TABELLS MARKET LETTER -.. j 909 STATE ROAD, PRINCETON NEW JERSEY 08540 DIVISION OF MEMBER NEW VORK STOCI( eXCHANGE, tNC MEMBER AMERICAN STOCK eXCHANGe – We have referred in recent letters to the fact that 1972 is a Presidential election January 14, 1972 year and suggested that this fact should be taken into account in trying to foresee the price pattern probabilities for the next 12 months.' Numerous studies have been made of-market action in such-years,and'it'ls-an indubitable fact that normal market patterns do tend to be slightly altered. In an effort to tabulate election year action succinctly, we have prepared the following table. It shows, for each year, the President elected and his party, followed by the average price for each month expressed as a percentage of the previous December's close (i.e., 110 means the market was up 10, and 90 means it was down 10). Year President Jan. Feb. Mar. May June l!!!v.. Aug. Sept. Oct. Nov De. 1900 McKinley R 101 103 .104 105 100 9B 9B 99 97 100 lOB 114 1904 Roosevelt R 102 99 99 101 99 99 103 107 112 11B 125 126 190B Taft R 105 100 105 III 117 117 123 126 125 126 134 13B 1912 Wilson D 100 99 102 106 105 105 106 109 109 109 lOB 103 1916 Wilson D 99 9B 97 96 9B 99 9B 99 102 105 107 103 1920 Harding R 99 91 97 96 91 B9 B9 B6 89 89 85 77 1924 Coolidge R 103 104 102 100 99 101 109 113 112 1I0 115 119 1928 Hoover R 99 98 103 110 113 108 108 112 120 123 131 132 1932 Roosevelt D 103 101 102 76 66 59 63 89 102 88 87 82 1936 Roosevelt D 102 108 1I2 1I2 104 108 116 1I8 120 126 130 128 !940 Roosevelt D 99 98 97 98 85 76 80 82 86 87 88 85 1944 Roosevelt D 102 101 105 101 105 109 112 110 108 III 110 115 1948 Truman D 97 92 94 101 106 110 108 104 103 106 100 99 1952 Eisenhower R 102 100 100 100 100 102 105 106 104 104 105 109 1956 Eisenhower R 97 98 104 105 103 102 107 106 103 102 100 102 196U' Kennedy-''''''D 'j. If'''-'-'99'''''-9S-gz-'93 '-92 96'—9Y'-'94 92''901—–93 9i 1964 Johnson D 102 103 105 107 109 lOB III 110 III ll3 115 ll2 1968 Nixon R 98 94 92 99 101 104 104 101 105 108 109 110 Incumbent party did not control Congress. Incumbent party not re-elected. The eighteen years to date show an approximate normal distribution. Ten could be considered bull markets, whereas three (1920, 1932 and 1940) are distinct bear-market years. In five years, the trend was flat, as evidenced by the fact that the December average price was .within 5 either way of the previous December's close. Of even more interest is the general tendency towards a flat trend or moderate weakness during the first half of the year. Ten of the IB years showed little market change through June. Indeed, only in the three years which later turned out to be full-fledged bear markets was the action in the first half predo- minantly on the downside. It is worthy of note that a downward bias tends to be introduced on two sorts of occasions. First, when the incumbent President loses the election and, second, when the incumbent party does not control Congress. This latter tendency is especially worthy of note since such a condition obtains in 1972. Despite the fact that 10 of IB election years were bull-market years, none of the 10 took place in years when the President did not control Congress. In the six years that this has occurred, the market was down sharply twice and flat four times. The first statistic suggests the market may be a good forecaster of election returns. In none of the six years when the incumbent lost the election was the market up more than 5 in the first half of those years. Thus a booming market between now and June would augur well for Mr. Nixon's chances. The most consistent fact about election-year markets, though, is the definite tendency toward'a strong second half. Indeed, as the table shows, in 15 of the IB years the average price for December was higher than the average price for June. Even in two of the three bear markets, 1932 and 1940, the market rallied in the second half from the June lows. Furthermore, in one of the three exceptions (1912) the June-Decem- ber difference was miniscule, and the market spent most of the second half in higher territory. Only in 1920 and 194B were June prices significantly lower than December's. The problem, of course, is to fit all this into the pattern for 1972. The strength of the recent recovery, it seems to us, argues against the expectation of any serious weakness during the first half of the year. As suggested above, however, the tension between the President and Congress could well produce a market that showed little essential change from December during the first half. During the second half, we would expect the normal tendency toward a strong market to take over and, in this context, it is quite probable that the year's high might be made in the Fall. Dow-Jones Industrial (1200 P.M.) 905.4B , ANTHONY W. TABELL S&P (1200 P.M.) 103.20 AWTmn DELAFIELD, HARVEY. TAB ELL No statement or expressIon of opinion or any other motter herem tonlolrled IS, or .110 be deemed to be, directly or ,ndirectly, on offer or the sollcltallon of on offer to buy or sell any ecuflty referred 10 or mentioned The mattcr .s presented merely for the converlence of the subSCriber While ….e believe the sources of our Informot,on to be reliable, we in no wov represent or guarantee lhe accuracy thereof nor of the statements mude herein Any achon to be token by Ihe subscriber should be based on his own investigation and Information Janney Montgomery Scot', fnc, as a corporation, and Its officers or employees, may now have, or mav loter take, positions or trades In respect to anv secuntle5 mentioned In thiS or any future IS5ue, and such posITIon may be different from any views now or hereafter expressed In thiS or any other Issue Janney Montgomery Scott, Inc, which IS registered With Ihc SEC as on IfIvestmenl adVisor, may give adVice to Its Investment adVisory and other customers IfIdependently of any statements mode on thiS or In ony other Issue Further .nformotlOn on any security mentioned herein 15 available on request

i I, TABELL-S I MARKET LETTER 909 STATE ROAD. PRINCETON, NEW JERSEY 08540 DIVISION OF MEMBER NEW VORK STOCI( EXCHANGE, INC MEMBER AMERICAN STOCK EXCHANGE January 21, 1972 Analysis of the stock market cycle is similar, in many ways, to doing a jigsaw puzzle. Fitting of one piecallows (oLtl!e 3Icldition of further pieces, and this goes on until, finally, a coherent picture begins to take sha-pe.- Likewise;-iththe;3tock iii1irket,'-'as infiiorcanacr-nferme'cHate-cyclesunfold;'''— , – we are able to put together an interpretation of the major cycle that fits the available facts. Let us briefly recapitulate the market history of the past nine months. The Dow reached its high last April 28 at 950.82 and spent most of the Summer and Fall of 1971 declining, reaching a closing low of 797.97 on November 23, thus dropping 16.08 over a period of 156 trading days. In the 38 trading days to January 18, 1972 which followed, some 78 of the loss was recovered with the index advancing to 917.22. The advance in the broad-based indices was even more dynamic with 95 of the loss having been recovered in the S&P 500 and a similar amount in the New York Stock Exchange Index. The problem is what sensibly to make of all this. Those bearishly inclined will point to the fact that new highs have not yet been scored and will, therefore, suggest that the advance from the Nqvember lows is nothing more than an interruption in an on-going bear market. The naturally opti- mistic will point to the vigor of the December rise and assure us that bright new days are in prospect. As we look at the market's action in terms of historical precedent, however, a coherent picture begins to emerge. Let us first dispose of the theory that the action over the past month and a half constitutes Simply an interruption in a continuing down cycle. This interpretation unfortunately