.', TABELL'S MARKE.r, LETTER' 909 STATE ROAD, PRINCETON. NEW JERSEY 08540 DIVISION OF MEMBER NEW YORI( STOCK EXCHANGE. INC MEMBER AMERICAN STOCK eXCHANGE . March 14, 1980 'thes-teepnessOf 'the94 28-poillf decline- .. – in the Dow-Jones Industrial Average which, since its recent high of 903.84 posted on February 13 of this year has, in the short period of 21 trading days, declined 10.45 to a low of 809.56 on Thursday of this week. This letter recently discussed the possibility of market weakness over the short term, citing the possibility of a move to the 800 level. The correction best measured by the Dow-Jones Industrial Average five-point unit chart indicates a downside objective of 805795. However, to date, all the available technical evidence does not 'suggest any sort of major long-term deterioration from these levels, particularly in the broader-based Stardard & Poors and New York Stock Exchange Composite averages. The market, quite obviously is oversold short term, by any measure that might be applied. The familiar 10-day advance /decline oscillator which on March 7 reached an oversold condition of -5806 is by no means a record. This was, however, recorded on October 27, 1978 when the 10day advance/decline oscillator reached -9382. To make these figures more compatable historically, they could be adjusted for the number of issues traded, as we have done in the past when discussing long-term breadth of the market studies. However, for this exercise, raw advance /decline data is used, which does not distort the results significantly, only limits the observations to recent periods. A study of the history of this oscillator over the years reflects a tendency of the Dow-Jones Industrial Average to rally after these oversold levels have been reached. 10-Day -Total DJIA Percent DJIA Percent DJIA Percent Date Adv-Dec DJIA 30 Dars Change 60 Days Change 120 Days Change . Aug 29 1966 -6,288 767.03 758.63 -1. 095 796.82 3.884 847.88 10.541 May 26 1970 -6,259 631.16 682.09 8..069 723.99 14.708 768.00 21. 681 Nov 26 1973 -5,898 824.95 834.79 1.193 846.84 2.654 818.84 -0.741 Oct 27 1978 -9,382 806.05 817.65 1. 439 846.41 5.007 856.98 6.318 Oct 22 1979 -6,682 809.13 824.91 1. 950 863.57 6.728 000.00 0.000 Mar 7 1980 -5,806 820.56 O.OU 0.000 000.00 0.000 000.00 0.000 . To justify this statement, with the help of our computer, the table above lists every oversold condition where a plurality of declines outnumber advances by 5800 or more to include the most current oversold condition. . It is interesting to note that there have been only six of these observations ever recorded, all occurring over the last 15-year period. The remainder of the table lists the DJIA close as of each oversold condition and then reviews the performance of the DJIA 30,60, and 120 days from the oversold condition. A casual inspection of the table shows the DJIA has advanced from the oversold condition in 12 of the 14 time periods observed. The two periods not advancing were down an average of less than one percent. The average advance of the 3O-day period was 2.31, 60-day period was 6.60, and 120-day period 9.45. Clearly what this data suggests is the tendency for markets to rally from their ultimate sharply- oversold condition. If we assume the March 7 figure of – 5806 was the ultimate oversold condition, and if we apply the above logic to our current market, we become not so concerned as to where the market is going on the downside from here — as mentioned earlier, 805-795 has seemed possible — but rather the behavior of the market after it rallies from its current oversold condition. It would seem, therefore, any clues for any further long-term deterioration would manifest itself from higher levels rather than the current 800 level. ROBERT J. SIMPKINS, JR. DELAFIELD, HARVEY, TAB ELL Dow-Jones Industrials (12 00 PM) 809.22 S & P Composite (12 00 PM) 105.10 Cumulative Index (3/13/80) 746.89 RJS sla No statement or expression of opinion or any other matter herein contolned IS, or IS to be deemed to be, directly or ,ndlrec1Ir,' an offer or the soJlcllohon of on offer to buy or scll ony secunTy referred 10 or mentioned The molter IS presented merely for the conver'lenC! of the subscriber Wh! e e believe the sources of our mforma lion 10 be reliable, we In no way represent or guarantee The accuracy Ihereof naf of Ihe statements mude heleln Any cctlon to be token by the ubcrlber should be based on hiS own mvest,gat,on and mformollon Janney MonTgomery Scott, Inc. os a corporotlon, and ItS officers or employees, moy now hove, or moy later toke, poSlhons or hades ,n respect to any SecUfltll.lS mentioned m thiS or any fulure lSue, ond such position moy be dlfferenl from onv views now or hereofler c)(pressed m Ih,s or ony other Issue Jonney Montgomery Stoll, Inc, which 15 regiStered With the SEC as on Inveslment adVisor, may give adVICe to la Investment adVisory and olhel customers Independently of any stalements mode In It-us or m ony olher Issue Further Information on ony.securlty menlulned herein !5 ovollable !;In request

TABELL'S MARKET LETTER 909 STATE ROAD. PRINCETON, NEW JERSEY 08540 DIYISION OF MEMBEFI NEW VORl( STOCK eXCHANGE, INC MEMBER AMERICAN STOCK EXCHANGE The short-term weakness in the Dow-Jones Industrial Average continues. From the recent high of 903.84 on February 13 of this year. the DJIA has declined 115.19 points to 788.65 in the short period of 22 trading da'ys. averaging durmg this period a 5.24-point per day decline. During the declme In the DJIA (-12.74) comparable performances were registered in the broader-based averages such as the Standard & Poors Composite (-13.66) and the New York Stock Exchange Composite (-14.09). Last week's market letter examined the technically oversold condition which exists in the current stock market environment and tried to compare this condition to past oversold markets. The basic tenet presented last week, that markets tend to rally from their ultimate sharply oversold condition, If has. of course,' not changed. The only thing that has changed is the market has become more sharply oversold. On Monday of this week. the 10-day advance/decline oscillator reached the previous week's fIgure was -5806. Coincident with the oversold condition of the market mentioned above, the Dow-Jones Industrial Average penetrated the 1979 low of 796.67 reached November 7 of last year. This confirmed the down- side count from a top formation indicating an 805-795 objective on the five-point unit point-and-figure chart of the DJIA. The next benchmark which looms on the horizon is the February 18, 1978 low of 742.12, less than' 50 points away. Although further short-term weakness is a distinct possibility, it would appear tech- nically that the DJIA is in need of a rest. This would