.. .t; TABELL'S MARKET LETTER 909 STATE ROAD, PRINCETON, NEW .JERSEY 08540 DIVISION OF MEMBER NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE, INC MEMBER AMERICAN STOCK EXCHANGE June 9, 1972 We indicated in last week's letter the fact that we were becoming somewhat less than en- chanted about the technical performance of the stock market, citing at some length the evidence ,- .. of 1echnicardeterioration which-had-beenmanifesting its elf'since'a pproximately-la stMarch7-We -' confess, looking back at it, that we were somewhat surprised when this weakness began to emerge and yet, probably, we should not have been, for the occurrence of weakness as the Dow moved above the 920 level in March of this year was totally consistent with the hypothesis as to long-term market behavior which this letter has held for the past two years. We have repeatedly suggested that the single, most significant technical occurrence of the post-war period was the violation, in 1969-1970, of the secular uptrend channel which had con- tained the major market averages since 1942. As we said in this space almost a year and a half ago, on January 15, 1971, the equity market from 1942 until 1966 was buoyed by a secular up- trend advancing at the rate of about 9 a year on the Dow. Sure, there were bull markets and bear markets within the framework of that uptrend, but the bull markets were long and dynamic and the bear markets, although painful, short and quickly recovered .. There is real eVidence, at the moment however, that the secular uptrend is no longer with us. Indeed, computed from 1966, the slope of the DJIA has been virtually zero. The most statistically accurate description of the market on average for the past five years is that it is a wide, flat trading channel. Absolutely nothing has happened in the past 18 months to challenge the accuracy of that descrip- tion. Let us examine the action of the major averages since 1966 a bit more closely. For the Dow- Jones Industrial Average, the major secular trend can be described by a line which has been de- Gl4ningat the,ate-ofapproximatelYo',,017points .pertradingday..since..Jilnuaryo'L,16Ji,.P.t,that .,,- time, the central value was 879, and the slight downward slope since then now makes the central or normal value for the Dow approximately 852. The expected fluctuation about this central value can also be computed, using a device which statisticians call the standard error. In the case of the Dow, this is about 69 pOints which means that, during 1966-1972, the Dow spent approximately two-thirds of its time within a range of 69 points plus or minus the normal value and 95 of its time within 138 points (twice the standard error) either way of its normal value. Looked at another way, the Dow moved above its range of normal value at approximately 920 and would reach a range of extreme overevaluation at about 990. Conversely it would be- come undervalued at 783 and extremely undervalued at about the 714 level. For the S &P 500, the picture is a bit more bullish. Unlike the Dow, its action since 1966 can be described by an upward-sloping channel riSing at the rate of .007 points per day. Thus, while its central value in 1966 was 87.77, it has increased, at the moment, to 98.84. The standard error is approximately 7.18 points so that the index becomes overvalued at about 106 and extremely overvalued at 114. The range of undervaluation begins at 91 and reaches extreme undervaluation at 83. Viewed in this light, the fact that the market remained in a state of almost perfect health through March, 1971,at which point it began first to show deterioration, is hardly surprising. The Dow first closed above the 920 level during the la st week in February, and it was shortly after —– —that that -the weakness we referred to-last week .- began to – manifest itself. The – S&P 500. IJ- wise, moved above the 106 level at precisely the same time. Now all of the above is nothing more than a description of what has taken place in the past. If we choose to believe that the underlying process determining stock prices has changed dra- matically from that of 1966-1972, it is totally worthless. However, as we stated above, we are willing to proceed, until confronted with evidence to the contrary, on the hypothesis that seven years of statistical eVidence cannot be ignored in a future projection. We have said in the past that all too many investors are, consciously or unconsciously, bas- ing their behavior on the market pattern which prevailed between 1942 and 1966 rather than the one which has obtained from 1966 to date. We intend to discuss the market-strategy implica- tions of our hypothesis more fully in future issues of this letter. Dow-Jones Industrial (1200 p.m.) 935.73 ANTHONYW. TABELL S&P (1200 p.m.) 106.92 DELAFIELD, HARVEY, TAB ELL AWTmn No STatement or expression of op'l1lon or OilY other molter herell1 contained is, or IS to be deemed to be, directly or mdHectly, on offer or the soliCitation of on offer to buy or sell any secunty referred to or menlloned The matter IS presented merely for the converlienCE; of the subSCriber. While we believe the sources of our ,nformo tlon to be reliable, we 111 110 way represent or guarantee the accuracy thereof nor of the statements mude herein Any achon to be token by the subSCriber should be based all lIS own investigation and mfo,matlon Janney Montgomery Scott, Inc, as a corporation, and Its officers or employees, may now have, or may later toke, potlons or trades, respect to any secufltles mentioned In thiS or any future ISSUe, ond such position may be different from ony views now or hereafter expressed In this or ony other Inue Janney Montgomery Secll, Inc, which IS registered With the SEC as on Investment adVisor, moy give odvlce to liS Investment advls.ory and othel customers mdependently of any statements made In this or 111 any other Issue Further Information all any security mentioned herein IS oV(IIloble on request

! TABELL'S MARKET LETTER t , …1 909 STATE ROAD, PRINCETON, NEW JERSEY 08540 DIVlElION OF MEMBER New VORk STOCK EXCHANQE. INC MEMBER A.MERICA.N STOCI( EXCHA.NGE June 16, 1972 What follows is, in essence, nothing more than an exposition of past history showing how the inves- tor might have achieved superior portfolio results over the past 6-1/2 years. While it obviously contains I n – o def — We inite – i m – plic – ations ,—.,. for -th-.e. -f-u-tu r-e.,- – -w e thin – k the poi -. nt made –.- suggested last week that the action of the Ilow-Jones In may, in fact, be of some i -. – —- -,.- . dustrial Average since Jan ntere ualy, st 1 . —- 966c —- ould ..