will be recalled, was a shrap three-day, 45-point rally ending on Wednesday with some correc- tion on Thursday and Friday morning. Although PreSidential resignation is an experience unique in 200 years of American history, the stock market's action was, m initial appearance at least, simply another repetition of a phenome- non that has ample historical precedent. That phenomenon centers on the fact that, shortly after any sudden and unexpected change in administration (or change in direction of administration) the rrKlrket tends to respond initially with an extremely sharp, short-term rally. That short-term rally, moreover, often constitutes the takeoff point for a sustained advance later on. Let us consider the precedents. On Sunday night, March 31, 1968, President Johnson announced he would not seek reelection and would actively pursue peace in Vietnam. The Dow moved ahead 20 points on the following Monday, setting an all-time volume record in the process and continued the advance throughout the early part of the month of April ,advancing over 50 points in two weeks. On November 22, 1963, President Kennedy was assassinated in Dallas. The ini- tial response was a panic decline of 20 points, with trading halted early. However, after a three- day closing, the market opened the following week wIth a 32-point advance, closing 11 pOints higher than it had been the day prior to the assassination. The rally continued into early Decem- – -ber-for-a-tota 1-auvanCErofmore'thln''l'SOpo1nts. On Aprirr2-,-19457'Prn-siuent-Rb'oS'even-dfed at—'- Warm Springs, Georgia, wIth the presidency passing to V,ce President Harry S. Truman. On the following Monday, the market advanced sharply on expanded volume, and continued the advance without any substantial interruption for the next two weeks. Going back even farther, the after- math of the death of President Harding, on August 4. 1923, was an initial decline followed by a sharp' rally throughout the remainder of August,which produced a 7 1/2 advance. Now, the rea son for this sort of behavior IS not the fact that the market exhibits a macabre ex- citement at the unexpected removal of a President, by whatever means. There exists, rather, m our view. a strong psychological tendency to rally round a new President. We thus, at the time, called the 1963 action the Johnson Confidence Eoom. If a rally from current levels ensues, the appelation, Ford Confidence Boom will probably not be a misnomer, just as it is, likewise, arguable that, in the earlier ca ses, the market wa s expressing mitial confidence in new Presidents Coolidge and Truman. The conditions preceding the changes in administration above and their longer-term aftermaths are also interesting. At the time both of Roosevelt's death and the Johnson announcement, the market had been advancing for a number of years. Both of the ensuing rallies, the one in 1968 lasting for nine months, and the one in 1945-46 for 14 months, proved to be the final advances of their respective bull markets. In neither case, did the market correct substantially following the initIal rally. In 1923, by contrast, the market had been drifting lower for most of the year. The initial rally in August was retraced entirely m September and October, but prices went on . . – – – –… – – – – – -.– – – –;;-. — – . — – —- from the October low to advance almost uninterruptedly into 1929. The 1963 experience, in many ways, constitutes a unique case. At that point the market had been advancing for over a year but was beginning to show distinct signs of weakness, mcluding sharply deteriorating breadth conditions. The boom of confidence m President Johnson was of sufficient strength to turn that technical condition around entirely in the first few months of 1964 and to lead to an advance which went on for over two years. If any sustained rally does develop from the current levels. then, it will undoubtedly be viewed by many as being ephemeral. Historical precedent, however, hardly suggests that this is likely to be the case. Dow-Jones Industrials (1200 p.m.) 777.77 S & P Compo (1200 p.m.) 80.90 ANTHONY W. TABELL DELAFIELD, HARVEY, TAB ELL Cumulative Index (8/8/74) 462.05 AWT/jb No stalemenl or expression of opinion or any other moIler herem contolned IS, or IS to be deemed to be, directly or mdlrectly, on offer or Ihe sollcltotlon of on offer to buy or sell any securrty referred 10 or menlloned The molter IS presented merely for Ihe conVCl'lenCE of the subscriber While -HC believe the sources of our information to be reliable, we In no way represent or guarantee the accuracy thereof nor of the statements mude herein Any cc1lon to be token by the subscriber should be bosed on hiS own InvestlgohOn ond Information Janney Montgomery Scot Inc, os 0 corporation, ond Its officers or employees, may now have, or may Icter toke, positions or trades In respect 10 any seculltlcs mentioned In thiS or ony future Issue, and such position may be different from any views now or hercofter expressed In thiS or any other Issue Janney Montgomery Scott, Inc, which IS reglslc-cd With the SEC as on Investment adVisor, may give adVice to liS investment adVISOry and other customers Independently of any statements mode In thiS Of In any other Issue Further information on any secu-Ily mentIOned herein IS ovolloble on request

TABELL'S MARKET LETTER ,. 909 STATE ROAD. PRINCETON, NEW JERSEY 08540 DIVISION OF MEMBER NEW VORK STOCK eXCHANGE, INC MEMBER AMERICAN STOCK eXCHANGE August 16, 1974 Welk-ed)st.. e-.'-..k.,.i-b-ou-!-th-e-possibi-li-ty'o,L8aFor-d'.'C–;Q- n–i-de.n.,c..E…'l.,.-B.o-o m-. ILoneIs.t-..o…- be,forth – … commg, it was by no means apparent in last week's market, which celebrated President Ford's first week m the White House by plunging to new lows, at least as measured by the Dow-Jones Industnal Average. Actually, the Ford rally, if there was one, took place while Mr. Nixon was still in office and ended apparently, just as PreSIdent Ford was being sworn in. It was on August,S, 6 and 7, prior to the reSignation speech that the Dow advanced a total of 45 points. Starting on Thursday, August 8, the evening President NIxon resigned, and continumg through the Ford accession on Friday, to his speech to Congress on Monday, the market gave up all the ground gained and lost sixty points in six trading sessions through yesterday. Reasons for encouragement in the market's achon are, admittedly, sparse. There was, mdeed, a great deal of technical vigor to the rally, and, interestingly enough, that vigor continued past the rally pea k a week ago. The Thursday decline, for example, saw more advancing stocks than declining stocks despite a 1 1/2 drop in the Dow, only the seventh time this has occurred In the past 47 years. Market breadth continued fairly good on Friday and Monday despite the sharp drops on those two days. On Tuesday and Wednesday, however, the dechne began to develop steam as breadth deteriorated sharply, and other signs of internal technical weakness made themselves manifest. There were, indeed, a few signs that the stories being told by the Dow and by the S & P 500 –were a bit more pessimistic than the true action of the market. Our own Cumulative Index….f.-ool.l.