TABELL'S MARKET LEnER Olgby 44141 Railroad stocks have few, if any, friends left. The various services have recently issued some rather pessimistic reports on the outlook for rail traffic and increased costs in 1949. There have been various compilations predicting possible 1949 earnings based on various contingencies such as a 10, 20 or 25 reduction in traffic. The final conclusion in most cases appears to be that only the soundest rail equities should be held under present conditions. I do not profess to know just what railroad earnings will be in 1949. However, at present prices and yields, it would appear that most railroad stocks have already discounted a substantial decline in earnings. The technical patterns of the rail average and of individual issues suggests that the 52-49 range in the DOl'/-Jones rail average is a strong support area. This same trpe of formation is present in the graphs of individual rail issues. Here again I would think that the rail average will reach its 10Vi in the first three months of 194-9 — if it has not already done so. The improvement in the financial condition of the railroads Since 1937 has been tremendous. Earnings and diVidends were considerably higher in 1948 thar, in 1937 and yet in many cases, at the 1937 highs, r2.ilroad stocks were selling higher in 1937 than they are now. For example, in 1937 Southern Ral1..way sold at a high of 43 3/8, in comparison with its present level of around 4-0. Yet in 1937 the common stock showed a Cleficit of 1.69 and paid no dividend. 194-8 earnings are estimated at 12.4-5 and the stock is paying at the indicated ate of 4.00 annually to yield 10. It might be also interest- ing to note the improvement in tIl' flnarcial condition of the road. For the year ending December 31, 1937, Southern Railway had cash items amount mg to 9.4- millions as aga.lnst 57.7 millions at the end of 1947. This same comparison applies to many other roads. For example, Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe sold at a high of 94 3/4 in 1937, as against the present price of around 100. In 1937, the stock earned 60 cents and paid a 2.00 dividend. In 1948, the company earned an estimated 23.00 and paid 8.00 in divi00nds to yield approximately 8. Financial position also showed a wide improvement with cash items at the end of 197 at 145.4 millions against 21.6 millions in 1937. The total fixed charges and preferred dividends were cut from 19.4 millions to 14.9 miLlions. Illinois Central is another example. The 1937 high Vias 38, as against the present pr,ce of 28. In 1937 the common stock earned 70 cents as against an estimated 14.00 for 1948. No dividends were paid in either year. Cash items at the end of 1937 were 10.9 millions as against 73.0 millions at the end of 1947. Fixed charges and preferred dividends have been cut from 17.8 millions in 1J7 to 11.9 millions at the end of 1947. Still another example is Northern PacifiC. At the 194-7 high Northern Pacific sold at 36 5/8 as compared to its estimated price of arolnd 16. 1937 earnings were 5 cents a sta.re and the stock paid no divicend. 1948 earnings are estimated at 4.50 and the stock paid a year-end dividend of 1.50 to yield approximately 9. Cash items improved from 16.4 millions in 1947 to 44. millions at the end of 1947. Fixed charges dropped from 14.4 millions to 10.5 millions .,r' In comparison with thp heights reached in 1937 on much lower earnings and dividends, rail stocks seem modestly priced at the moment even when a Possible decline in earnii1gs is taken into consideration. Probably one of the nore important reasons for the' present low price level of railroad stocks is the generally peSSimistic attitude toward the equities in this grcup. Given a change in public psychology, rail stocks could sell considerably higher even in the face of reduced earnings. February 2, 1949 EDMUND W. TABELL WALSTON, HOFFMAN & GOODWIN This m.mcrandum 11 not to b. construed lIS an onu or I have an Interest In some or aU of the HCuritlel upon Information bel1eftd rellabl. but not I I&curltles. From lime to time Wabton Hoffman Ie Goodwin mlly prepllred by UI as a matter of Intormation only. It b based or fInal, and II not intended to foreclose Independent Inqlry. ….. \