-. – – -. be described by a trendline which started at roughly 879 in 1966 and has been moving downward slightly ever since with a standard error of some 68 points. Under this conception, the market could be regarded as moderately over or under-valued when 68 pOints above or below the central trendline and is distinctly over-valued when 136 pOints above or below that line. A similar computation can be made for the S&P 500 stock index, for which the central trendline has a slight upward slope. The following table assumes that an investor, 'in January, 1966, had formulated an investment policy as follows. As the market rose above its computed trendline, he wished to be 50 invested in stocks; when it became moderately over-valued, he wished to be 25 invested; and, when distinctly over-valued, he wished to be 100 in cash. Conversely, as the market became moderately under-valued, he wished to in- crease his stock investment to 75 and, at the distinctly under-valued figure, he wished to be 100 in- vested in stocks. Following this policy he would have made an initial investment followed by 14 changes in his stock pOSition in a 6-1/2-year period. The dates these changes would have been made and the value of the account on each of these dates, assuming an initial 100,000 investment, together with the current value, are shown below. The performance of the stock portion of the account is assumed to be the same as the DJIA. The table is for illustrative purposes only and commissions and taxes are not in- eluded. -Date DpA Desired Stock lnvestment Action Cash Portfolio Value 1/3/66 968.54 25 Buy 25,000 75,000 100,000 5/13/66 876.11 50 Buy 26,192 48,807 97,614 – 8/19/66 3i',nfu7 804.62 8-766'7 75 50 Buy 25,399 SBlt55'1 23,407 49-;l59 93,631 99-;-919 9/25/67 943.08 25 Sell 27,818 77,778 103,704 lI/1/67 867.08 50 Buy 26,970 50,807 101,615 9/4/68 938.28 25 Sell 28,532 79,340 105,787 7/9/69 861. 62 50 Buy 27,527 51,813 103,626 12/3/69 793.36 75 Buy 26,932 24,880 99,521 5/4/70 714.56 100 Buy 24,880 0 92,107 11/30/70 794.09 75 Sell 25,589 25,589 102,359 1/22/71 861. 31 50 Sell 28,839 54,428 108,857 4/12/71 926.64 25 Sell 30,310 84,739 112,986 8/3/71 850.03 50 Buy 29,414 55,325 110,650 2/16/72 922.94 25 Sell 31,221 86,547 115,396 6/15/72 945.96 86,547 116,897 As the last figure shows, the present value of an account invested along the lines of this policy is 116,897 giving a 16.9 increase over the six years. A simple policy of buying and holding the Dow over the 6-1/2-year period would have resulted in a 2 loss, For the more sharply rising S&P 500 a 29.5 gain would have been shown vs. a 16.2 gain achieved by Simply buying and holding. Now it may be argued that neither of these results are particularly spectacular in terms of actual return. It should be pOinted out, however, that the investment policy suggested would have enabled the investor to outperform the market with a relatively low degree of risk. Despite the fact that the hypothetical per- formance was better than that of the average, the investor, for the bulk of the period, was 50 or less in- vested in stocks. He thus maintained, for the.most,part, a highly defensive,position with no. sacrifice of capital gains Prospects' – – .- – It may also be argued that superior stock selection over the 6-1/2-year period could have achieved still better results. The same would be true under the plan suggested above. Had the performance of the stocks owned under the plan been better than that of the market, the overall results would have been proportionately better. We purposely started this exercise by saying that it represents history and history only. If the inves- tor were to adopt such a polley today, as of mid-197, and the market were to do something inconsistent with its 6-1/2-year record, such as moving ahead to substantive new highs, the policy would obviously turn out to be inferior to that of Simply holding common stocks. What we have been repeatedly suggesting in this letter, however, is that the behavior of the market in the past 6-1/2 years may have some implica- tions for the future. Under these conditions a policy of adjusting equity exposure in accordance with market levels may well prove rewarding for the investor. Dow-Jones Industrial (1200 p. m.) 943.03 ANTHONY W. TABELL S&P (1200 p.m.) 108.21 DELAFIELD, HARVEY, TABELL AWTmn No statement or expressIon of opinIon or ony other matter herem contolned IS, or 15 to be deemed to be, directly or indirectly, on offer or the 5011(llollon of on offer to buy or sell any security referred to or mentioned The matter .s presented merely for the canverlIence of the subSCriber While we believe the sources of our Informa tlon to be reltable, we In no way represent or guarantee the accuracy thereof nor of the statements mude herein Any action fa be token by the subscriber should be bosed on h.s own inVestigation and information Janney Montgomery Scali, Inc, as a corporation, and Its officers or employees, may now have, or may later toke, pOSlhons or trades In respect to any cur.tles mentioned In thiS or any future Issue, and such pOSition may be different from any views now or hereafter expressed In th.s or any other Issue Janney Montgomery Scott, Inc, which IS registered With the SEC as on Investment adVisor, may give adVice to lIS Investment adVisory and othel customers Independently of any statements mode In ,I-IIS or In any other Issue Further Information on any security mentioned herein IS available on request

., L 909 STATE ROAD, PRINCETON, NEW JERSEY 08540 DIVISION OF MEMBER NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE, INC MEMBER AMERICAN STOCI( EXCHANGE June 23, 1972 The single question most familiar to anyone in the securities industry is, What is the market doing'. The problem has always been how to couch the answer. Generally, an average, most commonly the Dow- Jones Industrials, less often the S&P 500, is used as a proxy for the market as a whole. With the grow- – lng-'te-'Chntta1'sophlstict1oii'e'-nmi\gtITe'ilfvesCtmenecommu-rrity,'brea-dth'action'isalso–often citediwlth'- – the number of advances and declines being mentioned. However, in a market consistmg of over 3,000 listed stocks, accurate description is always a diffi- cult task and the action of an average can never serve as much more than an approximation of the true state of events. This is especially true at the present time when a discussion of the market's action over the past four months must be presented in terms a great deal more complicated than the simple traCing of a market index. The action of the Dow since March is fairly simple and straightforward. It reached an intraday peak of 957.03 in the early part of the month, declined moderately and then rallied to a bull market high of 977.72 in mid-April. After a drop in late April and early May, it rallied again and exceeded the previous peak, reaching 979.46 on May 26. Subsequently, it declined into mid-June and this week rallied above the 950 level, fairly close to its previous peaks. The table below compares this action with that of the S&P 500 stock index. At first glance, the action of the two indices would appear almost identical, with similar peaks and troughs. However, the third column, which shows the ratio of the two (the S&P divided by the Dow) highlights an interesting fact. The decline in this ratio indicates that, since March, the Dow has been outperforming the S&P. This is of more than passing significance. The secular uptrend of the broader average has for many years been better than that of the 30 Industrials. A superior performance by the Dow generally occurs only in down markets. Dow-Jones Industiial Average S&P 500 Ratio 957.03 109.75 .1147 .'—–'——–924-ZZ——————–roS;-86,.. 1-1'45 -.-.