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Tabell’s Market Letter – September 07, 1979

Tabell’s Market Letter – September 07, 1979

Tabell's Market Letter - September 07, 1979
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TABELL'S MARKET LETTER 909 STATE ROAD, PRINCETON, NEW JERSEY 08540 DIVISION OF '.., … I\Ul Jiw,,,! .,4,ll,om,,,J' J!c, MEMBER NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE, INC MEMBER AMERICAN STOCK eXCHANGE September 7, 1979 -. market, especially in recent years, is for market weakness to develop dUring'the month of September. Apparently, traders returning from their Labor Day holiday believed in this pattern as, on the first two trading days of September, 1979, what had been a reasonably strong stockmarket turned into somewhat of a rout. The Dow started out on Tuesday with a 15-point decline, and weakness continued throughout most of the day Wednesday with prices having slipped another 13 points by 3 o'clock. A fair por- tion of the loss was erased in strength in the last half hour, and Thursday saw an extention of that recovery. Nonetheless, the decline was of reasonably serious proportions, amounting to some 22 points on a closing basis and 32 points from Friday's intraday high through Wednesday's intra- day low. ' It all occurred, as we said, following a market which had displayed above-average strength, at least through mid-August. It is true that most major indicators had spent the latter two weeks of that month consolidating, and Friday's closing level, while a new bull-market peak on a closing basis was not the high for the move based on intraday figures. On that basis, the Dow had reached a peak of 893.60 on August 16 versus a peak of no better than 890.10 on Friday. Thus, for two weeks, the market had essentially been moving sideways. The occurrence of this sort of action, especially with the arrival of September, might appropriately have caused nervous analysts to remember the action of just a year ago. At that point, -c -1- September 11. Two days of relatively mild weakness followed, after which a five-day decline trimmed some 40 points from the index by the end of September. For the rest of September and through early October, a consolidation and rally attempt brought about a renewed move to close to the old peak in mid-October. This was followed, however, by the vicious Halloween Massacre. downswing in the last two weeks of October which, at the lows, had trimmed better than 110 points from the Dow. It took the entire remainder of 1978, some two months, for prices to reaccumulate for their subsequent recovery in the spring. In view of all of this, it is certainly worth asking the question of whether there exist similarities between the present market pattern and that which obtained during the summer and early fallof 1978. Our own view is that such is not the case. The 1978 decline, as noted above, had been preceded by a distributional pattern that built up during the entire month of August. In terms of point-and-figure activity, this distribution was substantial in its own right. The failed rally attempt in early October broadened that distribution still further. Nothing remotely similar exists in the present instance. As indicated above, the distribution preceding the present decline had lasted only two weeks, the current market's having displayed above-average vitality through mid-August. By the end of this week's two-day debacle, all existing downside objectives had been reached, and the rally attempt which occurred, was, therefore, a logical expectation., Now it is, of course, entirely possible that the sudden onset of weakness,this.week,signalized,-the start of some sort of distributional pattern which has yet to be built. There were, indeed, a number of disturbing elements in the downswing, not the least of which were the negative breadth figures of 4 to 1 on Tuesday and almost 7 to 1 on Wednesday. Any event such as this week's decline memorializes the analyst to be especially alert to any signs of ongoing deterioration. Such deterioration, however, had not yet proceeded to the disquieting stage as of last week's end. ANTHONY W. TABELL DELAFIELD, HARVEY, TAB ELL Dow-Jones Industrials (1200 PM) S & P Composite (12 00 )M) Cumulative Index (9/6/79) AWT sla 868.69 106.92 794.32 No totemenl Of expressIon of opinion or any other motter herein COntOined IS, or IS 10 be deemed jo be, directly or indirectly, on offer or Ihe solic.tot.on of on offer to buy or sel! any securIty referred 10 or mentIoned The matter IS presented merely for the convefl'e'1l;e of the subSCriber White NC behevc the sources of our informa- tion to be reliable, we In no woy represent or guarantee the accuracy Ihereof nor of the slaements mude herein Any acllon to be Token by the subscriber should be ball'ld on hiS own Invcst'gat,on and mformatlon Janney Monlgoncry Stott, Inc, os (I corporaTtOn, and Its or employees, may now have, or may later take, positions or Trades In respect fa any seCUrilles menhoned tn thtS or any fmure lSue, and sucli POSITion moy be dtrerenT from any vIews now or hereaftet c)pressed in th or any other Issue Janney Montgomery ScoT!, Inc, which tS registered With the SEC as on Investment adVisor, may gIVe adVice to Its Investme.,t and othe, customers Independently of any statements mode 11'1 th.s or 11'1 on… other Issue Further InformatIOn on any security mentioned herem IS available on request

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Tabell’s Market Letter – September 14, 1979

