—– ——– ———- -c—- – I TABELL'S MARKET LETTER 909 STATE ROAD. PRINCETON. NEW JERSEY 08540 DIYISION OF MEMBER NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE, INC MEMBER AMERICAN STOCK EXCHANGE – – u . -W '…. p s. August-20,d-971,……– A number of years aqo Charles E. Wilson, then Secretary of the Treasury and previously of General Motors Corporation, was heard to utter the phrase What's good for General Motors is good for the country. He was, thereupon, castigated soundly in the nation's press. The criti- cism was, to a degree, unfair since it was obvious that Mr. Wilson really meant the phrase to be turned around — to say, in other words, that General Motors was an important institution in the U. S. and that thos e developments which advanced the U . S. economy had, of neces sity, inure toG M' s benefit. The criticism, however, had a tiny core of validity, for it is always danger- ous to identify parochial interests with those of the nation at large. Those of us associated with the stock market are as prone to this weakness as anyone else. We tend to feel that what is good for the country is good for the stock market and vice versa. Over the long range there is no doubt that this is true. But the stock market, for all its importance, is not the country or even the economy. It is thus at least as important to look at the stock market itself rather than at the economy in order to forecast the stock market's behavior. The above preamble is, of necessity, a long and windy one, but it is appropriate, we think, to what happened in the stock market last week. Let no one underrate the importance of last weekend's economic mes sage to the long-range future of the U . S. economy. It is our own belief that, when historians ultimately come to view the chain of events which President Nixon's actions on the dollar last week will set off, these events will constitute one of the most important econo- -mic..turning..points0f..the2 OthGentury.We .tb j nktbevision.shown.b–theadministration.in .this – step is so far reaching as to be almost breathtaking, and, in the long run, the sort of economic climate the new monetary policy will engender must be benign for future stock markets. Having thus indulged ourselves in pontificating, we must climb down off our cloud and address ourselves to the less glamourous task of guessing what the stock market is likely to do. The conventional wisdom quite clearly believes that the importance and drama of the Nixon speech is, in itself, sufficient to stem the market decline in effect since last April and to set prices off again on a new upward course. The facile comparison is with 1968 when PreSident Johnson's decision not to seek reelection set off the April Fool's Day Rally which led, in turn, to six months of a highly dynamic equity market. The case is a plausible one, and we would not care vehemently to dispute it. We beg forgiveness, however, for a timorous desire to await more evidence before embraCing the conventional doctrine wholeheartedly. It is absolutely true that rallies of the breadth and magnitude of last Monday and Tuesday have invariably, in the past, been associated with m a j 0 r , albeit occasionally temporary, stock market bottoms. It is likewise true, that 840 on the Dow, the point at which the market turned even before this week's rally, constituted one downside objective for that index. Nothing that has happened over the past week or two has been at all inconsistent with a market ready to re- sume a sharp upward trend. And yet a number of the problems that were facing the market before last weekend are still there following the President's speech. We have noted before that the central dilemma.facing ie;;..- -Ulemarket was tiiElevidentPul;iiC(iise;chantentwlth reis far too early to tell whether the confidence in President Nixon's new economic policy is going to reverse that tide of disenchant- ment. Thus we had, in July, the third consecutive month of net mutual fund redemptions. It will be mid-September or mid-October before we know whether this trend and other indications of public disinterest in equities have, in fact, been reversed. It would take very little, we admit, to convince us that the stock market tide had, in fact, turned — at least for the near-to- intermediate term. Continued basing action in the 875-900 area could, in our view, forge the last link in a persuasive chain of evidence suggesting that the market indeed had begun a new upward leg. It is our intention, however, to wait for that last final link to be forged. Dow-Jones Industrial (1200 Noon) 879.89 S&P (1200 Noon) 98.23 AWTmn ANTHONY W. TABELL DELAFIELD, HARVEY, TAB ELL No statement or expresSIon of opinion or ony other matter herein cont(lIned 1, or 1 10 be deemed 10 be, directly or Indirectly, em offer or the 011(1Iollon of on offer to buy or 5e1l ony security referred to or mentioned The motter IS presented merely for the converolence of the subscriber. While- 'He believe the sources of our Informo tion to be reHoble, we ,n no way represent or guarantee the accuracy thereof nor of the statement!. mude herem Any action to be taken by the !.ubscnber should be based on his own Investlgallon and information Janney Montgomery Scoll, Inc, as 0 corporation, and Its officers or employees, may now have, or may loter take, positions or Irodes In respect 10 any securities menhoned In thiS or any future Issue, and such POSition may be different from any views now or hereafter expressed In thiS or any other Issue Janney Montgomery Scott, Inc, which IS reglered With the SEC as on Investment adVisor, moy give adVice 10 lis Investment adVisory and othel customers Independently of any stotements made ,n thn or In any other ISsue Further mformatlon on any seevrlly mentioned herein 1 available on requesl

r ———————– TABELL'S MARKET LETTER 909 STATE ROAD, PRINCETON, NEW JERSEY 08540 DIVISION OF MEMBER NEW VORK STOCK EXCHANGe, INC MEMBER AMERICAN STOCK EXCHANGE – – August27, 1971 We confessed in last week's letter the desire to v;,ait for ii- bit more evidence befcir pron-eo'u..,n–….-.-… — cing the market totally recovered from its pre-Nixon debacle. We must admit that last week's performance went a long way toward providing that evidence. In a powerful extension of the rally on Monday, Tuesday and Wednesday, the DJIA chalked up a 27-point advance before turning irregular at week's end. In the process, the blue-chip index penetrated the trading range between, roughly, 840 and 900 which had contained it since mid-June and which can, we think, be proper- ly assumed to be a base. The rally since the August low has, moreover, been accompanied by highly satisfactory breadth. Our breadth index moved above its comparable late June peak on Wednesday — the same day on which the Dow scored its upside penetration. This coincidental confirmation is generally the precursor of a reasonably healthy rally. If we are convinced that the path of least resistance is upward, harder questions such as How Far and For How Long are immediately raised. In attempting to find answers, it is well to recall that we cannot erase past history. It is a fact that between April 28 and August 10 the Dow posted a 11.7 decline. It is a fact which we will have to keep in mind regardless of what the market does from here on out. Let us try to clarify this. Short-to-intermediate-term market downswings are often called, in technical