flies in the face of all market history. The Dow has advanced just under 15 since the November lows. There is no bear market in the post-war period that has been interrupted by an advance of anything 1ike t his magnitude', and-,it-becomes ,therefore,-qui-te' clear-inretrospect-that4a-st—November-constituted—a bottom of some importance. The degree of that importance is the next major qestion which must be examined. Was November, 1971, like May, 1970, for example, a bottom of major cyclical magnitude This must be answered in the negative. Most of the factors common to major bottoms were conspicuous by their absence last November. The reversal, therefore, assumes intermediate-term rather than major proportions. This being the case, questions are raised about the decline which preceded the November rever- sal. Quite obviously, based on the nature of the turn, the decline cannot be called a major bear market cycle. Examination of the decline itself supports this interpretation despite the 16 drop in the averages. Too many stocks resisted the decline to suggest that 1971 was a major downswing. It, therefore, must be regarded as an interruption in an on-going advance whose genesis goes back to May, 1970 and for which the highs have not yet been seen. There is fairly well-documented prece- dent for interruptions of this magnitude near the terminal stages of upswings. The most obvious recent example is January-October 1960 which almost paralleled the recent drop both in time and percentage decline. While the above exercise may seem academic, we think it is important because it fixes us, at the present time, at a recognizable point in a market cycle, 1. e., somewhere in the advanced stages of a mature bull market. If this is, in fact, the case, the following conclusions can be drawn from the history of similar market cycles. 1) The advance, now almost two years old, probably has a limited amount of both time and amplitude rema'ining. A target of around 1050 to be reached some . . – 'tlmethis Fall is plausibie,biit.even assuming'this to be the case some three–quartrs of the move — in the major averages is already behind us. 2) The remaining phase of the advance, while not par- ticularly dynamic in the averages, could be quite exciting in terms of individual stocks, es pecially those of a more speculative genre. This can be a very exciting game, of course, but the player who decides to participate should realize the risks he is taking. 3) The final probability, as the bull market reaches a mature stage, is that we will be deluged, over the rest of the year, with optimis- tic statements about the outlook for the economy. We have already begun to see this with the emergence of a standard forecast for 1972 almost too good to be believed. We think that the up- coming year will be one to view such roseate projections with some skepticism. Dow-Jones Industrial (1200 p.m.) 904.43 S&P (1200 p.m.) 103.33 ANTHONY W. TABELL AWTmn DELAFIELD, HARVEY, TABELL No statement or expreSlon of opanlon or ony other motter herein contained IS, or IS 10 be deemed to be. dIrectly Of mdHectly, on offer or the SOllCflotlon of on offer to buy or sell (lnr, seC\,lrlty referred 10 or mentioned The motter IS presented merely for tke convenienCE! of Ike subscriber WhIle we believe Ihe sources of our Informa- tion to be rellob e, we m no way repreent or guorontee Ihe OCCUTOCY thereof nor of the fotemenls mude herem Any ochon to be token by the subSCriber Ishould be baed on hiS own Investigation and Informallon Janney Montgomery Scott, Inc, as a corporal lon, and Its officer; or employees, may now have, or may oter toke, positions or trodes In respect to any securihes mentioned m Ihls or any future nsue, thiS or ony other Issue Janney Montgomery Scon, Inc, which is regIStered wllh the ond SEC such as on pIOnSvietisotmn emntoyodvblesdri,ffmeraeyntgfirvoemadaVniyce.vtioewItsS now or hereafter expreued In Investment adVISOry ond othel customers independently of ony statements mode In thIS or In any other issue Further Informottan on any security menhoned herem IS available on request

TABELL'S MARKET LETTER .- 909 STATE ROAD. PRINCETON. NEW JERSEY 08540 DIVISION OF MEMBER NEW VORk STOCK EXCHANGE INC MEMBEfl AMERICAN STOCK EXCHANGE January 28, 1972 . ,Mtersix. consecJ.1tive days .of decline fromJhe. highreg.ched. earlJr. th!s. Il!0t,-I tock.., market again surged ahead on a broad front at the end of last week. The Dow reversed itself sharply with a lO-point gain in heavy volume in Thursday's trading and, in early trading Friday morning, had tacked on another 10 points. As has been the case recently, the Dow was actually weaker than the broader-based indices. While the senior index was still trading significantly below its high of mid-January, the S&P 500 had, by Friday, moved above that level. posting a new high for the recovery and again flirting with its April. 1971 intra-day peak which. if exceeded. would bring the index to a new high for the bull market. The really significant news, however. may have taken pIa c e two blocks west of Wall Street. as the American Stock Exchange Price Change Index, which two weeks ago surpassed its April high, surged further ahead to the highest level attained since early 1969. The recent better relative action of the American Stock Exchange Index may have more than passing significance. Another statistic of interest is the fact that, for the week ended Decem- ber 31, 1971. volume on the AMEX reached 26,090,000 shares, which figure constituted 36.2 of New York Stock Exchange volume for the same week. Since that time AMEX volume as a per- centage of NYSE volume has been hovering close to that figure. Now the 36 figure, as we shall see, is not at all high on a historical basis. It is, we think, significant. though, that this is the highest figure attained by this ratio in over two —years-'isince- JanuaryJ of19 70 …-InLother-words-.in-the.entireadvance.to-date ,activity-on ,the . AMEX has been unable to attain the levels recently reached. Yet there still appears to be further room on the upside. In the 1966-1968 bull market, AMEX volume, on a monthly basis, reached over 60 of New York Stock Exchange volume. In 1966 it reached 55 and in 1961 it got as high as 70. The recent action, in other words, could be a beginning of the sort of rise in activity in more speculative stocks which has been a feature of every bull market of the post-war period and has been conspicuous by its absence to date. It is, moreover, logical that such a phenomenon should begin to emerge at this particular point in time. We cited, last week, the reasons for the assumption that the present constitutes an advanced stage of a bull market proces s that goes back to May, 1970, interrupted, tempo- rarily, by the weakness of April-November, 1971. It is in just such advanced stages that an in- crease in speculative activity generally begins to rear its head. The prospects for a dynamic move in secondary stocks, moreover. become even greater when one looks for the major areas of buying power which could fuel a further rise in the stock market. As we have been suggesting for the past few months, the prospects for an increase in net insti- tutional purchases of equities appear, at the moment, to be limited at best. The major reserves not yet committed to equities belong to the margin trader who, so far, has steadfastly refused substantially to increase the level of his debit balances as the market has moved -ahead, despite two reductions in margin requirements since 1970. New York Stock Exchange margin debt, – as of the endof-1971, totalled S.4-billion vs; a high of 'almost 7 billionin 1968iIt'is-woitti I noting that, like AMEX volume, after being sluggish throughout most of the market advance, this figure also has begun to rise at a more rapid rate. Now, how the investor treats the prospect of a more speculative market environment