Tabell’s Market Letter – September 14, 1979

Tabell's Market Letter - September 14, 1979
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TABELL'S MARKET LETTER 909 STATE ROAD. PRINCETON, NEW JERSEY 08540 DIVISION OF MEMBER NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE, INe MEMBER AMERICAN STOCK EXCHANGE September 14, 1979 Stock market action is a phenomenon often seen thM'g!, a darkly, and the significance .'u,''''''''''o ,LV,' ',I .-, have recently been discussing in this space the four-year-cycle pattern in the StoCK market, and, as readers of that discussion will be aware, it has only recently become evident, 18 months after the fact, that a bottom of major significance in terms of that cycle probably occurred in the spring of 1978. While it was possible, of course, to suspect that this was the case for quite some time, evidence became overwhelming only this July and August as most indices moved to new bull- market highs and time began to run out on the possibility of new cycle lows being attained within any sort of a sensible time frame. Ironically, it is only in the light of this recent interpretation that we can now go back and reexamine some of the market events of 1978, events whose meaning was relatively obscure at the time, and attempt to place them in their proper perspective. The first event whose meaning was unclear at the time of its occurrence was the actual bottom itself, which took place in early March. Identification of that bottom as a major turn was far from easy. We have been rereading, for example, our own comments at the time. We did note on March 17, 1978 the fact that the steepest portion of the 1977-78 downtrend had been reversed, but we were unsure as to whether this was of short or long-term significance. The following week, commenting on possible reversal evidence, we said, All these signs. . are subtle and a good deal less dynamic than the strength of last December which later proved to be a false rally. Certainly, more confirmation in a number of areas would be appropriate before it is possible, from a technical point of view, to adapt an unreservedly bullish stance. Shortly thereafter, some six weeks after the actual low, we first drew attention to the possibility that a bottom in terms of the four-year-cycle might have occurred, but noted also, the total absence to date of technical signs of a major bottom. Quite obviously, in short perspective, the portents were somewhat less t hIm clear, In any case, the 'had ronntin,.rl its auv, rlllM'lg the summer of 1978, , on the Dow, above 900 by mid-September. This led to the second phenomenon whose mean- ing was difficult to interpret. In a surprisingly sudden downtrend, the market moved sharply lower during October as the Dow plunged to new lows under 800. There then occurred, during the first week of November, 1978, an almost classic selling climax of the type which historically has featured bear-market bottoms. Indeed, based on a number of measurements, the first week in November, 1978 reached an oversold condition which surpassed any comparable condition since 1926, including the entire period of 1929-32. All of this was easily recognizable to the technician, and our letter of that week commented on it. However, we were forced to go on to say, We are compelled to raise a more-than-moderately disquieting point. It all took place at the wrong time. The textbook climax action of last 'week occurred, not after a major downswing, but very close to a market top scored just last September. This, and the fact cannot be ignored, is totally without precedent for the last 30 years. 1978, therefore, saw two events which were extremely difficult to interpret at the time of their occurrence. The first was an apparent stock market bottom in the spring featured by a total absence of the sort of reversal signs normally associated with such bottoms. Second, those reversal signs finally occurred — but not until six months later in October-November, and they occurred at the conclusion of a short, medium-scale decline, rather than, conventionally, at the end of a major downswing. Perhaps it is our own obtuseness, but it did not occur to us, at least until recently, to view the two phenomena as being associated. Now, however, it becomes possible to view all of the 1978 action as a sort of double bottom, in whiCh the major averages reversed themselves at an early stage, totally without the usual climactic indications and in which the rest of the,market performed a cyclical reversal at a higher level and with all the conventional fireworks some six months later. This view fits neatly into the cycle pattern, which, we suggested above, only became apparent with the strength of last summer. This whole exercise of groping our way toward an explanation of the events of the last 18 months is not, in our view, totally academic. If this view is indeed the correct one, it would suggest that, from a technical point of view, the present cycle has a good deal longer to go both in terms of time and amplitude. Dow-Jones Industrials (12 00 PM) 877.22 S & P Composite (12 00 PM) 108.49 Cumulative Index (9/13/79) 798.02 ANTHONY W. TABELL DELAFIELD, HARVEY, TABELL AWT sla No statement Of expression of opinion or ony other moiler here'n contOlned IS, or ,s 10 be deemed Ie be, dnedly or mdllectly, on offer or the SOllCltollon of on one' to buy or sen any secunty referred to or mentioned The motter IS presented merely for the convel'lenCE of the subscriber While Ne bolleve the sources of our Informa tlon to be reliable, we In 1'10 way represent or guarantee the accuracy there! nor of the statements mude herem Any acTion to be token by the subscriber should be based on hiS own mvestlgatlon and Information Janney Mon!gomery Seoll, Inc, as 0 corpO(atlon, and liS offICers or employees, may now have, or may later teKe, POSitions or trades In respect to cny securities mentioned In thiS or any future Issue, and such posilion may be d,fferent from any views now or hereafter e…pressed In this O( ony other ,nue Jenney Montgomery coH, Inc. which IS registered wllh the SEC as an lI'\Vestment adVisor, mey give adVICe to Its Investment adVISOry ond othel C1.Istomers Independently of any Statements mode In thiS or In any olher Issue further information on any secunty menlloned herein IS available on request

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Tabell’s Market Letter – September 21, 1979

Tabell’s Market Letter – September 21, 1979

Tabell's Market Letter - September 21, 1979
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TABELL'S MARKET LETTER 909 STATE ROAD, PRINCETON. NEW JERSEY 08540 DIYISION OF MEMBeR NEW VORK STOCK EXCHANGe, INC MEMBEA AMEAICAN STOCK eXCHANGe September 21,.1979 is, , necessary that- we- shOtiIa; gold. The reader is herewith warned that this letter is probably the wrong source from which to gain en- lightenment on this particular topic. We have referred to gold in the past as,the barbarous relic and have noted with approval the late Premier Khrushchev's dictum that its Ultimate suitability would be for lining the walls of public washrooms. Such statements regarding a commodity which has advanced in price 150 in the past two years and 25 in the past two weeks is, our gold-loving friends tell us, a fair indication of our perspicacity on the subject. Actually, we have no apologies to make for the above record. Throughout a long career, we have failed to recommend and indeed recommended against probably thousands of investment vehicles that have appreciated as fast or faster than gold has done in the recent experience. We find ourselves no more or less chagrined at having missed gold than having missed last year's over-the-counter flyers. We are, in other words, prisoners of our unfortunate inability to regard the yellow metal as a religion rather than a commodity. There exist, however, substantial areas of agreement between our own position and that of avid believers in the gold mystique. Our skepticism regarding the metal rises from the fact that' we do not believe that the world would necessarily be a better place were gold to be adopted as a monetary standard. We do, however, share with the gold bugs a profound skepticism of the ability of governments to maintain a stable currency. ' This skepticism will be understood by anyone who takes the trouble to read history, starting with the Emperor Hammurabi who was only the first in a long string of rulers to practice debase- ment of the coinage. That gold should be rising in price at a time when currency debasement or'ising. To attribute its most recent action simply to reasonable and urlarlle doubts regard- g the ability of governments to manage their own affairs, -however, betray's, in our view, nothing more than profound ignorance of markets. To any reasonably detached observer, the whole situation is rather familiar. . The sane and sensible rationale for the investment purchase of gold noted above has long since disappeared, to be replaced by rumors about mysterious doings by Arabs, repeated by people who never met an Arab in their life. The obvious current motive of gold purchasers is that of being able to sell it to someone else at a higher price, preferably as soon as possible. Such purchases may, indeed, for the time being, prove to be justified. On a pure momentum basis, we would suggest that the near-term trend for gold is as likely to be toward higher prices as toward lower. We would, however, strongly caution against the notion that speculation on the gold market constitutes protection against inflation or indeed against anything else. We see gold, in other words, as nothing more than one of a series of commodities large num-, bers of investors have, in recent years, decided might provide protection- against what monetary authorities are doing to them. One area, 'of course, that has conspicuously failed to provide such protection is common stocks which, of course, accounts for the relative lack qf interest therein. It has been noted, however, that mindless projection of past trends is seldom the key to invest- ment success. In terms of classical wisdom, the current flight from currency' should portend nothing short of disaster for the equity market. The problem for those of us who study equity price action is that stocks refuse to act as they should on their way to a disaster. Indeed, in a long-term sense, precisely the opposite appears to be the case, suggesting ,that in the future, unlike the past, the neglected area Of common stocks may provide the best available shield against currency debasement. ANTHONY W. TABELL DELAFIELD, HARVEY, TABELL Dow-Jones Industrials (1200 PM) S 8. P Composite (12 00 PM) Cumulative Index (9120179) 890.87 110.22 801. 08 AWTsla No statement or e)(prenlOn of opinIOn or any other motter herein contolned IS, or to be deemed to be, directly or indirectly, an offer or the OIICltotlon of on offer to buy or sell any scctmry referred to or menlfoned The morrer JS presened merely for Ine converlence of the subscher Wfule we believe Ine sources of our Informa- flon to be reliable, we III no way represent or guaranlee the accuracy thereof nor of thc stotements mod!! herein Pony adlon to be by the should be bcued on hiS own mveshgatlon and Information Janney Montgomery Scofl, tnc, as a corporaTIon, ond Its officers or employees, may now have, or may later poSitions ar trodes In reSpect to ony sCQJntles mentioned In thiS or any future 15sue, and such poSition may be ddferenl from any views now or hereafter expressed In thiS or any (lther Issue Janney Montgomery Scali, Inc, which IS reglslt!red With the SEC os on Investment adVisor, moy give adVICe to Its Investment odvlOry ond othel customen Independently of ony statements mode In thiS or 10 any other Issue Further mform(\lon on any securrty mentioned herem IS aVailable On request

