Viewing Month: May 1986

Tabell’s Market Letter – May 02, 1986

Tabell’s Market Letter – May 02, 1986

Tabell's Market Letter - May 02, 1986
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— — ——-..,.—————————–,;—-. TABELL'S MARKET LETTER 600 ALEXANDER ROAD, PRINCETON, NEW JERSEY 08540 MEMBER NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE, INC MEMBER NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF SECURITIES DEALERS, INC (609) 9872300 May 2, 1986 We are attempting, this week, once more to take up the cudgel following a two-month enforced medIcal absence. As has been the case in the past when we have spent long periods away from our desk ,-we..d!vg triedto …follow ,.,the ,.-mar-ket as.,.closely .. as … circumstances -allowed-. -T-he ,major impression– which emerges from that inspection is that very little seems to have changed since we entered the hospital in early March. This remains true despite the 42-point, Wednesday declIne in the Dow, WhICh found itself hailed in many headlines as the largest decline in hIstory. The above characterization, without qualification, appeared in a number of quarters WhICh should have known better. The drop of 41. 91 in the DJIA was indeed the deepest ever for that average in terms of points, a statistic which (no pun intended) is pointless. As we and our fellow technicians have been lamenting for years, the significance of a decline can only be measured in percentage terms, and in those terms the Dow's 2.3 drop can hardly be considered a disaster. Over the past 60 years, in fact, there have occured no fewer than 362 one-day declines of greater magnitude. Since there have, in those 60 years, been 16,304 trading days, the average expectation is that such a decline should appear no fewer than 1 day in every 50. This should hardly be the stuff of headlines. We have, for what it is worth, a suggestion as to how one ought to think about the large num- bers of points which have characterized recent market swings. Subconciously, our thinking about the market is probably largely conditIOned by the eighteen years ended 1982, durmg which the Dow remained confined in a trading range whose average level was roughly half today's. Wednesday's 40-point drop, therefore, has about the same significance as a 20-point decline in terms of most in- vestor's psychological conditioning. It is probably therefore appropriate, in considering future mar- ket swings, to divide them by two before becoming wildly excited about their significance. In any case, the 10-day drop from the April 21st high appears, so far at least, to be nothing more than a loss of momentum, and a minor one at that. As our colleague, Bob Simpkins, pOInted out in this space while he was ably filling in for us, the April peak in the Dow was confIrmed by both daily and weekly breadth indexes. Our readers are aware that such breadth peaks tend to -..lead peakill-'-Jhe-Dow-by intervals, measured minimally in months and often.in years. Other .statI.s–'-,I tics confirm the market's continued upside momentum. As recently as February 18th, 452 daIly new highs were scored–just about equalling the 454 posted a year ago. There has been some deteriora- tion since (only 332 new highs on April 16th), but new highs historically have peaked as much as 2 years before the end of a bull market. It thus appears that there is little cause for alarm from this sector at the moment. Indeed, despite Wednesday's sharp drop, the market continues to set one peculiar record. To date, 351 trading days have passed since the Dow has seen a 5 correction, the last one having ended in December, 1984. The upswing now has become the third longest in history without such a correction, having surpassed the December, 1953-January, 1955 perIod, and is now exceeded only by the 410-day advance of December, 1957, – August, 1959 and the 370-day rise following the Kennedy assasination low of November, 1963. About the worst thing that can be said about the recent action it that it may have laid the groundwork for the development of future vulnerability. The average has now returned to the 1800- 1770 level within which it spent most of the early part of April. Further trading in this region, followed by a decisive break below 1770, might eventually suggest a correctIon approaching intermediate- term in scope, but such evidence is not yet present. Nor does it seem, to date at least, to be present in individual stock patterns. There exists at the moment I according to our own reading, a surprisingly small number of tops, most of these cen- tered in the financial area, suggesting perhaps only that the recent rather amazmg bond-market rally may be in need of some consolidation. Indeed, what may emerge from the current downswing may well be a shift in leadership rather than a decline. The improving short-term action of over-the-counter, secondary issues was noted in this space last week. Such issues could well emerge as upside leaders once the present correction is complete. The maturity of the present advance is a fact w.,ll known to the readers of . thIS !etter, 'fll1 It . IS indeed possible that the action of the past ten days may constitute some erly, tentatIve steps m the process of unwinding that upswing. Before this takes place. howeve, eVldence a good deal more significant than that provided by a miniscule week-and-a-half drop WIll have to accumulate. Dow Jones Industrial Average (12 00 noon) 1784.47 S & P Composite (12 00 noon) 235.61 Cumulative (5/1/86) 2679.25 ANTHONY W. TABELL DELAFIELD, HARVEY, TABELL, INC. No statement or aprCSSlon 01 opinion or any other matter herein contained IS or IS to be deemed 10 be, directly or Indirectly, an ofter or Ihe SoliCitation 01 an ollello buy or sell any security referred toor mentioned The matter IS presented merely lor the convenience of the subscriber While we believe the sources 01 our Information to be reliable, weln no way represent or guarantee the accuracy thereol nor 01 the statements made herein Any aCllon to be taken by the subscrtber should be based on hiS own investigatIon and Infomallon Delafield, Harvey, Tabelt Inc, as a corporatIon and ItS officers or employees, may now have, 01 mav latCf tae poSitions Of trades In respecl to any securities mentioned In thiS or anv future Issue, and such position may be dlflercnt lrom any views now or hereafter e'pressed 111 this or any other Issue Delafield Harvey labelt Inc, which IS registered With the SECas an Investment adVisor, may give adVice to Its Investment adVisory and other customers Independently 01 any statements made In thIS or In any other Issue Further Information on any secullty mentIoned herein IS avaIlable on request