seem to suggest an immediate assault on the 1978 February low is unlikely. in fact, an oversold condition of historically large magnitude. coupled with technical downside objectives being reached, would argue for a rally. It has been the contention of this letter that the broader-based averages such as the Standard &' Poors Composite and the New York Stock Exchange Composite shown above reflect technical patterns which are conSIderably less vulnerable than the Dow-Jones Industrial Averages which, for the last two years, has underperformed the market. In the case of the Standard & Poors Composite (103) the short-term top recently formed indicated a possible downside target of 106 and has been exceeded. The New York Stock Exchange Composite (59) also reached the downside count from its short-term top. In both cases neither of these averages indicate a future prospect that should cause concern. The above projections are. of course, short. term. What is more important. however, is to try and place the present market condition into longterm perspective. As far as the broad-based Standard & Poors Composite and the New York Stock Exchange Composite are concerned. both patterns appear to be in well-defined major uptrends. There is nothing in these patterns to suggest that the current weakness constitutes anything mOre than a minor to mtermediate correction withIn these uptrends, and since the downside targets mentioned above have been realized. both averages are currently trading on strong support levels. The short-term technical deterioration that has taken place since the end of February would appear to be running its course. Selective individual stocks are moving into logical support levels which would suggest purchase. The correctionary phase has not changed our long-term technical outlook. Dow-Jones Industrials (11 00 AM) 790.61 S & P Composite (11 00 AM) 103.07 Cumulative Index (3/20/80) 724.66 ROBERT J. SIMPKINS, JR. DELAFIELD, HARVEY, TABELL No statement or exprenlon of opinion or any other matter herein contained IS, or to be deemed to be, dlreclly or Indirectly, (Ill offer or the of an offer to buy or any security referred to or mentIOned The molter Is presented merely for the convenience of the subSCriber While oNe believe the sources of our Informa tlon to be relloble, we In no way represent or guarantee the thereaf nor of the mude herein Any to be loken by the subSCriber should be bosed on hiS own Investigation and Information Janney MOntgomery Scolt, , as a corporation, ond It offICers or employees, moy now have, or may later take, posll!ons or Ir!;ldes In respect loony seCUrities mentioned In thiS or any future Issue, and such pOSition may be ddferent from any views now or hereafter expressed In Ihl! or any other Issue Jannty Montgomery Scott, Inc, which IS registered With the SEC os an Investment adVisor, may give odvtce to Its Investmenl OdVIKlty and olhel customers Independently of any stalements mode In ,I-lIS or In ony other l5ue further IIlformatlon on any 5eC\Hlty mentIOned herein IS avaIlable on reque5t

TABELL'S MARKET LETTER 909 STATE ROAD, PRINCETON. NEW JERSEY 08540 DIVISION OF MEMBER NEW YORK STOCK eXCHANoe, INC MEMBER AMERICAN STOCK EXCHANGE One of the reasons that a study of the stock market is fascinating is that it is almost always a blend of the new and the old, the unprecedented and the familiar. This week's action constituted a particu- larly pointed example of this combination. Few, if any, stock market pundits that we are aware of had looked to silver and other commodity prices as a possible catalyst for a collapsing stock market. Yet it turned out to be the collapse of the Hunt brothers silver holdings which produced one of the more fascinating stock market afternoons in recent memory, an afternoon in which the Dow plunged some 16 points in the penultimate hour of trading and gained back some 20 points in the final hour. If the intervention of precious metal prices into equity trading was a new phenomenon, the effect it produced was an old one. Single-mindedness and massive long positions held on borrowed money are phenomena as old as markets, and the effects they have produced have caused similar consequences over the years. Thus, from a technical point of view, Thursday's trading was straight out of the textbooks, constituting the familiar phenomenon known as a selling climax. The occurrence of this particular classic example, we must quickly point out, does not necessarily suggest that the stock market saw its absoloute low of 729.95 intraday for the Dow on Thursday after- noon. Market history is replete with what are known as multiple-climax low points, and many of them have occurred at levels somewhat higher than those which turned out to be the ultimate low. The first identifiable climax in 1974, for example, took place in August when a 27-point, 6-hour decline was fol- lowed by a 12-point, 6-hour rally. This occurred around the 680 level approximately 100 points above the ultimate low. Three similar climaxes followed, including the record one in October in which a 12.2point, 3-hour decline was followed by a 55-point, 6-hour rally. However, in comparison with recent re- versals, it must be noted that Thursday's action appears most similar to those ultimate climaxes of 1974 or to trading action in late November. 1978 when a rally over a 5-hour p-eriod. – – . – – … We have in the past in this letter used the technique of suggesting that an effective bottom has been reached. Some thought has gone into the use of this phrase. It is an attempt to recognize that a sell- ing climax represents the start of the process of probing for a bottom and that the process of probing may take a multitude of shapes and forms. Almost invariably the process includes, somewhere along the line, a test of the climactic lows and, as noted above, often a significant penetration of those lows. That penetration is usually temporary, and the ultimate recovery generally proceeds above the climax levels, but the period of uncertainty that normally follows a sharp market decline can produce all manner of results. This reminder is, we think, applicable in the present instance, since we do not foresee that the uncer- tainties which have been interjected into the commodity markets plus the chaotic credit market conditions which have accompanied the past six weeks' collapse are going to go away over night. Our feeling, however, based on Thursday's action plus the historically oversold condition which prededed it, is that the preliminary stages of a technical rebuilding process have probably begun. Part of the reason we do not project significantly lower prices is that, in our view, individual stock patterns do not show the same sort of massive distributional characteristics