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Tabell’s Market Letter – September 28, 1979

Tabell’s Market Letter – September 28, 1979

Tabell's Market Letter - September 28, 1979
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TABELL'S MARKET LETTER 909 STATE ROAD, PRINCETON. NEW JERSEY 08540 DIVISION OF' MEMBEfI NEW YORK STOCK eXCHANGE, INC. MEMBER AMERICAN STOCK EXCHANGE September 28, 1979 It is often dangerous to anthropomorphize an institution such as the stock market, but, if one looks — '-lWIS.st-weeks p-ricrreliaVior, -tne-overwhe1minlfimpressloniS'one -ofjjervousness7 Kaffiiftetlly is plenty to be nervous about. As suggested last week, it is difficult to pinpoint just what, precisely, 400-per-ounce gold means as far as the stock market is concerned. It is also difficult to assess the exact impact of short-term money rates approaching 12 except to suggest that they are hardly bullish. Such rates obviously continue to make alternative forms of investment relatively attractive vis-a-vis stocks and increase the borrowing cost of carrying stocks. The foregoing negatives are piled upon a skyrocketing rate of inflation, a rising money supply, and, as an election year approaches, continuing reminders of both the actual and alleged shortcomings of the present administration. Under these conditions, it is hardly surprising to see a market which, after posting a near-record advance to a new high, as the Dow did on September 20, totally fail to hold that gain as it did in Friday's trading, and then plunge sharply as it did on Monday. Equally typical is a market such as Tuesday's which continued the previous day's slide, and then recovered almost totally in the final hour, fOllowed by one which extended the prior day's rally and then lost almost all that gain at the tail-end of the day. Meanwhile, the financial commentary seems to be focused more and more one these erratic short-term swings and less on basic trends and fundamentals. We have been trying to establish in these letters our belief that, as of mid-August at any rate, bull- market conditions existed. We have, in the past, likened the management of money under such condi- tions to the process of driving a car at night. The obvious requirements are that one should remain alert and carefully inspect that which is taking place within the range of one's headlights. Obsessive worry about what obstacles mayor may not lie beyond the range of the headlights can produce nothing but schizophrenia. The relative point in the present instance, it seems to us, is that, at least until headlights available revealed the stoc1\; market ahead to be free of obstacles. Whatever threats may have developed in the past three or four weeks seem — to be of potential rather than actual significance One fear, for example, that appears to preoccupy many investors is a repetition of the sharp intermediate-term crash of October a year ago. (Actually, if one is looking for significance in anniversaries, an even more significant one is occurring in September-October, 1979. That, of course, is the 50th anniversary of the 1929 crash, an anniversary which we do not intend to allow to pass without comment next month.) In any case, we pointed out a fortnight ago that the potential distributional pattern which had formed bore no resemblance whatsoever to that which had formed during the summer of 1978. Despite the fact that an area of potential distribution has continued to build, centering around 880- 890 on the Dow, that area is still of significantly less magnitude than the one which preceded last year's Halloween Massacre. Just as generals have a tendency to fight the last war, bearish analysts seem to be enamored with protecting us against the last down-swing. It is seldom a productive exercise. None of this is to say that areas of possible concern are, at the moment, totally lacking. For the technician, one such area must be breadth action which, since mid-August, has been, in a word, abysmal. This is taking place at a time when a fair number of market averages (although not the Dow against which breadth is usually measured) have moved into new high territory while all breadth measurements remain below their levels of September, 1978. This sort of action sets the scene for a divergence of the classic sort It must, however, be remembered that breadth divergences, historically, have taken place Over protracted periods of time, and there have often been long lags between new highs in the averages and ultimate confirmation by market breadth. We are inclined, therefore, to give this factor, for the time being, at least, the benefit of the doubt. Still another potential area of concern is the lack of confirmation of the Dow's new high by either the Transportation or Utility averages. Here again, it is perfectly true that such confirmation is lack- ing as of the present date. It is, however, certainly not impossible for later Utility and Transport strength to bring these averages once again into gear on the upside. What we are saying, in summary, is that any market which has advanced as sharply as the current one did during the summer rally of 1979 is vulnerable to a short-term correction. What needs to be assessed is the risk that such a correction, if it occurs, might develop into something of more serious import. Our own assessment, based on the evidence presently available, does not indicate such vul- nerability. We think, therefore, that a continued aggressive attitude toward the equity market appears warranted. ANTHONY W. TABELL Dow-Jones Industrials (12 00 PM) 886.60 DELAFIELD, HARVEY, TABELL S & P Composite (12 00 PM) 110.18 \ Cumulative Index (9/27/79) 798.18 No stotement or expressIon of opinion or any other motter herein contOlned Is, or IS to be deemed 10 be, dIrectly or Indncc!ly, on offer or the 50licllollon of on oFfel to buy or sell any secunty referred 10 or mentIOned The marter presen1ed merely for the of Ihe subScriber While we beheve Ihe sourl;es of our Informa- tion 10 bl! reliable, we In no way represent or guarantee the accuracy thereof nor of the statements mode herem Any aellon 10 be by the subSCriber should be based on hiS own ,vestlgollon and mformaHon Janney Monlgomery Scali, fnc, as a corporohon, and ,ts offICers Or employees, may now have, or may laler role, poslhans or trades 10 respect to any securlt,es mentioned In thiS or any future 's,ue, and such POSITion may be different from any views now or hereafter expressed In th,s or any olher Issue Janney Montgomery cott, Inc, wh,ch IS registered w,th the SEC as an ,nvestment adVisor, may give adv,ce to Its Inveslment advlilory and olhe, customers Independenlly of any statements made In thiS or In any ather 'ssue Further Information on any secunly menhoned herein ,s avmlable on request