is, of course, dependent entirely on his own objectives. The conservative investor is probably well advised to ignore the whole thing entirely, an easy task at the current early stages but one which will become more difficult as speculative activity becomes more obvious. The aggressive investor, of course, will probably opt to participate. It will be important for such investors; how- ever, to maintain a certain attitude of skepticism. As long as one realizes such a phase can- not continue foreover, it can be one highly productive of profits. Dow-Jones Industrial (1200 p.m.) 904.88 ' S&P (1200 p.m.) 104.10 ANTHONY W. TABELL AWTmn DELAFIELD. HARVEY 0 TABELL No statement or expressIon of opmlon or any other motter herem contOlned Is, or 15 10 be deemed 10 be, directly or Indorectly, on offer or Ihe soliCItation of on offer to buy or sell any seoJflty referred 10 or mentIoned The motter IS presenled merely for Ihe convellentt of the subscrIber WhIle we believe the sources of our information to be rellCble, we In no way represent or guarantee the accuracy thereof nor of the statements mude herein Any aCllon to be taken by the subSCriber should be bosed on hiS OVin investigation and information Janney Montgomery Stet', Inc, as a corporation, and Its offICers or employees, may now have, or may raler take, poSItions or trades In respect 10 any S!!CUfitles mentioned In thiS or any future Issue, and such pOSition may be different from any views now or hereafter expressed In this or any olher Issue Janney Montgomery SCalI, Inc, which IS registered With the SEC a5 an mvestment adVisor, may give adVICe 10 lIs Investment adVisory and other customers mdependently of any statements made In thiS or In any other Issue Further Information on any sectmty mentioned herein IS aVOllable on request

I TABELL'S MARKET I LETTER , I -.J 909 STATE ROAD, PRINCETON, NEW JERSEY 08540 DIVISION OF MEMBER NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE, INC MEMOER AMERICAN STOCK EXCHANGE February 4, 1972 ReguTar readers orthhdelterwlll no doubt be aware'thatwe'a's'-market technfcians, 'have alwayS– been more than a little dubious about the applicability of economIC forecasting to stock market fore- casting. Thus, m recent months, while not denying the great technical strength shown by the market itself, we have remained skeptical about some of the recent economic forecasts which have been offered as a rationale for the market rise. Nonetheless, it IS always desirable, we thmk, to keep an eye on the economic background as it develops and to try to guess what surprises could be in store for us. In terms of potential uncertainties, the present situation is especially interesting. Economic writers (just as, we suppose, stock market writers) often appear to be frustrated authors of fiction. There is a tendency to create heroes and vllhans, good guys and bad guys, and, if, later. the good guys fall from grace, why, this is the stuff of which great fictIOn is made. In much of the writing about the economy m 1968 and 1969, the good guys were unquestionably the o-called mone- tarist economists, those who tended to emphasize the Importance of fluctuations in monetary aggre- gates as being important to the course of the economy. Their academic dean, Dr. Milton Friedman, was assumed to have the ear of the Nixon administration and George Schultz, one of their number, was firmly implanted in that administration's inner circle. Such bastons of monetary theory as the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis and the First National CIty Bank of New York were widely quoted, and weekly money-supply figures regularly supplied lead stories for financial pages. All this was not without reason. It was the monetarists who had first forecast that the sharp ex- pansion of monetary aggf8;atEs throughout 1967 and 1968 suggested the dangers of a record-setting inflation. The subsequent contraction m the money supply in 1969 also correctly forecast the 1969- 19 Zp. ceces sion . .Moreover, themoneJarists .as.sured .us., .this .contraction.would. help .to.bring abouta- slowdown in the inflation which plagued the economy in the late 1960's. As 1971 emerged, however, dIsenchantment set in. The recession — which the monetarists had correctly forecast and a great many others had not — had arrived on schedule. But the slowdown in inflation, by early 1971, had totally failed to materialize, and the administration was severely taken to task, especially by non-monetarist critics. for bemg in the uncomfortable position of presiding over a recessIOn and an inflation at one and the same time. Thus the impOSItion of the Phase 1 wage- price freeze in August and the Phase 2 price controls m November were widely mterpreted as the formal castmg out of the monetarists from the administration temple. By the end of 1971, John K. Galbraith, mirablle dictu, was saymg kmd words about RIchard Nixon, and conventional economists were emerging from the woodwork armed with rosy forecasts for 1972. MeanwhIle, back in the banking system, there continues to be a money supply, and ItS action during 1971 has been interesting. For the first seven months of 1971, demand deposits and currency mcreased at the annual rate of II. 6, just about the most rapId mcrease for such a period in modem times. Smce that time, the mcrease in monetary aggregates has been just about mI. All this has received scant attention from a financIal community busily concerning itself with Phase 2. What it all means, of course, is sub j e c t to varying interpretations. If we SImply measure the money'supply increase for the entire year 1971, it turns out to be a more-or-Iess normal 6. Very recent behaVIOr of the monetary figures ind,cat3s mild expansion, suggesting that the 6 rate might continue. Yet the slowdown of late 1971 at least raises some questIOns. Comparable slowdowns have occurred seven times-in the'-pa-st-cgince 1947 and five-of the seven; with' lead times generally running around a year, have led to recessions. Yet that ugly word would certainly be the last to occur to us as we listen to the deluge of optimistic 1972 forecastmg. Now lead times, as monetarists learned in theIr erroneous forecasts of slowed mflatlon for 1971. are notoriously imprecise, and we have no way of knowmg whether the erratIc growth of money supply m 1971 will have i'my effect at all or, assuming an effect, how long it WIll take to become manifest. We think It would be folly, however. to proceed on the assumption that the imposition of price controls has ushered in some sort of new era and that fluctuations in monetary aggregates can Simply be Ignored. Dow-Jones Industrial 11200 p.m.) 904.80 S&P(1200 p.m.) 104.68 ANTHONY W. TABELL DELAFIELD, HARVEY, TABELL AWTmn —. No statement or expression of opinion or any olher moHer herein contamed 1, or IS to be deemed to be, directly or IIld.rec;tly. on offer or the SOI,c,lotlon of on oHer to buy or sell cny security referred to or mentioned The matter 15 p-esenled merely for the converlenee of The subKl'lber While we beheve The sources of our Informohon to be reliable, we In no way represent or guarantee Ihe accuracy Thereof nor of Ihe slolements mude herein Any aellOn 10 be token by the s\lbscrober sho\lld be based on hiS own InvesTigation and Information. Janney Montgomery Scott, Inc, a a corporation, and lis offlce or employees, may now have, or may laler lake, positrons or trodes In respect to any sec\lrltles menltoned In thrs or any f\llvre ISS\le, and S\lch position may be different from af'ly views now or hereafter epressed In thiS or any other Issue Janney Montgomery Scott, Inc, which IS registered With the SEC as on Investment adVisor, may give adVice To Its Investment adviSOry and other customers Independently of any statements made In thIS or In any other Issue Further Information on any seo.mtv menhoned hereen IS avalloble on feque!

