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Tabell’s Market Letter – September 22, 1978

Tabell’s Market Letter – September 22, 1978

Tabell's Market Letter - September 22, 1978
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TABELL'S MARKET LETTER 909 STATE ROAD, PRINCETON, NEW JERSEY 08540 DIVISION OF MEMBER NEW VORK STOCK EXCHANGE. INC MEMBER AMERICAN STOCK EXCHANGE September 22, 1978 – – -We- have-begun this letter–in–the past with have we h5re''!.What ..- we have, first of all, is a short term dovJntrend, the Dow having closed just ten trading days ago on —. — September 8th, at 907.74 and having finished Wednesday at 857.16, a drop of better than 5 1/2 percent. What we have, in addition, are fairly pronounced distributional tops in the major averages — a fact which does not require expostulation by a professional technician, since it should be obvious to anyone who believes in such things as distributional tops and takes the trouble to look at the chart on the back page of the WALL STREET JOURNAL. Where some perspective is necessary, perhaps, is in the interpretation of these two facts. It is, frankly, difficult to become undulyllXercised .about the top referred to above. Its downside objective is, roughly, 850-840 in terms of the Dow — an area that coincides with relatively strong support. Noe does it appear appropriate, on an historical basis, to become deeply worried about the extent of the decline. Drops of 7-8 percent, which is what this one would tum out to be if the afore- mentioned downside objective were reached, are not uncommon in the context of major up swings, although they have tended to occur late in advances rather than in the early stages. What we are saying in other words, is that nothing has occurred in the past two weeks to shatter the rather positive expectations we had retained concerning the stock market. It is perhaps worth recalling the process by which major tops tend to form. That process tends to involve one form or another of loss of momentum, such as, for example, decidedly inferior action on the part of market breadth measurements. These measurements have dropped off sharply in the past fortnight along with the rest of the market, but just two weeks ago they were uniformly achieving new highs. It is, of course, entirely possible that a peak in breadth was seen early this month, but that peak,it should be recalled, is supposed to lead major downswings by a fairly considerable time peltod. What we have seen over the pa-st couple of weeks coulll, of course, be-an ea-rlyinaicaUon of' — a dangerous loss of momentum. The current eVidence, in our view, does not admit of more than that. This first instance of noticable market decline has been seized upon with almost lascivious glee in some quarters, especially those who have remained skeptical of the entire advance since February. Along these lines, one of the favorite topics of market Cassandras has been the existance of speculative activity, and, indeed, some of the comments on the subject seem to suggest that we are at the moment witnessing a combination of the worst features of tIe Holland Tulip Bulb mania, the South Sea Bubble and the 1929 crash. Most recently, of course, such commentators have been able to point to the whle moves, first up and more recently down, In gambling Issues. It cannot be denied that such moves have, indeed, taken place, but it should also be kept In mind that this action Is restricted to some 1/2 dozen Issues constituting a miniscule portion of the total list. Mor e fundamental evidence of speculative activity exists, we think, elsewhere. The number of mar- gin accounts, for example, has continued its fairly steady rise from the 1974 lows and has now exceeded its 1968 peak. The outperformance of higher grade Issues by secondary stocks Is a not-at-all-new phenomenon that has recently continued unabated by most measurements. In this connection, however, it should be pointed out that these issues began their recent sharp rise from a point where they were fundamentally undervalued In relation to the rest of the market, and it Is arguable, at least, that all that has taken place In the past year or two Is a return, on the part of these stocks, to their normal niche in the overall market picture. Finally, it must be recalled that speculative activity, like some of the Indicators referred to above, generally tends to be an Indicator of market momentLrn rather than market level. Thus, at least in one sense the upside current that has carried the market along through early.this,month.continues.to flow– … – -…. It is not our intent, In this analysis, to ignore or to gloss over less-than-favorable portents. Like most people we would prefer to see the market consistently move ahead to new highs without any correctionary interuptions. Such markets, of course, present little difficulty for the technician. They are, however, rare, as the present instance tends to suggest. As we have tried to indicate above, sigrs of market deterioration do not tend to present themselves In blinding flashes but in accumulating chains of evidence. If such evidence continues Its buildup, we will comment thereon and suggest appropriate action. It Is premature at this stage, we think, to become unreasonably pessimistic based on the downswing of the past few days. Dow-Jones Industrials (1200 p. m.) S&P CompOSite (1200 p.m.) Cumulative Index (9/21/78) 858.45 101. 71 779.59 ANTHONY W TABELL DELAFIELD, HARVEY, TABELL No statement or expression of opInion or any other molter herein contOlned IS, or 15 to be deemed 10 be, directly or indirectly, on offer or the Ollcltollon of on offer to buy or sell any security referred to or mentioned The matter IS presented merely for the converlence of the subSCriber While e believe the sources of our Informo' !lon to be reliable, we m no way represent or guarantee the thereof nor of the stolements mude herem Any action to be token by the subSCriber should be bosed on hiS own Investigation ond Information Janney Montgomery Scoff, , oS 0 corporation, ond ItS officers or employees, may now hove, or may loler toie, pOSitions or trades In respect to ony securlltes mentioned In Ihls or ony future Issue, and such poslilon may be different from any Views now or hereafter expressed In thiS or any other Issue Janney Montgomery Scoit, Inc, which IS registered With the SEC as on Investment adVisor, may give adVice to lis IIlvestment adVisory ond othel customers mdependenily of ony slatements mode In thiS or III ony other Issue further Information on any securtty menhoned herem IS available on request

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Tabell’s Market Letter – September 29, 1978