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Tabell’s Market Letter – October 05, 1979

Tabell’s Market Letter – October 05, 1979

Tabell's Market Letter - October 05, 1979
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TABELL'S MARKET LETTER – 909 STATE ROAD, PRINCETON, NEW JERSEY 08540 DIVISION OF MEMBER NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGe, INC MEMBER STOCK EXCHANGE October 5, 1979 Our readers are undoubtedly aware that this letter's attitude toward the stock market has, for some time, one. When the market outlook appears positive, however, it is necessary to be aware of potentiBl clouds-onAhe -liorlzon–;- and one–suchC1ouil, -as of market breadth. This action does, indeed, raise a few mildly disquieting questions, but, before becom- ing overly concerned, it Is, perhaps, worthwhile examining recent breadth behavior in some detsil. Perhaps the most important point that can be made is that there are currently two separate and distinct developments as regards breadth which have possible negative implications. The first of these is longterm in nature and has been present for some time. The second is shorter-term and of relstively recent vintage. Let us first examine the shorter term problem. The following table shows the major short-term swings in both the Standard 81 Poors 50o-Stock Index and our breadth index since the low of October, 1978. New highs both in the breadth index and in the 500 are indicated with an asterisk. SiP 500 BREADTH DATE SloP 500 BREADTH Oct 31, 1978 Nov I, 1978 Dec 6, 1978 Jan 26, 1979 93.15 96.85 97.49 101. 73 805.17 811.79 813.60 819.61 Apr 10, 1979 Jul 9, 1979 Aug 31, 1979 Sep 20, 1979 103.34 104.47 109.32 110.51 821. 75 822.88 831. 62825.24 Classic breadth theory, it will be recaJIed, suggests potential bearish implications whenever a new high in the market averages is unconfirmed by a like high in breadth. As the table quite clearly indicates, each new high in the S 81 P since last October has been confirmed by a new breadth peak with the single exception of the last one, the September 20 high of 110.51 which found the breadth index some 61 points below the peak it had attsined on August 31. The following table is constructed Blong the same lines and goes back to the beginning of 1976. This longer-term perspective reveals still another difficulty. DATE S&P 500 —–.Jan-1-4-,-1-97G – Feb 4, 1976 Feb 20, 1976 Apr 5, 1976 Jun 21, 1976 Jul 14, 1976 Sep 21, 1976 Dec 15, 1976 Jan 3, 1977 101.91 102.10 103.51104.28105.95107.83 105.14 107.00 BREADTH 804.12 818.43 824.15 820.21 815.77 821. 72 823.85 829.84 836.15 DATE Jun -27. 1977 Jul 22, 1977 May 17, 1978 Jun 8, 1978 Aug 17, 1978 Aug 25, 1978 Sep 11, 1978 Aug 31, 1979 Sep 20, 1979 SiP 500 100.98 101. 67 99.60 100.21 105.08 104.90 106.98 109.32 110.51 BREADTH 836.94839.4U 840.22 841.07 849.40849.76 853.78 831. 62 825.24 The highs of early 1976 in the S 81 P 500 were confirmed by new breadth peaks up through February 20. However, four-successive new market peaks in April, June, July, and September of 1976 were unconfirmed by new highs in the breadth indicator. This, on the record, suggested a bear market as far as the S &P was concerned, and indeed, one ensued, since the average dropped from 107.83 to a low of 8Y.19 in March, 1978. It was a peculiar bear market, however, since, as the- table shows, each successive short-term peak took breadth to new highs even though the 500, at each peak, tended to be lower. As the market moved up again to a high of 106; 98 in September, 1978, breadth continued to achieve new peaks. There then ensued the break of September-October, 1978 which took Blmost a year to recover. When the 500 finaJIy managed to achieve a new high in the end of August this year, breadth, Blthough it had risen satisfactorily as the first table shows, was still unable to rise above its September, 1978 peak. Needless to say, it remsins below that peak today. Let us examine each of these divergences. The first one is ,- indeed, disturbing, and the six-point difference between breadth on September 20 and its higb of three weeks earlier is an unusaJIy wide one. It must, however, be noted that this particular divergence is barely a month old Hlld could easily be erased by a couple of weeks of markets which demonstrated across-the-board strength. The second divergence is indeed real, but its implications are, in our view, somewhat ambiguous. We discussed a couple of weeks ago the theory that the period March-September, 1978 constituted, in many ways, a sort of double bottom. If this is the case, the fsilure of breadth to better its September, 1978 high is of little-consequence since divergence. are normBlly measured from the start of bull markets. Also, the superior action of the breadth during 1977 and 1978 is historicaJIy unprecedented. Although breadth has not yet bettered its own high, made in September, 1978, it is, at current levels, comfortably above its level of September, 1976, the last time the 500 achieved a major high. The unusuaJIy strong breadth action during the 1976–78 bear market, in other words, has made current interpretation somewhat difficult. We are trying here to put breadth action in perspective, not to paint an overly rosy picture. Recent breadth has, perhaps, placed the market in a position where it must prove itself — by putting On a raJIy sufficiently dynamic to rsise breadth to new peaks. This would not be at an difficult in the current context. On the other hand, it is becoming just about a necessity if the doubts referred to above are to be dispelled. Dow-Jones IndustriBls (12 00 PM) S & P Composite (12 00 PM) 897.18 111.09 ANTHONY W. TABllLL DELAFiELD, HARVEY, TABELL Cumulative Index (10/4/79) 801. 57 AWTsIa 1 'fNo statement Or expresSion of opinion or any olher motter herein coni d to buy or sell any secvrory referred fo or mentioned Th off olned IS, 10 b he dd eeme 10 be, dlreetly or indirectly, on offer or the SOllCllotlon of on offer tlon to be reliable we In no way re re t em er IS presente mere Y or t e of Ihe subscriber While we believe the sources of our Inforrna bosed on his own 'investigation and nor of the stotement!, mode herein Any action 10 be token by the subscriber should be positions or trades m H!Spect to any SeCUrities mention dYm ttl go ery co t, nc, os 0 corporation, ond Its offIcers or employees, moy now have, or mcy Icter tOke, 1hlS or any other ISsue Janney Mont orne Sc II I e IS or any future ISsue, and such POSition may be different from any Y'eWl now or hereafter eypressed In CVltamers mdependenlly of any , 'm 's which IS With, 'h'h SEC ,os on mvestment advisor, moy give adVICe to lis mveslment adVisory and othel I or In any 0 er Issue urt er In orrnotlOn on any seruflly mentioned herern 15 aVailable on requeu