''–. TABELL'S MARKET LETTER , – – —-'— — …. –J 909 STATE ROAD, PRINCETON. NEW JERSEY 08540 DIVISION OF MEMBER NEW YORK STOCK eXCHANGE, lNC MEMBER AMERICAN STOCK EXCHANGE February 11, 1972 Last week's market behavior should have been surprising only to those die-hard few who stil stubbrnly refus to b.e!iey that the presept era represents an extended bull market. Havingdeclinedmildly inmid'J1muaryand consofidated duringtlle endaf JariuarYand'eayFebruaiy, – the major market averages shook off their lethargy and spurted ahead in Wednesday and early Thursday's trading until mild profit-taking .set in at noon Thursday. Most major indices, the Dow Utilities being a notable exception, m 0 v e d ahead to new highs for the rise from their November lows. The broad-based indices continued to outperform the Dow, however, in that they moved decisively above their highs of April, 1971 made more than nine months ago, thus confirming the interpretation which this letter has been sUJgesting for the past month that the bull market, which began in MlY, 1970, is, though mature, still intact with the weakness of the Summer and Fall of 1971 constituting no more than an interruption of a basically rising stock market environment. The following table, giving recent 'peaks for the Dow and S &P 500 — which is reasonably re- presentative of the behavior of most broad-based indices –, indicates the distinct downward bias of the Dow vis-a-vis the S&P over recent years. At its recent high the 500 was 3 above its peak of September following the Phase 1 announcement. It had moved slightly above its April, 1971 high and stood only 2.5 below its all-time high scored in November, 1968. It was also, interestingly enough, 12 above its February, 1966 peak which was scored coincidentally with the famous 1000 peak on the Dow Industrials. By contrast, the Dow,at its recent high, was 7 below its February, 1966 level, 3 below its high of April, 1971 and had just barely managed to equH!.he figure attail1d last Sp!;.mber. It is inte;esting to nte!hat !.f the D.11ad uic;ated 1.-. the action of the S &P over the past six years, it would have sold for 1153 in 1968 and arOlina the 1120 level in April of last year and again today. Feb. 1966 Nov.-Dec. 1968 April 1971 Sep. 1971 Recent DJIA 1001.11 994.65 958.12 925.67 931. 81 S&P 94.06 108.37 104.85 102.25 105.59 The better performance of the broad-based indices has, parenthetically, some significance for the market. While not totally reliable (the S&P outperformed the Dow just prior to the 1961 top), better performance by these averages has generally tended to occur during strong advancing phases rather than close to market peaks. There is, thus, some indication in this performance that the advance still has a fairly substantial future. If we are ready to assume that we are, in fact, in a continuing bull market, comparison with past such periods becomes useful and instructive. If one fits a trend line to the action since May, 1970, one finds that the Dow has been advancing at the approximate rate of .06 per day over the past 435 trading days and the S&P has been advancing at the somewhat faster rate of .078. These rates of advance are roughly comparable to the upswings of 1962-1966 and 1957- 1961. In the former the daily rate of percentage advance was. 07 and it was. 05 in the latter. Interestingly enough, the present advance, to date, has been a great deal more dynamic than the bull market which preceded it, that of October, 1966 to December, 1968. For that period, the rate of advance was only .025 for the DJll and .04 for the S&P. – It wil(be interesting to see which model proves more-accurate in terms of time. Thei966- 1968 rise lasted only 519 trading days and the current one,as noted above, is already 435 trad- ing days old. Thus, if the most recent model were conformed to, barely four months of life would remain in the present rise with a price target of not much better than 975-1025. If we were to duplicate the experience of 1957-1961 or 1962-1966, a good year and a half would remain in the advance with a probable ultimate target in the 1100-1200 range. Despite the current similarities of the present market to the earlier upswings, we continue to be inclined, for reasons repeatedly expressed in this' letter, to suggest that the current ad- vance may wind up more closely approximating that of 1966-1968 than the earlier more dynamic bull markets. Dow-Jones Industrial (1100 a. m.) 917.07 S&P (llOO a.m.) 105.10 AWTmn ANTHONY W. TAB ELL DELAFIELD, HARVEY, TAB ELL No statement or expression of opinion or any other matter herein contained IS, or'IS 10 be deemed to be, directly or indirectly, an offer or the Solrcltatlon af an affer 10 buy hon to or sell any security be reliable. we In referred no way 1r0eporresmenetntoirongeudaraTnhteeemathtteeratIScuprraesyenttheedremoferneolyr for Ihe canverlente of the subsrlber While we belreve Ihe sources of our Informaof the statements mude herein Any oellon to be taken by the subSCriber should be bas.ed on hiS own inVestigatIOn and information. Janney Montgomery Scott, Inc. as 0 corporallon, and Its officers or employees, may now have. or may later lake. poSitions or trades In respect to any securlhes mentioned In HilS or any future Issue, and slJch pOSlhon may be different from (Iny views now or hereafter elpressed In thIS or (Iny olher U,ue Jonney Montgomery Scott, Inc. which IS registered With the SEC os on Investment adVisor, may give adVice to lIs Investment advisory (Ind othel customers mdependently of any stotements mode In Ibtls or In any other Inue. further Information on any security mentioned herein is aVailable on request

– – – – – .i I, TABELL'S MARKET LETTER '-. ' 909 STATE ROAD, PRINCETON, NEW JERSEY 08540 DIVISION OF MEMBER NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE, INC MeMBER AMERICAN STOCK EXCHANGE February 18, 1972 We touched lightly a few weeks ago on the recent behavior of margin debit balances. We think these figures are of more than passing interest at the moment by reason of their behavior, both over the pastfew months and the past few years, and also for their implications as to market action in 1972. 'Let us first dispose of the most recent'action'; In December,-1971-, margin-debt held bycNYSE member firms advanced 490 million, which rise constituted the largest month-to-month rise since the series has been computed. Performance in January was almost equally spectacular with an additional 300 million being added to total debit balances. This sharp advance of almost 800 million over two months was especially interesting in that it may suggest a reversal of the way the margin speculator has been behaving ever since 1968. This post-1968 behavior moreover itself constituted a dramatic change in the way the debit balances series had acted prior to the 1968-1970 bear market. Date High No. Months Next High as of Date High Date …!