parlance, corrections. The term is semantically unfortunate. The implication is that somehow, having undergone a decline of some magnitude, the market has mysterious ly purged itself and is thus in a better technical position than it was before. This is like saying that a man who has recovered from a near-fatal disease is a better health risk than fie was Defore the–c,…d disease's onset. The stock market has just proved that it was vulnerable to a llO-point decline. That vulnerability has to be kept in mind in the future. This is precisely what we had been trying to suggest statistically before the Nixon rally re- versed the intermediate term downtrend. A month ago we pointed out that a reading of the record showed that declines of the present magnitude had seldom, iJ ever, occurred in the early or middle stages of bull markets. They were, indeed, more characteristic of top formations and/or bear markets and, to the extent that they occurred within the context of major upswings, tended to occur late in those upswings. The recent improvement in the market's technical condition has not changed the statistical evidence. With this background, then, we can approach the question of trying to forecast upside targe1S. The base referred to above, at 840-900, indicates an upside potential of 940-945 0 nth e Dow. in other words, a return to approximately the level of the April high. In order to forecast higher levels, it is necessary to go back to the original base from which the 1970-1971 rally commenced. This base, as we pointed out as long ago as last Fall, has a possible potential of 1065. The reading, although called into some question by the action of this Summer, is still a valid one. To put it into perspective, however, it should be recalled that such a move could be produced by a rise of as little as 9 points in each of the 30 Dow stocks. What we are saying in terms of individual issues, of course, is that the rise, as it continms, – – mustinevitably 'develop 'iJre-ater' sele-ctivity;- Th-e-re-cent 'market'weaknes s infUcted' damage-on -,,- – –' the technical patterns of a great number of stocks. In some cases, that damage has been or will be repaired. In others the injury is unquestionably more permanent. It is possible at almost any time, other than in the final throes of bear markets, to find, among individual stock patterns, a number of reasonably attractive ones. Such is the case at the moment. The difference between the early and later stages of upswings is not so much in the existence of attractive patterns but the fact that, in the former case, almost no patterns at all indicate any substantial degree of downside risk. This is most emphatically not the case at present. The presence of this sort of risk in a number of issues is what we mean when we use the much-abused catch word, selectivity. Dow-Jones Industrial (1100 a.m.) 909.02 ANTHONY W. TABELL S&P (1100 a.m.) 100.58 DELAFIELD, HARVEY, TABELL AWTmn No stotement or e)(pre,slon of opinion or ony olher motter herCln contolned IS, or IS 10 be deemed 10 be, directly or indirectly, on offer or the solicitation of on offer to buy or seU ony security referred to or mentioned The motter IS presented merely for the conver-lence of the subscriber. While Ne believe the sources of our information to be reHable, we In no woy represent or guorontee the otcuroc;y thereof nor of the staTements mude herem Any octlon to be token by the subscriber should be based on hiS own Investigation and mformotlon Janney Montgomery Stott, Inc, os 0 corporohon, ond Its offlters or employees, may now hove, or moy lofer take, positions or trades In respect to ony securities mentioned In thiS or ony future Issue, and such POSition may be different from any VICWS now or hereafter C)(pressed In this or ony other Issue Janney Montgomery Scott, Inc, which IS registered with the SEC os on mvestment adVisor, moy give odvlce to Its mvestment adVISOry cnd othel customers Independently of any statements made In thiS or In any other Inue Further mformahon on any secunty menhoned hcrem 15 available on request

————————————————————————– Vr– TABELL'S MARKET LETTER I, I .————————– 909 STATE ROAD, PRINCETON, NEW JERSEY 08540 DIVISION OF MEMBER NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE. INC MEMBER AMERICAN STOCK EXCHANGE – September 3, 1971 The dust has now settled a bit in the three weeks that have elapsed since PresIdent Nixon's economic message, and the state of the stock market has changed from one of frenzy to one of come–. nOr!llality, ollowing,c;;ppside,geetration of 840-900 ar, th..!mc;! of last week reacting and testing the upper part of tnat-a-rea. In'tile peoce'ss, most snort term maicat-o'rs–,.-I- have returned to moderately oversold territory, and the normal expectation, after further digestion, would be for the advance to resume, first penetrahng last week's peak at 910 and later making an as- sault on the April 28 high of 950. Of course, forecasting an improved market climate is one thing, and determining proper invest- ment behavior should the forecast materialize is yet another. Recent readers of this letter will no doubt , have noted a tendency toward increasing skepticism as prices advanced for some time and which we enun- ciated as long ago as last December in issuing our forecast for 1971. In that forecast we suggested that the Dow might well attain a new high — moderately above 1000 — in early 1972, and indeed the current picture makes it possible, at least, that this forecast will be attained. However, in making the forecast, we said It must be noted that this is in sharp contrast with the sort of upswing typical of the period between World War II and the mid 1960's. At that time, advances tended to last three to four years and involve rises of around 100. Our forecast environment is more similar to the 1966- 1968 upswing in which a 32 advance covered a 26-month period. It is also worthy of note that, if our forecast is correct, the Dow at the end of the year will have remained in a trading range between 600 and 1000 for a seven-year period — action qUlte dissimilar from the post-war experience' Another way of looking at the same phenomenon is to observe that, five times in the past six years, the DJIA has penetrated the 950 area on the upside. In each one of the five cases, the penetration has been followed shortly by a decline of 100 points or more, the most recent instance, of course, being April-August 1971. Why should this be One's answer to the question will depend on his view of what, fundamentally, \ – –ot!term–rnllS'th'gejr1 al-l'tivel''i''stc-C-k–prlc;s. Wlllrmll'owrltech''rilcian's'llias, ofC01ltse, we are prone to point to supply-and-demand factors rather than the conventional factors of earnings and economics. We think this is particularly true when talking about the general level of stock prices. We think that earning projections, in other words, may go a long way toward explaining the prices of different stocks relative to each other. We think they have precious little to do with the prices of all stocks taken collectively. This price level, it seems obvious to us, will derive ultimately from the upside or downside pres- sure placed on the stock market by the net inflow of new funds available for stock market investment. This will derive, m turn, from the rate of personal and corporate savmgs. The portlOn of these savings directed to common stocks will