that were present prior to earlier major declines such as those of 1968-1970 or 1973-74. In a longer-term sense, most issues have returned to the lower part of what we think will ultimately be regarded as base formation levels, rather than having broken down following long-term up moves, with no visible support. None of this is to say that the stock market has not suffered severe technical damage over the past six weeks. This is, indeed, the case, and a numb'lr of unanswered questions remain which can be resolved only by the future pattern as it emerges. It is, nonetheless, well to remind ourselves that selling climax conditions are a product of panic and uncertainty. It has always been the course of wisdom not to succumb to the sort of atmosphere produced. Dow-Jones Industrials (12 00 PM) S & P Composite (12 00 PM) Cumulative Index (3/27/80) 764.08 99.08 660.57 ANTHONY W. TABELL DELAFIELD, HARVEY, TABELL AWT sla No stotemenl or of op,nion or any other matter herem conlc'ned IS, or IS to be deemed 10 be, directly or ind,rectly, on offer or the lol,Cllotlon of on oller to buy or sell ony securIty referred to or menlloled The moiler IS presented merely for the conver-Ientc of the subscriber While oNe believe the sources of our Informo- lion 10 be rehoble, we In no woy represent or guarantee the accuracy thereof nor of the statements mude herein Any ocllon to be by the subscriber should be based on hiS own Invesligotlon and Informatlan Janney Montgomery Scali, Inc, as a corporation, and Its officers or employees, may now hove, or may loter toke, positions or trades In respect to any seCUrities menhoned In thiS or any future Issue, and such paslhan moy be dlfferen from any views now or hereafter expessed In thiS or any other Issue Janney Montgomery Scoll. Inc , which IS registered w,th the SEC as on ,nvestment adVisor, may give adVice to ds Investment adv,sory and othel cuS\omel5 Independently of any statements made In thiS or In any other Issue Further information on any security mentioned herein ,s available on request

TABELL'S MARKET LETTER —— ————-. 909 STATE ROAD, PRINCETON, NEW JERSEY 08540 DIVISION OF MEMBER NEW VORl( STOCk eXCHANGE, tNC MEMBER AMERICAN STOCK EXCHANGE April 3. 1980 – – ;–;—— …… -..) .—-. – – -. In what must be considered normal technical action followil1g the classic intraday selling climax of March 27. the market has paused and given us some breathing space. The 17-point rally on the Dow on Friday. followed by the eight-point extension which began this week's trading. constituted a typical technical rebound. and demand. by and large. continued to manifest itself. albeit on reduced volume. for the remainder of the week. On an intraday basis. the Dow had recovered. by Wednesday. some 66 points from its March 27 intraday low of 729.95 to an intraday peak. so far. of 796.40. This constitutes a 35 recovery of the 188 points lost since the February 13 intraday high of 918.17. The task now at hand. of course. is to attempt to divine some meaning from the rather unpleasant six weeks that constituted late February and March. The first point to be made is that the decline was surprising. not in its occurrence, but in its extent. Signs of technical deterioration suggesting the probability of some sort of correction were evident in early February and were duly noted in this letter. At the same time we drew attention to this possibility. however. we also suggested that the maximum foreseeable downside target was somewhere around 800. As it turned out. this was off the mark by some 70 points. not the first time in our forecasting career that we have been taught an object lesson in humility. It is perhaps too early to reach conclusions as to precisely why the decline extended consider- ably further than technical portents would have suggested. A plausible reason. it seems to us. however. was the interjection of the metal-price collapse into a market whose major concern had been with interest rates and a credit crunch. The fact that the market this week ignored the arrival of a 20 ;–t current price expectations. It was perhaps trie unexPected silver crisis of a week ago which brought the Dow from its logical stopping place in the low 800's. a level at which it had been trading in mid-March. to the extraordinary intraday bottom attained on March 27. All this. of course. is past history. and it now remains to make some assessment of the probable future course of equity prices both over the near and the long term. In this regard. the most relevant fact at hand. we think. is the extraordinary oversold condition which prevailed as long as two weeks ago. Technicians have a tendency to point to oversold conditions when the market is declining. usually as part of some prayerful attempt that the de- cline may reverse itself. The greatest analytical value to be derived from such conditions. however. occurs once a significant rally. such as the one that began a week ago. has taken place. If such a rally is accompanied by meaningful breadth and volume (and we think such was the case in the recent instance). it is. at least. suggestive of the fact that the process of probing' for an intermediate-term bottom has begun. We do not think. in the present case. that the process will be a simple one or one which the market will undergo totally without trauma. Almost invariably. the record tells us. the process of forming a base involves. somewhere along the line. a test of the initial reaction lows. In some cases those lows have simply been approached. In many other cases on record. it must be noted however, the lows made on the initial reaction have been penetrated by a fairly significant amount. We would not care to suggest that such will not be the case in the present instance. It seems to us. in other words. that the market is now facing the necessity of forming a base. the exacLshape of which is so far-unclear-.–That process will. we think. -take time. and it would- be illogical, based on past precedent. to expect it to be over much before sometime this summer. As the formation takes shape. the ultimate upside prospects will become clearer. Dow-Jones Industrials S & P Composite . Cumulative Index (4/2/80) AWTsla 784.13 102.15 704.59 ANTHONY W. TAB ELL DELAFIELD. HARVEY. TABELL No sfatement or expression of opinion or any other motter herein contatned 15, or 1510 be deemed to be, directly or Indirectly, on offer or the OIllollon of on offer to buy or sell any security referred 10 or mentioned The molter 1 presented merely for the conver'!enc!; of the subscriber While He believe the sources of our Informa- tion to be reltoble we In no way represent or guarantee the accuracy thereof nor of the slolements mude herein Any action to be toen by the subscriber should be based on hiS own 'lnvestlgollon and ,nformat,on Janney MOnlgomery SCali, Inc, as 0 corporation, ond lIs officers or employees, may now ha,'e, or may later toke, posHlons or trodes In respect to any SeCUrities mentioned In thiS or any future Inue, and such pOSition moy be different from any views now or hereafter expressed , this or any other Issue Janney Montgomery Scoll, Inc, which IS registered With the SEC as on Investment odvlsor, may give adVice 10 lIs adVisory and othel customers Independently of any stalemenlS mode In thiS or In any other Issue Further information on any security mentioned herein 15 available on request