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Tabell’s Market Letter – May 09, 1986

Tabell’s Market Letter – May 09, 1986

Tabell's Market Letter - May 09, 1986
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TABELL'S MARKET LETTER 600 ALEXANDER ROAD. PRINCETON. NEW JERSEY 08540 MEMBER NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE. INC MEMBER NATIONAL ASSOCIATION O.F SECURITIES DEALERS. INC (609) 987-2300 May 9, 1qR6 We took exception. in last week's letter. to the recent tendency on the part of many market reporters to attach exaggerated importance to the large number of points by which the Dow Jones Industrial Average has recently tended to move back and forth. There have. for example, been 1 threeDJJAll1oyesofgreae ,than. 30pointsin tRe .month ,of-April,.and- there were. four such il1oves-I du ring March. Since the previous record for the number of lO-point moves in an entire year was six, scored in 1982, the imtIal impression is that recent market behavior has been extremely volatile. We noted that this false impression is solely attributable to the fact that the Dow, at around 1800, IS around twice the level where It spent about twenty years prior to 1982. Changes measured in points therefore, tend, qUIte simply, to be twice as great. Yet, it may well be asked. are there not a number of new factors in today's market which contribute to increased volatility One obvious such factor would be the emergence of futures- related buy and sell programs. the putative existence of which has lately become everyone's favorite explanation as to whv the market suddenly rocketed in one direction or another. There exists. however, no apparent evidence that buy and sell programs have had any effect whatsoever on overall market volatility. STANDARD DEVIATION OF DRILl LOG CHRNGES DOW JONES INDUSTRIAL AVERAGE MONrHL1 1926 – DRfE The chart above first appeared In this space In December. 1982. after the upsIde explosion in the second half of that year engendered comments on volatility similar to those we are heanng today. The chart, qmte simplv. for each month from 1926 to date. measures the standard deviation from the mean of the daily log changes in the Dow for that month. Those familiar with statistics will understand the arcane language of the previom. sentence. Others need only to know that a log change IS similar to (but more accurate than) a percentage change. and that the standard deviation is simply a measure of variabilitv. The chart, updated to laClt month. continues to show what it showed four years ago. I! mdICates. first of all. that market volatilitv, not unexpectedly.peal,ed in the 19291932 era, subsequently declined to the early 1940's and has more or less remained constant ever since. The standard deviation for most months has averaged around .5 (the scale is multiplied hv 100) which means that most changes tended to fall within one-half of one percent of theIr mean. There have been, since the 1940's, occasional peaks above the 1.5 level–most recently in 1982–and these have turned out to he useful indIcators of market bottoms. Since early 1983, however, the monthly stanrlard deviation has ranged between .5 and a bit over I, which is almost precisely the range that has characterized the-decade-and-a-half since 1970. In terms of average volatility. therefore, nespite appearances to the contrarv. there has been absolutely no evident change in market beh'lvior for the past 15 years. Dow Jones Industrial Average (1200 noon) 1781.37 S & P 500 (12 00 noon) 236.77 Composite (5/8/86) 2694.12 ANTHONY W. TABELL DELAFIELD, HARVEY, TABELL, INC. NO slatemenl or e…presSlon at opll'1lon or any other matter herem contamed IS or Is to be deemed to be directly or IIldlrectly an orler or the soliCitation of an offer to buyor sell any security fe!errecl 10 or mentioned The matter IS presented merely for the convenience of the subSCriber While we believe the sources 01 our mformahon to be reliable, we In no way represent or guarantee the accuracy thernel nOf 01 the statements made herein Any action to be taren by the subSCriber should be based on hiS own Inyestlgatlon and information Delaheld, Harvey, labell tnc, as a corporation and 115 of/lcers or employees may now have, or may laler take, positIOns or trades In respect to any seCUrities mentioned In thiS or any fulure Issue, and such pOSition may be dillerent from any YleWS now or heleaf\er expressed In thiS or any other Issue Oelafleld Harvey label! tnc ,WhiCh IS registered With the SEC as an Investment adVisor, may give adVice 10 liS mveSlment adVisory and other customers mdependent!y of any statements m3de In thiS or In any other ISSue Further Inform3tlon on any security mentioned herem IS avallabte on request