Tabell’s Market Letter – September 29, 1978

Tabell's Market Letter - September 29, 1978
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TABELL'S MARKET LETTER — — –.— 909 STATE ROAD, PRINCETON, NEW DIVISION OF 08540 MeMBER NEW YORK STOCK eXCHANOE, INC MEMBER AMERICAN STOCK eXCHANGE .. '!…. '- !rno!, In commenting last week on the pessimism which seemed to abound In certain quarters we – suggested, It is perhaps worth recalling the process by which major tops tend to form. That process tends to Involve one form or another of loss of momentum, such as, for example, decidedly Inferior action on the part of market breadth measurements.. On the one-picture-I, OOO-words theory, we are showing below what that loss of momentum looked like in the last four previous major stock mar- ket tops, contrasted with the picture at the moment. In all five of the charts below, the solid line represents the Dow Jones Industrial Average,and the line with asterisks represents a dally breadth Index. 1961 – MAR 1962 1965 – FEB 966 SEP ISS7 – FEB ISSS – JUN 1977 – SEP 1978 In 1961-1962, three successive peaks in the Dow,in May, 1961, August 1961, and December, 1961, were followed by successively lower peaks In market breadth. In 1965, the sharp breadth drop from the mid-summer-1965 high was never recovered on the 1965-1966 rally, despite the fact that the Dow moved up some 150 pOints, with explosive advances in secondary issues. In 1967-1968, breadth remained generally in a downtrend, despite the explosion In the Dow to a new peak close to 1,000, and a strong DJIA rally in early 1969 Showed almost no breadth improvement. The top formation pro- – cess and the first bear-market rally in 1972-1973 encompassed a continuous downtrend in the breadth …- …. …… ….. – – . As'against thls'hlstory. if is-worth looking at breadth action at present as shown in the lower right-hand comer. The downtrend at the end of last year actually featured flat-to-improvlng breadth action, and breadth falled to exceed Its November low when the Dow bottomed early this February. Every single new high since February has been confirmed by a new breadth peak. Indeed, breadth has been in an unrelieved uptrend Since 1974. As we noted last week, the recent breadth decline has been sharp, but, as comparison with the other charts will show, if this constitutes deterioration, it is only the beginning of the process. Market momentum, in other words, continued right through early this month, and it is far too early to speculate about that momentum being lost. Dow-Jones Industrials (1200 p.m.) 862.79 ANTHONY W TABELL SSP Composite (1200 p.m.) 102.20 DELAFIELD, HARVEY, TABELL Cumulative Index (9/28/78) 787.99 No statement or expreSlon of opinion or ony other motter herein conlollled 15, or .510 be deemed to be, directly or Indirectly, em offer or the 5011(1101101'1 of on offer to buy or sell any securlly referred 10 or mentioned The matter IS presented merely for the convel'lenaJ 01 the subSCriber While we believe the OUIteS of OUI tlon to be rei roble, we m no way represent or guarantee the accuracy theleQf nor of the statements mude herein Any action to be taken by Ihe subscriber should be based on hiS own Investigation and Information Janney Montgomery Scali, Inc, as a corporation, and Its officers or employees, moy now have, or may later take, pOSitions or trades In respect 10 any seCUrities menlloned In thiS or any fvlure Issue, and such posItion may be different from any views now or hereafter expressed to thiS or any other Issue Janney Montgomery SeoIT. Inc, which IS registered With the SEC as on Investment odvlsor, moy give adVice to Its Investmenl adVisory ond othel customers Independently of any tOlements mode In Ihls or In any other iSsve Funher information on any secullty mentioned herein is available on request

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Tabell’s Market Letter – October 06, 1978

Tabell’s Market Letter – October 06, 1978

Tabell's Market Letter - October 06, 1978
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TABELL'S MARKET LETTER 909 STATE ROAD. PRINCETON. NEW JERSEY 08540 DIVISION OF MEMBER NEW YORK STOCK eXCHANGe, INC MEMBER AMERICAN STOCK eXCHANGE – October 6, 1978 -Readers, of financiaL theiLchoice. of.v.arioull, materigl.V'!ith whtch. to bore themselves. In the case of the bulk of stock market -he'-investor has hacCoi the opportunity to become bored with abstruse observations about such phenomena as the money sup- ply, the discount rate, the,Mid-East situation, foreign exchange markets and other such items that supposedly have some relevance for what the stock market might do. This being a technical market letter, we generally choose to lull our readers to sleep in another fashion, the recitation of boring series of numbers. It is our belief, of course, that these numbers have at least as much relevance to the equity markets as some of the factors discussed above. Herewith, in any case, some statistics. Last month, on September 7th, the Dow closed at 907.74. This was 22.3 above its prior major low which occurred on the last day of February this year. This places the current stock market in the company of six prior stock-market periods in the past 30 years, these periods being defined by the occurance of an advance of greater than '20 with no intervening drop of any significance. These occurances, it will be recalled, are known in the vernacular as bull markets. More recently, the Dow has moved off from its September 7th high having closed at 875.16 on September 20th, a drop of 5.57. This is the second drop of greater than 5 since the advance be- gan, the previous one having been a 7.01 decline between Tune 6th and Tuly 5th. We thus have, at the moment, a 20 advance which has been interrupted to date by two declines by 5 or greater. It, therefore, becomes relevant to ask how many declines of 5 or more occurred in the six previous upswings before the advances finally ran their course and gave way to major drops. The table below cites the statistics Jan. 1946-Jan. 1953 Sept.1953-Ju1y 1957 Oct. 1957-Dec. 1961 DOWNSWINGS 5 OR 'MORE 6 Oct. 1966-Dec.' 1968 8 May 1970-Jan. 1973 5 Dec. 1974-Dec. 1976 4 5 7 As can be seen, no previous advance has reached a bull-market high without being interrupted by at least four drops of 5 or greater, and there have, as in 1953-1957, been as many as eight. On an historical basis, therefore, the present interruption in the upswing would appear to be a perfectly normal phenomenon and could, indeed, continue further and deeper without eliciting any great concern. Looked at in another way, it is now 18 trading days since the Dow last posted a new high for the advance. How many times in the past have advances been interrupted by periods of similar magnitude, say 15 trading days or longer, during which time they failed to make new highs Presented below is a table of the count Jan. 1946-Jan. 1953 Sept.1953-Ju1y 1957 Oct. 1957-Dec. 1961 PERIODS Of LONGER THAN 15 DAYS WITHOUT BULL MARKE HIGH 11 Oct. , 966-Dec. , 968 ' 6 May 1970-Jan. 1973 14 Dec. 1974-Dec. 1976 7 8 7 In contrast to the above, it can be noted that the present interruption is only the third since the advances began in February. It is furthermore relatively short compared with the interruptions of past bull markets, the bulk of which have tended to be from 20-40 days long. Indeed, it is worth noting that, in all of the upswings defined above, there has been at least one interruption which .– lasted close ,- -,—,—,- – —,. The above statistics may have indeed been boring, and we apologize therefore. Some comfort may be found, however, in that they do not seem to suggest any reason to worry about the stock market based on September's action. – …. Dow-Tones Industrials (1200 p.m.) S&P Composite (1200 p.m.) Cumulative Index (10/5/78) 879.50 103.59 795.57 ANTHONY W. TABELL DELAFIELD, HARVEY, TABELL No statement or expreulon of opinion or any other matler herein contolned is, or IS to be deemed 10 be, directly or ,ndlrectly, on offer or Ihe solicitation of on oHer to buy or sell any security referred 10 or mentioned The motter IS presented merely for the conver'lence of the subSCriber While .,e believe the sources of our Informa lion 10 be rellble, we In no way represent or guarantee the accuracy thereof nor of the statements mude herein, Any action to be token by the subSCriber should be based on hrs own IIlveslrgolion and IIlformatlon Janney Montgomery Scott, Inc, as a corporatron, and rts offrcers 01 employees, may now have, or may later toke, posilions or trades III respect to any securrtles mcnhoned In thiS 01 any future Issue, and such posrlton may be drfferent from any views now or hereafter expressed In thiS or any other Issue Janney Montgomery 011, Inc, which IS regl5lered With the SEC as on Iflvestmenl advrsor, may gIVe adVice to Its rnvestment adVISOry and othel customers mdependently of any statements made III thiS or In any other Issue Further Information on any security mentioned herein IS ovarlable on request