TABELL'S MARKET LETTER 909 STATE ROAD, PRINCETON, NEW JERSEY 08540 DIYISION OF MEMBER NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE. INC MEMBER AMERICAN STOCK EXCHANGE We have expressed the view in these pages that the extraordinary market action of March 27 had many of the earmarks of the sort of initial selling climax which characteristically occurs in the early stages of a bottom formation. We acknowledge that there are those pessimistic observers who may argue with this view, but, accepting it as a hypothesis, it is worthwhile to ask what sort of market action we might then expect over the near term. The charts below show the market action of the Dow-Jones Industrial Average following various reference dates, each of these reference dates marking the occurrence of a previous initial selling climax. In all cases, the Dow has been adjusted to make it equal to 759.98 (the March 27 close) on the reference date. The time scale has also been adjusted to show the equivalent time period in 1980. In each chart, the actual action of the Dow for the ten trading days since March 27 so far has been shown by a dotted line. REFEPfNCE . 28 19G2 , REFERENCE DRTE . AUG 29 1966 REFERENCE DATE . or, LI 19N RE'FERENCE CATE NO'I 2 1!77 79 so 80 80 lSO …uN 80 Lu.. 80 an soY lJUN 80 an MAT 80 JUN an It is interesting to note that in almost all cases there has been an initial rally approximately equivalent or, indeed, in 1970 and 1974, substantially greater than the present one. What is also interesting, however, is that all instances, with the exception of 1970, involved the return to an area somewhere around the initial low. In 1962 and 1977-78, the market moved below the initial lows to today's equivalent of about 705. It is possible to analyze these past cycles in some detail, but One point clearly stands out. That is the fact that, if it is granted that the current process constitutes a base formation, the prospect of a move back to the old lows possesses a fairly high degree of probability. Moreover, as the charts show, such a move would not necessarily constitute evidence that a bottom is not, in fact, taking place. Dow-Jones Industrials (1200 PM) S & P Composite (12 00 PM) Cumulative Index (4/10/80) AWTsla 795.22 104.46 718.74 ANTHONY W. TABELL DELAFIELD, HARVEY, TABELL No statement or expression of oplmon or ony other motler herein contained IS, or IS 10 be deemed 10 be, directly or IndlTlJctly, an offer or the ollCllollOn of on offer to buy or sell cny lecvnly referred 10 or mentIOned The moIler IS presented merely for the converJence of the 5ubSCllbcr Whde oNe believe Ihe sources of our Information to be reliable, we In no way represenT or guarantee the accuracy Ihereof nor of the statements mude herein Any action to be token by the subsctlber should be based on hIS own investigation and Informallon Janney Montgomery Seoll, Inc, as a corporation, and ils olflccrs or cmployees, may now have, or may later lake, positions or lrodes In rC!spC!CI 10 any SCUrtlies mentioned In Ihls or any future Issue, and such pOSition may be ddfcrenl from any views now or hereafter e)'p'essed In thIS or any olher I5Ul' Janney Montgomery 50011. Inc, which IS registered With Ihe SEC as on ,vestment adVisor, may give adVice to I'S Inveslmenl adVISOry and olhe customers Independently of any statements mode In thiS r In any 01 her Issue fu'tner mformaTlon on any sewnly menllOned herein IS available on request

TABELL'S MARKET LETTER 909 STATE ROAD, PRINCETON, NEW JERSEY 08540 DIVISION OF MEMBER NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGe. INC MEMBER AMERICAN STOCK EXCHANGE April 18, 1980 During th'estock market'sln()sf recent advancing -,-.-. first six weeks of 1980, the lack of market breadth, i.e., the relatively small number of stocks advancing, did not go unnoticed by analysts. Likewise, the pronounced breadth weakness once the declining phase began on February 13 was also widely noted. What has gone largely unremarked, is the extent to which this phenomenon has dramatically reversed itself over the short term, since about the end of March. Indeed, by one measurement, the market has shown better breadth over the past three weeks than at any comparable period since the rally in January, 1975, following the 1974 bottom. This statement in regard to a market which has recently declined almost 150 points and sits within a dozen points of that decline's low, requires some amplification. There exists something which may be called normal breadth action, and it is based on the relationship of the number of advancing stocks and the change in the Dow. The precise nature of that relationship over some 10,000 trading days since 1942 has been investigated by computer, and, using this relationship, it is possible, on any given day, to calculate an expected number of advances based on the change in the Dow. There exist relatively few time periods in which the number of advancing stocks repeatedly exeeed their expected value. This, however, has been the case to an unusual degree since March 31. In the 12 trading days between that date and April 16, the number of ad- vances was never greatly different from its expected value and often exceeded it by a large amount. By contrast, the 15 trading days between February 5 and February 26 included 13 on which the number of advances was significantly less than the expected number based on the Dow change. The contrast between the two periods is shown in the table below. POllANCES DPTE DJIA EXP. ACT'' bIFF. Feb 5 876.62 1. 53 Feb 6 881. 83 5.21 923 765 -158 Feb 7 885.49 3.66 879 802 – 77 Feb 8 895.73 10.24 1086 878 -208 Feb 11 889.59 – 6.14 5fi4 565 1 Feb 12 898.98 9.39 1056 744 -312 Feb 13 903.84 4.86 918 799 -119 Feb 14 893.77 -10.07 425 415 – 10 Feb 15 884.98 – 8. 79 465 382 – 83 Feb 19 876.02 – 8.96 469 351 -118 Feb 20 886.86 10.84 1107 868 -239 Feb 21 868.52 -18.34 159 434 275 Feb 22 868.77 0.25 757 374 -383 Feb 25 859.81 – 8.96 463 315 -148 Feb 26 864.25 4.44 885 654 -231 ADVANCES 'DATE- -, ..,. bJ 1A EXP-.-ACT–'!HFF-.– Mar 31 785.75 8.10 I04olT9o 150 Apr 1 784.47 – 1. 