- 977.72 111.11 .1136 917.37 979.46 103.83 111.48 .1132 .1138 Looking at other market indicators, the divergence is even more striking. The Dow Industrials and the S&P made successive new peaks in March, April and May but the Dow-Jones Transportation Index at its May high of 264.33 was a striking 5 below its April peak and last week, while the general market was recovering, the carrier index was sinking to new lows. The Dow-Jones Utilities, moreover, made their high for 1972 back in January and have, essentially, been declining ever since, with the March, April and M3Y highs each at successively lower figures. There is even a divergence between the American Stock Exchange and New York Stock Exchange. The peak of the Amex Index was made at 28.80 in April and not even approached at 28.10 in May. It is, moreover, demonstrable that the bulk of individual issues have been showing action quite different than that of the averages. The following table is based on a study of 2897 New York and Ameri- can Stock Exchange issues at recent prices, dividing these issues into percentiles based on, first, their percentage below their 1972 high and, second, their percentage above their 1972 low. Percentile 1-10 Below 1972 High 3.85 or Less Above 1972 Low 43.36 or More 11-20 21-30 3.85 6.80 6.78 .64 43.28 – 27.96 27.94 – 20.41 31-40 41-50 . . 9.65 – 12.50 — – – 12;50–15.37 -. 20.40 – 14.13 —–..– -14.-12 9.46- 51-60 15.38 18.41 9.45 – 6.47 61-70 18.42 – 22.29 6.47 – 4.16 71-80 22.32 27.54 4.15 2.36 81-90 91-100 27.59 – 34.78 34.78 or More 2.36 – 0.77 0.77 or -Less For comparative purposes, the Dow is, at the moment, well within 3 of itS 1972 peak. As the table shows, less than 10 of all stocks are as close to that peak, and a good half of all issues are 15 or more below their year's high. Likewise, while the Dow is up almost 8 from its low for the year, almost half of all listed stocks have been unable to equal this figure. Thus, as we have mdicated in past letters, while the action of the Dow has recently been unspec- tacular, a good deal of underlying deterioration has, in fact, been taking place. Dow- Jones Industrials (12 00 p. m.) 949.20 S&P (1200 p.m.) 108.59 ANTHONY W. TAB ELL DELAFIELD, HARVEY, TAB ELL AWTmn No statement or expression of opinion or any other maHer herein contained IS, or IS 10 be deemed to be, directly or mdlrectly, on offer or the 501lciloilOn of on offer to buy or sell any seunty referred to or mentioned The matter IS presented merely for the onvel'!ene of the subsrlber While -tie believe the oures of our information to be reliable, we In no way represent or guarantee the accuracy thereof nOf of the statements mude herein Any action to be token by the SUbscfloer should be bosed on hIS own mvestlgallon and mformatlon Janney Montgomery Scott, Inc, as a corporation, and Its officers or employees, may now have, or may later toke, pOSitions or trades In respect to any securilles mentioned In thiS or any Future Issue, end such pOSitIOn may be different from any views now or hereafter expressed In thiS or any other Issue Janney Montgomery Scott, Inc, which IS registered With the SEC as on Investment adVisor, may give adVice to Its Investment adVisory and othel customers Independently of any statements made !n thiS or In any other Issue FUr1her Information on any security mentioned herein IS available on request

TABELL'S MARKET LETTER 909 STATE ROAD, PRINCETON. NEW JERSEY 08540 DIVISION OF MEMBER New YORK STOCK EXCHANGE. INC MEMBER AMERICAN STOCK eXCHANGE – June 30, 1972 T)1esefi!i,E1!Y l o,fJhe most ,uncerta.in o!l i,dysyies–,- nd , in the light of this uncer- tainty, it is not surprising that market commentators should' seek 'security-in- nffieTts of fammar fftual' , Many of these ritual events are seasonal, and, as the 4th of July approaches, we are predictably being treated to speculatlOn about the so-called summer rally. Much of this speculation tends to treat the event as a phenomenon comparable to the early tomato crop — a happening that occurs with unvarying regular- ity with only the exact date varying slightly. Since almost no two-month period goes by without a market rally of some sort occurring, it is very easy to seize on whatever advance happens to occur in July or August and call it the summer rally. A look at the record indicates that while the summer rally is by no means a mythical beast, Some caveats about making it too strong a factor in a market forecast may well be expressed. ONE-MONTH PERIODS TWO-MONTH PERIODS Ending Month Advances Declines Avg . Chge Advances Declines Avg. Chge January 30 16 0.75 30 16 2.05 February 25 21 -0.03 25 21 0.71 March 25 21 – 0.23 22 24 – 0.37 April 26 20 0.94 28 18 0.80 May 24 22 -0.76 28 18 0.43 June 22 24 0.95 23 23 0.14 July 32 14 2.31 30 16 3.22 August 31 15 1.88 34 12 4.36 September October November December 20 24 27 . 35 26 – 1.34 22 – 0.54 19 0.71 ' 1-1 '15 27 19 0.47 23 23 – 1.81 28 18 0.23 31 1-5 -2,.10 -1 Total 321 231 0.50 329 223 1.03 The table above shows the action of the Dow-Jones Industrial Average in every one-month and two- month period from 1926 to 1971. For each period the number of instances when the market advanced and de- clined is shown, together with the average percentage change for the period. A preliminary look at the table, indeed, supports the notion of a probable summer rally. The average monthly advance for the Dow over the period has been .5 whereas the average performance in July is an advance of 2.31, more than four times as great. Likewise, the average advance of 4.36 for the two months ended August is four times larger than the average two-month advance. It would, indeed, appear that the expectation of an advancing market during July and August has some solid grounding in fact. Having made this statement, however, a few doubts must be raised. The first factor which needs to be pOinted out is that a large part of the high average advance for the summer period rests on the accident of the 1932 bottom's having occurred at the end of June. Thus, July and August of that year produced the largest two-month advance in stock-market history, an astounding 70 rise. If this single year is elimi- nated from conslderation, the results for July and August are much closer to normal. Secondly, while lt is true that July and August do show significant pluralities of advancing months over declining months, it must be remembered that advancing periods tend to outnumber declining ones over the 46 years by almost three to two. When standard tests of statistical Significance are appli,ed, the period with the clearest seasonal action is the month of December, which is why this letter has always empha- sized the importance of the year-end rally. Likewise, the tendency toward a declining market in Septem- ber is statistically more significant than that of a rise in July or August. Interestmgly enough, none of the other months show any discernible seasonal pattern whatsoever. Lastly, in looking for seasonal patterns/ it is wise to examine the most recent data to see ifit seems- to be deviating from the past and, indeed, this is, apparently, the case. The six years between 1966 and 1971 have produced two rallies and four declines in July and four rallies and two declines in August, and the two-month period ended August ha s produced three rallies and three declines with an average advance of only 6o/ Even the familiar December rally appears to have lost its recent reliability, and, mterestingly enough, a new seasonal tendency, not heretofore apparent, seems to be emerging — that of a decline in May-June. Every May, from 1965 through 1972, has produced a declining market and the same is true of every two-month period ending in June. The moral of the whole exercise, we suppose, is that the stock market is a difficult and changing beast, and, whlle certain seasonal tendencies are apparent, they constitute only one factor in what is invariably a highly complex equation. Dow-Jones Industrials (1200 p.m.) 930.01 S&P (1200 p.m.) 107.26 ANTHONY