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Tabell’s Market Letter – October 13, 1978

Tabell’s Market Letter – October 13, 1978

Tabell's Market Letter - October 13, 1978
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-.- I TABELL'S I MARKET I LETTER 1 – – – – – – – – – 909 STATE ROAD, PRINCETON, NEW JERSEY 08540 DIVISION OF MEMBER NEW YORK STOCK eXCHANGE, lNC MEMBER AMERICAN STOCI( eXCHANGE October 13, 1978 –, -It-has been-some time since-we-dlscussed in this-space -the Jones Industrial Average. We have not discussed it, in fact, since the February-September upswing –. — reached a magnitude of 22 and thus qualified as a major uptrend. It is thus perhaps worth reviewing the picture at this time, as depicted in the chart below. COMPUTED TREND – DJIA 1!t1&R 11. 1978 ''''' . 1m 19'78 ….. '978 ' '978 Ilt1 '98 ' rn As readers will recall, computed trend work mathematically fits trend channels to observed market swings, which can be classified as major, Intermediate and minor — denoted by their exceeding 20, 10 and 5 respectively. The advance from 742.12 on February 28th to 907.74 on September 8th now qualifies as a major trend and its channel is shown by the solid line on the chart projecting forward through the end of 1978. As may be seen, there have been two important tests of the bottom of this channel, the first, in late June and the second just recently, when the Dow actually spent a period of two weeks slightly outside the channel but by an insignificant amount. That penetration was never great enough to be considered Important, and It Is indeed interesting that the present rally occurred from around the exact lower limit of the channel. During the summer, an intermediate term uptrend had been established by the center dotted channel – on the chart. Had that trend remained in effect, the Dow today would be in roughly the 930-985 range. It was, however, decisively broken in mid-September, and the intermediate trend picture must now be conSidered unclear, just as did the rally last summer. Since the Dow last made its low ay 857.16 on September 20th, a new minor uptrend channel has been established, since the advance has now been extended to 5.16. That channel Is shown projected forward on the rlghthand side of the chart. It should be noted that this channel is probably too narrow to be long maintained, and It w1ll probably be broadened as it is recomputed. It Is also possible that it will be decisively penetrated, and a new minor uptrend will start from a different base. However, it is worth noting that, If carried forward as shown on the chart, it would reach the upper limit of the major channel around mid-December at a level of around 1000 on the Dow. DOW-Jones (12 00 p.m.) 896.92 ANTHONYW. TABELL S&P CompOSite (1200 p.m.) 104.80 DELAFIELD, HARVEY, TABELL Cumulative Index (10/12/78) 803.47 No stotement or expressIon of opInion Or any other matter herein IS, or IS 10 be deemed to be, directly or indirectly. on offer or the OIlCllollon of on offer to buy or sell any security referred to or menlfoned The matter IS presented merely for Ihe of the subScriber While we believe the wurf;eS of our Informo- han to be reliable, we In no way represent or guarantee the accuracy thereof nor 01 The statements m.lde herein Any action to be token by the subSCriber should be based on hiS own investigation and information Janney Montgomery Sea!!, Inc, 05 a corporation, and Its officers or employees, may now have, or may loter tOKe, positions or trade, In respect 10 any seCUfilies mentioned In thiS or any future Issue, ond such poslhon may be different from any views now or hereafter expressed In thiS or any other ISSue Janney Montgomery Scott, Inc, which IS registered With the SEC as on Investment adVisor, may give adVice to Its Investment adVisory and other customers Independently of any S\otemenn mode HI thiS or In any other Issue Further Information on any security mentioned herein 15 available all request

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Tabell’s Market Letter – October 20, 1978