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Tabell’s Market Letter – May 16, 1986

Tabell’s Market Letter – May 16, 1986

Tabell's Market Letter - May 16, 1986
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11 ISUE Il..Il.. ' S (jl1j IRl IEII 1l..IEIIIIlEIRl 600 ALEXANDER ROAD, PRINCETON, NEW JERSEY 08540 MEMBER NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE, INC MEMBER NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF SECURITIES DEALERS, INC (609) 987-2300 r– May 16, 1986 In what seems like a previous incarnation (although it was only last February), we devoted a series of three letters to outlining what we thought were some rather amazing parallels between both stock-market and economic behavior in the 1920's and in the lQ80's. This discussion was ——interrupteir bv our recent h'iJ'SPiWStliV7and we woum.. liketobeg- oadersl fnaulgto– — —,. take it up once again so as finally to get our thoughts on this subject off our chest. The original letters, it will 1)e recalled, focused on the period August, 1921 – February, 192fi and its similarity to the time frame of August, 1982 to date. Both periods featured stock markets which advanced by about the same amount, although the current one remains just a bit short of its predecessor and would have to move ahead to around 2,000 to equal it. Both advances featured mid-course interruptions–Novemher, 1983 – July, 1984 in the present case– which could be characterIzed as conohriation phases rather than full scale corrections. Both markets were characterized by similarities in maior features of the economic environment, notahly falling inflation and a decline in interest rates. We pointed out, rather emphatically, that todav's market had not yet duplicated the entire cycle, which ended so unhappily in 192Q. In order to do that, we would have, at some point, to undergo another relatively mild consolidation phase, of perhaps a year in length, following the recent high or, more probably, a subsequent high later to be reached .. That consolidation would have to be followed by an upswing which, if it duplicated that of 1927'1929 exactly, would reach the 4,000-5,000 level. Such a level would be attained, if it were like 1927-29, with little in the way of economic or corporate-profits improvement to justify it. Since 1929 occured over 50 years ago, economic and stock-market historians have had ample opportunity for detailed examination and consequent self-flagellation. We are all now, with the virtue of 20/20 hindsight, fully aware that 1929's villain was speculative mania facilitated and fueled by rising levels of margin debt. We have, in the intervening half-century, developed an incredibly sophisticated array of tools and indiclltors to monitor and control the emergence of similar conditions. Yet one of the fascinating attributes of the stock market is that, while II–f—tlfid-erl-yin-g-..z.beh&vior—pa-tt-erns-remain-censtant-;-su-rface….manifestations-'change-'-vadically-Aovertime. — Today's analyst who is waiting for impenriing doom to be signaled by the reemergence of the cab-driver/odd-lot speculator is due, we suspect, to wind up being sandbagged from behind. It is only necessary to recall all of the obvious changes that have taken place over the past five stock-marlet decades. During that period the individual investor has been totally supplanted as the major factor in