depend in great degree on investor attitudes toward stocks vis-a-ViS other investment media. From the resultant amount of money available for stock mvestment, one must deduct the number of new stock issues which will absorb this demand. The residual will then be the factor which tends to move prices up or down. Now it is a fact that for the past six or seven years there has apparently been very little upward pressure on the general level of stock prices, and, it is very difficult to see, in presently available statistics, anything that would cause such upward pressure to resume. The level of new stock issues is approaching all-time peaks, and senior securities at current levels present the highest return rela- tive to equities available m years. And there is, moreover, abundant eVIdence that the level of demand for equities characteristic of the 1950's and 1960's may no longer exist. Two commonly cited pieces of evidence are the sluggish rise in debit balances from last summer's lows — despite the reduction in margin requirements — and, of course, the swing of the last three months to net redemptlOns of mutual .fund shares,. The,impact.oLthis ,cancbe demonstratedTbYTGil-lngTthe fact,thahthroughoutl'968andI'969– net new purchases of stock by the mutual fund mdustry frequently exceeded an annual rate of 2.5 bil- lion. Yet, for the past 12 months, the net new money available to the industry has been less than 1 billion. All of the above, it should be noted, IS not a bearish forecast. Indeed, we purposely led off this letter with a discusslOn of the market's Improved intermediate-term techmcal health. The reason we have been repeatedly ralsmg the issue of the apparent change in the long term market pattern is that we think the eVidence calls for a radical change in investment strategy and investor behavior. The entire hIstory of the 1960's has been one of increasmg acceptance of stocks as permanent growth vehicles and of the concomitant theory that one could achIeve investment success by Simply buying and holding the conventional growth favontes and Ignoring stock market swings. This IS a theory which will have to be altered radically if the pattern established in the latter part of the 1960's IS in fact a per- manent one. ANTHONY W. TABELL Dow-Jones Industrial (1l00 am) 903.48 DELAFIELD, HARVIY,TABELL S & P (ll' 00 am) 99.64 AW'fNoSsetallt.ement or expression of opInion or any other motter herein contCllned 15, or IS 10 be deemed 10 be, directly or mdlrectly, on a ffer or t he soIICltotlon a f on aff er to buy or sell any security referred to or mentIoned The mattcr IS presented merely for the converlenC6 of the subscrober. While 'lie believe the sources of our Informa tlon to be rehable, we m no way represent or guarantee the accuracy thereof nor of the statements mude herem Any action to be taken by the subSCriber should be bosed on hiS own InvestIgatiOn and Information Janney Montgomery Scott, Inc, as a corporahon, and ItS offIcers or e'T1ployees, may now have, or may later lake, positions or trades m respect 10 any seCUrities mentioned In Ihls or any future Issue, ond such position moy be different from any views now or hereofter expressed In thiS or any other Issue Janney Montgomery Scali, Inc, which IS registered With the SEC os on Investment adVisor, may give adVice to lIs ,vestment adVisory and other customers Independently of any statements mode In thiS or In any olher Issue Further Information on any security mentIoned herem IS aVailable on request

———————————— TABELL'S MARKET LETTER 909 STATE ROAD, PRINCETON, NEW .JERSEY 08540 DIVISION OF MEMBER NEW YORI( STOCK eXCHANGE, INC MEMBER AMERICAN STOCK EXCHANGE September 10, 1971 The central theme of our past few letters has been that, while the baby bull spawned in May, 1970 the is .apparentlyinJeas onably ,good .health.still ,he .hascertainly.Iostthe,bloom .OJ .Y9l!tn ,arlq.ls Jal,p1llPf,I approaching maturity. The first conclusion, that of bull ma;kt' s ;';ntin;'ing existence. can deduced from the excellent technical action of the market, which continued last week prior to a minor correction at week's end. The second conclUSion, regarding approaching maturity, derives from the occurence of the recent II intermediate decline. Aliments of this sort have not afflicted past advances in the bloom of their youthful, vigor. They have been far more prone to occur in the later stages of a bull market's life. Now, a maturing bull market is, historically, a reasonably well-defined phenomenon. As old age begins to set in, more and more individual stocks and groups begin to lose their technical health and move from uptrends into downtrends. This process begins well before a bull market reaches its high, continues during the top formation and indeed does not reach its completion until a fairly mature stage of the ensuing bear market. A study of individual group action at the moment confirms that this histori- cally inevitable phenomenon is undergoing its normal evolution. A simple definition of an uptrend is that condition in which a stock or index remains above its rising long-term moving average. Of 95 Standard and Poors Industrial Group Indices, as of last March, 93 were in such a state. As shown by the following table, that situation has changed radically. The indices in group one are those which never, during the recent decline, moved substantially below their moving averages, while the second group includes those which did break their moving averages but have since recovered sufficiently to be again classified as in uptrends. Those indices which have had some recovery but not enough to indicate definite uptrends are in group three, and group four includes those indices where there has been no recovery whatever and where the trend is now down. Auto Parts Machine Tools Leisure Time Auto Trucks Mach- Construction Mach. – Agricultural Food-Pkg. Foods Beverages-Soft Drinks Mach-Industrial Mch. Steam Gen. Forest Products Chemicals Mach-Specialty Metal Fabricating Gold Mining Drugs Pollution Control Publishing Home Furnishing Electrical Equipment Radio-TV Mfgs. Real Estate Lead & Zinc Elec. Household App. Railroad Equipment Retail Stores-Disc. Metals Misc. Food-Dairy Retail Store – Depart. Textiles Products Motion PIctures Food-Meat Packers Steel Tobacco Cigarette Office Equipment Machinery – Oil Well Textiles-Syn. Fiber 4. No Recovery Oil – Domestic Mobile Home Savings and Loan Aerospace Oil -International Offshore Drilling 3. Partial Recovery Aluminum Paper Oil-Crude Producers Air Freight Atomic Energy Retail Strs. – Food Radio- TV Broadcasting Air Trans port Bldg. Mat. – Air Con. Shoes Restaurants Automobiles Bldg. Mat. – Cement Sugar – Beet Retail Stores – Mail Order Beverages-Brewery Bituminous Coal Sugar – Cane Retail Stores – Variety Beverages-Distillers Confectionery' Sulphur Soap Bldg. Mat.-Heat & Plumb. Cont.-Metal, Glass Textiles-Apparel Tire & Rubber Bldg. Mat. – Roofing Containers-Paper Toys Truckers Conglomerates Copper Utilities – Elec. Vending Machines InsuranceLife . EI'!'ctronicMajor2. , Csmtics U t i l i t ie s-' Nat. Gas – s. ….