Tabell’s Market Letter – October 20, 1978

Tabell's Market Letter - October 20, 1978
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TABELL'S MARKET LETTER 909 STATE ROAD, PRINCETON. NEW JERSEY 08540 DIVISION OF MEMBER NEW VOAK STOCK EXCHANGe, tNC MEMBER AMERICAN STOCK EXCHANGE – .20 It has often been remarked that there exist multituainous reasons for the placement or erasers-on'- pencils, and anyone who has been in the business of issuing market commentary for more than a few years is aware of a number of them. We chose to occupy a good portion of this space last week with an attractive computer-drawn chart illustrating the fact that the short-term uptrend which began on September 20th took place from a pOint near the bottom of the major uptrend channel in effect since February. We also projected that short-term trend forward, suggesting that, if it remained in effect, the Dow could approach the 1000 level by year-end. We did, we will note in our own defense, draw attention to the possibility that the September-October uptrend channel could be violated and commence again from a lower base. We did not, however, expect that violation to take the form of one of the more dramatic weeks in 1978 thus far. As our readers are no doubt aware by this time, the Dow opened the week by dropping almost 22 pOints and continued to plunge more or less precipitously through early Friday trading, the midday level on that day being 840.44. With startling suddenness, the recent uptrend has been replaced by a plunge to new lows. Where, it may well be asked, does all this leave us at the moment In terms of trend analysis, the current violation of the major uptrend has not existed long enough to be considered decisive so that, however shaken, that trend must be considered, for the time being, to be intact. The original top on the Dow, formed late last summer, had a downside objective of 840, a figure which was never attained prior to the time the late rally set in. This figure has been attained, and it is thus possible to view the downswing, in conventional terms, as a second downward leg. It is also possible, if one considers the top to have broadened by the late rally, to visualize targets in . lmlstic .s imply.are.notI.ea da ble. ….,.. I As we tried to sUg;jest above, the most notable feature of the market drop has been Its suddenness. It is not an overly common occurance for a market uptrend, such as the one which was progressing nicely last Friday, to be replaced on the very next trading day by a precipitous decline. Perhaps even more startling was the breadth of the decline. On Tuesday, for example, 1546 stocks moved lower, a quantity constituting over 80 of all issues traded. This sort of number Is not totally without preced- ent,but it is generally associated with periods which we have come to call selling climaxes. This, of course, is all well and good, except for the fact that climaxes, for obvious reasons, tend to occur following a sharp market decline. For such action to take place almost immediately after a downs ide reversal, must be considered somewhat unusual. This sort of downside climax breadth (80 of all issues traded declining) has, in fact, occurred on only 145 trading days in the past 52 years. It has, as we noted, a fair probability of being associa- ted with market turns. On 61 of the 145 occasions, it was followed by a market upswing, defined as the S&P 500 being higher than the climax day three, six, and nine months later. In only 22 cases was the action followed by ongoing bear markets. The occurance of such action shortly after long upswings, as in the present case, is even rarer. Only 37 of the 145 occasions noted above took place in an environment where the market had been advancing for the prior six months. Only six of those occasions were followed by ongoing bear markets without an intervening rally, and it must be noted that all six of those cases took place during the 1930's, the most recent instance being 1939. There have been eight occasions since 1948 where action such as Tuesday's has taken place in an up market. In all of them, the market moved somewhat higher at somepoiht during-the next nine mofiths;and;-in some cases, it did'so bya-substantial'amount. It is not the intention of these remarks to slough off the implications of the market's actio,n since September, which, in many respects, has been, to say the least, less than satisfactory. We do not, however, think the accumulated chain of evidence put together to date, even Including the calamitous action of last week, Is sufficient for long-range bearish conclusions. The burden of proof may, by now, have shifted to the side of the bulls, but we do not think that proving that case is an'imposs- ible task. Dow-Jones Industrials (1200 p.m.) S&P Composite (1200 p.m.) Cumulative Index (10/19/78) 840.44 98.49 747.77 ANTHONY W. TABELL DELNIELD, HARVEY, TABELL No statement or expression of opinion or any olher maNer herein IS, or IS to be deemed to be, directly or mdtrectly, on offer or the of on offer to buy or sell any security referred to or mentIOned The matter IS presented merely for the converllence of the subscriber While we believe the saurO's of our mformo- hon to be reliable, we In no way represent or guarantee the accuracy thereof nor of the statements mude herein Any achon to be by the subSCriber should be based on hiS own investigation and .nformot,on Janney Montgomery 5011, Inc, 0 a corporation, ond Its officers or employees, may now hove, or moy later take, POSitiOns or trades In respect to any securlhes menhaned In ttliS or any future Issue, and such postllon may be different from any views now or hereafter expressed In thiS or any other Issue Janney Montgomery call, Inc, which IS registered With the SEC as on Investment adVisor, may 9've adVice to Its Investment adVisory and othel customers Independently of any statements mode In thiS or 11'1 any other Issue Further Information on any security mentioned herern IS available on request

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Tabell’s Market Letter – October 27, 1978