TABELL'S MARKET LETTER )5 WALL STREET, NEW YORK 5, N. Y. Digby 4-4141 The table below lists the earnings, dividends and average price (the mean of the high and low) for the last twenty years on General Motors common stock. Also included is the price to earnings ratio and the yield, both based on the average price. This twenty year period in- cludes the top of the bull market of the twenties, the depression years, the boomlet of the thirties, the war years and three and a half years of peace. Thus, the period covers all phases of the economic cycle. At the 1948 average price of 57, General Motors was selling at eight times earnings. This is the lowest price to earnings ratio in twenty years. At the average price of 57, General Motors yielded 7.9 on the 1948 dividend payments of 4.50 per share. On only three occasions in the past was this yield surpassed. On one of these occasions, in 1931, the dividend was paid out of surplus. In the other two cases, in 1940 and 1941, the divideds ere barely covered. In 1948, only 50 of earnings were paid out in dividends. 1948 1947 10 46 1l45 1944 1943 1942 1941 1940 1939 1938 1937 1936 1935 1934 1933 1932 1931 1930 1929 Earnings 9.00 E 6.25 1.76 4.07 3.68 3.19 3.55 4.45 4.32 4.00 2.17 4.39 5.35 3.70 2.00 1.73 d. .21 2.01 3.25 5.49 Aver.Price 57 60 64 70 58 7/8 50 37 1/4 38 1/2 47 46 1/2 39 3/4 49 1/2 65 1/2 43 33 1/2 22 7/8 16 1/8 34 5/8 42 7/8 62 S/8 Price Earn. 8.0 9.6 36.3 17.1 16.0 15.6 10.4 8.6 10.8 11.6 1(3.3 11.2 12.2 11.6 16.6 13.2 17.2 13 .2 1.4 Dividend 4.50 3.00 2.25 3.00 3.00 2.00 2.00 3.75 3.75 3.50 1.50 3.75 4.50 2.25 1.50 1.25 1.25 3.00 3.00 3.60 Yield 7.9 5.0 3.5 4.3 5.1 4.0 5.4 9.8 8.0 7.5 3.8 7.6 6.9 5.2 4.5 5.5 8.7 7.0 5.7 E – estimated d – deficit At present prices, it is possible to purchase more earnings and dividends for each dollar paid for General lotors than at almost any tDne in the past twenty years. It would fle possible to use much more spectacular examples than General Motors. February 4, 1949 EDMUND W. TABELL WALSTON, HOFFMAN & GOODWIN This memorandum Is not to be construed illS ilIn offer or solicitation of offen to buy or sell any SClcurities From time to time W,sf' Homan &, Gftd.winbal have an Interest In lomll or all of the securities mentioned herein. The foregoing material has been pr.epared by, us as ,ill matter 0 norma IC! on y. d 1\ ul . upon information believed reli.sble but not neuss.srily complete, is not gUo!Iro!lnteed as accurate or final, o!Ind IS not Intended to foreclose mdepen ent I q ry

TABELL'S MARKET LETTER 35 WALL STREET. NEW YORK 5. N. Y. Digby 44141 Weakness in the commodity markets has brought the stock market sharply below the trading range which it had occupied for the past four weeks. The industrial average reached an intra-day low of 172.91 on Tuesday, as against a 1011 of 170.35 on November 30, 1948. The rails at their low of 49.43 decisively penetrated the comparable November low of 51.91. In spite of the disappointing action of the market I see no reason to change the forecast for 1949 as stated in my letter of December 15, 1948. I repeat below that forecast – To sum up, I again predict that the market will reach its low point for 1949 in the first three months of the year. I do not believe the low will be much, if any, lower than the November, 1948 low of 171, and that it will certainly be above 160. I am still of the opinion that the range of the last twenty-eight months, between 160 and 195 in the industrial