- Finance Cos. Food-Biscuit Bakers Utilities – Telephone Insurance-Multi Line Insurance- Prop. & Liab. Finance-Small Loan Hotel-Motel Food-Bread & Cake Food-Canned Foods Banks – NYC Banks – Outside NYC As can be seen, a total of 39 of 95 indices are in confirmed downtrends versus only 2 SlX months ago, and, in 60 cases, the technical condition is at least questionable. Only 35 of the 95 groups can now be considered in distinct rising trends. This situation will no doubt improve, of course. The recent advance is barely a month old, and as it continues, more and more groups will progress from the fourth through the third and into the second category. Nonetheless, as we observe these individual components of the market, the process of aging is clearly established. ANTHONY W. TABELL Dow-Jones Industrial (1100) 909.54 DELAFIELD, HARVEY, TABELL S&P(1100) 100.23 AWTSem No statement or exprClSSlon of opinion or any other motter herein contOlned IS, or IS 10 be deemed 10 be, directly or mdlrectly, on offer or the sollcltotlon of on offer to buy or sell onr. security referred to or mentioned The mOiler IS presented merely for the convelfenCfJ of the subscriber While Ne believe the sources of our Informo lion to be rei lob e, we In no way represent or guarantee the accuracy thereof nor of the stotemena mude herein Any action to be token by the subscTlber should be based on t1l1 own investigation and Information Janney Montgomery coli, Inc, as 0 corporation, and 115 officers or emplQyees, may now have, or may laler loke, positions or trades In respect to any secuntles menhoned In Ihls or any future Issue, and such poslhon may be different from any vieWs now or hereafter expressed m thIS or any other Issue Janney Montgomery Scott, Inc, whllh IS registered With the SEC as on Investment adVisor, may give adVice to Its Investment odvlsory ond othel C\lstomers Independently of any stolements mode In thiS or In any other Issue Further information on any secuTity menTioned herein IS ovalloble on request

————- —, TABELL'S MARKET LETTER 909 STATE ROAD, PRINCETON, NEW JERSEY 08540 DIVISION OF MEMBER NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE, INC MEMBER AMeRICAN STOCK eXCHANGe September 17, 1971 f,. Stoek-market.,foreeasting7we cS hould'cons tantly remind-oursetves,is, an,art.asmucha a .. science. This is a fact which has occasionally proved frustrating to those who believe reality does not exist unless it can be quantified. Unfortunately, it is totally impossible precisely to quantify a great many stock market phenomena which, nonetheless, the vast majority of the in- vestment community would agree, exist. Take, for example, the commonly-used terms, bull m-arket and bear market. How are we to define these Should the definition be in terms of percentage move, length in time, or a combination of the two It is easy to agree, for example, that the period December, 1968-May, 1970, when the DJIA declined 37 over a period of 18 months,was a bear market or that 1962- 1966, when the average almost doubled in value over 3-1/2 years, was the opposite number. However, what about January-September, 1960, which saw an 18 decline over a ten-month period, or, for that matter, 1966-1968, during which time a relatively small 35 advance was strung out over 26 months As soon as we start applying precise definitions based on time or amplitude, we see ourselves either including periods which most people agree should not be classified as separate bear or bull markets or leaving out periods which most observers feel merit that classification. Since we have difficulty defining what a bull or bear market is in the first place, it is hardly surprising that we should often have equal difficulty defining where we are at any given point in time. It is impossible, for example, to say with certainty that we are, at any given moment, 1 – -iR-b,J.I-mar-k-et-linles-s-t-le.-m-mQv-ing–into-new.hig!l.ground.xepeatedLyforsome…..—tl-II fairly-protracted period of time and we have, on the previous day, just made a further new high. Each day that goes by without a new high being posted, quite otviously, increases the pOSSi- bility that the last high made was, in fact, the high for the swing. Now it is not necessary to be all that restrictive in our defimtion. It can be agreed, for example, that bull market conditions exist when a high has been made fairly recently and prices lately have not been substantially different from that high. There are, unfortunately, many situations where even this state of affairs does not exist, and the present Is a beautiful example of one of them. Certainly a central question to investment policy at the moment is, Are we in a bull market or bear market. Yet it is totally impossible to answer the question in light of the criteria outlined above. It was possible to say with absolute certainty, as of last April 28, that a bull market exis1Ed. At that pOint the Dow had just closed at 950 after an ll-month, 50 advance. Unfortunately, that day five months ago was the last time a new high was posted, and there have been prices over the interim substantially lower. The certainty of the bull market's existence, therefore, is somewhat diminished. What about the opposite conclUSion Are we in a bear market Well, the last new low was over a month ago now on August 10 — at 840 after an 11.7 decline. It is, however, not custo- mary to call declines of this magnitude bear markets and, furthermore, we have since rallied smartly from tha!)ow.reachinga;high of.920a.couple.of.weeksago…….Unfortuna.tely,eyenAhe………..— post-Nixon-speech rally looks a little bit questionable at the moment, with the Dow having eased off from 920 to a low of 901 in the past couple of weeks. By this pOint in the exercise, the reader should be thoroughly confused, so he will no doubt pardon the forecaster if he also confesses to a bit of confusion. The dilemma can be partially resolved if we can admit of yet another type of market besides bull and bear markets — that tranSitional phase during which a bull market begins to lose momentum and eve n t u all y swings over to a downturn or consolidation. Such a phase commonly begins well before a high is made and continues well beyond the posting of that high before any serious decline occurs. We think the evidence, at the moment, is fairly persuasive that such a phase, in fact, exists. We are inclined to believe that we are in the early stages of such a phase and thus would regard a new high above the April 28 level as a distinct possibility — indeed a probability. We think it imperative to recognize, however, that the conditions of a clear-cut bull phase, which characterized the market as of last April, are no longer with us. Dour JQR'ilS IAQ1!&triEll (UOQ a. me) 90S. 57 A;WTMOJY 3'. T41lElL S &P Nblllltottrl'lntpT wP rq;slQQf cm,lon or any other matter herem contained is, or IS to be deeme, 1,l'lf()ftW..oHndlr1I.rif or Ht4oIi40on of on offer AWTI'rrntqtd-M1 'drielPcmt'!etl-ntT' f!fo Or mentioned The motter IS presented merely for the converIMtr6.liJ1,l; L..L-k.Jblr, vilLU.WIte1leve I'.bi our mformo- be reliable, we In no way represent or guarantee 'he accuracy thereof nor of the statements mude herem Any aellon to be token by the subSCriber should be ooseaon hIS own Investlgotlon and mformatlon Janney Montgomery Scali, Inc, as a corporation, and Its officers or employees, may now have, or may later toke, positIons or trades m respect to any securities mentioned m thiS or ony futufe Issue, and such posliion may be different from any views now or hereafter expressed m thiS or any other Issue. Janney Montgomery Scott, Inc, which IS registered With the SEC as on II'lvestment adVisor, may give adVice to Its II'lv(!slment adVISOry and othel customers Independently of ony statements mode In Ihls or In any other inue Further Informahon on any security mentioned herein IS available on request