Tabell’s Market Letter – October 27, 1978

Tabell's Market Letter - October 27, 1978
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TABELL'S MARKET LETTER 909 STATE ROAD, PRINCETON, NEW JERSEY 08540 DIVISION OF MEMBER NEW YORI( STOCI( EXCHANGE, INC MEMBER AMERICAN STOCI( EXCHANGE October 27, 1978 Nobody likes declining markets, and sharply declining markets are especially distasteful. The natural — questlon,H3k-ed-by-most'irtVestors7therefore,–when -they -are confronted-by–a phenomenon such -as the price collapse of the past two weeks, is When will it all be over As is often the case in turbulent stock markets, it is the wrong question. The reason the question is wrong is that short-term cycles, however painful momentarily, do, ultimately, run their course. The question that should almost always be asked about short-term action should center around what it is telling us about the unfolding longer-term picture. The question we should now be ask- ing ourselves is whether or not the sharp price reversal of the past two weeks suggests termination of a cycle, or — in the present case — either one of two cycles, the four-year-old bull market which has existed in the broad range of individual securities and the barely-six-months-old bull market in the widely- followed stock market indicators. We think the answer in both cases is no — with a fair degree of proba- bility in the first instance and an even greater degree of probability in the second. That having been said, we can tum our attention momentarily to the more widely-asked question about whether the short-term downswing is likely to be over, and the answer here is probably not. Although the drop, except for Thursday's plunge, became less broad this week, and the rate of decline mitigated somewhat, we are unable, at this writing, to detect any convincing signs of reversal evidence. Predict- ably enough, with the Dow down about 9 at current levels, a short-term oversold condition has been reached, indeed an oversold condition that, on many indicators, approaches record proportions. What it is necessary to remind ourselves about short-term oversold conditions is that they can always become more oversold and that they can continue to exist for fairly lengthy periods of time. Although, as we noted here last week, climactic conditions existed at the sharpest stage of the decline a week ago, a drop as vicious as the current one often requires multiple climaxes prior to its ultimate reversal. We have at those Qaradoxical a tepid rally would be bearish. The most con- structive thing that the market could do currently would be- to complete the washout and allow us to get -', on with the more important business of assessing its significance. By the time a decline has gone as far as the present one, tops are complete and downside targets are available. Currently, existing distributional tops are fairly well defined. For the Dow-Jones Industrial Average downside objectives center around the 810-805 area. In the case of the Standard and Poors Composite the objective is approximately 95, and for the Standard and Poors Industrials the plausible target appears to be in the 105 area. Other indicators, notably indices of financial stocks and the DO-N-Jones Transportation Average, have already approached downside targets. The pOint is that there is very little in the technical patterns of these indicators or indeed in the existing patterns of individual stocks to suggest objectives Significantly lower than this. In order for such objectives to exist the distribution patterns would have to be broadened. Since most such patterns have already been penetrated on the downside, such a broadening would require a Significant rally. Such a rally is in tum unlikely to take place without completion of the current cycle and a base formation pro- cess which would take time. Much has been made of the sharpness of the decline in secondary stocks, and indeed this phenomenon reached the front page of the WALL STREET JOURNAL on Thursday. It has long been axiomatic that, once a piece of financial news reaches this lofty degree of prominence, it is too late to act on it. The sharp- ness of the decline among secondaries can, we think, be attributed to two factors, their already-sharp rise and the fact that they are more volatile than the general market in the first place. The American Stock Exchange Index, to select a convenient proxy for secondary issues, had at its recent high, risen 227 since late 1974. That it should now be subject to a correction of 19 , the amount it had actually declined at its low, is hardly we do not rule out the 'possibility of widening distributional..– –' patterns beginning to build in secondary issues, we do not think that, at the moment, these patterns are yet complete. In the case of higher-grade issues, all that the recent decline has done in most cases is to bring them back into what,we feel,will ultimately be regarded as long-term base formations. Within these base formations massive support exists, and in many instances the current weakness must be viewed as a buying opportunity. In summary, then, while the downswing that began on October 11th has probably not yet run its course, we do not regard it as a harbinger of more disruptions to come. We think in other words that the drop, rather than an ill omen, may well prove to be an attractive purchase opportunity. Dow-Jones Industrials (1200 p.m.) S&P Composite (1200 p.m.) Cumulative Index (10/26/78) 816.53 95.68 698.39 ANTHONY W. TABELL DELAFIELD, HARVEY, TABELL 0 5 alement or expression of opinion or any olher matter herem contomed Is, or IS to be deemed to be, directly or mdlrectly, on offer or the soliCitation of on offer to buy or sell any security referred to or mentioned The motter IS presented mt'rely for the converlencc of the subscriber While He believe the sources of our Informo- han to be reliable, we In no way represent or guarantee the accuracy thereof nor of the statements mJde herein Any actIOn to be token by the subscnber should be based on hiS own Investlgohon and Informotlon Janney Montgomery Scott, Inc, as a corporation, and Its officers or employees, moy now have, or may later toke, poslhons or trades In respect to any seCUrities mentioned In thiS or any future Issue, and such pOSition moy be different from OI1Y views 110W or hereafter expressed Ir1 thiS or any other ISsue Janney Montgomery Scott, Inc, which IS registered with the SEC os on Investment adVisor, moy give adVice to 11 Investment odvlsory and olhel customers Independently of any stotements made In thiS In ony other Issue FIJrther Informotlon on any security mentioned herein 15 ovotlable on request

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Tabell’s Market Letter – November 03, 1978

Tabell’s Market Letter – November 03, 1978

Tabell's Market Letter - November 03, 1978
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– -. —–,——– TABELL'S MARKET LETTER ———– — 909 STATE ROAD, PRINCETON. NEW JERSEY 08540 DIVISION OF MEMBER NEW VORK STOCI( eXCHANGe. INC MEMBER AMERICAN STOCK eXCHANGE – – – -. . –.- – —,.. – – – – November 3, 1978 …. .– We attempted last week to preach a sermon on the virtues of not becoming panicked by the short term gyrations of the market while, at the same time, trying to pay heed to whatever message was being conveyed by those gyrations. This week's action made the first part of the admonition even more difficult at the same time that the message, however jumbled, was becoming more insistent. Monday featured an almost-classic selling climax which totally failed to follow through in Tuesday's trading as a 17-point decline to 792.45 took place in what may come to be known as the Halloween Horror Story. Then on Wednesday, ostensibly due to President Carter's plans to strengthen the dollar, cilme a 35-point rally which petered out and was partially retraced in Thursday and early Friday trading. For volatility, at least, it was quite a week. It is worth the risk of boring the reader by citing a few figures in an attempt to put the whole thing into historical persepctive. Wednesday's advance was heralded by many who should know better as the largest in history, which, of course, it was only if one has not yet learned to compute percentages. In terms of percentage advance, 4.46 , ranks 73rd on the all-time list of one-day advances, although, it must be admitted, in the post-World War II period, it has been approached only by advances occuring near the bottoms inOctober,1957, May, 1962, May, 1970, and October, 1974. Much has also been made of the steepness of the decline which, over 14 trading days, took the Dow down just over 12. This again is a phenomenon that has occured no fewer than 53 times in the past, although again very rarely since 1946, and, in most cases, associated with upside reversals. In one sense, it should duly be noted,the decline did set a record. It was, by at least one measurement, the broadest decline in stock market history of the past 52 years, exceeding, in – -breadth-terms,- a nything-that-took-place-during-the4-9 29-3 2,period-and-S-Uf-ja set at the October bottom in 1937 and at the fall of France in May, 1940. The measurement which exceeded these previous periods is the familiar 10-day advance-decline oscillator which, on October 27th, reached a record oversold condition at -9382. To make this figure comparable historically, it must be adjusted for the number of issues traded,but even when this adjustment is made the con- dition of last Friday outranks all previous short-term oversold conditions by a considerable margin. It is , ih sum, an undeniable fact that the sort of condition that the market had reached late last week and early this week was a rare bird indeed for the post-World-War-II period. It is possible to go even further and state that that condition, when achieved in the past 30 years, has been almost universally associated with major market bottoms. Climax lows are not always the actual lows in the averages, and, indeed, they may be followed by new lows often quite some time later. Such climactic troughs, however, have usually tended to pinpoint what may be thought of as the effective bottom. Having said all this, we are compelled to raise a more-than-moderately disquieting pOint. It all took place at the wrong time. The textbook climax action of last week occured, not after a major downswing, but very close to a market top scored just last September. This, and the fact cannot be ignored, is totally without precedent for the last 30 years. As we suggested above, to find the sort of action which featured last week occuring on a repeated basis, one has to go back to the 1930's. In those highly volatile markets wide short-term swings were the order of the day. market environment similar to that of 40-50 years ago. What we are suggesting, however, is that the market, via the suddeness and viciousness of the recent decline, is clearly trying to send us -. some sort-of .message. -Decoding,that message will.be-the major task of. market analys-is in -the- – weeks ahead. Dow-Jones Industrials (1200 p.m.) S&P Composite (1200 p.m.) Cumulative Index(1l/2/78) 819.04 95.76 677.84 ANTHONY W. TABELL DELAFIELD, HARVEY, TABELL AWTrak No !clement or e)(preS5lon of opinion or any otner moiler herein contained IS, or IS 10 be deemed to be, directly or ,ndlrectly, on offer or Ihe 501lcllollon of an offer to buy or sell any security refered 10 or mentioned tlon 10 be reliable we In no way represent or guaronlee the accuracy Ihereof nor at the s;olemenls mude herein Any octlon to be to en y t e su sconfbeoru1rSt ou t k dbased on hiS own' Inves'lgallon ond mformotlon Janney Montgomery Scol!, Inc, os 0 corporation, and Its officers or employees, moy now have, or may a er e, pOSitiOns or trodes In to any seCUrities mentioned In thiS or any future Issue, and such position may be different from ony views now or hereoJter e)(prcdse thin thiS or any other Issue Janney Montgomery Scolt, Inc, whICh IS registered With Ihe SEC as on II'Ivestment adVisor, may give adVice to Its a yuory, on a el customers Independently of any statements mode In thiS or In any other Issue Further information on any security mentioned herem IS avol a e on rllques