average, is an accumulation area and will eventually result in a price level somewhere around 240250. This fundamental pattern has not been changed by the results of the election. It has, however, been delayed. The market during the later part of 1949 should approach or pass the 1946 highs of 213 and be 'on the way to the aforementioned level. As for the short term action, the market has been in an oversold position for eight hours on my technical action indicator. However, as yet there has been no buying signal. Such a signal would be given if on Wednesday the market were able to reach, on an hourly average, a level above 174.73 on the industrial average. As for the rails, they are nO\'J in a very strong support level between, roughly, 50 and 48. Regardless of the short term action of the market, I still continue in the belief that the market is in a buying range jn or close to the 170-160 area. This has been my advice since September 1946. As for individual issues, I favor the stocks listed belo\'J. These stocks have been covered in previous letters or will be covered shortly. I believe these issues offer better than average appreciation prospects over the intermediate term. Thumbnail sketches are available on those issues marked with an asterisk – American Cyanamid American Home Prod Avco Borg Warner Burlington Mills Cities Service Cooper Bessemer Denver & Rio Grande Eastern Airlines Elec. Power '& Light Firestone Tire .Firth Carpet Flintkote Fruehauff Trailer Hewitt Robins Holland Furnace Closing 2/8/49 36 3/4 25 1/4 6 3/8 48 3/8 17 40 26 1/8 23 1/8 14 1/8 21 5/8 46 16 1/2 24 3/4 19 20 24 Closing 2/8/4 Inter.Min. & Chern. 25 1 8 Joy Manufacturing 36 Lowenstein 21 3/8 Paraffine Co 17 1/4 Penn-Dixie-Cement 18 3/8 Pressed Steel Car 7 Radio Corp 11 7/8 St. Regis Paper 7 3/4 Schenley 26 3/4 Sears Roebuck 36 1/2 Sharon Steel 33 3/4 Shell Union Oil 32 Sperry Corp 25 1/4 Standard Steel Spring 14 1/2 Sylvania Electric 20 3/4 White Sewing Machine 19 1/2 Youngstown Sheet & T 68 1/8 February 8, 1949 EDMUND W. TABELL WALSTON, HOFFMAN & GOODWIN This memorandum Is not to be conritued as an offer or solicitation of offen to buy or lell any securitlos. From time to tlmo Walston Hoffman & Goodwin may hn8 an Interest In some or all of the securities mentioned h.reln. The fore90l9 material has been prepared by UI as II matter of Information only. It Is based upon Information believed reliable bLrf not necessarily complete, I, not 'ilul!ranteed at accurate or final, and Is not Intended to foreclose Independent Inquiry.

TABELL'S MARKET LETTER 35 WALL STREET. NEW YORK 5. N. Y. Digby 44141 The rails continue their downdrift and at Friday's close of 48.70 were at their lowest point since March 1948 when the rail average started its advance to the year's high of 64.95. After the break in October, 1946, the rail average slowly built up a strong techfiicallpattern. 'fte reacting to approxImately ,44, 1/2Jin october, 1946, theradl'averagerallJtBd back to, 53; in early ili947(. Thelnext reaction carried,' the verage to;a new low of 41 in May). 197. The next advace in mid-1947 to approximately 53 failed to carry above the previous high. On the next decline, the rails held at 46 1/2 in December, 1947. These three successive lows of 44 1/2-41-46 1/2 built up a head and shoulders bottom pattern which was penetrated on the upside in April, 1948. The subsequent high of 64.95 was reached in July, 1948. During May through October of 1948, the rail average built up a distributional top that indicated a possible decline to the 50-48 range. The fact that this range has been reached, plus the fact that the average is in the 53-45 support area, indicates that the rails may be near a turning point. On the basis of earnings, yields and improvement in financial condition, the rails seem greatly undervalued. That is, unless we