i TABELL'S -ARKET ETTER 009 STATE ROAD, PRINCETON, NEW JERSEY 08540 DIVISION OF MEMBER NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE. INC. MEMBER AMERICAN STOCK EXCHANGE September 24, 1971 Short term weakness On low volume continued to be the dominant feature of equity markets for theJirUQl1r ys .9t.WJ..w. eek ,-Qe91yIl…TIldy ,'!J29br().thr''lghe-,JO level, reaching a closing low of 891.28 and an intra-day low of 884.64 in Thursday's trading. At that point it had pushed deeply into the 900-890 support zone, and the downside objective of the minor top formed at 920-900 had been reached. In the light of these facts, Friday morning's rally, following President Nixon's clarification of Phase 2 of his Economic Plan, was hardly surprising. There are now two benchmarks to watch in an attempt to forecast the intermediate-term course of stock prices. The first is the 920 level on the Dow, where the post-Nixon-speech rally peaked out. Inability to better this high would broaden a potential top and increase the near- term downside risk considerably. Were 920 to be surmounted, the next logical step would be a test of the April high of 950. It is, parenthetically, interesting to note that the present pattern of the S&P 500 diverges considerably from the Dow and is, in fact, somewhat more constructive. Ability of this index to move above 101. 50, not too far from its present level of 98.91, would clearly suggest a move into new high territory, a suggestion not necessarily implicit in the pattern of the senior average. It is thus apparent that we have reached a market stage when diversity and s e 1e c t i v i t Y among individual stocks is increasing, and the averages tend to give a less and less fair picture of what might be the performance of an average portfolio. The following table may serve to indicate the extent of this diversity. It is based on a study of 3,193 New York and American Stock e listed ues which s each as a of as a group to percentile and shows the performance of the best acting 10, the next best acting 10, etc. CHANGE FROM 1971 HIGH CHANGE FROM 1971 LOW PERCENTILE 1 – 10 PERFORMANCE – 0 – – 5 PERFORMANCE 53 or Greater 11 – 20 – 5 – 8 37 53 21 – 30 – 8 – – 11 26 37 31 – 40 -11 – – 14 20 26 41 – 50 – 14 – – 17 14 20 51 – 60 -17 – – 22 10 14 61 – 70 -22 – – 27 7 10 71 – 80 81 – 90 – 27 – – 33 – 33 – – 43 4 2 7 4 91 – 100 -43 or More 0 2 The figures are interesting. As of Thursday's close, the Dow was selling for just under 94 of its 1971 high. However, as the table indicates; more than 80 of all stocks were off from their highs by a greater percentage. More than one-half the list had declined at least 17 or more from peak 1971 figures, and at least one stock out of 10 had dropped 43 or more from its high for the year. ..- – The'same diversity 'is-apparent'in .individual 'ls sties . measured 'againsfthe year' s'low . Dow, again, is a bit over 7 above the low for the year, posted in early January. Yet almost one-third of all listed stocks have failed to better its upside performance and one-half the list is within 10 of its year's low. ConSidering the fact that 1971 has been a fairly good year for equities, it is at leaSt interesting that only about one-third of all issues are currently selling for 25 or more above the year's lows. Inspection of individual chart patterns, moreover, strongly suggests that this sort of diversity is apt to increase rather than decrease. This is absolutely normal at this stage and indicates that rigorous portfolio selection will become a more and more important part of the investment management process. Dow-Jones Industrial (1100 a.m.) 896,98 ANTHONY W. TABELL S&P (1100 a.m.) 98.91 DELAFIELD, HARVEY, TABELL AWTmn No statement or expression of opinion or ony other motler herein COntolned IS, or IS to be deemed to be, drrooly or IIld,rectly, on offer or the sollcitahon of an offer 10 buy or sell ony secunty referred to or mentioned The matter IS presented merely for the c.onvellence of the subSCriber While He believe the sources of our ,formahan to be reliable, we In no way represent or guarantee the atcuracy thereof nor of the statements mude herein Any aChon to be laken by the subscriber should be based on h' own Inveshgohon and Information Janney Montgomery Scali, Inc, as a corporation, and lIS officers or employees, may now have, Or may later toke. POSitiOnS or trades In respect to ony securttles menhoned In. thiS or any future Issue, and such positron may be different from ony views now or hereafter expreSsed tn thiS or any other Issue Janney Montgomery Scott, Inc, Which IS regiStered With the SEC as an mvel/mel'll adViSor, may gH'e adVICe 10 115 Investment adVISOry and other customers Independently of any statements mode III thiS or In any other Issue Further informatIOn on any secunty mentioned herein IS oVOllable on request

TABELL'S MARKET LETTER 909 STATE ROAD, PRINCETON, NEW JERSEY 08540 DIVISION OF MEMBER NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE. INC. MEMBER AMERICAN STOCK EXCHANGE –Iw';b;;;, 'w7ue'Sj;c,;oervetrip;;pratsity;ea-r, ;d-;;r.mrann;y-;jo7utr ;;;;;'fu,;;tto'ur!consLtan!t.r!eF- iteration of the thesis that the basic investment background has. apparently, changed radically from that of the 1950' s and early 1960's. We would forbear devoting still more space'to the subject were it not for tfe appearance of a generally excellent article in the October issue of Fortune which reiterates, in greatly expanded form, exactly the same thesis. While it is possible to disagree with portions thereof, the questions raised by the article should place it high on any investor's reading list. Fortune points out that the return, including both dividends and capital appreciation, on the NYSE Index has, since December 31, 1965, been just about 5. This is in marked contrast to the 1945-1965 period for which University-of-Chicago figures show an average annual return of 12.6 on all common stocks. All of this, of course, is just another way of indicating that the secular uptrend channel which characterized most market indices from 1942 to the middle 1960' s has, by now, been decisively violated. Now it should be made perfectly clear at this point that what both we and thE1 Fortune article are talk- ing about are not bUll and bear markets as the financial community generally understands these terms. We are particularly sensitive to this point because our own repetition of the thesis has evidently earned us an ursine reputation with which we would prefer not to be saddled. What we are talking about here is the basic background against which normal bull and bear markets are played out. We think all the evidence indicates that this background consists of a much flatter and perhaps somewhat wider channel than the 1942-1966 channel, and it is obviously perfectly possible to maintain this thesis while being optimistic, pessimistic or neutral concerning the intermediate-term course of stock prices. The major implications of the thesis, we think, are largely unrelated to a market forecast at any given .