28 687 963 276 Apr 2 787.80 3.33 857 1018 161 Apr 3 784.13 – 3.67 601 718 117 Apr 7 768.34 -15.79 171 342 171 Apr 8 775.00 6.66 986 968 – 18 Apr 9 785.92 10.92 1129 1159 30 Apr 10 791. 47 5.55 951 1237 286 Apr 11 791. 55 0.08 757 963 206 Apr 14 784.90 – 6.65 509 497 – 12 Apr 15 783.36 – 1. 54 687 657 – 30 Apr 16 771.25 -12.11 314 747 431 – .- Typical of the February action were February 7 and February 20. On each of these days, the Dow advanced some 10 points, and over 1,000 advancing stocks would have been expected under such conditions. The actual number of advances was more than 200 lower. By contrast, the April period featured such days as April 1 and April 11. On each of these days, the average was essentially unchanged, a phenomenon which, on an historical basis, would produce some 700 ad- .ancing stocks. On each day, however, the number of advances was well over 900. ' A dramatic reversal of this sort is a fairly rll.re occurrence in the stock market and has often been associated with important lows. It will be interesting to see whether such an event occurs in the present instance. Dow-Jones Industrials (12 00 PM) 769.11 S & P Composite (12 00 PM) 101. 21 Cumulative Index (4/17/80) 713.26 ANTHONY W. TABELL DELAFIELD, HARVEY, TABELL AWT sla No statement Of of opInion or ony olher motter herein contolned IS, or IS to be deemed to be, directly or Ind,rectlr on offer or the soliCitation of an offer to buy or sell any security referred to or mentioned The mOiler 1 presented merely for the converlence of the subscriber Whl e we believe the sources of our Infarma han 10 be reliable, we In no way represent or guarantee the accuracy thereof nor of Ihe statements mude herem Any action to be taken by the subscflber should be based on hu own mvestlgotlon and mformallon Janney Montgomery ScOIl, Inc, as a corpo/allon, and lIS off.cers or employees, moy now have, or moy later toke, POSitiOns or trode5 m respect to any mentioned In It'liS or any future Issue, and such position may be different from any views now or hereJfter In thiS or any other Issue Janney Montgomery Scali, Inc, whICh '5 registered With the SEC as on InveStment adVisor, may give adVICe to .ts Investment advlso,), and olhel customers Independently of any statements mode In thiS or In any other Issue Further information on any security mcroncd herein IS available on request

TABELL'S MARKET LETTER 909 STATE ROAD, PRINCETON. NEW JERSEY 08540 DIVISION OF MEMBER NEW VORK STOCK EXCHANGE, INC MEMBER AMERICAN STOCK eXCHANGE April 25, 1980 Every so often, far too seldom in an uncertain world, things turn out as they are supposed to; the good guys win, the hero marries the heroine, and everyone lives happily ever after. This satisfying 'arrangementctendscto-J)e the rule inthe in the-vola-' – tile world of finance, events occasionally transpire the way folk wisdom tells us that they should. The textbooks inform us that formation of a stock market bottom generally follows a particular sce- nario, The first act of this scenario is a selling climax characterized by a large one-day or intraday loss, heavy volume, and, in terms of prevailing mood, uncertainty and panic. This climactic washout is then supposed to be followed by a relatively dynamic rally which, after a time, loses momentum and peters out. The next act is a further decline, this time more desultory and on reduced volume. Such a decline should return approximately to tpe area of the original low — the so-called test — at which point additional demand, again on increasing volume, is supposed to manifest itself. It is interesting to examine the past four weeks of trading in the light of this description. On March 27, in a panic atmosphere caused by the collapse of silver and other commodities, the Dow reached an hourly low at 3 o'clock of 739.59. Almost all of this loss was recovered in the final hour of trading as volume expanded to 63 million shares, one of the highest levels on record. The rally continued to a close of 785.75 two days later and to 791. 55 on April 11. As the rise continued during the first week in April, volume gradually petered out, dropping under 30 million shares on April 3 and 7. Over the period between April 14 to April 21, the Dow showed consecutive declines with volume re- duced still further, as low as 23 million shares on the first day of the decline and never reaching higher than 39 million shares on April 16. By this Monday, the Dow had closed at 759.13, a closing figure actually lower than the close of March 27 and precisely within the range which the climax rally had covered four weeks earlier. Prices had been even lower an hour before the close, but improved somewhat in the final hour of trading. It is precisely from such a level that, conventional wisdom advises us, demand should materialize, the market staged its amazing,2erformance us;of last Tuesday. The Dow wound' up 30'.72 points which, as the newspapers duly lnformed' was – terms of points gained, the fifth largest rally in history. Volume expanded to 47,920,000 shares, and prices continued to firm for the remainder of this week. As of this writing, even the Iranian fiasco has shown little effect on this firmness, with prices off only moderately in early Friday trading. For the time being, at least, the textbooks have been vindicated. A few comments seem called for. The first is that we are taught in grammar school that percentage change is a more accurate way of comparing figures than raw change. Thus, comparing Tuesday's 30-point gain to past rallies overstates its relative significance. The rise was 4.05 in the Dow and 3.46 in the Standard & Poors 500. These figures have been exceeded by six rallies in the Dow and 11 in the 500 in the modern (post-1942) period. In the 1920's and 1930's, however, rallies of this mag- nitude were fairly common occurrences. There were eighty rallies of better than 4.05 in the Dow between 1926 and 1940, the record, for what it is worth, being 15.34 on March 15, 1933. If one eliminates the volatile pre-World War II period, however, and looks solely at what has happened since, the comparison is still interesting. Of the six Dow-Jones rallies which bettered Tues- day in terms of percentage advance, five occurred as the initial rally from the climax low of major bottoms in 1957,1962, 1970, 1974, and 1978. The sixth, November, 1963, was the rebound from the Kennedy assassination low. Here the current market is, in an interesting way, at variance with the past. As noted above, Tuesday's rally must be considered the aftermath of a test rather than an initial climax, that obviously having occurred on March 27. No such rally in the modern era has ap- proached this one in magnitude. The closest approximation would be the rally of June 28, 1962 of 3.79 or the 4.02 rally of October 19, 1974. Both these occurred well