-o-w–e-d .. – the popular aver'ages into newlow -territory'on Wedne'sday but it can be said', at least that ICis– now moving concurrently with the Dow rather than leadmg It as it had been dOIng ever since last spring; Some confidence may also be gleaned from the fact that, as of this writing at least, both the Trans portation and Utility averages have failed to follow the Industna Is mto new low terrItory, with the contracyclical action of the utilities being better technical strength than this index has been able to exhibit for some time. Likewise, the number of daily new lows, which peaked at 197 on Wednesday of this week ,constitutes a low figure, considering the posihon of the market averages. It IS not our purpose here to emulate Pollyanna. The market IS, mdeed, sinking to new lows and there is no strong technical evidence that It w!ll not, m fact, proceed lower yet. Indeed, the lower downside objectives that exist for most averages were outlined in this letter m the early part of July. We cannot avoid the feeling, however, that the really vicIOUS area of decline is being restricted at the moment to the over-exploIted growth issues. We have been regaling our readers ad nauseam for the past two years with the fact that we considered these Issues to be over-priced in relation to the obvious values available in the rest of the market, so we can hardly say that this action is surprising. Even m the growth area, however, a number of stocks are beginmng to approach major long-term downside objectives. Once this takes place, considering the already depressed nature of the bulk of the list, it IS difficult to envision where the market will find further downSide leadershIp. – – – – – – — We have commented in the past on the phrase,turned by another technician which states that the market IS always lowest at the low. A moment's reflection WIll reveal the fact that there IS, indeed, a grain of wisdom m this apparently inane statement, in that hIstory will undoubtedly some day show that one of the Sickening plunges to new lows that have been part of the stock market expenence since 1973 was, mdeed, the last one. It WIll also have represented one of the better buying opportunities of the pa st few years, but, If history is any gUIde, this w!ll not be recognized in many quarters until a great deal after the fact. Dow-Jones Tndustrials '1200 p.m.) 735.22 S & P Compo (1200 p.m.) 76.17 Cumulative Index (8/15/74) 439.76 AWT/jb ANTHONY W. TABELL DELAFIELD, HARVEY, TABELL No statement or expression of opInion or Clny other motter herein contained IS, or IS to be deemed to be, directly or mdlrectly, on offer or the soliCitation of on offer 10 buy or sell ony seCIJrlty hon to be reliable, we In referred no way to or mentioned The matter 1 presented merely represent or guarantee the accuracy thereof nor for of the the sclao!nevmelelnentsCfmuodf ethheerseuinbSCArinbyer acWtIOhnileto ebebtealieevne the sources of our Informaby the subSCriber should be based on hiS own Investigation and informatIOn Janney Montgomery Scott, Inc, as a corporation, and Its officers or employees, may now have, or may later take, pasltlons or trade, In respect to any SeCUrltles mentioned In thiS or any future Issue, and such pOSition may be different from any views now or hereafter expressed In thiS or any ather Issue Janney Montgomery Scoll, Inc, whICh IS registered With the SEC as on Investment adVisor, moy gIVe adVICe to Its Investment adVisory and othel customers Independently of any statements made In thiS or In any other lS5ue fUMher Informollon on any security menhoned herein IS available on request

..— – TABELL'S MARKET LETTER 909 STATE ROAD, PRINCETON, NEW JERSEY 08540 DIVISION OF MEMBER NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE, INC MEMBER AMERICAN STOCK EXCHANGE August 23, 1974 Ayear and a half ago, we published a series of four letters exammmg some of the impilcations of the ThenpopUTai theorY-ofgrowttl stock InvestmeOn ApiIU19-73 we P7IBfislles-umriiaryra-na1;onclu' sian based on those four letters. That summary is reprinted herewith,verbatim and in its entirety. There lS, of course, nothing new under the sun. The following quotation is an appropnate summary of what we have, in our series, lndicated was taklng place over the past few years. Selectivity took on a new character by reason of the overshadowing emphasis placed on expected future growth as the pnme criterion of an attractive investment. There was nothing wrong with these .. 1deas, except that it was almost impossible not to carry them too far. With encouragement from the past and a rosy prospect in the future, the buyers of 'growth stocks I were certain to lose their sense of proporllon and to pay excessive prices. The above is not Anthony Tabell writing in 1973 about 1971-72. It is Benjamin Graham writmg in 1951 about 1928-29. As readers may have gathered from our previous letters, we find ourselves, on this issue at least, comfortably in Dr. Graham's camp. Eut, If mindless projection of growth rates is not the simple key to investment success, what is an alternative philosophy We offer herewith three principles 1) Two and two make four. 2 There are no one-decision stocks. 3) Investor confidence varies more than earn- ings. Let us examine some of the implications of these three suggestions. It was Eernard Baruch who first suggested that in periods of market optimism it was necessary to repeat to oneself that two and two were four. We are, ln other words, willing to accept the intuitive conclusion that, when large numbers of buyers are agreed that a given method of investment lS a sure road to success, that method cannot prove viable over the long term. The enforcement of this principle 1S the function of the marketplace, and it is our belief that the market will be no less effic1ent in this task m the future than -it-hasbeenin'1hepast; — – – -',..,, – – – It should be made clear that what is being sa1d here implies no critiC1sm whatever of the fundamental merits of recognized growth issues, suggests that they should not sell at some premlUm over other 1ssues or affirms that they cannot under any circumstances be attractive purchase candidates. What we are suggesting, along with Graham, 1S that the concept that such 1ssues represent appropriate mvestment vehicles for conservative accounts, regardless of the pnce being paid, lS, to put it mildly, ludicrous. Secondly, we think the suggestion that there exists a class of one-decision stocks, where all that is necessary is to buy and hold, constitutes an abdication of the investment manager's responsibility. Were the mvestment manager perfect, his initial selections for purchase would, of course, be only those stocks which were going to provide the maximum long-term rate of return, and these could be held effec- tively indefinitely. Investment managers, however, are far from perfect. Each initial purchase memorial- izes the manager continually to decide whether to hold or not to hold, depending upon whether the original expectations are being fulfilled and to what extent the market price discounts these expectations. Finally, as we have pOinted out, the b1ggest factor in price change, over relat1vely long periods of time, tends to be caus ed not by earnings but by investor confidence in thos e earnings — this confidence being most readily expressed by the statlstic of the price/earnings ratio for individual stocks. Th,S fact has two implications. The first provides the reason for our convichon, which will surpnse no one, that technical analysis is an indispensible factor in the mvestment decision-making process. It 1S