&!y. Decline Exceeded Later of Previous High Jan. 1957 2,918 Dec. 1957 2,550 13 May 1958 5 147 Dec. 1961 4,294 Jul. 1962 3,592 16 Feb. 1963 7 123 Jun. 1966 5,310 Jan. 1967 4,850 9 Jun. 1967 5 125 Jun. 1968 6,690 July 1970 3,780 43 Never 22 (to date) The table above outlines the behavior of NYSE margin debt shown in millions of dollars during and sub- sequent to each of the major bear markets from 1957 to date. As can quite clearly be seen, each of the first three downswings involved some liquidation of margin debt, with declines between 9 and 16 taking place during each market drop. In general, debit balances tended to peak out almost coincidentally with the market's high and to reach their bottom a few months after the low was made. As the table shows, how- ever, liquidation of margin debt in the bear market of 1968-1970 was a great deal mor!, extensive, with a decline of 43 being posted. The sharp drop of that period involved the liquidation of almost 3 billion of sucfi -debt, certainlytne iiITgeSt such-liquidation ever seen in the post\Var period 'The- decline in nUl11ber of margin accounts was equally dramatic. From a high of 945,000 such accounts in the Fall of 1968 the total continued to drop to 650,000 as recently as November, 197L The table also shows, quite obviously, that the recovery from the lows of July, 1970 has been far les s dramatic than that of previous bull markets. Invariably in the past, the debit balance series recovered all of their los ses within five to s even months of their low. Now, 22 months into a bull market, NYSE margin debt remains almost 1 billion below its high of June 1968. The current debit balance figure appears even lower when viewed as a percentage of total market value of all listed stocks. At the 1957 and 1961 highs, the old net debit balance series reachedl.3 of total mar- ket value and, at the 1966 and 1968 highs, the slightly-lower NYSE margin debt series peaked out at 1.1 of total market value. For January, 1972, debit balances of 5.7 billion constituted just. 7, of an estimated 800 billion total market value. Thus, were the series to rise to the l.1 figure attained 'in 1966 and 1968, it would mean some 3 billion of new purchasing power for common stocks. It will also involve a rise in margin debt to some 130 of the old 'high, a figure which the table above shows to be in line with past action. Another confirmation of the potential inherent in margin accounts is found in NYSE figures on potential buying power in such accounts. For January, un de r the stimulus of the recent margin requirement reduc- tion, this figure jumped to almost 10 billion, by far a new record. Moreover, the number of accounts had recovered to only 685,000 at the end of January vs. the old high of 945,000. Thus, if the December and January figures are any indication of a desire on the part of the margin spec- ulator to return to a market where he has obviously been a minor factor over the past few years,.the impli- cations could be important. One might almost say, in fact, that it is crucial that he does return. Net new purchases by mutual funds for 1972 will likely be little different from 1971, and there is reason to suspect that growth in pension fund net purchases may also slow. Meanwhile, new issues of common stock are expected to continue at record levels. Thus, a further awakening of public stock interest could be the crucial factor in determining the course of prices over the next year. If the margin speculator does return,moreover, it will have important implications for the character of market leadership. Historically, he has tended to prefer low-priced stocks to high-priced stocks, secondary issues to blue chips, and has shown a greater-thaverage interest in the American Stock Exchange. If his purchases continue to increase, these preferences should become manifest in market action. NOTE Statistical series on debit balances have been revised three times in the recent past. The old Cus- tomer's Net Debit Balance series was superseded in 1965 by the NYSE Margin Debt series which, in turn, was slightly revised in May, 1970. All figures above represent the series in use at ,the time. It is believed that the statistical comparisons are valid. ANTHONY W. TAB ELL Dow-Jones Industrial (1200 p.m.) 917.37 DELAFIELD HARVEY TABELL K&MP(1200p.m.)105.15 ' ' 0 statement or expreUlOn of opinion or any other matter here'n contolned IS, or '5 to be demed to be, directly or indirectly, on offer or the sollcltotlon of on offer to buy or sell ony security referred 10 or mentioned The moiler 15 presented merely for Ihe convel'!lenC'f of the subscriber While we belleve the Ources of our information to be rellOble, we In no way represent or guarantee the accuracy thereof nor of Ihe statements mude herein Any actIOn to be token by the subscrober should be hosed on hls own Investigation and information Janney Montgomery Scott, Inc, as a corporation, and Its officers or employees, may now have, or moy loter toke, positions or trades in respect to any seamlles mentioned In thiS or any future Issue, and such position may be different from any views now or hereafter expressed In thiS or any other Issue Janney Montgomery Scoll, Inc. which IS registered With the SEC as on Investment adVisor, may give adVice to Its Investment adVISOry and othe, customers mdependently of ony statements mode m th,s n In any other Issue further mformahon on any secuflty menhoned herein '5 ava.lable on request

TABELL-S MARKET LETTER J 909 STATE ROAD. PRINCETON, NEW JERSEY 08540 DIVISION OF MEMBER NEW YORI STOCK EXCHANGE, INC MEMBER AMERICAN STOCK EXCHANGE February 2S, 1972 As part of our effort to follow industry group action, we regularly examine the chart patterns of the various Standard & Poor's Industry Group Indices in an attempt to determine whether each group'is in an torup.nd or owntrend . A fairlobje!!ve set of standards can be applied. A group whose long-term mov- fng a-verage-has been rising someflmecall be saidt6 be in- if uptrendIf -ash()rterfriil ili9 – .. .-.. average moves below the long-term one, early stages of weakness can be noted and, if the long-term average itself begins to turn down, that weaknes s can be said to be pronounced. Downtrends and rever- sals of those downtrends are, of course, a mirror image of uptrends and uptrend reversals. The table below divides the group indices into six classifications which we find useful. The groups listed in the first three columns maintained uptrends throughout the 1971 weakness, and the stocks in the three right-hand columns moved into downtrends during the 1971 correction. Their current status is as indicated by the column headings. GROUPS IN UPTRENDS Some Pronounced Continuing Weakness Weakness Air Trans port Auto Parts Automobiles Roofing NONE Auto-Trucks Finance Brewers Distillers Variety Stores Savings & Loan Soft Drinks Air Cond. Chemicals Ins.