after the initial climactic lows had been made. Finally, although it would be an incredible pessimist would did not view the last month's action as constructive, it is still only a month. Time is required for bases to form, and even at this point, the base so far formed is insufficient to support anything more than moderately higher levels. Further- more, the success of one test of previous lows does not necessarily suggest the unlikelihood of further tests, and indeed, we would think that something like another test would be necessary to broaden the base so as to indicate worthwhile upside possibilities. In other words, we continue to regard the ex- tension of the base formation period into mid-summer, in accordance with the normal election year pattern, as the most likely course of events. Undoubtedly, somewhere along the line, the market will do something to confuse the current conventional pattern. Nonetheless, action so far is, to say the least, refreshing. ANTHONY W. TABELL Dow-Jones Industrials (12 00 PM) 794.97 DELAFIELD, HARVEY, TAB ELL S & P Composite (12 00 PM) 104.20 Cumulative Index (4/24/80) 741. 49 AWTsla No statement or eXpreSSion of opinion or any other matter herein contamed IS, or 15 to be deemed to be. directly or indirectly, on offer or the sohCltotlon of an offer 10 buy or sell any security referred to or men honed The molter IS presented merely for the conVel'llCnCE of the subSCriber While 'c bclilevQ the sources of our Informa tion to be reliable, we In no way represent or guarantee the accuracy thereof nor of thc statements mude herem Any acllon to be token by Ihe subscriber should be hosed on hiS own Investlgollon and Informallon Janney Montgomery kott, Inc, as a corporation, and ,ts offICers or employees, may /lOW have, Or may laler loke, pOSlllons or trodes In respect 10 any SeUIIIICS men honed In Ihls or ony future !Ssue, and such POSition may be different from any views now or hereafter expressed In thiS or any other Isue Janney Montgomery Scoll, Inc, which 1 registered wllh the SEC as an Investment adVisor, may give to lIS mvestment adVISOry and othel customers Independently of any statemcnts made In thiS or m any other Issue Further mformatlon on any securrty mcnlloned hefeln IS available on request

TABELL'S MARKET LETTER -, 909 STATE ROAD, PRINCETON. NF!!W JERSEY 08540 DIVISION OF MEMBER NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE, INC. MEMBER AMERICAN STOCK eXCHANGE May 2, 1980 One of the most important tasks of the market analyst is the development of a forecast, that is some -to–behave -in.t-he, fut-ure.-..-A-usefulpreambleo-to-.Suc , forecast, in many cases, is ari analysis of tlie way in -which the market has behaved in Hie past along with an attempt to set this known behavior within the context of the economic background which went along with it. The object of such an exercise is to find out just how much of that economic background is built in to the current level of stock prices. Modern academicians, who theorize about the economic perfection of capital markets, would have us believe that, at any time, all known information is built in- to a given price level. The technician, needless to say, denies this assumption, but there is no doubt that, at any given time, the stock market reflects a number of assumptions about the current economy. The attempt to detect just what these assumptions might be is often an interesting one. The market's behavior is, of course, a matter of record. Most recently, that behavior has been not at all bad. We have tried in the last four issues of this letter to reflect the fact that, based on histor- ical precedent, action since March 27 must be viewed at least as an attempt to form a bottom of some im- portance. This attempt began with the classic intraday selling climax of March 27, continued with the subsequent test of that low on April 21, and was also suggested by extraordinarily good market breadth during iust about the entire month of April. Assuming the success of this bottoming attempt, it will mark the end of the third market correction since the fall of 1978. These three corrections have all had similar characteristics. All were relatively minor to intermediate-term in scope, ranging between 11 percent and 16 percent, declines well below the historic norms associated with major bear markets. All took place rather quickly with only a few weeks between the high and the initial climax low, and all, finally, started from the level of 900, plus or minus a few points, on the Dow-Jones Industrial Average. Before these three market drops, the only identifiable decline of more than short-term proportions was the two-year drop in the averages which took the Dow-Jones Industrials from 1014.79 on September 21, 1976 to 742.12 on February 28, – – –,–19780–l'-his-decline-was-of–bearmarket-pr-Opol't-ions-iIht…. 19 on the S & P 500), and its 18-month length was not unusual in the light of recent downswings. Nonetheless, it could hardly be considered a broad decline in that, during the period, many stocks advanced in the face of the fall in the averages. In one sense, it has been six years, since 1974, since we have had a classic bear market, defined as an instance in which almost all stocks decline sharply over a protracted period of time. All of the above, we think, has been taking place against a rather interesting economic background. As examples of that background, it is only necessary to cite three news stories which appeared during the past week. The first of these was the Iranian misadventure, the second was the news of financial difficulties being undergone by' a major U. S. bank, and the third was the sharp drop in March by the Commerce Department's composite index of leading economic indicators, marking the continuation of an ongoing decline that has been underway since October, 1978. The stock market's response to all three of these developments was, essentially, to ignore them. Even the weakness which set in late Thursday afternoon, while possibly associated with the last of the three items mentioned above, did not begin until the later part of the day's trading, whereas the news had been a prominent feature of the morn- ing's papers. It is worthwhile asking why this should be so. The record of stock market responses to wars and rumors of war is a mixed ,one, and there is no particular reason why the market should have declined in the light of what happened in the Persian desert. It seems axiomatic to us, however, that a more technically vulnerable market might well have done so. Those of us familiar with economic history have been trained to regard signs of strain in the banking system as a major concomitant of disaster. The stock market has apparently developed suffici- ent faith