equity-market activity by financial-intermediary institutions which now tend to account for somewhere around three-quarters of all trading. This is at total variance with the picture sixty yellrs ago when, even at the height of the hunger for common stock, the Institutional investor managed to remain largely aloof. One needs only to look at margin-deht statistics. Such deht today constitutes iust over one percent of the total value of all listed stock. In 1929, although the figures are not exactly comparable, It was probably over twelve percent. IJItimate liquidation of this debt was one of the principal causes of the 1929-2 debacle, Yet, as we suggested ahove, underlying factors, even in very different markets, tend to remain the same. The problem with 1929 and its aftermath was a stock market fueled by excessive credit. What it is necessarv to ask ourselves is what form a credit overstimulation might take today. The answer, provided by the history of the past few years, could not be clearer. That form could well turn out to be the credit-financed takeover. In terms of market effect there is absolutely no difference between an individual's horrowing to purchase shares and a corporation borrowing in order to buy an entire company. Both phenomena possess the potential for being unwound rather unpleasantly. Once more, a caution. We are making no claim whatever that the level of takeover activity to date has been either excessive or dangerous. Indeed impressive statistical evidence can be adduced that such is not the case. This could well be one of the reasons we have so far witnessed a stock market which has advanced only a fraction of the 1921-1929 amount. It is not hard to see, however, that further credit expansion, having the effect of additionally reducing the supply of common stock, could indeed lead to a subsequent contraction not unlike that of the early 1Q30's. We shall devote one further issue to discussing the possible consequences thereof, and how they mlgh t he avoided. ANTHONY W. TAB ELL AWT vfl DELAFIELD, HARVEY, TABELL, INC. Dow-Jones Industrials (12 00 noon) 1759.67 S & P 500 (1200 noon) n2.36 Cumulative Index (5/15/86) 3116.21 No statement or eyDteSSIQn 01 Opinion or any other mailer herem contamed IS or IS to be deemed to be, directly or mdlrectly an olter or the soliCitation of an olfer to buy or sell any security ret erred loor mentioned The matter IS presented merely for the conventence of the SubscHber While we belIeve the sourcesol our information to be reliable, we In no way represent or guarantee the accuracy thereof norol the statements made herein Any action to be taken by the subSCriber should be based on hiS own investigation and Informa1\on Delalleld, Harvey, Tabel1 tnc, as a corporation and ItS ollicers or employees may now have or may latertal\ll, poSl\lons or trades In respect to any seCUrities mentioned In thiS or any future Issue, and such position may be olfterent 110m any views now or hefCaher epr(!ssed In thIs or any other Issue Delatle!d, Harvey, Tabell Inc which Is registered wllh the SEC as an Investment adVisor, may give adVice 10 Its mvestment adVisory and olhor customers mdependentty 01 any statemCflts made In thiS or In any otner Issue Further Information on any secuflly mentioned herOin IS available on request

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Tabell’s Market Letter – May 23, 1986