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Tabell’s Market Letter – October 12, 1979

Tabell’s Market Letter – October 12, 1979

Tabell's Market Letter - October 12, 1979
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,— ,. …. ! —- TABELL'S MARKET LETTER 909 STATE ROAD, PRINCETON NEW JERSEY 08S40 DIVISION OF MEMBER NEW VOAK STOCI( EXCHANGE, INC MEMBER AMERICAN STOCK EXCHANGE October 12, 1979 It would, needless to say, be possible, given the time and space,to put together a short book exploring the ramifications of the astonishing market events of the past week. Both factors, however, are limited, so we must content ourselves at this stage with what we hope are some relevant observations. It is first necessary, we think, to disabuse oneself of the notion that the shift in monetary policy announced by the Federal Reserve last weekend has any relationship to the behavior of the stock market any more tangible than the trigger has to the rifle bullet which it fires. Let it be remembered that it was only last summer that the market greeted the accession of Mr. Volcker to the Fed chairmanship' with one of the stronger rallies it had put on all year. This was, presumably, in anticipation of his instituting precisely those policies which were set in motion last weekend. The market seldom performs in a faShion vastly different from one for which it has prepared itself, although sudden and unexpected events — of which more below — can often greatly intensify that performance. Such was the case, we think, this week. Let us next consider the volume, a record 81 million shares on Wednesday, coupled with almost equally amazing numbers the rest of the week. This, in our opinion, is the least remarkable aspect of the whole affair. Recent volume figures, in relation to shares listed and to the historical record have, if anything, been on the low side. It was, therefore, hardly surprising that trading activity, an increase in which is a normal function of unusually sharp downswings, should have attained new records this week. Indeed we doubt very much that this particular record will stand for very long. Neither is the steepness of the decline all that unprecedented. The Dow found itself down 4.46 on Tuesday and off 5.38 for the three days ended Wednesday. Comparable drops, at various stages The factor that does, we think, set this week's market apart and which assumes paramount im- portance from an analytical point of view is the downswing's unusual broadness. On Tuesday, 1765 issues out of a total 'of 1937 traded moved lower. This instance, of 91.12 of all issues traded de- clining, is, for the record, the 7th largest percentage, over the 53 years that breadth figures have been kept. The 86 figure, which followed it on Wednesday is, itself, almost as unprecedented. Since this sort of downside breadth is, indeed, relatively uncommon, it is appropriate to ask, Of what stage of the market cycle is it characteristic The most important fact which can be noted is that it is NOT, historically, characteristic of the early stages of an ongoing decline. Examination of the record shows that, as a long downswing starts out and begins to gain momentum, trading days in which 70-8(1 of traded issues fall in price begin, to become a fairly regular feature. The sort of extraordinary downside breadth occurring this week has almost universally failed to occur until such time as the market approached a climactic bottom. Now with the major averages having reached new peaks just a week ago (and unweighted aver- ages some six weeks ago), it is somewhat fatuous to compare recent action to the sort of thing that occurs at the end of major bear markets. It does, however, tend to occur on one other sort of oc- casion, those rare instances where a market decline is related to a sudden and unexpected event. Examples which occur are the Kennedy assassination (75.8 of issues declining), the Eisenhower heart attack (92.88), and the outbreak of the Korean War (89.5). Perhaps the most parallel is the announcement of the Treasury-Fed accord of March, 1951 (82.5), probably the last instance of a shift in monetary policy comparable to the present one. In all of these instances, a decline which might have been stretched out over a relatively long period was compressed into a short space of time given the impetus of a particular event. It is worth noting that all of the instances mentioned above were, shortly, followed by recoveries which took the market to new highs. – – ——–. Now we are not here either suggesting such a recovery or indicating that new lows in the present downswing may not continue to occur over the near term. We think, though, that the record does suggest the inadvisability of precipitate action in response to last week's events. ANTHONY W. TABELL DELAFIELD, HARVEY, TABELL Dow-Jones Industrials (12 00 PM) S & P Composite (1200 PM) Cumulative Index (10/11/79) 845.22 105.30 743.86 AWT sla No statement or expression of opInion or any other mattcr herein Contained IS, or IS to be deemed to be, dIrectly or mdlrectly, on offer or the solICItation of on offer to buy or self any sewflty referred to or mentioned The matter IS presented merely for Ihe canverlencEo of the subsctlber While we believe the sources of our II'1formo- tlon to be reliable, we ,n no way represent or guarantee the accuracy thereof nor of the statements mude herein Any action to be tal-en by the subscnber should be based on h own Ifwesligolion and 1I'110rmCllion Janney Monlgome-y Scoll, Int , os 0 corporation, ond lIs officers or emplo(ees, may now hove, or may laler loire. positions or trades 'n respect to any seCUfilies menlloned In thiS or any future Issue, and such position may be different from any views now or hereafter expressed In thIS or any other Issue Janney Montgomery Scott, Inc, which IS registered wllh the SEC as on Investment adVisor, may glye adVice to ItS InYcstment adVisory and olhel customers Independently 01 any statements mode 11'1 thIS or 11'1 any olher Issue Further II'1formohon on any secvflly menhoned herein IS aVailable on request

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Tabell’s Market Letter – October 19, 1979