equally important m evaluating common stocks to have some idea of what the market is likely to pay for future earning power as it is to forecast what that eamlng power is going to be. Technical work, we think, is a most useful guide in making such a projection. The second implication of investor confidence variability is that price level, In relation to earnings and in turn to comparable vEduation of other stocks;-must beapri1ne criteria inlnveslment selectionIt'ls-' axiomatic that a stock having a low multlple, thus suggesting low investor confidence, has more potential on the upside should investor confidence increase and less risK on the downside should it continue to deteriorate. Willingness to ignore the price being paid, even in companies of the most prishne qualIty I involves, in our view, another abdication of the investment manager's responsibility by reason of the assumption of unnecessary risK. It may be suggested, of course, that recent markets have hardly tended to prove the soundness of these tenets vis-a-vis the simple-minded growth approach and, indeed, may even have suggested the opposite concluslon. We continue to believe, however, that the principles above represent viable guide- posts to a successful investment philosophy. Dow-Jones Industrials (1200 p.m.) 706.82 S & P Compo '1200 p.m.) 73.24 ANTHONY W. TABELL DELAFIELD, HARVEY, TABELL Cumulative Index (8/22/74) 419.19 AWT/jb ..- No statement or expressIon af aplnion or any other matter herem contained IS, or , to be deemed to be, dtredly or Indirectly, on offer or the solIcitatIon of an offer to bvy or sell any securtty referred to or mentIoned The matter IS presented merely for the converolenc6' of the subscrtber Whde -Ne belIeve the sources of our mfarma- tlon 10 be reliable, we In no way represent or guarantee the accuracy thereof nor of the statements mude herem Any action 10 be token by Ihe subSCriber should be based on hIS own Inves\lgatlan and Information Janney Montgomery Scali, Inc, 0 a corporation, ond Its offICers or employees, may now have, or may later toke, poslttons or trades m respect to any seclJrltles mentIoned In thIS or any flJtlJre ISSlJe, and SlJch POSitIon may be different from any views now or hereafter expressed In thIS or any other Issve Janney Montgomery Sc01l, Inc, which IS registered WIth the SEC 0 on mvestment adVIsor, may give adVICe to Its Investment adVisory and othel customers mdependently of any statements mode m thIS or In any other ISSlJe FlJrther tnformatlan on any 5eClJrtty menhoned herem IS avadable on reqlJesl

p– TABELL'S MARKET LETTER 909 STATE ROAD, PRINCETON. NEW JERSEY 08540 DIVISION OF MEMBER NEW VORk STOCk eXCHANGe, INC MEMBER AMERICAN STOCK EXCHANGE – September 6, 1974 '— . -, Herewith a'warning7'-This -l-etter 'isgotng'to'bealmose'exclu-si velyconc-erned' witlffigures ; Tiles e – .., who are turned off by numbers, therefore, need read no further. The warning also applies to those whose attitude is, Don't confuse me with facts; my mind is made up, and there are, unfortunately, a few investors in this category, investors who prefer the construction of elaborate economic scenarios of gloom and doom to painstaking study of the realities of the marketplace. With this caveat out of the way, we continue. In precipitously plunging markets, such as those in the last few weeks, the first task of the technician is to determine whether the preconditions for reversal In fact exist. We have, fortunately, numberous benchmarks to guide us. Painful as they are, down markets are nothing new. There are plentiful examples from the past, and they can be studied and measured. One Simple and obViOUS measurement of the severity of a decline is the rate at which various moving averages are dropping. For example, as of last Wednesday, a ISO-day moving average of the Dow was declining at a rate of .17 per day. This rate of decline, Interestingly enough, has been equaled or exceeded only on three occasions in 28 years of market history, June, 1962, August, 1966 and May, 1970. All three, in- vestors will recall, constituted major bottoms. On a shorter term basis, a 25-day moving average, as of Wednesday, was moving down at the rate of .64 daily. This is the approximate figure reached a few days prior to the bottom in 1970 and also on one occaSion In June of 1962. In 1966 the down- swing never attained the short-term rate of decline that the present one has shown. Still another measurement of whether a decline is reaching historical maximum severity is the ratio of the Dow to its own moving averages of various lengths. The ratio of the D1A to its own 25-day moving average, for. example, has been below 0.9 on four,occasions ,over the ,past few-,-eks. Her,, — – – ——'— . – – – – , – – – ————- .–.-,– —–'. again, we have a level attained on only three occasions in 28 years — September, 1946, May, 1962 and May, 1970, all recognized by hindsight to have constituted major bottoms. A third measurement of whether a market is sufficiently oversold so that a major bottom may be considered in prospect is market breadth. The ten-day advance-decline oscillator, consisting Simply of a cumulative total of advances minus declines for the past ten days, is a widely-used tool and appears in many stock market publications. The raw figure IS useless for comparison over long periods of time, but such comparisons may be made by running a ten-day total of the ratio of the net differ- ence to totallssues traded. That figure moved down to a level of -3.18 last week. This level has been attained on 14 separate occasions in the past, each one fairly close to a bottom of either Inter- mediate term or major proportions. There are a few cautions to be derived from a study of this figure, however. There is ample past precedent for its moving lower than its current level and, therefore, based on this indicator, another short-term down leg cannot be ruled out. Such a down leg, however, would move the ratio to a level which has characterized major bottoms in the past. We could bore the reader with more numbers. We maintain and study at least a dozen other simi- lar series, the purpose of which is to measure the severity of a decline against historical bench- marks. They all pOint, however, to the inevitable conclusion that the recent decline has been sharp enough to set up the preconditions for a major reversal. We emphasize our use of the word preconditions. At the moment the stage is only set, and the actors have yet to make their appearance. Once the preconditions are met, first-stage upside rever- sal evidence must present itself. Such evidence is often provided at an early stage by breadth and volume. Here, again;-we return-to numbers .One general characteristic-of,true market reversals in the past has been the occurrence of days on which 80 or more of all issues traded advanced or when volume expanded to 150 of its own 25-day moving average. In these terms, Thursday's 22-point rally in the Dow must be termed disappointing. A bare 55 of all traded issues moved upwards, and volume was just barely above its average for the pnor 25 days. No series that we maintaIn, it must be admitted, has shown convincing evidence of true reversal momentum. Now the above, like most statistical presentations, has been dry as dust, but we make no apolo- gies therefor. Obviously in times like the present it is easy to become prey to emotion and be haunted by the spectres