Tabell’s Market Letter – May 23, 1986

Tabell's Market Letter - May 23, 1986
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TABELL'S MARKET LETTER 600 ALEXANDER ROAD, PRINCETON, NEW JERSEY 08540 MEMBER NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE, INC MEMBER NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF SECURITIES DEALERS, INC (609) 987-2300 May 23, 1986 11./1', – \., DU4 been .-tr.y-ing–to–accomplish…in. recent- maket-comment has consiste(i of'—-;;.. trying to set apparently unusual price behavior into perspective. We have, for example, been trying to point out that seemingly large moves (Thursday's 31-point rise in the Dow for example) are a perfectly normal phenomenon with the Dow now in the area of 1800. Likewise, the market's behavior over the past couple of months may appear unusual, and therefore, perhaps portentious. Is is certainly arguable, however, that it consists of nothing more than a return to normality following more than a year of action which, however pleasant, has been somewhat unique. The uptrend which characterized most of 1985 was noteworthy both for extent and persistence. A stock-market chart has two dimensions, price and time, and a trend tends to gain importance by covering large distances in either dimension. Thus a market which goes up a great deal quite obviously creates a trend which is increasingly noticable. The same is true for markets which proceed in the same direction for a long period of time. It can hardly be gainsaid that, until lately, the Dow has moved up sharply; it was under 1300 as recently as last September. It has also done so persistently. We have lately been pointing out that the last five-percent correction occured in December, 1984. Likewise, since the September, 1985, low, new highs have been almost a daily event, with the longest interval between such a phenomenon eighteen days in January. These records have now been broken. It is currently twenty-three days since the DJIA attained its all-time peak on April 21st, and we have finally achieved a five-percent retracement with the Dow's close at 1758.18 on Monday. All this has produced a pattern shown in its five-point, point-and-figure figuration at rlt;'-'-'. ' vnu ;;'!. 1U 1 'w example of what often 'no P & F analysis difficult. The pattern, under normal circum- stances, might appear ominous, possesing many of the attributes of a complex head-and- shoulders top. The problem is in the two downward spikes, to 1725 in early April, and the recent downthrust to 1755. Both of these were of course quickly recovered, the last one by Thursday's and today's rally. The presence of the spikes may indicate that the formation consists of a whole series of individual patterns and is, therefore, of little significance. On the other hand, it is often advisable in such cases to ignore the downward thrusts and simply interpret the pat- tern as a conventional top with a low around 1770. If this is the case, a decline of inter- mediate proportions, very possibly to the low 1600's becomes a possibility. This again needs to be put into perspective, however, as it would constitute, on a percentage basis. a fall of 12-13, hardly disastrous given the market's 1985 rise. Furthermore even were this most pessimistic interpretation to be the correct one, and this is, as noted. by no means yet certain. it would certainly run out all existing downside objectives and leave the market poised for a further advance. AWTvfI Dow-Jones Industrials (1200 noon) 1830.85 S & P 500 (1200 noon) 241.41 Cumulative Index (5/22/86) 3146.07 ANTHONY W. TABELL DELAFIELD, HARVEY, TABELL, INC. No statement or erpresslon of OplnlQn or any othel matter herem contained IS or IS 10 be deemed to be directly or Indirectly. an oUer or the solicitation 01 an offer to buyar sell any secunly referred tOOf mentioned The matter IS presented merely lor Ihe convenience of the subscriber While we behevelhe sources 01 QUlin/ormation to be reliable. we In no way represent or guarantee the accuracy thereof nor olthcstatememsmado he'em Any aCllon)o be laxen bl' the sl.Ibscllher Should be based on his own JnYE'stlgalJon and mformaflOfI Delafield, Harvey, labe)) Inc, as a corporation and lIs officers or employees, may now havj) or may Laler take, POSitions or trades In respect to any securities mentioned In thiS or any future Issue, and such pOSll!on may be dil!eron! from any views nowor hClea/tcr cpressed In thiS or any other Issue De!afleld Harvey labell Inc which IS registered with the SEC as an Investment adVisor, mayg!ve atlvlceto ItS Investment adVisory and other customers Independently 01 anv statements made In thiS 01 10 anv other Issue Further Informallon on any security menlloned heroin IS available on reQuest

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Tabell’s Market Letter – May 30, 1986