–'I-'P a i-n,t-i,n-t-i-m e'''''''-';l!hey'ha,'e',.gFea,t…jeal–t101..rlo,,,e,vE'r-''',ithth,eijenerah, p'pr),cht1e' irlvs Itol'alncl–'I money manager should take toward the market, and, if we are correct, it is evident that a great deal of what has come to be regarded as proper investment strategy will have to be changed and changed radi- cally. We have, based on the long experience-of the 1950's and 1960's, come dangerously close to a conventional wisdom about how money should conservatively be invested. The baSic approach of this conventional wisdom is that good stocks should be bought and more or less permanently held as capital gains vehicles. There is also a conventional wisdom as to the names of said good stocks, the list mevitably including such standards as I.B.M., Xerox, Avon, etc., etc. Now the result of investing according to conventional wisdom is almost never disaster. It is more usually a substandard return vs. what history later tells us would have been available. Thus the conventional wisdom of the 1940's told us that a substantial portion of most conservative portfolios should be in long-term bonds. When pur- sued into the 1950' s, this did not necessarily show -great losses, but it certainly produced a much lesser return than that which could have been achieved using equities. We think the current conventional policy is just as likely to produce substandard returns in the 1970' s. We think the inevitable result of the new investment background will be to force the money manager, if he is to achieve an above-average return, to be a great deal more aggressive and active in the manage- ment of equity portfolios. Ironically enough, the discredited conventional wisdom of the 1940' s may be more accurate today. At that time, it was generally agreed that the conservative way of running money involved first making a decision as to the relative attractiveness of the equity market in general and then deciding the percentage of equibes that should be owned. Such an approach, of course, is totally appl cable to the sort of market we (and Fortune) are enisioning, — alwys assu'!!ing one'; ,!ssu,!ns about, the 'refieral-leverof eqilitY'pficesareesseriHally correct. ' The money manager, it seems to us, must also become more active in his approach to security selec- tion. This is not to say that every investor should immediately transmogrify himself into an in-and-out trader. Common stocks, obviously, can still be bought with the ultimate objective of holding them for an indefinite period. However, the art of security analysis has never been perfect, and, in any attempt to find the 1. B. M. 's of the future, mistakes will be made. In the past, the money manager has had a secular uptrend to bail him out of these mistakes. The new era will be considerably les s foregiving. We are not at all peSSimistic about the apparent change in the investment background. The job of the money manager, after all, is not to change reality but to recognize it. In every era diligence and skill have produced above-average returns. The coming one will be no different. Dow- Jones Industrial (12 Noon) 891.21 S&P (12 Noon) 98.80 AWTmn ANTHONY W. TABELL DELAFIELD, HARVEY, TABELL No staTement or express.on of opinion or ony other 10 buy or sell any security referred 10 or mentioned motter herein The maller IS conlolned presenled IS, or .s to be merely for the deemed to be, conven.ence of d.rectly or Ind.rectly, the subscriber WI-nle one offer or believe the the sollC.lal.an of on offer sources of our hnforma- t.on to be rel.able, we ' no way represent or guorantee the accuracy thereof nor of the statemenls mude here.n Any action to be loken by the subscrlberls auld be based on h.s own pos.t.ons or trades mvest.gallon In respect 10 and mformot.on Janney Montgomery any sccunhes menl.oned .n Ih.s or any Scali, fulure Inc, as a Issue, and corporallon, and .ts offlCcrs Of such pos.t.on may be d.fferent employees, may from any views now now ohravhee,reoarftmerayexporteertetodkheln, th.s or any other Lssue Janney Montgomery cott, Inc, whICh LS registered w.th the SEC as on Investment adVisor, may give odv.ce 10 Its mvestment adVISOry on 01 er customcrs .ndependently of any statements mode m th.s or m any other Issue Further mformatlon on any seamty mentioned herein IS available on request

———————————————————————————————- TABELL'S MARKET LETTER 909 STATE ROAD, PRINCETON. NEW JERSEY 08540 DIVISION OF MEMBER NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE, INC MEMBER AMERICAN STOCK EXCHANGE October 8, 1971 The market's initial response to President Nixon's announcement of Phase Two of his economic pro- gram was -;' essentilly;-a'yawn7'tooked'at 'purelyin'terms'oYthe 'averages ;-the'market remains on –aead 1- center, in the lower part of the 880-920 range on the Dow which has characterized it since the rally from the August lows. It is axiomatic that the ultimate penetration of this range will indicate the direc- tion of the next move. Guessing as to the direction of penetrations of this nature is always a risky business. but we admit an inspection of individual patterns leads us to guess that the penetration will be on the upside. In any case, accepting the theory that we are somewhere in the mature stage of an upswing, selecti- vity will become more and more a factor to be reckoned with. We are, therefore, inaugurating this week a review of the technical position of major industrial groups with comments on major stocks within those groups. The review will be continued in subsequent issues of this letter. AEROSPACE – Almost all issues in this group have shown deteriorating relative action recently, but the weakness has returned them to the bottom of potential long-term base formations. They could be thus appropriate for those investors interested in bargain hunting. Boeing Co. (17), McDonnell Douglas Corp. (30) and United Aircraft (32) are all close to downside objectives as is General Dynamics (2I). At the moment, the latter appears to have the broadest upside potential. AIR TRANSPORT – Most stocks in this group corrected sharply in the recent market weakness,' but the bulk of them appear to be about to post major upside reversals. Purchases of almost all major issues appear suitable for risk accounts at this time, with the most attractive being American Airlines (39) with an objective of 50 and Delta Airlines (46) with an initial price target of 65 followed by possible higher levels long term. A L U . ' -ThiS .qrouP.has.been hnwlna infrinr r.tionreltlv.to .the. L.or.o,er. two ve.ars .and I unlike the aerospace issues, no sign of a base.is apparent. We would be inclined to suggest switching issues in this group into stocks with more immediate upside potential. AUTOMOBILES – Potential bases are substantial on all three of the major companies. However, best relative action has been shown by Ford (72), and this is the only one which has broken out of its base formation on the upside. A switch into this issue out of others in the group is probably worth considering AUTO ACCESSORIES – The group as a whole has shown above-average relative action and, at least moder- ately higher objectives are readable in the case of most indiVidual issues. Eaton Corp. (41) has a possi- ble upside target in the mid-60's. BUILDING SUPPLIES – Recent group action has been only average, but a number of attractive chart patterns exist in indiVidual stocks. Among the more interesting issues appear to be Johns Manville (41), u. S. Gypsum (72), Flintkote (31) and Tim Walter Corp. (41). In the air-conditioning area, Carrier (43), which has spent the past two years in a broad potential base formation, appears to be the most interesting. CHEMICALS – Group action has been only average and as might be expected, individual patterns are mixed. Monsanto Co. (52) is probably the most interesting issue in the group with an upside target of 70 and good support just under current levels. CONTAINERS – METAL & GLASS – Relative action has been inferior and the patterns of American Can (33) and Continental Can (34) indicate possible further price vulnerability. We would be inclined to avoid the group at the present time. CONTAINERS – PAPER – By and large the downtrend from the April highs remains in effect. Chart patterns of most individual issues remain unimpressive and we would be inclined to consider switches out of the I-Iindustry. –… -. ..