W. TABEI.1. DEl.AFIELD, HARVEY, TABEI.L AWTmn No 'talemenl or expressIon of opinIon or any other moiler herein contolOed IS, or . to be deemed to be, directly or indirectly, on offer or Ihe SOIIC.lollon of on offer to buy or sell any security referred 10 or mentIoned The molter IS presented merely for the conver'!cnce of Ihe subscrIber While oNe believe the sources of our information to be reltoble, we In no way represent or guoranlee Ihe accuracy thereof nor of the statements mude herein Any actIOn to be token by the subscriber should be bIlsed on hiS own Investigation and Information Janney Montgomery Scott, Inc. 05 a COrporatIon, and lIS offIcers or employees, may now hove, or moy loler toke, poSitions or trades In respect to any seCUrities mentioned In thIS or ony future Issue, and such POSitiOn may be different fram any views now or hereofter expreued In thiS or (my other Issue Janney Montgomery colt, Inc, which 1 registered With the SEC as on Investmen! adVisor, may give adVice 10 Its Investment adVISOry and othel evstomers Independently of any statements made In thiS or In any other Issue Further mformotlon on any security mentioned herein 1 ovollable on request

TABELL'S MARKET LETTER – — – ——- 909 STATE ROAD, PRINCETON. NEW JERSEY 08540 DIVISION OF MEMBER NEW YORI( STOCK eXCHANGe, INC MEMBER AMERICAN STOCK eXCHANGe July 7, 1972 Stock cmarketca ctionisoftenparadoxicai;' and-thepres entc!instanGe isa' particularly 'good -.-c – example. For the first time in a number of weeks the stock market managed, from a technical pOint of view, to do something moderately encouraging. Yet, and herein lies the paradox, the fact may hold unfavorable implications for the longer term. Actually, Thursday's rally in response to Vietnam peace rumors was encouraging only in a relative sense, since the market rose sharply from the bottom of the trading range which had contained it for some four months. Thus, with the advance, the market has refused, for the time being, to forge the ultimate link in what has, until recently, been an accumulating chain of discouraging eVidence. It is perhaps worthwhile at this stage to back up a bit and recapitulate some of the points this letter has been raising since early Spring. Since the beginning of March, it will be re- called, the Dow-Jones Industrial Average has remained in the trading range bounded by an intra- day low of 917.37, reached in May and approximately equalled in March and early June, and an intra-day high of 979.46 attained in the end of May and roughly equalled earlier in late April. Patterns on the other major indices have been roughly similar. While this so-called line formation was taking place, indices of internal market vitality were showing conSistently de- teriorating action. In the face of this deterioration, it was logical to theorize that the March- June period constituted a distributional formation with the consequent implication of lower prices. -vfEl,Nocwb,Utdietisspiintetetnh3setvi;ig;ogr,ofafthleearsatl,lyt,hantotthheingDohwasmraenaallgyedoctcourrereadc t h o dramat 917.75, ically alter tha within pennies tof-'-….\— the May low, at which point it held prior to the holiday and then moved upward in response to the peace news. Here, of course, is where the paradox occurs, because, if what we have been seeing for the past three months is, in fact, distribution, any attempt at a rally at this stage will simply broaden the potential top and make the ultimate downside reading even worse. It is, furthermore, highly difficult at this stage, based on the weight of present evidence, to visualize a rally which would do more than simply test the old highs, thus lending further cre- dence to the belief that substantive deterioration has been taking place since early Spring. One of the few major arguments (aside from the election-year pattern previously discussed at some length in this letter) against a market-decline at this stage is the almost total absence of the sort of speculative activity which has, in the past, generally tended to characterize major distributional periods. Here, of course, exists still another paradox. The market, for over a year now, has been in the group of what is, basically, an unfavorable supply/demand equation. This was true as early as the Spring of 1971 and it was, in our view, essentially this unfavorable supply/demand picture which explained the ISO-point decline in the Dow-Jones Industrial Average which took place during the Summer and Fall of last year. Available figures since that time strongly suggest that the basiC reason for the recovery was the sharp increase in margin-account debit balances which was able, in the period November, 1971-March, 1972, to override a basically unfavorable demand picture and push the market averages to new highs. Not.surprisingly-in view,ofthe-market' s recent action, -the -latest-available figures suggest – – — that the rise in debit balances has begun to slow down. Yet the increase in stock market credit since last November has been unaccompanied by any sharp rise in other signs of speculative activity suggesting that the rise constituted simply a recovery to relatively normal levels rather than an upsurge in speculative interest. Any further advance, it seems to us, would have to consist largely of a speculative wave which later would have to be liquidated. Thus, the market, at this stage, may be buying time but the price, as is often true 'in such cases, may prove to be expensive. Dow-Jones Industrials (1200 p.m.) 941.15 S&P (1200 p.m.) 108.87 AWTmn ANTHONY W. TAB ELL DELAFIELD, HARVEY, TABELL No statement ar exprenlon of opinion or any other motter here'n contolned IS, or 1 to be deemed to be, directly or mdlrectly, on offer or the SOllCIlolion of on offer to buy or sell any security referred to or menhoned The molter IS presented merely for The convellence of the subSCriber While 'i'le believe tne sources of our Informehon to be relloble, we In no woy represent or guarantee tne accuracy tnereof nor of tne statements mude nerem Any action 10 be taken by tne subscriber snould be based on nls own inVeStigation and information Janney Montgomery Scali, Inc, as a corporotlon, and lIS offICers or employees, may now nave, or moy later lake, poslhans or trades In respect to any securthes mentioned In thiS or any future Issue, and such posItIon may be different from any VIews now or hereofter e)'pressed In tnn or any other Issue Janney Montgomery 5011, Inc, WhlCn IS regIStered WIth the SEC 0 an Investment adVisor, may give adVice to Its Investment adVisory and othel customers Independently of any statements made In thl or In ony otner ISsue Furtner information on ony security mentIoned herein IS availoble on request