in the viability of the current system so that the emergence of such strains can be shrugged off. The lack of response to increasing evidence of recession can probably be attributed to surfeit. We have been hearing about the impending recession for more than two years now. Surely most of the investment decisions made on the basis of that recession were, in fact, made a long time ago. One of the attributes of a bear market has always been an almost pathological sensitivity to news that was even remotely bad. In contrast, ignoring bad news often constitutes evidence of underlying strength. Viewed on the surface, we think, it is very difficult to find anything good about the sort of economic news to which we been recently treated. The market's lack of response to that news is, we think, a factor which must be viewed constructively. Dow-Jones Industrials (1200 PM) 810.07 S & P Composite (1200 PM) 105.45 Cumulative Index (5/1180) 747.51 ANTHONY W. TAB ELL DELAFIELD, HARVEY, TABELL AWT sla No stolement or ellprenlon of opinion or ony other matter herein contained IS, or IS 10 be deemed 10 be, directly or IndHec1ly, an offer or the solicitation of an oHer to buy or seJi any secufliy referred 10 or mentioned The matter IS presenled merely for the convef'lence of the subscriber While -He believe Ihe sOurces of our Informa tlon 10 be rehable, we In no way represent or guarantee the accuracy thereof nor of the stolements mude herein Any odlon 10 be laken by the subscriber should be based on hiS own mvestlgallon and mfC)rmatlon Janney Montgomery Scolt, Inc, as a corporation, and Its offICers or employees, may now have, or may later take, pOSllIOM or trades In respect to any SeCUfitles mentioned In thiS or any future Issue, and such pOSition may be different from any views now or hereafter e)(pressed In thiS or any other Issue Jonney Montgomery Scott, Inc, whICh IS registered wllh the SEC os on Inveslment moy give adVICe to Its Investment adVisory and othel customers Independently of ony statements mode In thiS or In ony other Issue Further mformotlOn on any seCl.J1!ly menhoned herem IS available on request

TABELL'S MARKET LETTER 909 STATE ROAD, PRINCETON. NEW JERSEY 08540 DIVISION OF MEMBER New YORK STOCK EXCHANoe, tNC MEMBER AMERICAN STOCK eXCHANGE – May 9, 1980 – … -.. '.!– Our quadrennial exercise-in analysis of the election-year stock market pattern was published somewhat earlier this time around than has normally been the case in the past. Back on November 16, we set forth our usual table detailing the stock market history of each election year since 1900 and duly arrived at the conclusions that this study normally tends to show. One of these conclu- sions pointed out the tendency of such years to have a flat or downward bias in the year's first half, a tendency which will apparently again be the case in 1980. ;;;- We generally couch this study in terms of the average price for each month in an election year, expressed as a percentage of the previous year-end close. In February of this year, the average prices for the Dow and S & P 500, respectively, were 104 and 107 of their year-end closes. The recent decline caused the average price for the Dow in April to be 94 of its yearend figure, and the comparable statistic for the S & P 500 was 95. Some recovery has taken place, but the average price for May so far is below its year-end figure in both instances. As the stock market sorts itself out, the political scene seems to be doing so also. It now appears probable that, despite media-attracting death rattles by the minor candidates and their satraps, Messrs. Carter and Reagan will be the contenders next November. The historical record of third-party candidacies, moreov.er, would suggest that, despite Mr. Anderson's efforts, one of the aforementioned two gentlemen will govern the United States beginning in 1981. We consider ourselves unqualified to comment on political subjects except insofar as they relate to the equity market, but it can be noted that the action of that market so far can be inter- as afforam-g -camp. -'l'nere -nave jeen seven elmrt10n years -1u this century in which the average April price was lower or about the same as that of the previous year-end. Those years were 1916, 1920, 1932, 1940, 1952, 1960, and 1968. In six of the seven cases, as was the case this year, the decline was modest, under 10, the only large drop being in 1932. What is interesting about the seven years, however, is that ,five of them saw the replacement of the incumbent Presidential party, Wilson by Harding in 1920, Hoover by Roosevelt in 1932, Truman by Eisenhower in 1952, Eisenhower by Kennedy in 1960, and Johnson by Nixon in 1968. The two exceptions were the reelections of Wilson in 1916 and Roosevelt in 1940. Conversely, of the seven occasions during the century when the party controlling the White House changed, five saw flat-to–lower stock markets in April. The two exceptions to this rule were the replacement of Taft by Wilson in 1912, and notably, the replacement of Ford by Carter four years ago, an interesting exception to the election-year pattern since it produced the strongest four-month rally of any of the 20 years under study. As far as the stock market is concerned, the most relevant conclusion of our election-year study at the moment points to the tendency toward a strong second half for the year, regardless of who winds up getting elected. As we pointed out last November, in 16 of the 20 election years, the .average price for December was higher than tlTe average price for June. Likewise, the Decem- ber average price was higher or the same as the April average price in 15 years of the 20. In five of the seven years in which the market was lower in April, it had recovered significantly from those lows by the year end. The only two cases where the market continued down from its -r April low figure were 1920 and 1940. –'-0' This letter, as its readers know, has been inclined toward the view that recent market action constitutes a base formation attempt which could, of course, result in a rally to take place later this summer. Such a pattern appears consistent with a year in which a presidential election is taking place. Dow-Jones Industrials (12 00 PM) S & P Composite (12 00 PM) Cumulative Index (5/8/80) 809.90 105.40 771. 78 ANTHONY W. TAB ELL DELAFIELD, HARVEY, TAB ELL AWT sla No statement or expressIOn of oplnlon or any other motler herein contamed 15, or IS to be deemed 10 be, directly or Indirectly, on offer or the soliCltallon of on offer to buy or sell any security referred to or menlloned The mOiler IS presented merely for the convef'lenCe of the subSCriber While 'lie believe the sources of our Informe- han to be reliable, we ,n no way represent or guarantee the occuracy thereof nor of the statements mude herein Any oct Ion to be token by the subscriber should be based on 1'115 own investigation and Informallon Janney Montgomery Seolt, Inc, as 0 corporation, and Its officers or employees, moy now have, or may loter lake, positions or trades In respect to any rrenlloned In thiS or any future Issue, and such posdlon may be different from any views nov. or hereafter expressed In thiS or ony other Issue Janney Montgomery Scott, Inc, which IS registered With the SEC as on Investment adVisor, may give adVice to Its Investment adVisory and othel customers independently of any stotements mode In thiS or In any other Issue Further Information on any security mentioned herein IS ovailable on request