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Tabell’s Market Letter – November 10, 1978

Tabell’s Market Letter – November 10, 1978

Tabell's Market Letter - November 10, 1978
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TABELL'S MARKET LETTER 909 STATE ROAD, PRINCETON, NEW JERSEY 08540 OIVISION OF MEMBER NEW YORK STOCK eXCHANGE. INC MEMBER AMERICAN STOCK EXCHANGe November 10, 1978 We noted last week that, based on the past 30 years' experience, the market configuration produced October decline'was a constructive-onein-terms'of the probability 'of having been reached. We felt it necessary, however, to insert the mildly cautionary note that it was, 10 say the least, unusual for an oversold condition of such virulence to manifest itself so shortly after a new cylical market peak. We promised, at that time, to explore some of the possible reasons for such an occurance, and, although any explanation at this stage must be tentative, it is worth starting on an examination of possible causes. – It is now apparent, based on a number of sources, that, as the drop reached it most vicious stage during the last week in October, margin liquidation was an important, if not the major, contributing factor. Our colleague, Robert J. Simpkins, Jr., explored in this space last summer the phenomenon of the four-year rise in margin debt, a manifestation which continued unabated through the end of September, at which time total NYSE margin debt had reached a level three times what it had been in December, 1974. With an almost uninterrupted rise over those 44 months, margin debt figures had been behaving in a manner which could be correlated with our Cumulative Index rather than the Dow. The level of margin borrowing is normally a statistic which moves up and down coincidentally with the trend of the market, and the period December, 1976-February, 1978 was the first time since the figures had been compiled that it rose in the face of a sharply-declining Dow Jones Industrial Average. During that period, of course, the more broadly-based indices hardly declined at all, thus pointing to the not-implausible con- clusion that a large part of the rise in debt had gone to finance the purchase of secondary stocks. In the light of this rise, the mechanics of margin regulation are worth reviewing. Maintenance margin, the point at which a lender chooses to ask for additional funds to support declining portfolio collateral value, is at the discretion of the lending broker, subject to an NYSE minimum. That level is generally 30-3 5 ent 'of–ia-rgenumb ccounts'below' th ity -wh-ich—–l- actually triggers margin calls. Initial margin, the funds which must be deposited when a stock is first purchased on margin, on the other hand, is set by the Federal Reserve Board. Although these Federal levels have no direct relation to collateral calls, the two factors, initial and maintenance margin, are inextricably intertwined as we shall see in a moment. It may well have been forgotten that the Federal Reserve is indeed responsible for initial margin requirements, and there is some evidence to suggest that the Federal Reserve may have forgottren it also. The Fed has not seen fit to change those requirements since they were set at 50 on January 3, 1974, a period of almost five years. This is the longest time the authorities have left margin requirements alone since they were kept at 40 from 1937 to 1945. It has normally been the tendency of the Federal Reserve Board to raise margin requirements progres- sively as the market rises, and the Fed's record in inadvertantly forecasting tops by this device is one that might be envied by prognosticators. In the bull market of 1946 for example, margin was raised three times starting 15 months before the top and culminating in a rise to 100 four months before the market peak. There were two raises, 19 and 16 months before the top, in the 1953-56 bull market, two prior to the 1961 peak, one prior to the 1966 market high, and one each prior to the market highs in 1968 and 1972. In general, the tendency of the Fed has been to drop margin requirements to around 50 shortly before or shortly after major market bottoms and to raise them succesively as the market moves ahead. Thus, in the broad-based indices at least, we have just gone through the first bull market in memory when the Federal Reserve has chosen to leave margin requirement set at the 50 level throughout the entire rise. Now the difference between 50 and 70 margin is not at all a miniscule one. With 70 initial margin 'requirements, an-investor may purchase a -margin-portfolio and see-'it decline 57 before he is subject to a margin call, assuming a 30 maintenance requirement. If, however, initial margin is 50, a drop of only 28 will produce the 30 equity figure and trigger a request for additional collateral. It is not too hard to envision portfolios purchased last summer undergoing declines of this magnitude. What may have been seen in late October, in other words, is a normal correction after a four-year advance being sharply exacerbated by levels of margin equity we now know to have been less than conservative. We will try to explore these levels and their implications in subsequent issues. Dow-Jones Industrials (1200 p.m.) S&P Composite (1200 p.m.) Cumulative Indes (11/9/78) 808.13 94.84 666.41 ANTHONY W. TABELL DELAFIELD, HARVEY, TABELL AWTrak No statement or of opmion or any other matter herein contolned IS, or IS to be deemed to be, directly or mdlrectly, on offer or the SOIICI'otlon of on offer to buy or sell any referred 10 or mentioned The moiler IS preented merely for Ihe conve',enn of the subscriber While oNe believe the sources of our rnformo tron to be relrable, we rn no woy represent or guarantee the occurocy there;f nor of the statements mude herem Any actron to be token by Ihe subscriber should be based on hrs own rnveslrgallon and Informotlo'l Janney Montgomery Scott, Inc, as a corporation, and lIs officers or employees, may now have, or may later toke, posltlonl or irades ,n respect to any securities mentioned In thiS or any future Issue, and such position may be different from any views now or hereafter c1pressed In thiS or any other luue Janney Montgomery Scott, Inc, which IS registered with the SEC as an Investment adVisor, may give adVice 10 Its Investment adVisory and othel customers Independently of any statements made In thiS or In any other Issue Further Informallon on any securrty mentioned herein IS available on request