of unreality. It is at just such times that It is helpful to return to the harsh, cold reality of numbers. Dow-Jones Industrials (1200 p.m.) 675.77 S & P Compo (1200 p.m.) 71.46 ANTHONY W. TABELL DELAFIELD, HARVEY, TABELL Cumulative Index (9/5/74) 391.52 AWT/jb No statement or expression of opinIon or ony other moiler herem contolned IS, or IS to be deemed to be, directly or indirectly, on oHer or the OIICllollon of on offer to buy or sell any security referred 10 or mentioned The moiler 15 presented merely for the conver'lence of the subCrlber While we believe the sources of our Informo hon to be relioble, we In no way represent or guarantee the accuracy thereof nor of the sto;ements m)de herein Any OelIOn- to be token by the subSCriber should be bosed on hiS own investigation and Information Janney Montgomery Scott, Inc, as a corporation, and ,ts officers or employee may now hove, or may laler toke, positions or trades In respect to any securities mentioned In thiS or any future Issue, and such position may be different from ony views now or hereafter eypressed In thiS or any other Issue Janney Montgomery Scali, Inc, which IS registered With the SEC as on Investment adVisor, moy give adVICe to ItS Investment adVisory and othel cvstomers Independently of any stotemenll mode In thiS or In any other ISsue Further information on any security mentioned herein IS oVOllable on request

. – – – I–'– TABELL'S MARKET LETTER t, t –,- – –'I …… – 909 STATE ROAD, PRINCETON, NEW JERSEY 08540 DIVISION OF MEMSER New YORI( STOCK EXCHANQE. INC MEMBER AMERICAN STOCK EXCHANGE September 13,1974 The precipitous plunge of the stock market to new lows has awakened money managers, how– -,everbelatedly ,-tQ-afatherelementaryfact -that ,peiodica-lly.s eemsAo, get.focgotten,-.-,-the fact that, by their very nature, stocks carry a high degree of risk, at least over the intermediate term. Yet, declining stock markets or not, capital exists and is required to be invested somewhere. Thus the investment world has been looking assiduously, in recent years, at other forms of investment. Some of these have been entirely outside the area of securities markets, such as real estate and precious metals. The problem, of course, is that even these markets are beginning to devel- op some of the symptoms with which those of us who have watched the stock market for many years are familiar. That risk attaches to real estate is a sad fact that a good many real estate investment trusts are beginning to discover, and ,if the recent behavior of gold stocks is any harbinger, those who have been assiduously socking away gold coins may shortly come to the same awakening. Closer to the securities field, there was a rash of interest about a year ago, in long-term bond funds as a potential public investment medium. It then became apparent that interest rates, even when high, can go still higher and bond prices, though low, still lower. There have been fewer recent long-term bond fund offerings. At the moment, short-term money market instruments are enjoying a deserved popularity, since current money-market conditions, where II-plus per cent yields can be obtained with almost ab- solute safety, are a rarity in financial history. All in all, there appears to be very little doubt that the existence of the alternative investment media mentioned above constitute at least a par- tia l-ex-plana-t-ion-of-the-eurrent-depres's-ecllevehof-stockpriees – – ' ' -, – – – , . . – — ., – – Yet problems remain. The current level of short-term mterest rates is hardly likely to be per- manent and, while pleasant to have around at the moment, is unlikely to be an answer to the problems of long-term investment. Long-term bonds Perhaps. We are, let us recall, in a period when every American, from the White House on down, appears agreed that the major prob- lem facing the country is inflation. We have studied in detail in this letter in the past the effect of inflation on long-term bond prices. Without going through the mathematIcs once more, it can be noted that the effective real dollar return to the investor after taxes on a 10, 20-year bond is less than 1, assuming a 6 rate of inflation which is a bit more than one-half of the current rate. There was a conventional wisdom that existed many years ago which hypothesized that Common stocks were the single medium that constituted an effective inflation hedge. Wall Street has spent the last 20 years effectively laying that myth to rest. The lesson that hyper-inflationary periods in the past have had a depressing effect on corporate earnings and hence, indirectly, on stock prices, has by now been well learned. However, in any economy the rules of the game change continually, and the rule changes can result in yesterday's myths becoming today's reality. We suggested in this space earlier this year that we were undergoing, in 1973-74, the first postwar experience in which the rise in corporate profits exceeded the inflation rate. It is a simple fact that,in our view,few analysts have given much attention. The market, certainly, is ignoring it completely. For the 12 months ended June 30,the DJIA -earned 93. 26;and it'ls'now-selling'for exactly the same'multiple'it'sold at the nadliof inVestor confidence in 1949. Current profits are a fact. The market's skepticism about future profits is clear. It must also be admitted that stock income has not in the recent experience kept pace with inflation. The current dividend paid on the Dow of around 38 reduces to 22.74 in 1958 dollars, less than the 27.95 return that the investor in the Dow received in 1958. The record on fixed income securities, however, is a great deal more dismal. All this simply underscores the insidiousness of inflation, an unpleasant fact the American public is finally beginning to realize. And yet lf, over the long term, capital is to be protected from the ravages of inflation, it may well be that equities will, in fact, provide a vlable vehicle. Dow-Jones Industrials (1200 p.m.) 634.86 ANTHONYW. TABELL S & P Compo (1200 p.m.) 65.91 DELAFIELD, HARVEY, TAB ELL Cumulative Index (9/12/74) 370.42 AWT/jb No statement or expression of oplnton or (Iny other matter herein onlolned I or 15 10 be deemed 10 be, directly or indirectly, on offer or the solicitation of on offer 10 buy or sell ony security referred 10 or menlloned The motter IS presented merely for Ihe converlena of the subscriber While we believe Ihe sources of our information to be reliable, we In no way represent or guarantee Ihe accuracy thereof nor of the stotements mude herein Any actIOn to be taen by Ihe subscriber should be based on hiS own Investlgollon and Information Janney Montgomery Scott, Inc, as a corporalton, and Its offlcer or employees, may now have, or may later toke, poslhons or trades In respect to ony securities mentioned In this or any future Issue, and such posl\ion may be different from ony views now or hereafter expressed In this or ony other Issue Janney Montgomery 5col1, Inc, which IS registered wllh Ine SEC as on Inveslmenl advl5ar, may give adVICe to .ts Investment adVISOry and othel customers Independently of any statements mode In thiS or ' any olher luue Further infOrmation on ony secur,ly mentioned herem IS ovallable on request