are on the verge of a long, .deep business depression resulting in several years of deficits. Even the most pessimistic do not expect that. The table below is self-explanatory. It shows, for example, that Southern Pacific earned over 10 last year and that it yields over 10 based on its present price of 42 and 1948 dividends. As the stock appears to be on a 5.00 basis, although it actually only paid 4 50 in 1948, it might be said that the yield is even higher. It also shows that the stock is selling at only slightly more than four times 1948 earnings. Earnings for the last ten years totaled 94.39 of which only 21.25 were paid out in dividends. A total of 73.14 was retained ih the company thus strengthening its financial condition by reducing debt and by improvements. This amount of 73.14 is over 30 more than the present price of the stook. Equally fantastic examples will be found in the list. TABLE ONE Approx. Price Atchison, Top. & S.F. Atlantic Coast Line Baltimore & Ohio Delaware & Hudson Great Northern Rwy Pfd Illinois Central Kansas City Southern Reading Company Northern Pacific Southern Pacific southern Railway Texas &.Pacific Rwy Union Pacific 91 38 9 37 39 23 35 20 15 43 37 40 82 Est. Earn. 1948 23.33 9.32 7.73 13.95 8.91 14.60 15.42 5.44 4.96 10.27 12.51 15.06 14.24 Price Times Earn. 3.9 4.1 1.2 2.7 4.4 1.6 2.3 37 30 4.2 30 2.7 5.8 Div. 1948 8.00 4.00 4.00 3.50 1.00 1.50 1.00 4.50 3.25 4.00 6.50 …; , cJ .( Yield 8.8 10.5 10.8 9.0 2.9 .5 6.7 10.5 8.8 10.0 7.9 Total Total 10-Yr. 10-Yr. Earn. -Di-v.- Balance 145.87 47.00 98 .8 114.84 2.75 90.09 60.16 60.16 85.34 16.00 69.34 73.36 21.00 52.36 92.16 92.16 56.86 1.00 '55.86 43.50 10.50 33.00 44.75 6.00 38.75 94.39 21.25 73.14 107.13 17.00 90.13 98.99 17.50 81.49 81.23 33.50 47.73 Adjusted for two-four-one split July 1, 1948 Some of the newly re-organized roads also appear very reasonably priced. Ten-year figures are not available. Most of these issues are selling at just slightly more than twice 1948 earnings and have generous yields. TABLE TWO Approx. Price Chicago, R0k Island Denver, Rio Grande Gulf, Mobile & Ohio St. Louis,-San Francisco Seaboard Air Line February ll, 1949 A- Paid in 1949 29 24 11 9 15 Est. Earn. 1948 11.41 1531 513 . 3.46 6.81 Price Times Earn. 25 1.6 2.1 2.6 2.2 Dividend 1948 3.00 2.00 .50 1.00-A 1.00 -Yi-el-d 10.3 8.3 4.5 11.1 6.7 EDMUND W. TABELL WALSTON, HOFFVAN & GOODWIN This memorandum Is not h..ve lin Interest In lome to or be at! construed 115 an of the securitIes offer or solkltallon of mentioned hereIn. The offers to foreQoing buy or sell anI securities, From mllterial has been prepared by tuims easto time Wliiston Hoffan matter of In ormlltlC!, & GoodwIn may only It Is. bll!ed upon information believed reliable but not necessarily complete, Is not quarllntef!d as accurate or final. and is not Intended to foredole Independent InqUiry,

TABELL'S MARKET LETTER 35 WALL STREET, NEW YORK 5, N. Y. Digby '141 While the rail average Q,t last week's low of 48.43 penetrated the November low of 51.91, the induntrial average has so far held above the comparable November low of 170.35. Last week's low was 171.03. This divergence in pattern between the two averages is a potentially bullish sign and brings up the possibility of an ending of the intermediate down- trend from the June-July closing highs of 193.16 and 64.95. Failure of one average to follow the lead of the other average into new high or new low territory is quite often the sign of an important change in trend. In recent times, this divergence occurred at the May 1945 top, the May 1947 bottom and the February 1948 bottom. If it does turn out that the market reached its low last week, the normal technical pattern would be an irrcgular-uptrend to 175-178 and 51-52 followed by a dip back to 174-172 and 50-49. After that, I would expect a long trading ranGe within