Tabell’s Market Letter – October 19, 1979

Tabell's Market Letter - October 19, 1979 page 1
Tabell's Market Letter - October 19, 1979 page 2
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TABELL'S MARKET LETTER 906 STATE ROAD, PRINCETON, NEW JERSEY 08540 DIVISION OF MEMBEfl NEW VOAK STOCK EXCHANGE, INC MEMBER AMERICAN STOCK EXCHANGE October 19. 1979 , . October 8-12 abated somewlfat-th'is week. – It -would-be -difficulf; however; 'to desCribe-theweek's – action as providing any sort of convincing reversal evidence. Modest new closing lows were posted on Monday and Tuesday, and Friday morning's trading saw renewed downside pressure. Although fairly dynamic rally attempts were mounted during various times during the week, all failed to display any sort of follow-through. It was certainly impossible to read, in the week's activity, any augury that near-term lows had been seen, much less that any meaningful rally attempt was in prospect. None of this, however, is particularly relevant to putting the decline of a fortnight ago in its proper context. The meaningful question centers on whether last week's sudden collapse sug- gests an end to the irregular up-market which began in early 1978, or whether it constitutes merely a sudden, sharp, and unexpected blip on what will ultimately be recognized as an on- going uptrend. We made a preliminary attempt last week to determine just where previous declines of similar vehemence fitted in to the long-term market cycle. The result, we think, is interesting and merits some further expansion. We noted last week that on Monday, October 9, 91.1 of issues traded moved lower in price and pointed out that this was the seventh highest figure since breadth statistics have been main- tained. The near record was followed on Tuesday, October 10 by a day on which 86 of all issues traded declined. The relative rarity of such occaSIons is underscored by the fact that, since 1946, there have been only 147 trading days on which more than 75 of-all issues changing hands moved lower. The essential point which we tried to make last week was that these occurrences generally have been characteristic of two sorts of occasions 1) the terminal phase of major declines, and 2) declines which take place in reaction to sudden and unexpected events, a of two-weeks–ago. 'l'-hel—I– point is that recent action hardly falls into the first category mentioned above, since it took place within a week of the major indices' achievement of new buH-market highs. It seems, therefore, highly likely that it must be placed in the second category. It is, therefore, worth noting that most declines of this type were shortly reversed by moves to new highs before too long a time period had elapsed. We have tried to underscore this on the chart reproduced on the reverse side of this letter. The chart condenses the history of the Dow since 1946 and notes, together with the appropriate percentage, each of the 147 trading days on which 75 or more issues declined. A look at previous major bear markets reveals quite clearly that days showing an extraordinarily high percentage of declining issues were not characteristic of the ongoing stages of those downswings. When such days occurred during bear markets, they tended to occur at points very close to the terminal phase. Moreover, as the chart quite clearly shows, extraordinarily high percentages have been common characteristics of the ongoing stages of upswings, often initiated by.unexpected surprises such as the Eisenhower heart attack in 1955 or the Kennedy assassination in-late 1963. It is this sort of action that is, to us, evoked most clearly by the events of a week ago .. Another point suggested by the chart is the extraordinary frequency of broadly declining days during the late 1940's and early 1950's. This was, of course, a period in which the market was moving irregularly, much as it has of late. It was, likewise, a period of considerable contro- versy in regard to appropriate monetary policy and its relation to inflation, a period which cul- minated with the accord of March 9, 1951 with which the Fed ceased its policy of inflating the money supply by artificially supporting low interest rates. It was also the last period in which stocks. battered by monetary uncertainties and talk of impending recession /depression. sold for -the sort of historically low level which characterizes equity prices today.- – – —- While we would be reluctant to push this analogy too far. it is apparent. we think. that last week's action, on the record, hardly constitutes evidence of a major downside reversal. Indeed. it is a phenomenon. as the historical record amply shows. not at all uncharacteristic of an ongoing upswing. ANTHONY W. TABELL DELAFIELD. HARVEY. TAB ELL Dow-Jones Industrials (12 00 PM) S & P Composite (12 00 PM) Cumulative Index (10/18/79) AWTsla 825.68 102.98 735.19 No statement or expression of opinion or any other matter herein contained IS, or ,s to be deemed to be, clrcdly or mdlrectly. on offer or the sol,cltollon of on offer to buy or sell ony security referred to or mentIOned The molter 15 presented merely for Ihe of the subscrIber While we beheve the sources of our Informo flon to be relloble we In no woy represent or guarantee Ihe occurocy !hereof nor of the stotements mude hereIn Any actIon to be by the subSCriber should be based on hIS own',nvest,gotlon and Informotlon Jonney Montgomery Scott, Inc, as a corporotlon, and Its off,cers or employees, may now have, or moy loler toke posItIons or trades In respect to ony secufliles mentIoned In thIS or any future Issue, ond such posItIon may be dIfferent from ony. vIews now or hereafter elpressed In thIS or any other Issue Janney Montgomery Scott, Inc, whICh IS regIstered WIth the SEC as on Investment adVIsor, moy gIve adVICe to Its Investment adVisory a,!d other customers Independently of any stotements mode In thIS or In any other Issue Further Informotlon on any securlly mentIoned hereIn IS ova liable on request ' I..u ' I 01 '' 1955 1956 1957 1958 1959 1960 1961 )965 )96-7 1968 1970 1971 1972 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 – – –r 1- . —-….J

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Tabell’s Market Letter – November 02, 1979