————– ————————————– —-, TABELL'S MARKET LETTER 909 STATE ROAD, PRINCETON, NEW JERSEY 08540 DtVISION OF MEMBER NEW VORl( STOCI( eXCHANGE, INC 'EMBER AMERICAN STOCI( E)cCHANGE September 20, 1974 If it did nothing else last week, the stock market at least provided us benumbed tape watchers opportunitytoo watchit-do .s-omething–other-thansink,like, a.stone .-It did ,.,-m,fact ,stage' an upside performance of moderately impressive proportions. Early weakness in the first hour of Mon- day's trading was soon erased,and the day ended with a 12 1/2 point advance. That rally continued through Tuesday afternoon before some of the gains were given up,but a 9 point rise on the day was still recorded. In Wednesday's trading the market remained lower most of the day, but a late- afternoon advance pulled it ahead to a 3-point gain, and finally, Thursday's action produced a sus- tained 22-point rally on 17-milliol1-hare volume. Thus a temporary respite, at least, from one of the most vicious short-term declines on record. Historically, we have been accustomed to set a 20 decline as the test of whether a downswing constitutes a major bear market. In just 35 trading days from its fuly 24 close of 805.77, the Dow dropped 178 pOints to 627.19 on September 13, an almost 22 dip. In four trading days since then a 46-point rise has retraced a quarter of the drop. The question is, of course, does all of this represent the denouement of the painful process we have been undergoing over the past year We discussed this question two weeks ago, even be- fore the market had completed its final plunge to a closing low of 627.19 of September 13. We noted at that time that the velocity of the decline to date had provided the preconditions for a re- versal, but we said, At the moment the stage is only set, and the actors have yet to make their appearance. The stage is still bare, albeit, perhaps, with a bit of rustling in the wings . Technical analysis, it seems to us, must always consist of a combination of hard statistical fact and a certain amount of intuition. There are those, unfortunately, who practice the latter al- 'W,'-1-rrlO!; teJ0-ltls';ve l-yand4hey-ha ve -oHenrju st-l-y-;-we -thl-i-nk.,-beE!ncI'i-Heized,,,,,- cl onc)t-o,,o,,e'ver ,,,,,,,,…,.I-, think a certain dose of intuitive reasoning can be ruled out of the process entirely. As far as statistical fact is concerned, there is, unfortunately, little comfort to be gained from last week's performance. Impressive as it was, the rally did not meet the standards of breadth and volume which have been set by most major reversals of previous market history. The cold- hearted statistician, therefore, can state, and quite correctly, that there is, based on this evi- dence, a high degree of probability that last week's rally dId not Signalize a major low. The trouble with the pure statistical approach is that it stops right there. We said above that the rally did not meet the standards set by most major bottoms in the past. 'There have been ex- ceptions. Where an intuitive approach is required is in determining whether it is more likely than normal that September, 1974, will constitute one of the exceptions. One major cause for optimism lies in the fact that, at the lows of a week ago, large numbers of downside objectives, many of which had seemed implausible to us as the related distributional tops were being formed at the beginning of this year, were, in fact, being reached. The Dow, for example, had a downside target of 620, reached at Monday's intraday low. More interestingly, a number of market leaders, names of the caliber of IBM, Eastman Kodak, Sears Roebuck, etc., were, last week, fulfilling the downside counts of their major distributional tops. With almost everything else in the marketplace having been thoroughly sold out long before the first-tier stocks underwent their blood bath of the past few months, it is possible to argue that the market may have run out of downside leadership. Yet all this -is;'as we said, intuitive. -Little reversalevidence has'been provided In four short — days of market action, although it may well be forthcoming In the future. The market's technical position at the moment, however, is unlike that of, say, May, 1970. At that time we said in this space, three days after the low, We think, in sum, the effechve bottom has been reached. We quote this, not to suggest that we happened to be right on a particular occasion, but to illustrate that 1970 was a market bottom where all of the numbers fell neatly into place, and it was possible to suggest a high probability of reversal. This is not happening in September, 1974, and It would, therefore, be well to treat it more gingerly. Dow-fones Industrials (1200 p.m.) 664.89 S & P Compo (1200 p.m.) 69.27 ANTHONYW. TAB ELL Cumulative Index (9/19/74) 381.16 DELAFIELD, HARVEY, TAB ELL AWT/jb Note Comments on all issues based solely on techmcal factors. Further informa- hon available on request. No stalement or e)(pr&SSlon of opinion or ony other matter herein contained IS, or IS 10 be deemed 10 be, directly or Indirectly, on offer or the sol,cltotlon of on offer to buy or sell ony security referred 10 or menhoned The motter IS presented merely for the converumce of the subscriber While -Ne believe the sources of OUf Informo- tlon '0 be ,el,oble, we In no way represent Of guorontee Ihe accuracy thereof nor of the Maternenls mude herem A.ny ocllon 10 be token by Ihe subSCriber should be bosed on hiS own Investlgot,on ond information Janney Montgomery SCali, Inc, as 0 corporation, ond I officers or employees, may now have, or may later lake, POSitiOns or trodes In repecl loony securities mentioned In th,s or ony future Issue, and such pOSition dlffcrent from Clny views now or hereafter eypressed If! thiS or ony other Issue Janney Montgomery Scoll, Inc, which IS registered wllh Ihe SEC os on may give advl;e to liS Investment adVisory and othel customers mdependently of any statements mode In thiS or In ony other Issue further mformollon on mentioned herem IS available on requet

, , c , , , , i I I ( TABELL'S MARKET LETTER . . . jc c 909 STATE ROAD. PRINCETON. NEW JERSEY 08540 DIVISION OF MEMBER NEW VOAK STOCK EXCHANGe, tNC MEMBER AMERICAN STOCK EXCHANGE no du ' September 27, 1974 ' 'azd eou Itory mark ,et–''''''-''''''''''''''''…….,..,..,.,.,,,,,,,,-…,.,,,,…–,…,…………-,……'Ii .,.,.. On the Prime Rate — Last week's market action can be likened — if one can visuallze the sce- nario — to one of the old Western movies where, as the wagon train 1S surrounded by Indians, the cavalry, flags flying and bugles blowing, suddenly appears at the pass — and then gallops headlong over the nearest cliff. We had been assured for some months that the prime interest rate was the key to the stock market and that the one thing really needed to turn the market around was a lower prime rate. On Wednesday we got one, and it turned the market around for something like three hours. In a wild frenzy, with a late tape, buyers turned a sharp selloff into a 13-point rally, which phenomenon petered out by noontime with the major averages actually winding up down on the day. The whole thing reinforces our content at being employed in technical work and thus not being forced to explain the market in terms of current news events. The unfortunates who have been devoting reams of type to exC plaining every recent market change in the light of interest rates will now, sad to say, have to return to their drawing boards and find another convenient simple-minded explanation for why the market is behaving as it