- Multi-Line Ins. Prop & Liab Drugs ' Electrical Equip. – HousehidAppC — Small Loans Biscuit Bakers Dairy Oil Well Mach Mobile Homes Offshore Drlll' g Pollution Cont'l Broadcasters Restaurants Dept. Stores Mail Order Soap Truckers Vending Life Ins. Continuin!l Confectonery Meat Packing Forest Prod Synthetic Fib GROUPS IN DOWNTRENDS Some Pronounced Stren!lth Streng!h Aluminum Atomic Energy Heat & Plumbg Cement Coal Containers – Conglomerates Paper Containers – Cosmetics Metal & Glass Bread & Cake Copper Coal Mining Electrical Mach Home Fum. Canned Foods Hotel/Motel Corn Refiners Lead & Zinc Packaged Foods . -Leis-ure Time Machine Tools Mach-Agricul Const. Mach Mach-Speclty Industrial Mach Metal-Fabrica1e Steam Gen. Mach Motion Pictures Metals -Misc Office Equip Oil Producers Shoes Oil Domestic Steel Oil Int'l Sulphur Paper Textile Apparel Publishing Textile Prod Radio-TV Mfrs Tobacco Railroad Equip Toys Real Estate Banks – NYC Discount Stores Banks-Outside Food Stores NYC Sugar-Beet Investment Cos Sugar Cane Tire & Rubber ……. . -..i . Utilities-Elec Util. Nat'lGas Util Pipeline ….. —– Util. Telephone An analysis of the list is interesting. It is a curious bear market throughout which one-third of all groups remain in uptrends, but this is precisely what happened in 1971, thus.- reinforcing the theory that the decline was no more than intermediate-term in scope. What is most interesting, however, is the sharp reversal that has taken place since November. At the worst stage of the downswing, some 61 groups had moved into downtrends. Of those only four continue in those downtrends today, and S7 have at least suggested the possibility of reversal with the possibility being particularly strong in 2S of those cases. Meanwhile, of the 33 groups that emerged from the 1971 experience unscathed, only seven are now show- ing signs of weakness, and none are showing that weakness in advanced stages. Now it is axiomatic that, for a bear market to occur, stocks must go down, and the point of the above analysis is that precious few are now doing so. The process of top formation generally consists of a growing number of individual groups showing signs of deterioration. An inspection of the table shows that precisely the opposite is taking place today. ANTHONY W. TAB ELL Dow-Ioes Indu)triaI 1200 p.m.) 922.03 DELAFIELD HARVEY TABEII. S&P (2.99 .m. 196. 1 '. – h- I I If A.WTIl\ll,uyNo statement or expression of opInion Of any olher maHer herein contolned IS, or IS to be deemed 10 be;-(llrectly or mdncc11y, on offer or 1 e 0 1(;ltotlon a on 0 er or sell Clny Ilcunty referred to Or menhoned The molter IS presented merely for Ihe converlenee of the subscriber Wl'ule -He believe the sources of allr informa- tion to be reliable. we ,n no way represent or guarantee Ihe accuracy Ihereof nor of Ine statements mude herein Any oellOn 10 be token by the subscriber should be bosed on hiS own mveu,gohon and Informatton Janney Montgomery Scoh, Inc. as a c;orporallon, and lIS offIcers or employees, may now have, or may laler toke, pOSItions or trades In respect 10 any secutll1es mentioned 11'1 thl! or any future Inue, and such pOSitIon may be dIfferent from any vle now Of hereafter expressed In thl5 or any other Inue Janney Montgomery Scott, Inc, wtch IS regIstered WIth the SEC as on Investment adVIsor, may gIve adVIce to Its Investment adVISOry and othel customers independently of any sfatements mode In thIS or In any other Issue Further InformatIon on any security mentioned herein IS avcllioble on requt

'-'l– – .0- TABELL'S MARKET LETTER – 909 STATE ROAD, PRINCETON. NEW JERSEY 08540 DIVISION OF MEMBER New YORK STOCK EXCHANGE, INC MEMBER AMERICAN STOCK eXCHANGE 'Is there any point to which you would wish to draw my attention' March 3, 1972 'To the curious incident of the dog in the night-time.' 'The dog did-nothingIn the night;time. . .. 'That was the curious incident', remarked Sherlock Holmes. Sir Arthur Conan Doyle, Silver Blaze We have always liked the above quotation,since the great detective's reasoning in this case often has a particular applicability to stock market forecasting. In a great many cases, the most in- teresting factor for market analysis is not that certain things are happening but that certain things are not happening. This is especially true at the present time. A great deal of market comment seems to regard it as peculiar every time the Dow stages another upward burst as it did again last week. Such comment often centers on the rapidity of the rise since last November and the need for correction or consolidation of that rise. And yet the curious fact of the stock market today is most certainly not the fact that it is going up. The stock market is a mov- ing object and the upward direction of the current move has been clearly established. The curious fact at the moment is that very little evidence of the sort of deterioration which would suggest the imminent end of that uptrend has as yet presented itself. Market analysis, it seems to us, must focus on different things at different times. Quite obviou&- ly, that analysis must take a different perspective in March, 1972 than it did in November, 1971 or April-May, 1970. During the latter two periods, with the market averages having moved sharply lower, the focus was on picking a point at which the market was likely to bottom. At the present time, the market technician is directing his attention towards an entirely different set of indicators — those which have historically indicated market tops. And, as we said above, the curious inci- dent,,atthe moment ,at, least ,,is.that, thes e-.indicatorsshow 'nos ign-of-amaj or top -being-imminent— Let us review a few of the more obvious such signs. In terms of a smoothed curve, an uptrend is rcognized as being in effect when an index, such as the Dow, is rising at a level above its own rising longer-term moving average. At the moment, the Dow, at around 930, is comfortably above its 200-day moving average of 884 and that average, flat for the last week or so, will inevitably, due to the nature of its construction, shortly begin to rise. In terms of its computed trend, the action of the Dow since May, 1970 can be described as an uptrend channel some 200 points wide, rising at the rate of some. 45 points per day. The current level of the index places it squarely in the middle of the current range of that channel which is now bounded roughly by 846 on the downSide and 1038 on the upside. Much has been made of the fact that breadth action over the past few weeks has been less im- pressive than formerly. For example, on Wednesday, with the Dow up over seven points, only 913 issues advanced whereas a figure well above 1000 advances might have been plausible earlier in the move. And yet, our indices of market breadth last week moved comfortably into new high ground along with the average, and these indices have succesively confirmed each consecutive new peak posted in the Dow. A failure to confirm could, of course, occur were the Dow to move above its April, 1971 high and breadth were to fail to follow. The whole point, though, is that this has not yet taken place. The object of this exercise is not to turn ourselves into an insufferable Pollyana. There