the limits of the projected highs and lows mentioned abpve. In the event that the market does not hold at last week's lows, I would not expec't any great extension of the decline. The broao May-November top on the industrial average has a downside indication of 172-167 and the comparable downside objective on the rail average is 50-48. In addition, both averages are in or near the very strong support areas of 53-45 and 170-163. It would appear that the market, as measured by the averages, has either reached its low or, at the \',orst, is within 5 of such a low. For intermediate term holdings, suggest purchase of the following issues during periods of market irregularity. These stocks have been covered in previous letters or will be covered shortly. Thumbnail sketches are available on those issues marked with an asterisk .. ,\ , Closim- Closing 2/16/49 2/16/49 American Cyanamid American Home Prod. Avco Bendix Aviation Bigelow-Sanford Borg Warner Burlington Mills Cities Service Cooper Bessemer Denver & Rio Grande Eastern Airlines Electric Pr & Lt Firestone Tire Firth Carpet Flintkote Fruehauf Trailer .Hewitt Robins Holland Furnace 38 25 1/2 6 3/8 32 1/2 29 1/4 48 1/2 17 1/8 40 1/8 27 22 3/4 14 3/4 22 1/8 47 1/8 16 1/2 25 1/2 18 1/2 18 22 1/2 Inter.Min & Chern Joy Manufacturing Lowenstein Paraffine Companies Penn-Dixie-Cement Pressed Steel Car Radio Corp St. Regis aper Schenley Sears Roebuck Sharon Steel Shell Union Oil Sperry Corp Standard S'ceel Spring Sylvania Electric White Sewing Machine Youngstown Sheet & T Reynolds Metals 26 37 1/2 22 1/2 17 1/2 18 3/8 6 7/8 11 7/8 8 26 7/8 34 7/8 33 33 1/2 25 1/4 14 3/4 21 1/2 20 3/8 67 3/8 20 3/4 February 16, 1949 EDMUND W. TABELL WALSTON, !QFFMAN & GOODWIN Thb memorandum Is not to be construed .,s an offer or solicitation of oHen to blJY or lell any securities. From time to time Walston, Hoff,man &IyGftdb'nbo!l!l hay. an Interest In 10m. or all of the securities merrlloned herein. The foreQoln; material hflS been prepared by UI as e metter of Infonnelon on . d I I upon Information believed reliable but not necessarily complete, Is not Quatanteed al accurate or final, and I, not Intended to foreclose Indepen ent nqu ry. '—– – f t

SAN FRANCISCO, CALIF. .- n.Hoffmon &, GOOduTi.,. NEW YORK, N. Y. LOS ANGELES, CALIF. BAKERSFIELD BEVERLY HILLS EUREKA. FRESNO RIVERSIDE SA.CRAMENTO SAN DIE&O LONG BEACH MODESTO SAN JOSE SANTA ANA OAKLAND STOCKTON PASADENA VALLEJO TABELL'S MARKET LETTER 35 WALL STREET, NEW YORK 5, N. Y. Digby 44141 Signs of a recession in business are multiplying. During the past week, this situation has been described as a leveling off, a disinflationand even as an economic burp. I prefer to call it a return to economic normalcy, an adjustment from the war boom with its dislocations and shortages to normal peacetime competitive condi- tions. This is a healthy situation. Sustained prosperity is not based on shortages and high prices and black markets. From 1921 to 1929, there was almost immediate delivery on any automobile you wanted and the only black market was in bootleg liquor. Of course a return to competitive conditions and lower prices will be painful to many marginal companies, but its effect on soundly entrenched enterprises should result in no more than a drop in earnings from the unprecedented peaks of 1947 and 1948. Business is following the normal post-war pattern. Economists have been predicting a depression since late 1945. Their timing has been woefully bad because they failed to take into consideration the huge pent up demand built up not only by five years of war shortages, but also by the t.en previous years of depression. That is why, in my opinion, the present dip in business will be in no way comparable in magnitude to the 1921 recession. When the adjustment is completed, there should be a sustained period of prosperity. The