Tabell’s Market Letter – November 02, 1979

Tabell's Market Letter - November 02, 1979
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TABELL'S MARKET LETTER 909 STATE ROAD, PRINCETON, NEW JERSEY 08540 DIVISION OF MEMBEft NEW VORK STOCK EXCHANGE. INC MEM8EA AMERICAN STOCK EXCHANGE November 2, 1979 . 2!1e of the Great'Crash was the way m which'lt'allseemed'to'come to-a-culmination'-this week;Trus climax was undoubtedly due to the fact that Monday was the precise anniversary of 1929's Black Tuesday, when the Dow plunged some 30 points on a record 16-million-share volume. (There – was also a Black Thursday on October 24, when, although the decline was only 6 points, volume reached almost 13 million shares.). The market, in 1979, celebrated the anniversary by doing nothing on the lowest volume in 5 months. This particular fascination with the last week in October exemplifies what we have always considered to be a misconception of history, The same sort of mindset is typified by a recent Broadway play in which a character, obviously living in the lap of luxury, picks up a newspaper and suddenly announces with a gasp, We're ruined. The most widely-read chronicle of the period, John Kenneth Galbraith's The Great Crash, concentrates exclusively on six weeks in October and early November of 1929, almost as though all of the relevant events which reshaped economic history took place within that month and a half. Unfortunately, it just didn't happen that way. As we noted last week, the stock market set records in those six weeks which are unlikely ever to be broken. The impact on the economy and on the life of the average American lasted for over a decade. For the record, the whole process started on September 3, 1929, the day after Labor Day, when the Dow closed at 381.17. Prices had worked lower (about 10) by mid-October, and by the end of the day on Black Tuesday, the Dow was at 230.07. Further weakness brought it to a close of 198.69, a total decline of 48, on November 13. What is generally lost sight of is that prices then recovered substantially over a period of si;months., On April 17, 1930, the Dow had risen almost 50 to 294.07, some 23 below the ,, —revels – — its prior high following the first rally after the bottom in the 1974 bear market. In other words, what took place between September, 1929 and April, 1930, while it set records which still stand today in terms of magnitude, still had many of the elements of normal stock market corrections. What was unique was what took place afterwards ,not over a period of six weeks but over a long dreary two-plus years. From that Easter weekend high in 1930, prices moved inexorably lower at an almost steady pace. By October, 1930, the 1929 low, set almost a year earlier, had been broken,and the dreary process of almost steady decline set in. In contrast to the record- setting trading pace of 1929, volume slowly dried up and, by 1932, was averaging less than a million shares daily. The unwinding continued, for the record, to a closing low of 41. 22 on the Dow on July 8, 1932. Volume on that day was 720,000 shares. In the fall of 1929, financial news centered on what was going on at Broad and Walls Streets. Starting in 1930, the focus was a good deal less narrow. In December of 1930, for example, the Bank of the United States failed, the first of 10,000 banks that were to disappear over the next three years. The Gross National Product was beginning a slide that would just about cut it in half by 1933, Unemployment, 3.2 in 1929, was on its way to 25. The stock price erosion of 1930-32, in other words, was amply justified by what was taking place in the real world. The Great Crash which we celebrated this week was, in other words, purely a stock market phenomenon, albeit the most resounding such phenomenon of all time. The Great Depression which began to evidence itself in mid-1930 and whose effects continued throughout the entire decade in the 1930's, was quite another animal indeed, touching the bulk of the American population which had never had anything to do with the stock market in the'first place. Bear markets of similar shape, if of considerably lesser degree, have occurred regularly since 1929 and will undoubtedly continue to occur just as regularly in the future, and investors have by and large learned, and will have to continue to learn, to live with them. The proper cOlcern of economic policy, it seems to us, is not preventing the repetition of 1929, but preventmg the repetition of 1930-32 and its aftermath. It was that period which taught us a lesson we have learned perhaps all too well, with the result that the problems we face today, centering around inflation, while no less real than those of the 1920's, are of an entirely different stripe. Dow-Jones Industrials (12 00 PM) S & P Composite (12 00 PM) Cumulative Index (11/1/79) 819.28 102.52 709.42 ANTHONY W. TABELL DELAFIELD, HARVEY, TAB ELL AWTsla No sto!emenl or expreSlon of opinion or any other motter herein contolned IS, or IS to be deemed to be, directly or mdnec!ly, on offer or the sOllcltotlon of at) offer to buy or sell ony referred to or mentIOned The matter IS presented merely for the of the subscriber Whde we believe the sources of our Informo- tlon to be reliable, we In no woy represent or guarantee the accuracy thereof nor of the statements mude herein Any action to be token by the subSCriber should be based on hiS own Invesllgohon and information Janney MOnlQomery Scott, Inc, as 0 corporatIOn, and lis officers or employees, may now have, or moy later to..e, pOSitIOns or trades In respect 10 ony secvfltles mentioned In thiS Clr any fulure Issue, ond such poslhon moy be different from ony views now or hereafter In thiS or cny other Issue Janney Montgomery Scott, Inc, wh,,h IS registered wllh the SEC os on Investment adVisor, moy give adVice to Its mvcsfmenl adVISOry and other customers Independently of any statements mode In thts or In any other ,ssve Funner informatIOn on any secuflty mentioned herem IS aVailable on request

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Tabell’s Market Letter – November 09, 1979

Tabell’s Market Letter – November 09, 1979

Tabell's Market Letter - November 09, 1979
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.. TABELL'S MARKET LETTER 909 STATE ROAD, PRINCETON, NEW .JERSEY 08540 DIVISION OF MEMBER NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANQE. tNC MEMBER AMERICAN STOCK EXCHANGE .;..'B'a November 9, 1979 isiiu'essummer; ;;-cdevcteih,llumterof 'Of this' cussion of the four-year cycle in stock prices. At that time, the Dow was sailing along in the upper 800's, most other major indices were achieving new highs, and the market had not yet been beset by reversal of Federal Reserve policy, accompanying astronomically-higher interest rates, renewed lunacy in the Middle East, or any of the other assorted woes that have since contributed to the erasure of most of 1979's gains. The point we attempted to prove then was that the market, in terms of the four-year cycle, had posted a major cyclic low in March, 1978 at 742.12 on the Dow, and that we were, therefore, in a new cycle barely a year and a half old. The reasoning ran somewhat along the following lines 1. There had existed an identifiable cycle pattern with approximately four years between lows covering the entire stock-market history of the 20th century, with some 22 such cycles identifiable. 2. The last obvious low in terms of this pattern had occurred in December, 1974. 3. A new low within the cycle that began in 1974 would make it the second-longest such on recordand cause a number of other distortions which would not fit into the pattern. 4. Therefore, that cycle ended in March, 1978, and a new one began at that point. On the Friday previous to the Federal Reserve announcement, the Standard & Poors 500 was at 111. 27, up 28 from its March, 1978 low, and the Dow, which had been lagging, was within 10 points of its high of a year earlier. The foregoing interpretation of the facts, therefore, appeared reasonably secure. At the moment, however, the Dow finds itself a good deal closerto its low of 20 months ago than to its recent high, and the S & P has retraced more than half of the ground nouncements of last August. ., The answer is that we see no particular need to revise our prior interpretation. We still feel that a cycle low can probably be placed in the spring of 1978 and that the cycle which commenced at that time remains in effect. We will be inclined to hold to this interpretation even were the Dow to test its lows of March, 1978 in the 740 area, an eventuality which must now be considered pos- sible if not probable. The only thing that recent action may be doing, it seems to us, is raising some questions about the precise shape of the cycle in which we now find ourselves. We pointed out last summer that, while the four-year-cycle pattern was indeed, without undue stretching of the data, identifiable, the shape of the cycles involved had varied widely. The bulk of them, of course, had divided neatly into those upswings and downswings we have come to call bull and bear markets. A number, however, which had, by any rational interpretation, to be considered part of the overall pattern, could not be so easily categorized. The period October, 1946-June, 1949 is a case in point. The cycle is obviously delineated by two lows at approximately the same point on the Dow on the dates noted. During the cycle, the Dow never advanced very much, its best level being achieved in June, 1948, some 18 above its low. The Standard & Poors 500 achieved a number of successive lows during the period in question and wound up significantly lower at the end of the cycle than at the time it had begun. Yet, since the period in question was 31 months long and was both preceded and followed by bull markets of considerable amplitude, there was little choice other than to call it a completed cycle. Recent market action at least raises the possibility that the current period may have a similarly irregular shape. This is, again, a possibility rather than a likelihood. With many downside objec- tives having been reached at the moment, it is certainly conceivable that, following a period of base formation around current levels similar to that which took place in October-December of last year ,- most major indices will recover to new highs above those of early October, thus conforming to the conventional pattern. Even should this not be the case, however, we still feel our current inter- pretation of the cycle picture is the correct one. The main point is that, if this interpretation is correct, any further weakness from current levels should not be viewed with alarm and would not be likely to lead to a decline of significant amplitude. Indeed, in terms of our conception of the pattern, any such weakness would have to be viewed as a buying opportunity. Dow-Jones Industrials (12 00 PM) S & P Composite (12 00 PM) Cumulative Index (11/8/79) 804.61 101. 27 703.11 ANTHONY W. TABELL DELAFIELD, HARVEY, TABELL AWTsla No statement or expression of opinion or any other motter herein contolned IS, or IS to be deemed to be, directly .or Indirectly, an offer or the sohCltotlon of on offer to buy or sell any Hlcurlty referred 10 or mentIoned The motter IS presented merely for the converqencc of the subscrIber While we believe the sources of our mforma- lion fa be reliable, we m no way represent or guarantee the accuracy thereof nor of fhe statements mude herem Any oct Ion to be by the subscflber should be based on hiS own InvestlgOTlon and mfarmatlon Janney Montgomery Scot!, Inc, as a corporation, and Its officers or employees, mav now have, or may later positions or trades m respect to any securrtles mentioned In thiS or any future Issue, and such positron may be d,fferent from any views now or hereafter expressed In thiS or any other Issue Jonney Montgomery Scott, Inc, which IS registered With the SEC as on Ir'Ivestment adVisor, may give odv,ce to Its Investment odvlsory and other customers mdependently of any statements mode 'n thiS or 'n any other Issue Further mf.ormot,on on any security mentioned herem IS ovorloble on request