are a number of reasons, and they have been amplified in detail in past issues of this letter, to expect that the present move may turn out t6 be limited in scope. This is a far different thing; however; ,;. from attempting to read into the present figures the fact that the move is over. Twenty-twenty hind- sight tells us that a major bottom occurred in May, 1970 and an intermediate-term bottom followed last November. The fact that we recognize these past events as buying opportunities should not lead us to believe that opportunities of a similar magnitude are very likely to occur in the very near future, probably not until we have passed out of the present cycle into a new one. The market is where it is today, 130 points up from the November low, and very little can be done about it. The point is that capital appreciation opportunities still exist, and it is the task of the investment manager to take advantage of them. Dow-Jones Industrial (1100 a.m.) 936.03 S&P (1100 a.m.) 107.46 ANTHONY W. TABELL DELAFIELD, HARVEY, TAB ELL AWTmn .-,,- – No statement or expreslon of opinion or cny other matter herem contained IS, or IS 10 be deemed to be, dlrec1ly or mdlrectly, on offer or the ollcltotlon of an offer to buy or sell (lny security referred to or menhoned The matter IS presented merely for the convel'lencp of Ihe subscriber While -Ne believe the wurces of our Informa- lion 10 be reliable, we In no way represenl or guarantee the accuracy thereof nor of Ihe statements mude herem Any ocllon 10 be loken by the subscriber should be based on hiS own Invntlgallon and information Janney Montgomery call, Inc, as a corporal lon, and Its officers or employees, may now have, or may laler toke, poSitions or trades In respect 10 any seC\Jrlt.es mentioned In thiS or any future Issue, and such poslhan moy be different from any views now or hereafter elpressed In thiS or any other Issue Janney Montgomery Scali, Inc, which '5 reglslered Wllh the SEC as on ,nvestment adVisor, may give adVice to its investment adVisory and other customers Independently of any statements mode 11'1 thiS or In any other iuue Funher InfOrmaTtOn on any seC\Jflty menlloned herein IS ava,loble on request

-. . — . . -r———–' .– I TABELL'S MARKET LETTER – –.- .– —— 909 STATE ROAD, PRINCETON, NEW JERSEY 08540 DIVl810N OF MEMBER HEW 'VORIC STOCI( EXCHANGE, INC MEMBER AMERICAN STOCIC EXCHANGE March 10, 1972 This week, of all weeks, should be the one for us to indulge in a bit of flag-waving, perhaps reaffirming, along with one of our competitors, our bullishness on America. For the stock market -7. an! thIs. thEL!irs ttmei!l1!IlosJ-2l/ 'ars,-that w!laYl.beenabletosaythis has actl1eveilanewall-timehigh.– – – . —— – – – — ——.– Or it has, at least, if we look at the S&P 425-stock index (which posted the high a week and a half ago), the S &P 500 or the New York Stock Exchange Index. The reason, of course, that the event wound up in the second or third paragraph of most market stories instead of under the banner headlines one would normally expect it to produce is that the familiar Dow-Jones Industrial Average still lags behind the other indicators. The poor old Dow, as a matter of fact, has, on a closing basis, not even been able to breach its high of last April and, as we all recall, its all-time peak was posted, not in November, 1968 along with the other averages, but more than six long years ago in February, 1966. It is, nonetheless, that magic 1000 level that remains the high in most investor's minds, and the huzzahs will undoubtedly be deferred until such time as this bastion is finally breached. We haste to admit we think it will be. Since October, 1970, this letter has been using 1065 as an ups ide target for the Dow Jones Industrial Average and, des pite the doubts that 1a stye a r' s decline engendered, this target has remained a valid one. Which is, of course, to say precious little. It could, in fact, be attained were each of the 30 stocks to tack on some 6-3/8 points from its close of last Monday, a process which would not necessarily create a whole new race of instant millionaires. Actually, the final achievement of new peaks at this late date raises, we think, some fairly fundamental questions. The significant fact is not the new peak but the 2-1/2 (or more) years – hashich has ,-in fact,.tak.to gettherecentral fact ofxecent stock l!larke,t history.is,,s-,-…,..I'o.' -wehave sucigested-betore,-thai-fhe Dow spent 74 months es-sentially moving sideways and that the same is true, despite a slightly greater upward bias, of the other indices. As market tech- nicians we should, we suppose, content ourselves with furnishing these bare statistics, leaving the whys and wherefores to others. Yet we are unable to resist a few thoughts. We have suggested in the past that part of the reason may lie in the name of the Dow itself. It is, after all, an index of industrial stocks. And despite their broader bases, the other indices are weighted heavily in favor of large industrial companies. Basic industry companies have had their problems in years gone by. The so-called consumer movement is one, as is the growing public feeling that industrial companies, and their stockholders, should be responsible for the waste products of those companies. More fundamental is, perhaps, the fact that while the American economy has continued to grow, that growth has tended to be centered in recent years more in the area of services than of basic industrial output. These problems may serve, at least, as a partial explan3tion of why industrial stocks as a group have had their difficulties over the past half- decade. It should also be noted that they are highly likely to continue. An even deeper-rooted explanation, and one which may be more important to the future, exists. Critics of the American economy, naturally enough, fail to cite its achievements, and those achieve- ments have indeed been real. Our standard of living has created a poverty level which would make half the citizens of the world rich beyond dreams of avarice by their own standards. We have achieved this in the post-World-War-2 era with no serious economic depressions — only an ever- diminishing series of minor slowdowns. This has been accomplished at the cost oLan inflation , wnien ,-howeverserious it has appeared recently, is not, taken in a world context and over a long enough period of time, that disturbing. And yet, as proponents of that system, we cannot claim that, having achieved all this, we have attained Utopia. More and more, the question is being raised as to whether economic growth is the sole desideratum of the good society. And if growth as a goal continues to be called into question, questions will continue to be raised as to the stock market as a vehicle for participating in that growth. Now all of this, of course, is nothing more than mere speculation as to why the stock market has behaved as it has, and may continue to do so in the future. It is meant simply to underscore our long-held