demands of fifteen years of depreSSion and war shortages have not been nearly supplied by the production of the last three years, even as large as that production has been. The Stock market started its readjustment period in the Fall of 1946 when it dropped from a May high of 213 to a low of 160. Since that time, regardless of greatly increased earnings, the market has moved in a relatively narrow range. Stocks are selling today at the lowest ratio of price-to-earnings, dividends, cur- rent asset value and book value in twentyfive years. The only comparable periods are 1921, 1932 and 1942. Today there are no top-heavy speculative pOSitions, only a small amount of stock on margin. and plenty of liquid money awaiting investment. This com- bination of factors will not last long. It is happening today only because of the depressed mental state of the investing public. The following quotation from the column of C. Norman Stabler n the New York Herald-Tribune of February 20th, is an excellent description of present public psychology. The tendency of the pendulum of human reactions always to swing too far, and thus to produce waves of unjustified optimism or pessimism, brought some thought-provoking observations from Herbert H. Weitsman, of the Stock Exchange firm of L. F. Rothschild &Co., last week. In the period immediately preceding the panic of 1929, he observed, there was a tendency to think that 'nothing means anything'unfavorable. It was a New Era. NOW, 'nothing means anything' favorable. A remark frequently heard is that 'earnings and dividends don't mean anything'. The mis- taken philosophy of the present, Mr. Weitsman notes, goes something like this. 'Low earnings are obviously no good, but high earnings are no good either, because the higher the earnings, the greater the vulnerability. Neither are increased dividend payments any good because large disbursements lend themselves to future reduction. Mere continuation of current rates is nothing less than catastrophic. After all, what good are stable dividend payments High pro- duction, at best, is just another reflection of unhealthy boom conditions. Why, it is the stuff that nightmares are made of – that slip from 102i of capacity and then fall rlght through the rigid break-even point into a bottomless sea of red ink. As to book values, well,have you ever tried to eat a brick or a lath or an openhearth furnace – who would want to drink from an oil well Big book values don't mean a thing, except perhaps potential business for the junk man. High commodity prices are no good because inflated prices are subject to collapse. Deflated commodity prices certainly are no good, Such a condition is bad for the farmer and inventory values are adversely affected. Implied lower costs for the consumer also are no good because the consumer is going to be worried about his job, if he has one. Anyway, he is nown the habit of saving instead of spending, the figures proves that. War is no good, that is self-evident, but neither is peace. Parades and inaugurations would hardly justify the present-day expensive military establishment. The prudent thing is to ignore values and yields. Equities should not be bought, it is concluded. 'Nothing means anything'-favorable. The 1929 philosophy was just as mistaken,Mr. Weitsman pointed out, for then nothing meant anything unfavorable. 