TABELL'S MARKET LETTER '– . -.l 909 STATE ROAD. PRINCETON. NEW JERSEY 08540 DIVISION OF MEMBER NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE, INC MEMBER AMERICAN STOCK EXCHANGE July 14, 1972 As of this writing (noon on Friday) the Dow-Jones Industrial Average continues to flirt with a down- – sidepenetration ofitsfour-J11onth ,tradingrang without dectsvely- achieving.such .a, pene.tration. The index, it will be recalled, moved to an intra-day low of 917.75 prior to the July 4th holiday; the – — firmed and rallied to an intra-day high of 948.15 on peace rumors following that holiday. Subsequently, it again tailed off and reached a new intra-day low at 912.93 on Thursday but, rather than decisively confirming that penetration, firmed slightly in early trading today. A market forecast, at any pOint in time, must address itself to two questions. First of all, what is the relative likelihood of higher vs. lower prices, and, second, given the likelihood of a move in one direction or another, how far is that move likely to carry 7 Our convictions as regards the first question should, by this time, be well known. Despite the attempts by the popular averages to hold within the March-July trading range, we shall remain convinced, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, that that range constitutes an area of distribu- tion. The evidence of internal deterioration which has accumulated during the four months in which the averages have remained locked in their sideways formation is, in our view, almost overwhelming. This has been reinforced in recent weeks by the rapid buildup of distributional patterns in substan- tial numbers of individual stocks. It must, therefore, be theorized that a high degree of likelihood points in the direction of lower prices. The second question, therefore, is How much lower 7. Let us start by detailing currently fore- seeable downside objectives for the popular indices. For the Dow-Jones Industrials various obJectives are readable in the 880-840 range. This would constitute a decline of 9 -13 from recent highs and 4-8 from current prices. For the Dow-Jones Transportation Index, the most plausible ' d owns-id eob ject-iv ei-s224Actu aHy–th is index'wa swi-thi-na n ce of–tha tobj ect!ve'a t-W-ed ne sdays low having already declined 18 from a high of 276 in May. The Dow Utilities have reached most downside objectives and are now in a strong support zone, having, essentially, been in a downtrend since the early part of January. The broader-based indices currently reveal less percentage risk than does the Dow. The top on the S&P 500, for example, does not indicate much worse than 102-101 vs. the current level around 106, and the New York Stock Exchange Index, at the moment, does not suggest prices much lower thm 56, a level at which strong support exists and one not that different than its current level just under 59. This general suggestion of lower — although not too much lower — prices is confirmed by an in- spection of individual stock patterns. As noted above, substantial distribution has occurred over the most recent period. But, despite the rapidity with which distributional patterns have built up, few of them appear to indicate drastically lower prices. Moreover, one must ask oneself, if sub- stantially lower prices are to be seen, what is to provide the downside leadership 7 It is not too much of a generality to say that the high-multiple growth stocks, where some fundamental vulner- ability might be theorized to exist, by and large, show few signs of more than minor distribution. On the other hand, those unexploited issues with low multiples, while continuing in downtrends from a technical point of view, appear to present a minimum of further downside potential on a fundamental basis. This paradox may, for the time being, constitute a source of strength. If it is our forecast that, however likely a decline might be, it is likely to be relatively insigni- ficant,should if not consthiite'sertsible-j'iolicyto'prepare-fO spenacash-reserves on any m-oderately lower prices which might develop 7 Certainly, the general scenario we have outlined would appear to point in this direction. However, even were the market immediately to move toward the objectives discussed above, we would be reluctant to be aggressive buyers in long-term accounts in the absence of convincing technical evidence that the situation had, indeed, reversed itself. Action during the Summer and Fall of 1969 constitutes one recent example of a market which apparently was making attempts to bottom, only to suffer an ultimate and more vicious downward leg. In fact, if the market does move down, it is precisely at this point that we expect the truly difficult investment decision will have to be made. The holding of reserves at the present moment is a matter of simple prudence. The question of whether those reserves should be spent if the market moves lower may well be the most difficult question that 1972 will poise. Dow-Jones Industrials (1200 p.m.) 920.08 S&P (1200 p.m.) 106.74 ANTHONYW. TABELL DELAFIELD, HARVEY, TABELL AWTmn No stolement or expressIon of opinIon or any olher motter hereIn contolned IS, or IS 10 be deemed 10 be, dIrectly or ind,rectly, on offer or the solICItatIon of on offer to buy or sell any secunty referred to or mentioned The mOiler 15 presenled merely for the conver'lenCEl of the subscriber WhIle we believe Ihe sources of our Informa lIon 10 be reliable, we In no way represent or guarantee the accuracy thereof nor of the statements mude herein Any octlon 10 be token by the subscriber should be based on h,s own Inveshgotlon and Informotlon Janney Montgomery Scoil, Inc, os a corporatIon, and lis offICers or employees, may now have, or may later toke, posItions or trades In respect 10 any seculles mentIoned In Ih,s or any future Inue, and such pOSItion moy be dIfferent from any vIews now or hereafter e,pressed In thu or any other Issue Jonney Montgomery Scott, Inc, whIch IS regIstered WIth Ihe SEC 05 on Investment adVisor, may gIve adVice to 115 Investment adVISory and othel customers Independently of any statements mode In thiS or In any other Issue Further information on any security mentlaned hereIn IS avollable on request

TABELL'S MARKET LETTER ; 909 STATE ROAD, PRINCETON, NEW JERSEY 08540 DIVISION OF MEMBER NEW YORI( STOCI( EXCHANGE, INC MEMBER AMERICAN STOCI( EXCHANGE July 21, 1972 We have been taken to task of late by some of our economist friends for our obvious lack of enchant- ment regarding the near-term future for stock prices. They inform us with great certitude that the economic outlook,for19 72cJs excellel).!andindeedthaJther,,ext,,ts jlstrongpro!lp!,,c,t(or,J!!rther cexpaps ion ,in 19,3,. How, then, they ask, can the course for stock prices be anything but an' upward one — , '-; '- Ironically, we have absolutely no quibble with our economist cohorts concerning the rosy business outlook, and our own economic data strongly suggest the likelihood of a relatively bright business picture. Having said this, it next needs to be noted that it is almost totally irrelevant to a forecast as to the course of common stock prices. One of the hardest-dYing myths in the financial community is the one that implies a short-term relation- ship between economic activity and stock prices. Inordinate amounts of time are wasted forecasting the economic outlook and attempting to relate this forecast to a stock price projection despite the fact that all available data indicate that the relationship is tenuous, at best. Ironically, the National Bureau of Economic Research includes the S&P 500 as one of its 12 leading economic indicators, thus using stock prices to forecast the economy rather than the other way around. Yet, Wall Street clings blithely to the delusion that stock prices cannot go down in the face of rising earnings or up in the face of declining ones, despite the fact that they have repeatedly been doing just that for years. As we have stated in this letter in the past, we prefer to regard the primary force acting on the aggregate level of stock prices as a supply/demand equation. When the supply of new common stock exceeds the demand generated by that component of national savings available for common stock purchases (in- cluding those made through financial intermediaries such as mutual funds, pension funds and insurance companies) the pressure on the aggregate level of stock prices will be downward. When the reverse 1S the case, it will be upward. This will tend to make itself felt in the average price/earnings ratio or the price actually being paid for a dollar of common stock earnings. G…NF. , C o r , p . o r a t e Eam-l,ngs P-!