contention that investment management, always a difficult task, will continue to be so during periods of societal change. It will be a process of making hard decisions as to the level of the stock market and of the relative merits of individual stocks. It will not consist of sitting back and waiting for a possibly non-existent growth trend to bail one out of one's mistakes. Dow-Jones Industrial (1200 p.m.) 940.70 ANTHONY W. TAB ELL S&P (1200 p.m.) 108.63 AWTmn DELAFIELD HARVEY, TABELL ' No sttltement or expreulon of opInion or tiny other motter herein contolned 1, or IS to be deemed to be, dIrectly or IndIrectly, on oHer or the sol1c.totlon of tin offer to buy or sell any security referred to or mentIoned The maHer IS prcsented merely for the convellenCI!I of the subSCrlber While we believe the Curbs ofbour hnfo;rb- tlon to be relIable, we In no way repreent or guorantee the occuracy thereof nor of the statements mude hereln Any tlctlon to be token by the su se(l er,' toul k e btlMld on his own posItions or trode i'n vreesStpIgeacttIo10n and ony information Janney Montgomery eaJntle mentIoned In th,s or any Scott, future Inc, os a Issue, ond corporatIon, and Its offIcers or such pOSItion may be dIfferent employees, mtly from any vIews now now ohrovhee,reoarJtmerayexptrI eersetod. e, .In tt. or ony other Issue Janney Montgomery Scott, Inc, wh,ch .s regltered Wllh the SEC as on Investment odviror, may give adVICe to Its Investment tI VISOry on ot el customers independently of tiny statements mode In liS or In any other Issue Further informatIon on ony scomfy menlloned hereIn .s aVailable on request

TABELLIIS MARKET LETTER J 909 STATE ROAD, PRINCETON. NEW JERSEY 08540 DIVISION OF MEMBER NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE. INC MEMBER AMERICAN STOCK EXCHANGE March 17, 1972 Money, inflation and the stock market constitute a triad of subjects which should be of interest to most investors. We plan, therefore, to devote two letters to these subjects, our concept of their interre- ..lation andthe suggestfo!\s ofthat-interrelatinn -ior-1972-1973 .—- – – – '- Readers of this letter will be aware that it possesses a certain bias toward the monetarist view of economic analysis. It will perhaps be worthwhile to examine some of the assumptions of this view. It is, first of all, based on a truism — the familiar equation, MV PT. This, translated into English, says simply that the money supply (M) times the velocity of money (V) equals total transactions (T) plus the prices (P) at which those transactions take place. Since PT is nothing more than a synonym for Gross National Product and velocity is defined as GNP divided by the money supply, the equation, of course, is true on its face. It has little practical value, however, unless a relationship between money supply and GNP can be established. The key monetarist assumption, of course, is that velocity tends to be relative- ly stable over the short run. If this assumption is true, then changes in M will have a direct and predict- able effect on the economy. The second key monetarist assumption is that the physical capacity of the economy to increase output year by year is limited and relatively fixed. Any attempt, therefore, to increase the money stock by more than that amount will simply be translated into price increase. The following table attempts to show whether the theory has worked in practice over the past 25 years. It shows the annual percentage change In six variables money supply, actual GNP, velocity, real GNP, the stock market (S&P 500) and prices (measured by subtracting real GNP change from actual GNP changEi. PERCENTAGE CHANGE IN Year Money Supply Actual GNP Velocity Real GNP SIXP 500 Prices 1947 3.67 10.94 7.01 -0.86 0.00 11.80 1948 – 1.41 11.37 -q,g49 – 0–27 ,— –04;'l 12.97 4.45 –0'i'l6- – – 1-01-2 – 0.65 ,)0–2-6 6.92 –0.-55,-'—''''' 1950 4.50 11.03 6.26 9.63 21.78 1.41 1951 5.59 15.31 9.20 7.91 16.46 7.40 1952 3.83 5.21 1.33 3.05 11.78 2.16 1953 1.10 5.53 4.38 4.48 -6.62 1.05 1954 2.72 0.05 – 2.59 – 1.41 45.02 1.46 1955 2.19 9.10 6.76 7.62 26.40 1.48 1956 1.26 5.33 4.02 1.85 2.62 3.48 1957 – 0.73 5.30 6.07 1.43 -14.31 3.86 1958 3.83 1.34 -2.40 -1.15 38.06 2.49 1959 0.57 8.14 7.53 6.39 8.48 1.74 1960 – 0.35 4.16 4.52 2.48 – 2.97 1.68 1961 2.83 3.24 0.40 1.95 23.13 1.29 1962 1.38 7.73 6.27 6.56 -11.81 1.17 1963 3.80 5.39 1.53 4.00 18.89 1.39 1964 4.90 7 .10 2.09 5.46 12.97 1.63 1965 4.98 8.30 3.16 6.32 9.06 1.99 1966 1.90 9.49 7.45 6.52 -13.09 2.97 1967 6.76 5.81 -0.88 2.60 20.09 3.22 1968 7.91 8.91 0.93 4.65 7.66 4.26 1969 1970 3.34 5.14 7.51 4.84 4.04 -0.28 2.56 -0.65 -11.36 4.95 -0.10– ,5.49- ' 1971 6.19 7.46 1.20 2.69 11.67 4.77 Average 3.02 6.72 3.63 3.54 8.94 3.18 Cursory examination of the figures bears out, we think, the essential monetarist assumptions. Velocity, while it has more than doubled in 25 years, has had relatively constant yeal'-to-year changes averaging 3.63. Moreover, the monetarist would argue that the advantages of slow steady growth in money supply are manifest as one looks, say, at the period from 1961 thru 1965. This produced, In 196z..l.966, a period of successive above-average changes in real GNP and a period of below-average Inflation with price In- creases of only a bit over 1 per year. By contrast, the past 5 years constitute a monetarist horror story, with four years of supra-normal growth punctuated by the sharp reversal of 1969. The result has been, in the monetarist view, a 1969-1971 period in which real change in GNP has been below average, and the inflation component of that change has been the largest for any period since just after World War 2. The Implications of all this for the economy and, more directly, for the stock market will be discussed in next week's letter. ANTHONY W. TABELL Dow-fones Ind. (1200 p.m) 941.75 DELAFIELD HARVEY TABELL SIXP (1200 P m I 107 81 ', AWTIDUltotement or expreslOn of opinion or any other matter herein contained IS, or IS to be deemed to be, dIrectly or Indirectly, an offer or the soliCitation of an offer to buy or sell any secuflty referred to or mentioned The matter IS presented merely for the conveIence of the subscrober. While we believe the sources of our Informa- lion 10 be reliable, we In no way represenl or guarontee Ihe accuracy Ihereof nor of Ihe statements mude herein Any action to be taken by the subscriber should be based an hIS own Invetlgatlon and information Janney Montgomery Scali, Inc, as a corporollon, and lIS offIcers or employees, may now have, or may later take, POSItions or trodes in respect to ony surrflCS mcntloned In Ih.s or any luture )nut', and svdl posihon may be different from any views now or hereafter expressed In Ihls or any other Issue Janney Montgomery Scali, tnc , whIch IS reglslered With the SEC as on Investment adVisor, may give advloCe to lIS Investment advISOry and othel customers Independently of any statemrnts mode In thiS or In any other Issue Further information on any security menlloned herein IS available on request