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Tabell’s Market Letter – November 17, 1978

Tabell’s Market Letter – November 17, 1978

Tabell's Market Letter - November 17, 1978 page 1
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r — ——-I TABELL'S i MARKET JLETTER \ 909 STATE ROAD, PRINCETON, NEW JERSEY 08540 DIVISION OF MEMBER NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE, INC MEMBER AMERICAN STOCK eXCHANGe November 17, 1978 this..oweek the stock market found itself once more in the vicinity of (actually, in the caseof most av-erages, slightly reacheif'adhe end of'Ocfober. differefi'cP– ….co,– appeared to be that action had become somewhat less frenetic. Volume, which had peaked at the 45-60 million share level a couple of weeks before, had dried up to around 25-30 million shares a day, and even the move to new lows early this week was unable to produce much in the way of followthrough, as the Dow twice rallied from around the 780 level. The history of markets which have behaved the way this one has lends little hope that the present torpor will be more than a temporary respite. It appears appropriate, however, to take advantage of the lull to try to review just what has taken place. We will admit freely to Our own lack (l)f prescience and confess that we detected nothing in the trad- ing activity of, say, August-September to suggest that an imminent decline of the sort of magnitude October produced was in the cards. For the past year, there have existed, to be sure, a number of bearish factors, most of them relating not directly to the action of the market itself but to conditions in the money and credit markets which had, by last summer,begun to display a high degree of similarity to conditions preceeding prior stock market drops. We made the choice, at the time, to ignore thos e factors on the theory that they were inconsistent with the story being told by the market itself. That story became altered very quickly as distributional patterns were formed throughout September. Subsequent downside penetration of these distributional patterns led, of course, to the weakness we have just experienced. Even granting that patterns suggesting some vulnerability did build up during September, however, those patterns did not suggest, under normal conditions, a drop of the severity of the one which took place. It is an axiom of technical work that distributional tops do not generally suggest a single down- side target but rather a range of possible downside objectives. It is also usually true, that when the — do. not. generallymove to.theirdowns ide targets …s taneously but rather at intervals over a period of time. In'the present case, the lower limits of the of downside targets appear to have been reached in the vast majority of cases, and the reaching of those lower limits seems to have been compressed Into a relatively short time period, a period, covering, by and large, the past two weeks. What might, under another set of circumstances, have been a normal corrective phase became in reality something a great deal more painful. It is, of course, worthwhile asking why all this should have been so in this particular Instance. Quite obviously, there were factors present in the fil)al quarter of 1978 not common to past similar market phases. We suggested in last week's letter that one such factor might have been what we now know to be an un- healtl level of margin borrowing, and we intend to comment further on this particular aspect. However, it is probably of more immediate importance to attempt to assess, the trauma of October-November, 1978 having taken place, just what it may portend for the market's futUre. Perhaps the most Important statement that can be made is that, despite the suddeness of occurance and surpr ising extent of the October-November difficulties, they do not alter, In our view, the basic technical assessment made last summer. The pattern does not suggest to us the onset of a conventional cyclical bear market. The technical difficulties that have manifested themselves have done so by and large in a particular segment of the market, the secondary Issues that had, contra-cyclically, been gOing through a four-year advance, which, by its very nature, had left them vulnerable, especially to the extent that that advance had been fueled by credit. By contrast, the stocks representing the vast preponderance of U.S. equity market value had moved up, by late summer, only by a modest amount from a two-year bear market low and have, by now, retraced just about 1/2 of that advance. The patterns which would suggest major cyclical vulnerability in large-capitalization stocks were not then and are not now present. -The 'levels of these stocks-, moreover, as'our fundamentalist brethren-have aBundantly pointed out,-are ' at historical nadirs in relation to earnings, dividends and book value. We have just spent a year and a half, during which primary and secondary issues moved in diametrically opposite directions — the former down- ward and the latter upward. A simple reversal of thos e roles v.o uld not, in our view, be all that incredible an occurance. None of this is intended by us to suggest undue optimism concerning the market's immediate future. As we noted above, a test of the October low is now obviously taking place, and a series of such tests would not be an historically unprededentedevent. Nor would it be unprededented for such tests to pro- duce new lows in the averages by fairly significant amounts. It will, furthermore, be extremely dif- ficult for the market to recover internally from the technical damage which has been inflicted upon it. We do not, however, tend to see Armageddon present in the market forces which have now been built up any more than was the case a few months ago. Da…. -Jones Industrials (1200 p. m.) 796.52 S&P Composite (1200 p.m.) 94.13 ANTHONY W. TABELL DELAFIELD, 'HARVEY, TABELL Cumulative Index (11/16/78) 653.64 No statement or expression of opinion or any other molter herein contained IS, or IS TO be deemed To be, directly or Indirectly, on offer or Ihe soliCitaTion of an offer sell ony security referred to or menTioned The matter IS presented merely for the of the subScriber While we believe Ihe sources of our Informa iion TO be reliable, we In no way represent or guaronlee Ihe accuracy thereof nor of the statements mude herein Any action to be taken by the subSCriber should be hosed on hiS own investigation and Information Janney Montgomery Scoll, Inc, as a corporaTion, and lIs officers or employees, may now have, or may laer toke, poSitions or trades In respect to any SeCurities mentioned In this or any future Issue, and such position may be different from any views now or hereafter expressed In this or any other Issue Janney Montgomery Stctt, Inc, which IS registered With the SEC as an Investment adVIsor, may give adVice 0 lIs Investment adVISOry and othel customers Independently of any statements made In thiS or In any other Issue Further Informallon on any security mentioned herein IS aVailable on request t\ i …' ! i i a.-…,., 0 — t-' w w0 (f) – .z…., Z tel a I ' to b; – …. ,.- ….. …- .. .. . …… .. 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Tabell’s Market Letter – November 24, 1978