is. On the Economic Summit Conference — Since we consider ourselves, at least parenthetically, economists, we find it difficult to work up a high degree of optimism as to what the forthcoming conference will, per se, achieve. In our experience, the easiest way to get three conflicting opinions is to force two economists into an argument. The thought of fifty or so of these gentlemen coming up with a coherent prescription for curing inflation boggles the mind. And yet, just as the English were famed for muddling through, we could, by happy accident, come out of the conference with something which '…..,….'c.1..,..m1.1(aghcmt work .W..e.ha'ee,,en.heen.tr.a ted.in.th e summiLprev'ie.wto Drs.,M ilton ,Fdedmanand.John Kenneth Galbraith agreeing on the need for restrictive fiscal policy. Now, anybody who has read even one chapter by either of these gentlemen must be aware that they reached this agreement from philosophical positions that differed by 180 degrees, The whole thing suggests, though, that an officious consensus policy is at least possible. What is absolutely guaranteed is that the formulators of that pollcy will not agree afterward a s to just why it did or did not work. On the Roids on the Cabuie — No, we were certainly not bright enough to coin that phrase. It was coined by a clever and humorour observer of the financial scene, Martin Sosnoff, in a recent Forbes magazine article. For the uninitiated, what are being referred to are the Polaroid options traded on the Chicago Board Options Exchange, and that exchange is apparently following the ancient and, to us, endearing, securities-industry custom of coining its own particular argot. Which brings us to the fact that options volume on the Chicago Board reached 44,140 contracts on Wednesday, a new record by about 10. This, incidentally, represents contracts for 4,414,000 shares of stock which was approximately one-quarter of the number of shares traded on the NYSE on the same day, despite the fact the options trading at the moment is restricted to 32 issues, or slightly under 2 of the total number of issues listed on the NYSE. We are duly informed by conventional wisdom that the publlc has left the market and that there is no further interest 10 speculation. To paraphrase Butch Cassidy and the Sundance Kid, Who those guys out there in Chicago On Odd Lotters — Another class of investors, one that can be shown statistically to have been – leaving the market in droves for four years, appears to be showil)H a minor renaissane.With a single – exception-;- therechad beer(ilci day since i970 until recently 'when the odd lot trader was a net purchaser of common stock. Yet it happened a couple of times in January of this year, and the phenomenon has been repeated no less than five times in recent weeks. This odd-lot buying, moreover, has been con- trasted with strong evidence of institutional seillng on the same days. It is an article of faith, and one borne out by historical experience, that this should be bearish. And yet, we wonder. It was the odd lotter who was a heavy net seller in all those years when astute professionals were rushing out to buy first-tier growth stocks at two to ten times their current prices. It was the odd lotter who was a net seller in a market that we now know, by hindsight, to have been one of the most difficult ones in which to achieve an above-average return since the 1930's. Could it be that the poor, innocent is smarter than we give him credit for being Dow-Jones Industrials (1200 p.m.) 631.49 ANTHONY W. TABELL S & P Compo (1200 p.m.) 65.87 DELAFIELD, HARVEY, TABELL Cumulative Index (9/26/74) 371.47 AWT/jb I NQ stotemenl or expreulon of opinion or any other matter herein contained 15, or IS 10 be deemed to be, directly or IndHectly, on offer Of the soliCitation of on offer to buy or sell ony security referred 10 or mentioned The moiler IS presented merely for Ihe convellence of Ihe subScriber While 'He belteve the sources of our tnformo tlon to be reliable, we In no way represent or guarantee Ihe accuracy thereof nor of Ihe stolements mude herein Any oellon to be token by the subscriber should be bosed on hiS own investigation ond Informotlon Jonney Montgomery Scott, Inc, os a corporotlon, and Its officers or employees, may now hove, or moy later toke, posItions or trades In respect to any securilles mentioned In thiS or any future Issue, and such position may be different from any views now or hereafter e)pressed In L. t,h,nomor'anmydo'theOrd'IsOsueYOfJaOnOnYey''MOonmtg.om,e'rmyoSdc.omll,'hIn,;,,ow'hmuohoy.sor'ehg.i'stier,e,d.WFithhth.e'SmEfCoo'smoo'n,oInovoesotmoeonyt,ad.V'isotr, ymma.y,gi'voeoa'ddVh.ic,.e.too,,ItsovInovesotmbe',ntoood,v,lqsor.y,o,nd othe. . J

TABELL'S MARKET LETTER 909 STATE ROAD, PRINCETON. NEW JERSEY 08540 DIVISION OF MEMBER NEW YORk STOCK eXCHANGE. INC MEMBER AMERICAN STOCK EXCHANGE I – October 4, 1974 All right, let's put it this way. Let's say you are thinking of buying a candy store. You have – on-e'pickedout;'a s amatter -of'fact-It ch-asthe-'f,-gst'lo-ian6niiit-(jwfi;-ana;–a s!1eaY'''a-s- you- can– – –,-II figure out, has for quite some time been doing close to half of the candy business in the entire area. The store, showcases and other equipment which you would be buying cost about 16,000 originallY,although they have been depreciated on the books to around 9, 000. The previous owner has done a good job of maintaining the property. As a matter of fact, over the past ten years he sunk a little better than 10,000 into the business. The store has something over 3, 000 in the bank and that bank account would come along with the business. Another 3, 000 is owed to it by some of the best families in town who maintain charge accounts with the store. Also coming along with the business is about 5,200 worth of eminently saleable inventory of candy and like goods sitting in the back storeroom. About 1, 000 of this year's expenses have been prepaid. You would be asked to assume some liabilities. The store has accounts payable to candy suppliers and other near-term liabilities of about 6,200 ,and there is a small mortgage of 756. You look at the past ten years operating record for the store, and it is pretty interesting. Last year, in fact, was its best year ever, and it sold more than 36, 000 worth of candy. That is more than twice the amount of candy that it sold ten years ago. Its operating income also set a record of 4,500 before taxes, and over the past decade.its record has been fairly consistent It has never prodd an operatingTe ofless than'3;'060 in a-ny -ye-r ,furtng- th-;-past ten, except for one year when the employees went on strike. In addition to operating income there was, last year, 900 of additional cash flow from depreciation. Operating income is, of course, figured after paying the manager a salary comparable to what he would earn elsewhere. 