- .. '–';' '- – . – – – . COPPER – Recently having moved to new lows, the stocks afford generous yield. but heavy overhead supply now exists and upside action will probably be slow. COSMETICS – Here again individual patterns are diverse. Avon (98), the most important factor in the industry, has recently held in the 93-106 range and the direction of the breakout will determine the direction of the next move. The potential in both cases is fairly sizable. For the other issues, down- side risk appears limited, but immediate upside potential is unclear. DRUGS – Another instance of widely diverging patterns. Smith Kline & French (55) has just broken out of a major base with a long-term upside objective well above current levels. Merck & Co. (115) and Upjohn Co. (68) must both be rated as strong holds' despite recent moves to new highs. Hospital supply issues posses extremely strang patterns, with American Hospital Supply (41) having the broadest upside potential. Dow-Jones Industrial (12 Noon) 895.08 S&P (12 Noon) 99.46 ANTHONY W. TABELL DELAFIELD, HARVEY, TABELL AWT'wn No statement or exprenlon of opinion or any other matter herein contained is, or 15 to be deemed to be, directly or indirectly, on offer or the soliCitation of an offer fa bvy or sell any security rcferTed to Or mentioned The matter 15 presented merely for the convelience of the 5ubscnber While Ne believe the Ourees of our Informohan to be reliable, we In no way repreent or guarantee the accuracy thereof nor of the statements mode herelM Any action 10 be taken by the subscrober should be based on nls own Invesllgatlon and mformatlon Janney Montgomery Scott, Inc, OS a corporation, and Its officers or employees, may now have, or may later toke, poSitions or trades 1M respect to any SI!C;u(1iles mentioned 1M thiS or any future ,ssue, and such poSition may be d,fferent from any views now or hereafter expresed 1M thiS or any other Ilsue Janney Montgomery Scott, Inc, wh,,h is feglstered wilh the SEC as on Investment advisor, may gIVe adVice to 'Is Investment advisory and other customers mdependently of any statements mode In thiS or In any other Issue further mformol1on on any secunty menhoned nerein ,s avollable on request

I———————— TABELLS MARKET LETTER 909 STATE ROAD, PRINCETON, NEW JERSEY 08540 DIVISION OF MEMBER NEW VORK STOCK EXCHANGE, INC MEMBER A.MERICAN STOCK EXCHANGE October 15, 1971 We ventured the opinion last week that the 880-920 range, which had contained the Dow since the first upsurge of the Nixon Rally, might well hold. The hazards of short-term forecasting were I-once-againproven-as;-in-''l'hursdaysand'i'rlday's'trauing;-theDow'brok'eiafrly-decisively below- I- – that area. Meanwhile, the less-than-buoyant action of the equity market has been accompanied by screams of anguish from a number of analysts who argue that the market shouldn't be going cbwn, because after all the economic outlook for 1972 is so excellent. We have tried to lay to rest in the past the myth that economics determine stock prices. In the present instance, es pecially, complex forces are at work centering around the supply of and the demand for equities. Without going into details here, suffice it to say that the figures are less than encouraging and are totally consistent with a market behaving the way this one has since last April. We will confess, ourselves, to a certain optimism in that we do not see the risk from current levels as being all that great. In terms of the Dow, the most plausible downside objective is centered around the 850-835 area. Moreover, a great many stocks continue to possess excellent technical patterns, suggesting that the necessary downside leadership for a full-scale bear market is not yet, at least, present. Nonetheless, with the aforementioned good technical pattern; now constituting a minority, selection will probably be the key to preservation of capital. We are continuing below our review of individual groups, highlighting above-average patterns where they exist. ELECTRICAL EQUIPMENT – This is one of the more interesting groups at the current time, based both on relative action and ultimate upside potential of the indiVidual stocks. General Electric – –6l)-and-W-es-tinghousec(-9m-haveboth-m0vedlYshar-ply-sL. , uW,J v Lue ,yea., UUL-m both cases, higher levels are indicated. I-T-E Imperial (35), Square D Company (29) and Sola Basic Industries (17) all have upside objectives considerably above current levels. ELECTRONICS – There is no discernable group trend. Hewlett-Packard Co. (44) has shown good relative action and could be attractive for risk accounts. FARM EQUIPMENT- Deere & Co. (46) is the only issue in the group with an above-average pattern, having strong support in the 45-40 range and an upside objective well above current levels. r.FOODS – Most canned food producers such as Campbell Soup Co. (31), H. Heinz Co. (42) and Del Monte Corp. (25) have only neutral patterns and appear uninteresting as capital gains vehicles. In the dairy area, Pet Inc. (44) has an upside objective of 70 and support at 42-40 Swift & Co. (38) continues to be our favorite issue in the meat-packing area. INSTALLMENT FINANCING – This is a generally defensive group which, nonetheless, has been showing above-average relative action and where most of the companies have large potential base formations. We think, therefore, that selected issues are attractive both for the conserva- tive and the more aggressive investor. We are inclined to favor C. I. T. Financial (48) with an up- side objective of 60 followed by higher levels and Beneficial Corp.