-E.Rat-io ,- ( Blllion) Chge Profits Chge ofG.N.P. S&P500 Chge S&P500 1950 1955 1960 1965 1967 284.8 37.7 13.9 2.69 7.6 398.0 40 46.9 24 11.8 3.65 35 12.5 503.7 27 49.9 6 9.9 3.10 -15 18.7 684.9 36 76.1 52 11.1 5.25 69 17.6 793.9 16 78.7 3 9.9 5.54 6 17.4 1968 865.0 9 85.4 8 9.9 5.92 7 17.5 1969 1970 931.4 974.1 8 5 85.8 75.4 -12 9.2 5.55 -6 7.7 5.34 -4 16.5 17.2 1971 1046.8 7 85.4 13 8.1 4.91 -8 20.7 1972-E 1160.0 11 93 8 8.0 6.25 27 16.9 The table above shows some relevant economic figures starting inl950 and going through 1972 estimates. As can be seen, G. N. P. has been increasing steadily over the period as have corporate profits. As can also be seen, those profits, as a percentage of G. N. P., have been declining steadily ever since 1950 despite a mild recovery in the early 1960's. And, indeed, corporate profits for both 1971 and 1972 should be at a percentage level not much greater than the new low reached in 1970. Earnings for the S&P 500 Stock Index which series roughly parallels corporate profits, are shown in the last column, and the final column indicates the price being paid for these eamings, 1. e., the pie ratio for the S&P 500. As should be quite obvious from the table, the bulk of the rise in s t 0 c k prices since 1950 has been due, not to increased profits, although profits have, indeed, moved up substantially, but to a dramatic in- crease in the price being paid for a dollar of profits. Indeed, this price was at.a new,high in the fourth ..,. ..,. . oI.-.- quarter of 1971, and is still not particularly low even taking into account the optimistic profits outlook for the coming year. One of the central tenets of this letter for some two years now has been that the equity supply/demand equation has been drastically altered from the one which existed throughout the 1960's. While we are willing, therefore, to share the economist's belief that earnings may continue to increase on into the early 1970's, we are less convinced of the implicit assumption that the price of those earnings (roughly 17 for one earnings dollar in terms of the S&P 500) will continue to be a viable one. The price earnings ratio for the S&P 500 was around 7 in 1950 and over 20 in 1971. The point is that neither figure is glven from on high as the permanent price at which earnings must sell. Thus, a protracted period during which earnings increase and stock prices remain stable or increase at a somewhat lesser rate 1S not to us at all unthinkable. Indeed, in the light of available evidence, such an environment may constitute the most plausible forecast. Dow-Jones Industrials (1200 p.m.) 909.69 S&P (1200 p.m.) 105.68 ANTHONY W. TABELL DELAFIELD, HARVEY, TABELL AWT'mn No stalement or expreSSion of opinIon or ony other matter herem contolned lS, or IS 10 be deemed 10 be, dIrectly or indirectly. on offer or Ihe 501'(lloon of on offer 10 buy or sell ony security referred 10 or mentIoned The moIler IS presented merely for Ihe convenience of the svbscflber While e believe Ihe sources of our Informo tlon to be reliable, we In no way represent or guarantee the accuracy thereof nor of the statements mude herein Any actIOn to be token by the subscriber should be based on I-IIS own investigation and Informallon Janney Montgomery Scott, Inc, os a corporation, and Its officers or employees, may now have, or may later toke, positions or trades In respect to any securities mentioned In thiS or any future Issue, and such pOSitIOn may be different from any views now or hereafter expressed In thiS or any other Issue. Janney Montgomery Scott, Inc, which IS registered With the SEC as on Investment adVisor, may give adVice to Its Investment adVISOry and otnel customers Independently of any statements mode In Iha or In any other nsue Further information on any seC\Jf1ty mentioned herein IS available on request

TABELL'S MARKET LETTER 909 STATE ROAD, PRINCETON. NEW JERSEY 08540 DIVISION OF MEMBER NEW VORK STOCK EXCHANGE, INC MEMBER AMERICAN STOCK EXCHANGE July 28, 1972 oO —Welo6nhet occationl1ls-t weeKt6 aliver ours-eives of-a–n'iimbe-rof'0mtty-op1nions on-the c interrelationship of economic news and stock prices. The basic conclusion of our remarks was that the economic outlook, admittedly favorable, should be taken into very little account in fore- casting the intermediate-term course of stock prices — these prices being determined by more fundamental supply/demand forces. Our carefully reasoned opus went to the printer at noon on Friday whereupon, in Friday afternoon's, Monday's and early Tuesday's trading, the Dow-Jones Industrial Average promptly advanced some 30 pOints — specifically in response to unexpectedly favorable economic news. So much for the hazards of pontification. It is now necessary to make an attempt at assess- ing what it all means. To begin with, there is no doubt about the fact that the six-month eco- nomic figures were good. The rise in G. N . P. was in line with the most optimistic expectations, and the surprise element in the news was, of course, the reduction of the rate of inflation. We doubt, however, that all of this is of sufficient magnitude permanently to override the fundamen- tal forces which we discussed at some length last week. The market now leaves us with a number of unanswered questions, the first of which centers on whether last Friday's reversal constituted a bottom of. at least, intermediate-scale propor- tions. In order to answer this question we must digress for a moment on the general nature of market bottoms. They are, basically, of two types. The first type arises from what is common- ly termed a deep oversold position, there being various ways of measuring objectively whether sucha-pOS1t1on -exists-.-Wnen itaoes exist-(May, 100TO was a typical exam-pIe 6f'ftie- genre)'the n technician is more inclined to trust any significant rebound as marking what may be a turning point. The second variety of market bottom (November, 1971 being an example of this type) takes place without the attainment of such an oversold condition, In such cases, the analyst must be more skeptical and demand of the market more eVidence of a true turn before committing himself to the position that a reversal may have, in fact, occurred The unavoidable risk heFe is of failure to recognize a bottom until significantly after the fact. But it is necessary to assume this risk in order to avoid being ensnared by every minor rally that takes place within an intermediate downtrend. If last week's action proves, in fact, to be a reversal, it will be one of the second type. The market was not in anything approaching a deep oversold position when it turned last Friday, and we are, therefore, inclined to demand more evidence of staying power for the rally before theorizing that the basic investment picture has drastically changed. Such evidence has not, as of this writing, been forthcoming. The advance petered out in late Tuesday's trading and has been unable, so far at least, to get underway again. There is also room for some feelings of skepticism regarding the advance itself. 