1- This year figures to be somewhat of a problem. The people in your town have gotten dietconscious and aren't likely to buy as much candy as they used to. Sales will probably be off some 20, and earnings before taxes may drop under the 3, 000 level for the first time in ten years except for that one strike year. You think this problem is largely temporary, though, and you expect an adequate earnings recovery in 1975. O. K. Now look at the above figures again. What would you be willing to pay for this business — 16,000 in property at original cost, 6,200 of working capital, negligible debt, earnings which in good years exceed 3,500 before taxes, cash flow which, last year, was well over 5,000. Would 10,000 be a fair price It would certainly seem so. Now, take all of the above figures and multiply them by one million. Change the business from candy to automobiles. What we have just given is an essentially accurate description of General Motors,and it can, indeed, be bought for one million times 10,000, the value of its -287,617,041 shares at 351/4 being approximately 10.14 billion. There is a simple point to this exercise. Benjamin Graham has repeatedly suggested, and has again reiterated in a recent article, that, In a large area of the present stock market, we could return to a very old-fashioned but nonetheless useful criterion for equity investment –namely the value of the company as a private enterprise to a private owner, irrespective of market quotations for the shares. We chose General Motors above, not to recommend it specifi- cally, but Simply because it is the largest company in American industry. It is simply used to make the point that it is just one of hundreds of listed companies whose securities are available at prices which appear patently absurd if the underlying companies are viewed as on-going concerns. Dow-Jones Industrials (1200 p.m.) S & P Compo (1200 p. m.) 577.99 61. 56 ANTHONY W. TABELL DELAFIELD, HARVEY, TAB ELL Cumulative Index (9/3/74) 355.80 AWT/jb No totement or expression of Opinion or cny other matter herein contomed IS, or IS to be deemed to be, directly or indirectly, on offer or the SOIICI'otlon of on offer 10 buy or sell any security referred to or menTIoned The motter IS presented merely for the converlence of the subSCriber Whde He believe the sources of our informa- tion to be reliable, we In no way represent or guarantee the accuracy thereof nor of the statemena mude herein Any action to be taken by the subSCriber should be based on hiS own investigation and information Janney Montgomery Scott, Inc, as a corporation, and lIs officers or employees, may now hove, or moy later take, 1Il.'- 1IIl'L- poSitions or tradc, In respect to any securities mentIOned In thiS or any future ISsue, and such position may be different from any views now or hereafter expressed In this or any other Issue Janney Montgomery call, Inc, which IS registered With the SEC as on IOvestment adVisor, may give adVice to Its Investment adVISOry and ather ruom''d'P'd','YOfOY''om','mod','h,,o,,oyo'h''''Fh'',fo'mooOOy,,ru..,ym,,,o'dh''''ovo'ob',o''q'-J

.- – – – – – – ——, TABELL'S MARKET LETTER I L – – – —- 909 STATE ROAD, PRINCETON, NEW JERSEY 08540 DIVISION 01 MEM8ER NEW VORK STOCK eXCHANGE, INC MEMBER AMERICAN STOCK eXCHANGE October 11, 1974 The stock market finally got around th,s week to turning in a reasonably exciting performance!c-.;,al- ,..I …- h0ii9fllii many ways -,t caiihardtybe' sald t,ilaVebeensur'Pii'Sfi1g.In-aii'y2ase;'theDawopenecttl1e week with a 23-point rise and, after a mild retracement on Tuesday, scored its best advance in SlX- teen months on Wednesday w,th a 28-pomt rally. This nse was further extended through midday Thurs- day, when profit-tabng set in, but Thursday's close, nonetheless, still showed a 17-point improve- ment on the day. All in all, from last Friday's intraday low of 573.22 to the Thursday mtraday high of 664.03, the total advance was some ninety pOints, or a nse of 15.8 in a four-day period. – We said above that the performance was hardly surpnsing. This is true in a sense that it obviously was going to take place at some time and some place, the only questlOn being when and where. The spectacle of a deeply oversold stock market probing for a bottom is in no way new and has been re- peated in essentially the same fashion for as long as markets have eXlsted. In this sense, at least, the week's action, for all the fireworks, was famlliar to the paint of being dreary. Whether the low of a week ago will ultimately turn out in the light of history to have been the low of the 1973-74 bear market is a question we do not think can be answered with certamty at the moment, although the probabilities of th,s bemg the case are perhaps better than they have been at any time so far. Thursday's advance, during which 26 million shares changed hands, met the volume standards which have characterized major turning paints in the past. Breadth, on the other hand, was disappOint- ing. Neither the 1301 advances of Monday, the 1220 advances of Wednesday or Thursday's 1338nsing issues met the standards of prior major turning pOints. Such a standard at the moment would call for a slightly over 1400 advanCing issues, a performance we have not, as yet, been able to achieve. Also disappointing was the renewed appearance, on Wednesday and Thursday, of the sort of strong selling 'I'p';re-sWs!u1raeCsiswpheirchhahpas ve turned well-to-)( back previous eep lD mlnaaY rally fliis ' attempts stage tstf ieaafr-lhioetrttohm,sS,yheiasrt.o ri c a U f , ' li a v e – a s suiile1i-dif– ferent forms and different shapes. For example, May 29, 1962, for many stocks, constituted the effective bottom of the 1962 bear market as the Dow touched an intraday low of 552. After a two-day rally, it fell again to an intraday bottom around 525 in June before reversing sharply. It then returned to the May low four months later in October, at the t,me of the Cuban missile crisis. In 1966, two successive lows' were made, the first m August and the second in October, and m this mstance the second low was moderately lower than the first. In 1970, of course, the May 26 low was never really tested, and, as it built its base for the 1970-73 advance, the market edged slowly higher. Such was also the case in 1957-58. Thus, wh'le history shows it is dangerous at this early stage to try to predict the course of the averages, it is hlghly possible that, in the case of a good many individual stocks, important bot- toms may already have been reached. The action of the market from here on out wlll be interesting and probably, in addltion, highly infor- mative. What most of the major indices have now done is to return to trading ranges which have a good deal of potent,al significance. The Dow-Jones Industrials, for example, traded m a range roughly be- tween 650 and 680 during the latter two weeks in August and early September. While this month of tradmg is not particularly slgnificant from a time point of view, it assumes a high degree of technical importance, due to the volume and pnce actiVlty that took place. The recent rally, of course, has brought the average back into this range, and the most constructive action it could possibly show would be to remain within the confmes of the 650-680 area and ultlmately penetrate ,t on the upside. Were this sort of action to ensue, something that could deservedly be called a bull market could appropriate- ly be foreca st. . The Transportation and-Utility mdices have patterns which are the s-arriein prln'ciple;- aHhough some- what different in specifics, These two indices did not make new lows on the recent downswing (The Transportation index did do so, but only fractlOnally) and are now moving toward the trading areas of late July and early August. They still have some d,stance to go to reach these areas, 150-160 on the Transportation index versus the present level of 145 and 68-72 on the Utilities versus a current level of 67. However, as