(61) with an initial price target of 86. LIQUOR – Action has been only average and we see no particular attraction in the group at this time. MACHINERY – Makers-of heavy-machinery should 'benefit'in'any incre-ase 'tn'capit,H 'expenditures next year, and technical patterns tend to reflect this. We have mentioned Joy Manufacturing (58) favorably in this letter in the past and would suggest continued retention of this issue. Ingersoll- Rand Co. (54) has a price target in the mid 70's. MACHINE TOOLS – Technical patterns on this group are still somewhat uncertain and we would prefer, in most instances, to avoid commitments until such time as they clarify. MOTION PICTURES – Group action has been distorted by the sharp move in Walt Disney Product- ions (98) earlier this year. This issue appears, at best, fully priced at the present time, and the technical patterns of the other stocks in the group are generally desultory . OFFICE EQUIPMENT-Burroughs Corporation (136),with a long-term price target above 200 and strong support in the entire 130-120 area, continues to be our favorite commitment in this group. We would be inclined to suggest avoidance of the other major issues. Dow-Jones Industrial (12 Noon) 873.32 ANTHONY W. TABELL S&P (12 Noon) 97.61 DELAFIELD, HARVEY, TAB ELL AV'TelRR No stalement or CXprel10n of opinion or ony other matter herein COnf(lIned Is, or IS 10 be deemed 10 be, directly or Ind,rectly, on offer or the soliCitation of on offer to buy Or sell any security referred to or mentioned The mailer IS presented merely for the converlence of the substnber While we believe the sources of our Informa' tlon to be reliable we In no way represent or guarantee thl! accuracy thereof nor of the stolements mude herein Any actIOn to be token by the subs.cnber should be based on hiS own 'InvestllJo!lon and Informotlon Janney Montgomery SCalI, Inc, as a corporation, and Its officers or employees, may now have, or may later toke, poslhons or trodes In respect to any SKunlle! mentioned In thiS or any future Issue, and such position may be different from any views now or hereafter expressed In thiS or any other Issue Janney Montgomery Scott, Inc, which IS registered wl1h the SEC as on Investment adVisor, moy give adVice to Its Investment adVISOry and othel C\lstomers Independently of ony stotements made In thiS or In ony other Issue Further information on any security mentioned herein IS ovallable on request

————————————-.., TABELL'S MARKET LETTER t, – . .J 909 STATE ROAD, PRINCETON, NEW JERSEY 08540 DIVISIO OF MEMBER NEW YORK STOCK eXCHANGE. INC MEMBER AMERICAN STOCK eXCHANGE – October 22, 1971 About a year and a half ago. the Institutional Investor magazine emblazoned its cover with the 1–l'lealthles5 rP'''hr,a,,s,e ;,,'This-isn'-t-'a 'bear'marketr—Thisis'the 'way things-are'going to -be fFomn0w0n.''– – The line tended to evoke nervous chuckles. At the time, the monetary squeeze was exerting its full pressure, the economy was halfway into a receSSion, the end of which was not clearly visible, and earnings comparisons were proving, to say the least, disappointing. Underthe circumstances, a plunge in equity prices was a logical expectation, and plunge they did, with the sickening thud typical of a bear market. Time passed. Prices bottomed in May, and by August, the obvious signs of a bull market were manifest. The warning, implicit in the magazine cover, was forgotten, as the recession ended, money flowed into the economy, and earnings projections began to improve. As we progressed to the Fall of 1971, the universal expectation was for an improving economic picture for 1972. Yet, in this totally different environment, stock prices were behaving in a manner much reminiscent of the Spring of 1970. We suggested in last week's letter that such behavior was totally consistent with our concep- tion of supply/demand forces affecting the equity market, and we discussed some of these forces in detail in our letter of September 3. It is worth reiterating them here, however, because it seems important to us to understand Just why the market has behaved as it has in the face of a quite obviously improved fundamental outlook. It is arguable, in other words, that this the way things are going to be from now on. To begin with, we have to disabuse ourselves of the notion that earnings have anything — ;11,, — .to do with the te.lool.oLstock Driro l\Tn L .. tho . 10. sentence brings the collective wrath of the fil .,,1 analyst community down on our head, we suggest that it be re-read — with particular emphasis on the phrase aggregate level. Earnings, of course, have a great deal to do with the prices of stocks relative to each other. The price of all stocks taken together is something else again. It is obviously possible for this figure to rise when, and only when, demand for stocks exceeds supply, and to fall when, and only when, the reverse is the case. The demand for all investment media, stocks included, derives ultimately from the rate of cor- porate and personal savings. This annual savings increment must be divided, in some way, bet1illEBn stocks and other forms of investment. Just how this division takes place cannot, of course, be documented, but it obviously must depend to some degree on prospective rates of return offered by other investments vs. those offered by equities. The division having been made, net demand for equities can be arrived at by subtracting from potential demand the total number of new common stock offerings. The residual figure is what will ultimately exert the upward or downward push on the stock market. Thus, in simplest terms, if stocks offer high rates vis-a-vis bonds and new offerings of common stock are low, it is potentially bullish for stock prices. If the relative rate offered by bonds (and other investments) is high, and new offerings of equities are at high levels, the im- plications are negative. This is precisely the case at the present time. Bond yields are well abo\e stock yields and have obviously been attracting fairly substantial amounts of individual and institutional money. Meanwhile, 'new offerings of equities-have been'at-recordor'near-'record levls- since June. Net result — the stock market posted a high last April and has not been near that high ever since. Now, as sugges ted above, this exercise is intended as an explanation rather than a forecast. As we noted in last week's letter, we do not see, in the present picture, the plethora of broad dis- tributional patterns which would suggest a bear market of the 1969-l970 scale. The most plausible downside objective, as we suggested last week, is 85G-835, the upper part of which range was touched during last week's trading. Also, on the plus side is the fact that a speculative binge, which normally has to be liquidated in a bear market, never really got off the ground this Spring. Under these circumstances, we think it probable that a near-term bottom may be at hand. None- theless, the factors mentioned above will remain with us and should be taken into account in stock market decisions. We think, in other words, that capital protection, as well as capital en- hancement, should be a major factor in investment decisions in the months ahead. Dow-Jones Industrial (1100 a. m.) 859.08 ANTHONY W. TABELL S&P (1100 a.m.) 96.29 AWTmn DELAFIELD, HARVEY, TABELL No statement Of expreUlon of opmlon or any Ofher motter herein contolned 1, or Il to be deemed to be. directly or indirectly, an offer or Ihe sollcilolton of an offer to buy or sell ony sect,rnty referred to Or mentioned The matter IS presented merely for the converlenCE of the subscnber While -c believe the sources of our informa- tion to be relioble, we In no way represent or guorontee the Clccuroty thereof nor of the stolements mude herein Any odlOn to be token by the subSCriber should be bosed on hiS own IrlVeshgollon and Informallon Janney Montgomery Scott, Inc. os 0 corporollon, and Its officers or employees, moy now have, or may loler lake, paS/fians or trodes In respect loony .secuTltles mentioned In fIIS OT any fulure JUue, ond sum poJlJon may be d,fferent from any views now or hereafter expressed Irl Ih,s or any other Issue Janney Monrgomery Scott, Inc, whICh ,s registered wl,h the SEC CIS on Investment adVISor, moy give adVice 10 Its Invelmenl advisory ond othel customen Independently of ony statements mode In thiS or In any olher ISsue Ft,rrther II'lformatlon on any secunty mentioned herem IS ovollable on request