TABELL'S MARKET LETTER -, 909 STATE ROAD, PRINCETON, NEW JERSEY 08540 elVISION OF' MEMBER NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGe, INC MEMBER AMERICAN STOCK EXCHANGE – May 16, 1980 -. '.-.- . be-en – for those whose business 'it is to comment on the stock market. For the entire period, we have been duly warned of the imminence of an economic contraction ,and , until recently, at least we are told, evidence of that contraction has failed to manifest itself. With the existence of a downturn now widely recognized, most discussion now centers on the probable extent and depth of the future slide. The one question not now being raised regarding a recession is Is it over It is, of course, patently obvious that the answer to this question as of mid-May, 1980, is No. It is, however, in our view, less than obvious that the question is inappropriate and quite probable that it will become more appropriate over the coming months. , We have pointed out before and will reiterate again the fact that those of us who predict reces- sions are not predicting a future event. The reason for this is that recessions are recognized after the fact. In all cases to date, the peak of a recession has not been formally recognized by the NBER until well after it has occurred, and very often, the recession itself remains unrecog- nized until well after the whole process is over and the economy has again turned up. The ques- tion for the past two years has not been when a recession would begin but when it would become obvious that a recession already begun was well under way. It is that point that has now been reached, and the job of the forecaster, at the moment, is not picking a peak but a trough. Part of the difficulty in the current analysis of economic time series lies in the fact that their recent behavior has, in many ways, been quite different than their behavior in the past. The NBER's various indices of economic activity have tended, since World War II, to feature sharp reversals and identifiable peaks and valleys. What has generally not been a feature of these ser- ies is broad flat periods with no clearly identifiable trend. It is, however, just this sort of I numbers recognize the fact that this sort of behavior makes cycle identification difficult. Thus, I' the long delay in recognizing the onset of a recession which has been a two-year topic of discus- sion. The Bureau's leading indicator composite, however, has been in a rounding to flat formation since early 1978 with an actual peak having been reached in October, 1978. The coincident com- posite has been flat since the beginning of 1979, with a peak having been reached in March of that year. Housing starts peaked in the second quarter of 1978 and are currently at a little better than half their peak level. The rate of inventory change turned down at around the same time and turned negative last fall. Inflation-adjusted money supply was flat throughout 1978, turned down that fall, and has been trending downward ever since. The point is that, assuming the present is ultimately identified as a period of economic contraction, its peak will most likely be seen as taking place well over a year ago. We are, meanwhile, seeing various pieces of evidence that point to the maturity of the process. The recent behavior of short-term interest rates, widely described as extraordinary, suggests one such instance. Their behavior, admittedly unprecedented, is less than extraordinary, when one pictures a Federal Reserve concentrating more and more on monetary aggregates and less and less on interest rates. At a time when the talk is still of monetary restraint, the Fed may be becoming an actual supplier of funds to the banking system. Under these circumstances, behavior of inter- est rates is simple evidence of reduced loan demand due to an economic contraction in its advanced rather than its early stages. It must be remembered, moreover, that economic indicators foreshadow bottoms with a much shorter lead time than is the case with tops. In a fair number of cases, the delay in getting the figures out is just about the same as the lead time. -Thus the -condition at the bottom of a reces- sion is the announcement of new lows by most indicators. It is well to keep this in mind at the moment, since this is precisely the condition which is likely to obtain for the next few months. We do not think that the action of the stock market over the past two years suggests that it has ever disbelieved in the existence of a recession or that the recession was going to be unusu- ally mild. We suspect, therefore, that its response to the obviously forthcoming announcements of economic contraction may be more positive than many analysts suspect. Dow-Jones Industrials (12 00 PM) 822.70 S & P Composite (12 00 PM) 106.89 Cumulative Index (5/15/80) 787.68 ANTHONY W. TABELL DELAFIELD, HARVEY, TABELL AWT sla No slalement or expression of opinion or any other motler herern contarned IS, or IS to be deemed to be, directly or indirectly, on offer or the soliCitation of an offer to buy or sell any security referred to or mentioned The matter IS presented merely for the convellence of the svbscrlber. While Ne believe the sovrces of our Information to be reliable, we In no way represent or gvarantee the accuracy thereof nor of the statements mude he'eln. Any action to be taken by the svbscrlber shovld be bosed on hiS own investigation and Information Janney Montgomery Scali, Inc, as a corporation, and ItS officers or employees, may now hove, or mol' later tae, positions or trpdes In respect to any seCUrities mentioned In thiS or any future Issue, and such pOSition may be different from any VieNS now or hereafter expressed In thiS or any other Issue Janney Montgomery Scott, Inc, which IS registered With the SEC as on Investment adVisor, may give adVice to Its Investment adVisory and olhel customers mdependently of any statements made In thiS or In any other Issue Further information on any security mentIOned herein IS available on request