is the case with the Industrials, could these levels be attained and held, the action would have to be considered constructive. It is best, at times Ilke the present, to remember the Blbllcal injunction that we see only through a glass darkly. As patterns like the present one slowly unfold, the specifics become clearer and a more rational forecast becomes poss,ble. Last week's action, however, must be regarded as a possible initial link in the constructive chain of events. Dow-Jones Industmlls (1200 p.m.) 646.59 S & P Compo (1200 p.m.) 69.80 ANTHONY W. TABELL DELAFIELD, HARVEY, TABELL Cumulative Index (10/10/74) 387.27 AWTjc No statement or exprenlon of opinion or any olher malter herein contOlned IS, or IS 10 be deemed to be, directly or mdnec1ly, on offer or the OIICllotlon of on oHer to buy or sell any secunty referred to or menlloned The mOiler IS presented merely for The convellenc of Ihe subSCriber While -Ne believe the sources of our Informotlon 10 be reliable, we In no way represent or guarantee the accuracy thereof nor of the statements mode herein Any adlon to be To!.en by the subSCriber should be bosed on hiS own investigation and Informallon Janney Montgomery Scott, Inc, as a corporation, and 11 officers or employees, may now have, or may later lak;.-, positions or trades In respect to any SeCUrities menllaned In thiS or any fuTure Issue, and such position may be different from any Views now or hereafter eJOpressed In ThiS or any other Issue Janney Montgomery Scott, Inc, which IS regisTered With the SEC as on Investment adVisor, may give adVice to ItS Investment adVisory and othel customers Independently of any uotements mode In thiS or In any other luue Further information on any security mentioned herein IS available on reque

r..— — —–'- – -…….. TABELL'S MARKET LETTER – 909 STATE ROAD, PRINCETON. NEW JERSEY 08540 DIVISION OF MEMBER NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE. INC. MEMBER AMERICAN STOCK EXCHANGE -1-…..'…-.-T-n-e,-s.to-c-k''7m'a-,rk.e.t,.',p,i,c.t.u..re.conti,n,u..e.d..,t-o,–u..m..c.i,l.a-th i s -w eek .wS2ffchto-abne-ra1st8o,n 197,;.4,,,isfiing aild ( as-w il l be dl S – ' – cussed below) unprecedented rapidity. We suggested in last week's letter that the action of the Dow as it approached the 650-680 area would help to provide a clue as to future market action. We indicated that the most bullish possible course of action would be for the average to fluctuate back and forth in that trading range for some period of time and eventually penetrate it on the upside, thus completing the familiar head-and-shoulders type basing action. Last week's trading saw no fewer than four distinct and separate moves across that range. Monday's continuation of last week's rally brought the index to an hourly high above the 680 level, and a decline starting Monday afternoon and continuing Tuesday morning carried to the mid660' s. An intraday rally on Tuesday brought the average up again, before a drop on Tuesday afternoon and Wednesday carried it down to a 642.29 Wednesday close, moderately below the range we had suggested. The strength on Thursday and Friday morning, however, brought the average back into the projected trading range. As we indicated last week, continued ability to hold within this area would suggest that the base formation for an advance may be completed around current levels rather than involving a test and possible penetration of the lows of two weeks ago. / Returning again to our letter of last week, we made an attempt to be somewhat blase about the sharp advance of a week ago suggesting that it was no more than one of many examples of an over- sold stock market probing for a bottom. This, of course, is at least partially true Since, in genera-lTma eket -Gha ra Gter-i s tic sha-verema,in edu ncha ng ed.for.centurie s….,.xet,c los erexa mina tionrev-ea Is that, in some aspects, we were present, during the week of October 7-11, at an event of historical proportions. The percentage advance on the Dow for that week was just under 12.6, and there has been no percentage rally of that magnitude in any given trading week since 1938. Prior to that it is necessary to go back to the 1929-32 period to find weekly advances of greater percentage. There were three on the way down during 1929-32 and eight after the market had turned in 1932-33. Markets in the postwar period had never been able to achieve a weekly advance of better than 6 1/2 until this week. Actually, the total length of the rally was six days, and, over the six-day period ending Monday, the Dow posted a 15.2 advance. Again, this advance has been exceeded over a sixday period on only nine prior occasions Since 1926, eight of them in the 1929-32 period and one in 1938. We have suggested in the past that it is necessary to return to the 1930's to find a benchmark with which to compare the current decline. It is apparently also necessary to return to that area to find a comparison for the market's current volatility. Nor is the action of a week ago the only instance in the recent past of unusually wide market fluctuations. The decline from the January, 1973 high was punctuated by two rallies, one of 16 in August-October, 1973, lasting 46 days, and a 67-day advance of 13 in December, 1973-March, 1974. Rallies of this magnitude within an ongoing bear market are essentially unprecedented by postwar standards. We are not sure what value the above statistics possess for forecasting purposes, but they – raise some rather interesting questions about the nature of the current stock market. Essentially, they constitute another link in a long chain of evidence which suggests that the equity market has become more volatile,both on the upside and the downside,than has been the case at any time with- in the experience of most investors. If this is indeed the case, flexibility in investment manage- ment, including ability to move rapidly as conditions change, will be at a premium. It is interest- ing to speculate as to the extent to which such flexibility indeed exists in a market coming to be dominated by larger and larger investment-decision makers. Dow-Jones Industrials (1200 p.m.) 657.62 ANTHONY W. TABELL S & P Compo 11200 p.m.) 72.13 DELAFIELD, HARVEY, TABELL Cumulative Index (10/17/74) 393.06 AWT/jb No stctemenl or expreSSion of opinion or any other maIler herein Contolned IS, or IS to be deemed to be. directly or Indirectly, On offer or the SOI'Cllotlon of on offer to buy or sell ony security referred 10 or mentioned The mottC!f Is presented merely for the corwerlence of the subscriber While Ne believe the sources of our 1Oforma han to be reliable, we 10 no way represent or guarantee the accuracy thereof nor of the statements mude herem Any (lctlon to be taen by Ihe subSCriber should be based on hiS own 1Ovestlgohon and InformallOn Janney Montgomery Stott, Inc, as a corporation, and lIs officers or employees, may now have, or moy later toke, poSitions or trades In respect to any securlhe mentioned In th' or any future Issue, and such pOSition may be different from ony views now or hereofter expressed In thiS Of any other Issue Jonney Montgomery Scott, Inc, which IS regiStered With the SEC as on Investment odvlsor, may give adVice to Its Investment adVisory and other rus/omers Independently of any stotements mode In Ih,s or In ony other Issue further 1Oformol!on on any security mentioned herein IS ovodoble on request