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Tabell’s Market Letter – November 16, 1979

Tabell’s Market Letter – November 16, 1979

Tabell's Market Letter - November 16, 1979
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TABELL'S MARKET LETTER 909 STATE ROAD. PRINCETON, NEW JERSEY 08540 DIVISION OF' MEMBER NEW YORk STOCK EXCHANOE, INC MEMBER AMERICAN STOCK EXCHANGE November 16, 1979 Political commentators have widely noted the recent tendency for presidential campaigns to – —- beginearlier -and -earlier-Indeed,- at – peIgning liaS-already begi.tn–in earnest W';-are-thus publishirig below', somewhat earlier than usual, our study of market behavior during presidential election years. The table shows, for each election year since 1900, the president elected and his party, followed by the average price for each month, expressed as a percentage of the previous December's close (i. e., 110 means the market was up 10 and 90 means it was down 10). Year President Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec 1900 McKinley R 101 103 lO4 105 100 98 98 99 97 100 108 114 1904 Roosevelt R 102 99 99 101 99 99 103 107 112 118 125 126 1908 Taft R 105 100 105 111 117 117 123 126 125 126 134 138 1912 Wilson D 100 99 lO2 106 105 105 106 109 109 109 108 103 1916 Wilson D 99 98 97 96 98 99 98 99 102 105 107 103 1920 Harding RII 99 91 97 96 91 89 89 86 89 89 85 77 1924 Coolidge R 103 104 102 100 99 101 101 113 112 110 115 119 1928 Hoover R 99 98 103 110 113 108 108 112 120 123 131 132 1932 Roosevelt D 103 101 102 76 66 59 63 89 102 88 87 82 1936 Roosevelt D 102 108 112 112 104 108 116 118 120 126 130 128 1940 Roosevelt D 99 98 97 98 85 76 80 82 86 87 88 85 1944 Roosevelt 1948 Truman D 102 101 105 101 105 109 112 110 108 111 110 115 D 97 92 94 101 106 110 108 104 103 106 100 99 1952 Eisenhower R 102 100 100 100 100 102 105 106 104 104 105 109 1956 Eisenhower R 97 98 104 105 103 102 107 106 103 102 100 102 1964 Johnson D D 102- -103- 105- i6i -i09 – -10-8 –11-1 –110 — ii1- R7 –;-1 113 – 115 –112 1968 Nixon R 98 94 92 99 101 104 104 101 105 108 109 110 1972 Nixon R 102 103 106 108 107 106 104 108 107 106 112 115 1976 Carter D 109 114 116 116 116 116 117 115 117 112 111 115 lncumbent party did not control Congress. lncumbent party not re-elected. The twenty years show an approximate normal distribution. Twelve are bull markets, three (1920, 1932 and 1940) are distinct bear-market years, and in five years the trend was flat. There appears to be a tendency toward a flat trend or moderate weakness in the first half. Eleven of the twenty years showed little market change through June. Indeed, only in the three years which evolved into bear markets was the first half action predominantly on the down- side. It is worthy of note that a downward bias tends to occur on two sorts of occasions, first, when the incumbent president loses the election, and, second, when the incumbent party does not control Congress. However, 1972 and 1976 were both exceptions to this latter rule and 1976, possibly due to its unusual circumstances, produced the second strongest first half on record. The first statistic suggests that the market may be a good forecaster of election returns. Only in 1976, of years when the incumbent lost the election, was the market up more than 5 in the first half. Thus early strength next year might provide heretofore missing comfort for President Carter. . The most consistent fact about election year markets, though, is It definite tendency toward a strong second half. Indeed, as the table shows, in 16 of the 20 completed years, the average price for December was higher than the average price for June. Even in two of the three bear markets, 1932 and 1940,the market rallied in the second half from the June lows. In 1912 and i976 the JuneDecemberdifference was mliiiScule-Oiify iri1920 and 1948 -were-there distinct declines from June to December. In terms of 1980, we have recently been suggesting that the market now finds itself in an upward cycle which is not likely to be completed before the end of that year. Thus second-half strength, regardless of irregularity which may be the outgrowth of recent near-term action, would be consistent with our current view of the cyclical picture. Dow-Jones Industrials (12 00 PM) 819.62 S & P Composite (12 00 PM) 104.15 Cumulative Index (11/15/79) 726.73 ANTHONY W. TABELL DELAFIELD, HARVEY, TAB ELL AWT sla No statement or e;.;preSSlon of opmion or any other motter herein contained IS, or Is to be deemed to bo, dlrcctly or mdlrectly, on offer or the SOIIC.totlon of on offer to buy or sell any seclJrlty referred to or mentioned The molter IS presented merely for the converenct of the subscriber While we believe the sources of our tnformo- lion 10 be reliable, we In no way represenl or guorantee the occuroy thereof nor of the sTatements mude herem Any OcTIOn to be tok.en by The suoscnber should be based on hiS own Investlgohon and mformatlon Janney Montgomery Scott, Inc, as a corporation, cnd Its or employees, may now have, or may loter take, POSitions or trades In respect 10 any SeCUrities mentioned In thiS or ony future Issue, ond such position may be different from any views now or hereafter eypressed In thiS or any other Issue Janney Montgomery Scoli, Inc, which IS registered With the SEC os on Investmenl adVisor, may give adVICe 10 lIs ,nvestment adVISOry and othel customers Independently of ony statements mode tn thiS or In any other Isue further information on any mentioned herein IS aVailable on request

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