Tabell’s Market Letter – May 30, 1986

Tabell's Market Letter - May 30, 1986
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'1TLiu'(!UE n..n..' s 1ilfIlIRl rE'1T L.rE'1T'1TrElRl 600 ALEXANDER ROAD, PRINCETON, NEW JERSEY 08540 MEMBER NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE, INC MEMBER NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF SECURITIES DEALERS, INC (609) 987-2300 ,, I.. May 30, 1986 -As, the majorJverages or-.some. of-themat any-rate)-go-sailing—on-to new highs.–there seem – -, to be developing two schools of thought as regards market forecasting. The first of these can be characterized as the it's-going-to-go-up-forevertl school which tends to gain more adherents the longer it proves to be the apparently correct one, which, of course, it has managed to do for some four years now. The second view, which, while losing adherents, manages to retain its die-hard supporters, can be referred. to as the early-puritan school of analysis. The rationale for this coterie of gloom-and-doomers has always been that a bull market constitutes a form of debauchery for which there must ultimately exist retribution in the form of fiancial damnation. Technicians, within limits, tend to be more sympathetic to the former view, since one of the basic tenets of technical work has always been that an established trend tends to remain in force. We have invariably been forced to recognize, however, that, at some point, a trend can become overextended, and a corrective process may become required. Our own stance of late has been to place ourselves somewhere between the two extremes mentioned above. The market has reached a stage. we think, where dogmatism, in either direction, becomes unwise, and it is best to allow the market to tell its own story. This got us into trouble last week. We tried in our last issue to explore the possibility that the Dow, which, since March, had shown some loss of momentum, might be in the process of forming a modest top formation. We did note that such an interpretation was far from a certainty, and the wisdom of this particular hedge was almost immediately validated by this week's move to new highs. Concerning this move, a few factors must be noted, which, for the time being at least, may tend to raise some doubts. The high remains unconfirmed by breadth–which reached its peak back in mid-April–although we are unable to get unduly worried about this failure, since breadth indicators have behaved well enough to confirm new peaks with any market strength. We cannot, however, say that we are terribly impressed with the 190 new highs, fewer than ten percent of issues traded. posted on Wednesday. Nor does what is, so ff!!J a succession of three lower highs, in March, April, and May, in both the Transport and Utility'averages, engender a great deal of confidence. We admit. we are purposely, here, being picky. All the indicators mentioned above are designed to provide fairly significant lead times on peaks in the averages. Since most of them have not yet provided anything like definitive sell signals, it is undeniably best to continue to assume that the course of least resistence remains upward. Nonetheless, the forecaster can be pardoned for being less confident of this particular scenario than might have been the case a couple of years ago. The investor, along with the forecaster. may also, as the upswing continues, be forced to live with a greater level of discomfort than that to which he has been accustomed in recent years. The basic tenet of modern portfolio theory and the capital asset pricing model suggests that excess returns are achieved only by the assumption of excess risk. There is a good deal of theoretical truth to this formulation, but we have never accepted the purists' reasoning that it holds true in all times and all places. The early years of the 1982-198 bull market were a perfect example of a period when this particular law somehow got suspended. By and large, superior returns tended to be earned by a whole bunch of stocks, mostly consumer-related and interestsensitive, which should, theoretically, have gone up a great deal less than the market as a whole. As the stock market advanced, large numbers of issues, many trading over-the-counter, whose historical beta-coefficients were huge, were totally failing to participate in one of the greatest bull markets in decades. We enjoyed, in other words, a period when the investor could sit back with confidence holding a portfolio of high-quality stocks and still enjoy above-average returns. We doubt that this comfortable situation will continue as 1986 wears on. We would expect the theoretical construct to reassert itself, so that. if excess returns are to be achieved. it will have to be in secondary stocks. It seems to us, moreover, 'perfectly pardonable to be somewhat nervous about such a switch at a time when the market has already moved up close to 150 percent. The path of least resistence, unquestionably. remains the upward one, but the unusual momentum that has characterized the bull market to date is unlikely, we think, to prevail throughout 1986. AWTvfl Dow-Jones Industrials (1200 noon) 1887.33 S. & P. 500 (1200 noon) 247.59 Cumulative Index (5/29/86) 3202.71 ANTHONY W. TAB ELL DELAFIELD. HARVEY, TABELL, INC. No statement or expression of opinion or any other matter herein contained IS or IS \0 be deemed to be dlrectty Of indirectly, an offer or the soHcltabon of an offer to buy or sell any security referred to or ment loned The matter IS presented merely for the convenience oj the subSCriber White we believe the sources of our information 10 be reliable, we In no way represent or guarantee the accuracy thereof nor 01 the statements made herein Any action to be taen by the subscriber Should be based on his own inVestigation and Informal Ion Delafield, Harvey, Tabell Inc, as a corporation and Its oilicers or employees may now have, or may later take positions or !fades In rcspect to any secufilies menlloned In thiS or any luture Issue, and such POSition may be dlHerenl from any views nowol helca/ler expressed In thiS or any other Issue oela/leld Harvey Tabell Inc, which IS registered With the SECasan Investment adVisor may give advice to ItS Investment adVISory and other customers independently of any statements made In th1S or In any other Issue Further Information on any secunty mentioned heteln IS available on request

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