'For example, on Monday, a day in which the Dow- Jones chalked up its biggest advance of the year, 7 of the 10 most active stocks failed to advance on the day. Some investors quite obviously had been awaiting a firm market into which to sell stock. How much'strength would be required-to-c0l1stltute-reversalevldence -'A'decislve mave— above 950 on the Dow would probably indicate the evldence of, at least, a short-term uptrend and a possible test of the prior highs. In the absence of this confirmation and/or further bas- ing action, we would be inclined to treat last week's advance with some skepticism. The final question, of cours e, is whether, if a short-term reversal does take place, the basic doubts expressed by this letter since May would be allayed. We do not think so. The evidence of distribution that has accumulated since March is formidable, and it will require a great deal more than ability to mount a short-term advance to alter that evidence. Even were we convinced of the imminence of such a rise, we would heSitate in utilizing it as anything but a vehicle for the most nimble of traders. Dow-Jones Industrials (1200 p.m.) 926.25 S&P (1200 p.m.) 107.22 ANTHONY W. TABELL AWTmn DELAFIELD, HARVEY, TAB ELL No stotemenl or expression of opinion or ony other matter herein (onlllned IS, or 1 to be deemed to be, directly or Indirectly, on offer or the SOllCIIoilon of an offer to buy or sell ony security referred to or mentioned The matter IS presented merely for the conver'lenCe of the subscfIber While we believe the sources of our Informa tlan to be reliable, we In no way represent ar guarantee the accuracy thereof nor of the statements mude herein. Any action to be token by the subSCriber should be based an hiS own Investigation and information Janney Montgomery SCott, Inc, as a corporation, and Its officers or employees, may now have, or may later take, pOSitions or trades 1n respect to any securities mentioned In thiS or any future Issue, and such position moy be different from any views now or hereafter e1pressed In thiS or any other Issue Janney Montgomery Scott, Inc, which IS registered With the SEC as on Investment adVisor, may give adVice to Its Investment adVISOry and othel customers Independently of any statements made In tF-us or In any other Issue Further Information on any security mentioned herein IS available on request ,

!— I I I I, TABELL'S MARKET I LETTER I.- – – – 909 STATE ROAD. PRINCETON, NEW JERSEY 08540 DIVISION OF MEMBER NEW YOAI( STOCK EXCHANGe. INC. MEMBER AMERICAN STOCK EXCHANGE August 4, 1972 As of noon today the stock market still continued its refusal to confirm a short-term uptrend by moving through the 950 level on the Dow. If such a penetration were to take place, a short-term upside objece-' tiJloLBO,995 would.be,indicated ,.whereas,a,iailure to move throughthis..level-wouldsuggestca'con- ' tinuatin of the intermediate term downswing from the April-May highs. A fortnight ago we devoted this space to a general discussion of the relationship between earnings and stock prices, suggesting that a forecast of the former was only a partial step on the road to fore- casting the latter. We would like to expand on this subject a bit further by trying concretely to relate a forecast for the Dow-Jones Industrial Average to its earnings prospects for 1972 and beyond. To begin with, it is well to keep our eye on the ball. The name of the game is to forecast prices, for it is prices that produce capital gains and losses. A price can be viewed as the product of two factors, first, earnings and, second, the multiple which the stock market is willing to apply to those earnings. The financial community spends a great deal of time and effort, by and large successfully, forecasting the former and relatively little effort trying to forecast the equally important second half of the equation — the multiple at which earnings will sell. The present instance can be cited as a specIfic example. For the 12 months ended June 30,1972 (est;.. mating the last quarter) the Dow-Jones Industrial Average earned 58.57. Our own estimate calls for earnings to continue to increase throughout 1972, and we are currently looking for earnings of 64.50 for the 12 months ended December 31, which figure will constitute a newall-time record and a substantial advance from the recession-low figure of 51.02, for the year ended December, 1970. Further improve- ment, although probably not at as great a rate, is likely for 1973. So much for the first half of the equation. What about the second — the multiple It is of more than passing importance. Assuming our earnings forecast to be correct, were the multiple to remain unchanged from the figure of 15.9 which obtained at the end of June, the Dow in December will be 1025, a worth- I–t–.w. hHe-btrt-uns-pectactllaratlvanC-erom—CurrenFlevelS7tiowever, quUea.Uferent- multiPles ate parr of th''''e'''''''-'''-''''- – record of the most recent past. At the high for the 1967-1968 bull market, for example, the Dow sold for 17.6 times earnings and, were this multiple to be achieved again, it could sell as high as 1135 at the end of the year. More recently, at the 1970 low, it sold for as little as 12.8 times earnings, and this multiple would produce a price of 825, better than 100 pOints below today's figure. If we broaden our historical perspective somewhat, an even wider range of valuation appears possible. The record high pie for the Dow of 24.2, achieved in the third quarter of 1961, would produce a price of 1560. Conversely, a return to the multiples of the early fifties would have the Dow around 525. Clearly, any forecast pretending to be worth anything must give some hard thought to forecasting pie ratios as well as to forecasting earnings. Luckily, in this area, there is some historical precedent to guide us. One of the most important prin- ciples is that changes in the multiple tend to be in the opposite direction from changes in earnings. For example, in the 169 quarters since 1929, earnings have increased 107 times. In 72 of those 107 cases, the multiple has moved downward. The converse is true in periods of dec lin i n g ear n i n g s. 62 quarters since 1929 have shown a quarter-to-quarter earnings drop and, in 46 of those 62 cases, the multiple rose. Even more interesting is the fact that exceptions to the rule tend to occur around earnings turmng- pOints. A perfect example is the recovery from the recent recession. In the first three months of 1971, Dow earnings increased by 2, but a jump in the multiple from 16.4 to 17.3 produced a healthy 8 ad- vance in stock prices. As earnings continued to advance through 1971 and 1972, the multiple almost stead- ily decreased quarter-to-quarter, with the result that, while earnings for June, 1972 had advanced 12, the Dow was ahead by only 3. In other words, the clear-cut probabilitY,is that heprice earmngs. ratio for tlfe Dow will be lower'a-t the end of the year Ulan itis-today. – 0 This projection is reinforced by a look at the historical pattern since 1961. Since that time, the mul- tiple applied to equity earnings has been decreasing steadily, with each successive peak lower than the previous one and each successive bottom recording a new low. Thus, the 1970 low multiple of 12.8 con- stituted a 13-year nadir, and the recovery from that figure failed to equal the high reached in 1967 before it began turning downward again. Thus, on