'It made no difference,' so the thoughts of that day went, 'that market prices in relation to earnings and dividends and book values were fantastically high. It was all in the future – prospects were the impGrtant consideration and that prospect was not only undiminished but increasing prosperity for the foreseeable future and even longer and the Dow Jones industrial average was only 380. The thing to do was to buy more and more common stocks.' Reference should be made to the 19291932 stock tables.for the complete details of that 'New Era' — and its surprises. .nThis memorandum Is not haY8 an Interest In some to or be condrued ., an of the NeurUies offer or IOlldtatlon of offers to mentioned herein. The foreooln; bmuyateorr!!!sI,1Ihaasnybeseencuprritji;MllU..''f'rWMll..V..tulrtWp,MtoA..1hln…'.,WaJ,stoInnoHrmoaftfm1oann & GoodwTn ma, only. It Is baled upon Information believed rellable but not n.cessarlly complete, Is not c;luaranteed as accurate or fInal, and Is not Intended to foreclose Indepondent InquIry. – ..– .—- SAN FRANCISCO, CALIF. NEW YORK, N. Y. BAKERSFIELD BEVERLY HILLS EUREKA RIYERSIDti SACRAMENTO ,..SAN DJEGQ TABELL'S MARKET LETTER LOS ANGELES, CALIF. OAKLAND PASADENA STOCKTON VAllEJO 35 WALL STREET. NEW YORK 6, N. Y. Digby 4-4141 I see no reason to change my forecast for 1949, as stated in the letter of December 15, 1948. Briefly, I still expect that the market will reach its low point for 1949 in the first three months of the year. I do not believe that the low will be much, if any, lower than the November 1948 low of 170.35, and that it certainly will be above 160. I believe that by the latter part of the year the market will approach or pass the 1946 high of 213. The action of the market has been discouraging, particularly as far as the rails are concerned. The rail average and individual rail stocks had two possible top formations. The first top formation was outlined by the May to July highso The second formation was formed across the entire May to October pattern. It appeared for a while that the average would hold at its first object- ive, but last week's decline carried most of the rail issues down to their lower objectives. I have listed below the downside objectives of the averages and individual issues in the three groups that have shown worse than average market action since Election Day. These groups are the rails, oils and steels. These downside objectives are the object- ives outlined by the complete May to October distributional pattern. It is interesting to note that in a great number of cases these objecttives are very close to recent lows. Prices are as of Friday, February 25th. – 2g Last Objective Low 1946-1948 Low (- Dow-Jones Ind. 171,10 172-165 162 170.56 Dow-Jones Rails 46.34 48-45 41 46004 New York Times 110 110-108 107 110 New York Herald-Trib 117 116 114 117 Armco 23 7/8 23 21 23 1/2 Atch.Topeka & S.F. 87 3/4 86-81 66 87 1/2 Atlantic Coast Line 36 37-35 41 36 Baltimore & Ohio 8 5/8 9 -7 8 8 1/2 Baltimore & Ohio,pfd 16 5/8 12 12 16 1/4 Bethlehem Steel 30 7/8 31-29 26 30 3/8 Chesapeake & Ohio Chicago & North W. 3110 /88 30 10 32 31 1/8 14 10 1/2 Chicago,Rock Island 28 1/2 28-26 26 28 1/8 Cities Service 39 39-36 21- 38 1/2 Continental Oil 50 45-42 34 47 5/8 Delaware & Hudson 34 35-33 26 34 Denver & Rio Grande 21 1/2 21 7 20 1/4 Great Northern, pfd 37' 36 35 36 1/2 Gulf,Mobile & Ohio 10 3/8 10 7 10 1/8 Gulf Oil 60 1/4 61-59 57 60 1/4 Illinois Central 23 23-20 19 22 1/2 Inland Steel Jones & Laughlin 36 5/8 28 1/8 33 28-27 33 28 36 1/2 28 1/8 Kansas City Southern 35 30-28 16 34 1/4 Louisville & Nashville 35 1/2 34 39 35 1/2 Mid-Continent Pete 42 41-39 32 40 1/8 M-K-T, pfd 18 16 12 16 1/4 New York Central 10 1/2 9 12 10 1/4 Since listing. The balance of the list will follow in the next letter. February 25, 1949 EDMUND W. TABElLL WALSTON, HOF1AN & GOODWIN j This memor.!lndum Is not to be construed as an offer or solicitation of offers to buy or sell any securities. From time to time Wolston, Hoffmfln & Goodwin may have an Itertlst In lome or all of the securities mentioned herein. The fOrElQolng matarlal has been prepared by us as a Mlitte, of Information cnly. It Is based upon information believed reliable but not necessarily complete, is not quaronteed as accurate or flnll1. lind Is not Intellded to foreclose independent Inquiry.