Tabell’s Market Letter – November 24, 1978

Tabell's Market Letter - November 24, 1978
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TABELL'S MARKET LETTER 909 STATE ROAD, PRINCETON, NEW .JERSEY 081540 DIVISION OF MEMBER NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE, INC MEMBER AMEftlCAN STOCK EXCHANQE o -cO. S'lnce 'f!gues I;'een' ava or margin' a November ccounts in 24, 1978 'haiv'e.;..-…… generally moved in the same direction as stock prices, but more sharply. The chart on the opposide page shows this to be true, until the Dow Jones InElllstrial Average from its 1976 high declined to its February 1978 low. Uncharacteristically during this time, margin debt increased uninterrupted to new high through September of this year. Two important influences both hard to quantify for this spectacular increase would seem to be clients' borrowing money for non-stock purposes from the margin account and the convenient use of the margin account for the next-day settlement of option trades. the new game in town. Margin credit has been singled out for selective control ever since the Securities and Ex- change Act of 1934. which directed the Federal Reserve to prevent the excessive use of credit in the purchase and carrying of securities. It is important to note this concept of excessive credit use relates not to the level of margin debt but rather to the actual or potential effect of such credit on the stock market. Initial margin requirements are not aimed at restricting the total amount of margin debt to some predetermined level. Instead, the Federal Reserve's purpose, it would seem, is first in rising markets to limit the magnitude of credit-based buying pressure generated by riSing loan values and second in declining markets to provide a buffer between customers' initial equity and the minimum maintenance levels that would initiate wide spread margin calls. The changes in the level of these initial margins affect relative rates or credit expansion or contraction as compared with stock price changes over the same period. Much attention has been given in recent week to the Federal Reserves' responsibilities in !he 910ser the borr!wers' initial margin is to the minimum maintenance margin requirements of the New York Stock Exchange, the greater the possibility that price declines will lead to margin calls. This forced selling exerts downward pressure on an already falling market. New declines then trigger more margin calls causing a perpetualizlng spiral of selling pressure, price decline, etc. This scenerio is not necessarily meant to explain Or simplify the behavior of our recent stock market. However, it Is interesting to look at the action of the stock market since the short-term oversold selling climax occurred last October. Since then, the market has rallied over 35 paints in one day, unsuccessfully tested the selling climax low, returned to a more normalized, albiet volitile, condition, and rallied to date over twenty pOints from its November 14th low of 785.26. This oversold condition was triggered in part by the declining quality of credit in margin accounts in an environment of short-term falling prices and high interest rates. Since statistics have been available, similarities can be seen between recent figures on the quality of margin debt and the figures registered at the 1974 low. In September, 1974, the quality of margin debt deteriorated seriously as 22 of customers' margin accounts were under 40 equity compared to 21 in October, 1978. Additionally, in September 1974, this represented 58 of the total margin debt under 40 compared to 47 in October, 1978. We are, of course, familiar with the two- year perfromance of the market since the 1974 low (October 4, 1975, DJIA 584.56 – September 21, 1976, DJIA 1014.76 73.60). It must be noted, however, en route to this spectacular advance an initial short-term rally of 90.19 points occured posting a high on November 5 or 674.75 which was followed immediately by a decline of 97.15 points to a low of 577.60 penetrating the selling climax low by a slight margin. Selling climaxes of this type are not unprecedented'October 1957, –May the behaviorof margin debt s't'a1iStics aCOr nea7iil'ajor marketllOitoms-' can be instructive. As previously painted out in this letter, climax lows are not always the actual lows in averages but rather tend to reflect an effective market bottom. The market action at the end of last October fits the criteria of a short-term selling climax. Historically, these conditions have occurred at Significant market bottoms — this possibility should not be discounted. Dow-Jones Industrials (1200 p.m.) S&P CompOSite (1200 p.m.) Cumulative Index (11/22/78) RJSrak 806.65 55.39 672.79 ROBERT J. SIMPKINS, JR. DELAFIELD, HARVEY, TABELL No tclement or expression of opinion or any olher matier herem contolned IS, or IS 10 be deemed to be, directly or Indlrectlr.' an offer Of the sollcltotlon of on offer to buy or sell (lnr. sl!cvruy referred to or mentioned The matter IS presented merely for the converlence of the subSCriber Whl e we believe the sources of Iur mformo- tlon to be rei lab e, we In no way represent or guarantee the occuracy thereof nor of the mude herem Any achon to be taken by the subSCriber should be based on his own Investigation and Information Janney Montgomery Scott, Inc, as a corporat,on, Clnd Its offoers or employees, may now have, or may later take, positions or trades In respect to any securities mentioned mil-lis or any future ISsue, and such posillon may be different from any views now or hereafter (lxpressed m In)s or cny olner ISsue Janney Montgomery Scott, Inc, ,nlch /5 registered woh Ine SEC as on InveMmenl adVisor, may gIVe adVice to lIs Investment adViSOry and olhel customers Independently of any statements made In thiS or In onf other Inue Further information on any security menlloned hcrCln h available on request

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