a purely statistical basis, it would not be unusual to see multiples move below their 1970 low figure some time in 1973 or 1974. We have outlined In the past our reasons for thinking that the multiple trend since 1961 is not a tran- sient one or a random phenomenon. It constitutes one of the reasons for continued skepticism regarding the likelihood of substantially higher pnces, despite a highly optimistic near-term economIC outlook. Dow-Jones Industrials (1200 p.m.) 947.92 S&P (1200 p.m.) 110.13 AWTmn ANTHONY W. TABELL DELAFIELD, HARVEY, TABELL No statement or expreulon of op,Ion or any other matter herem contained IS, or IS 10 be deemed to be, directly or indirectly, an oHer or ihe soliCitation of an offer io buy or sell ony secl,lfIty referred to or mentioned The mailer IS presented merely for the COnvel'lence of the subscriber While we believe the sources of our informa- tion to be reliable we In no way represent or guarantee the accuracy thereof nor of the statements mude herein Any action to be taken by the slIbscnber should be based on hiS own 'inveStigation and information Janney Montgomery Scolt, Inc, os 0 corporation, and Its officers or employees, may now hove, or moy later toke, POSitions or trades In respect to ony seCUrities menlloned In thts or any future Issue, and such position moy be different from ony views now or hereafter e)'pressedhln Ihl5 or any other luue Janney Montgomery Scoll, Inc, which IS reglslered With the SEC os on Investment adVisor, may give odvlce to Its Investment adVisory and 01 el customers Independently of ony statements made In tha or In ony other ISsue Further mformohon on any sea.mty mentioned herein IS avalloble on request

– – – – – – – – – -.—————— TABELL-S MARKET LETTER 909 STATE ROAD, PRINCETON. NEW JERSEY 08540 DIVISION OF MEMBER NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE, INC MEMBER AMERICAN STOCK EXCHANGE – August 11th, 1972 — , egular sede,s ()f thi,,letter,will have noted a certain skepticism regarding what has become, in our . —..- ,-, – – – – . – – ..,.-t…….,– -' !ll view. close to a conventIOnal wisdom in finanCial clrcles – Tnis-conventional w3dom-h'61ds'tnat'the'rn-' vestment management process consists of Ilttle more than selecting a relatively restricted Ilst of high- grade growth compaOles and then simply contlOulOg to buy those companies, pretty much regardless of what prices they may be seillng for at the hme. One prestigious financial institution recently took the opportunity to announce in the pages of the New York Times that the above was. in fac\, its pollcy and calmly proceeded to list the Olneteen issues it regarded as suitable vehicles under the theory. Actually, the theory is not a new one. It had emerged as long ago as 1966, and we took the opportun- Ity to take it to task at that time. We tabulated the performance of a list of widely-recognized growth stocks over the 1955-1966 period. The one difference between our compilation and the usual one of Its type was that we picked stocks widely recogOlzed as growth stocks—not at the end of the period. but at the beglOning, I.e., 1955. We thought It would be interesting to repeat the tabulation today some SIX years later. Listed be- low are the twenty stocks, together with their prices at the end of 1954, at the time of our original study in 1966, and today, With the Dow Jones Industrial Average included for comparison. Certain adjustments have been made. The price of Amerada Hess preferred has been used since It was received in exchange for the original Amerada Petroleum, and recent du Pont prices have been adjusted upward for the General Motors distributions. All 1954 and 1966 prices have been adjusted for stock spllts. 12/31/54 1966 Recent 12/31/54 1966 Recent Alcan Alum Amerada-Hess 26 62 27 21 Minn. Mining 74 102 Monsanto 7 27 40 82 38 53 1,,C,a!Tjj;'rCQ!'P, .'1c4 Corning Glass 58 22 27 182 261 NL Industries Owens Coing 30 17 29 ….,.15 40 47—- Dow Chemical 14 20 92 Pfizer, Chas. 4 23 45 DuPont EI Paso Natural G Goodrich, B. F. H0.neywell Intern'l Bus. M. 170 16-1/2 43 27 15 265 18-1/2 44 57 171 282 18 27 167 422 RCA Rohm & Haas Scott Paper Shell Oil Union Carbide Dow- lones Ind. 11 30 20 26 44 412 48 36 38 79 26 13 68 45 49 48 818 950 Readers with short memories will be as surprised today as they were SIX years ago at the names of some of the' stocks which the prevailing wisdom of the mid-fifties regarded as premier growth issues, Just as, we have no doubt, analysts of the 1980's will be surprised at the inclusion of some stocks 10 a list compiled today. The performance of the list, both to 1966 and subsequently, might, off-hand, seem to support the growth stock thesIs. The list performed 60 better than the Dow 10 the 1955-66 period and two and a half times better than the Dow from 1955 through 1972, sconng a 353 advance. As was the case 10 1966, however, the entire performance superiority was due to just three stocks,IBM, MlOnesota Mining and Pfizer, and, had these three issues been removed, performance would have been worse than the average. Perhaps a better illustration of the difficulties of picking growth issues is the fact that four of these issues are today lower than they were in 1954 (when the Dow was less than half its current level) and twelve have underperformed the Dow. Changes 10 performance since 1966 are also interesting. The three stocks mentioned above were leaders In the 1955-66 penod,and continued to be among. the top.performers.subsequently. Likewise, Alcan and NL Industries, subpar performers at the time of the hrst study, have continued to show below- average performance. On the other hand, RCA, one of the best performing Issues on the list 10 1966, has since lost ground,whereas Dow Chemical and Rohm & Haas, subpar performers prior to 1966, have turned m an above average performance since. We think that the moral we drew at the time of the origlOal study six years ago stlll holds good to- day. Growth continues to be an elUSive concept, and a great many of the stocks which Wall Street re- gards as certain growth vehicles today, Will probably, over the next decade or two, suffer a fate Slmllar to some of those WhlCh were regarded as equally certain growth vehicles In 1954. Dow-Jones Industrials (1200 p.m.) 955.37 S&P (1200 p.m,) 111.37 AWTkd ANTHONY W. TABELL DELAFIELD, HARVEY, TABELL No falement or expresSion of opinion or ony other maHer herein contomed IS, or 1 10 be deemed to be, directly or indirectly, an offer-or Ihe SOlitllallon of on offer to buy or sell any setunty referred to or mentIoned The matter IS presented merely for the tonver.ente of the substnber While He believe the sourtes of our Informa tlon to be rehable, we In no way represent or guarantee the atcuraty thereof nor of Ihe statements mucle herem Any action fa be token by the substnber should be based on hiS own Invesllgallon and Information. Janney Montgomery Scott, Inc, as a oorporol1on, and Its officers or employees, may now have, or may later toke, pasilions or trades In respect to any sec;unhes mentioned In thiS or any future issue, and such position may be different from any views now or hereafter expressed in thiS or any other issue Janney Montgomery Soolt, Inc, which IS registered With the SEC as on mvestment adVisor, moy give adVice to lis Investment adVIsory and other customers Independently of any statements mode In thiS or In ony other Issue FUr1her information on any security menlioned herem IS available on request