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Tabell’s Market Letter – May 19, 1978

Tabell’s Market Letter – May 19, 1978

Tabell's Market Letter - May 19, 1978
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TABELL'S MARKET LETTER -, .– 909 STATE ROAD, PRINCETON. NEW JERSEY 08540 DIVISION OF MEMBER NEW YORK STOCK eXCHANoe,lNC MEMBER AMERICAN STOCI( eXCHANGE May 19, 1978 It is probably not amiss, since this is a technical market letter, to begin a discussion ccof the recent'ma'rketexcitement'by defining-once'more the proper-subject'matter for analysis. Technical analysis is, to put it quite simply, the study of past stock-price data. Visualize, if you will, the continuous stream of reported transactions flowing each day across the consolidated ticker. It is the sum of these transactions, taken as individual items of information, that constitute the sole raw material for the technical process. The task of the technician is to manipulate this material. It ,may be reorganized, sep3- .-rated, collated, charted, graphed, averaged, smoothed, compared,' added, subtracted, multiplied and divided in infinite permutations and combinations of ways. Technical analys is, however, remains defined by its Input, which Is stock price action. Which leads us, of course, to a definition of what technical analysis Is not. It is not the analysis of Gross National Product, business cycles, inflation, receSSion, money supply, or interest rates. A technician may consider these Items, and, since they are quantitative in nature and quantitative work Is Indeed his stock in trade, he may use them, from time to time, In comparison with stock-price series. Such analysis, however, remains, in the purest sense, extrinsic to technical work. None of the above is meant to suggest that these various non-technical inputs are not a proper subject of study or that that study is not useful in the investment decision-making pocess. The portfolio manager would hardly be doing his job were he not to consider variables -, thissort and to utilize appropriate condusions deri;e;rfromthat cOnsMerauon in the COJrse of his work. The pOint is, though, that these inputs are sep3rate from technical analysis, not a part of it. We raise this subject at the moment simply because we are increasingly aware of some skepticism regarding the recent rally in the stock market. A good deal of that skepticism is, as far as we can gather, based on conclusions drawn from some of the factors mentioned above. As noted, we do not intend to belittle the value of these conclusions and, if they suggest pessimism at the moment, so be it. However, it should be made perfectly clear that the story being told by technical analysis is, at the moment, being writ plain. It is that the market is going up and, moreover, is likely to continue doing so. Now this rather clear indication may be at variance with conclus ions drawn from other facets of portfolio strategy work, and we Cdnnot help it. If, however, technical analysis has any validity and, after 25 years of practicing it, we think it does, it should perhaps stimulate the investment decision-maker to reexamine SOme of those conclusions. For what a study of the market is clearly telling us is that the negatives of interest rates, money supply and infla- tion are not so much an indicator of what the market is likely to do as an explanation of why it was down almost 300 pOints in the 18 months ended last February. The market is either telling us that, or it is telling us that the current conventional wisdom regarding recession, mflation ,andmterest rates,' is;quite simply .. mistaken. – ,0 ''''' – – – – – – – It has always been our view that economic-monetary analys is was valuable in stock market terms, but we have always felt it limited in the sense that investor reaction to these factors was a variable rather than a constant. We have long held, in summary, that the only way to get at the elusive variable of mvestor confidence was to observe the action of the investor in the marketplace via the simply-defined sort of technical analysiS referred to above. It is the technician's job, in other words, to gauge the health of the equity market. The con- clusion which must be drawn regarding that health at the moment is Simple. It could not be better, thank you. Dow-Jones Industrials (1200 p.m.) S&P CompOSite (1200 p.m.) 851. 61 98.52 ANTHONY W TABELL DELAFIELD, HARVEY, TABELL Cumulative Index (5/18/78) 743.23 AWTjt No statement Qf expressIon of opinIon or cny other matter herein contolned IS, or IS 10 be dee'Tled 10 be, directly or mdorectly, on oHer or the SOllCIIolion of on offer to buy or 1ell any security referred to or mentioned The mOiler 1 presented merely for the of the subscriber While -ne believe the sources of our Informo- tlon to be reliable, we In no way represent or guarantee the accuracy thereof nor of the statements mude herem Any action to be taken by the subSCriber should be based on hiS awn investigation and information Janney Montgomery Sco1t, Inc, as a corporation, and Its officers or employees, may now have, or may laler toke, positrons or trades 10 respect to any leCuntles mentioned In thiS or any fulure Issue, and such poslhon may be different from anv views now or hereafter expressed In Ihls or any other Issue. Janney Montgomery Scott, Inc, which IS registered With the SEC os on westment adVisor, may give adVice 10 115 ,vestment adVisory and other cvstomen Independently of any sotements mode In thiS or In any othe' Issue Further ,formatIOn on any security menhoned herein IS aVailable on request

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Tabell’s Market Letter – May 19, 1978

Tabell’s Market Letter – May 19, 1978

Tabell's Market Letter - May 19, 1978
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TABELL'S MARKET LETTER -, .– 909 STATE ROAD, PRINCETON. NEW JERSEY 08540 DIVISION OF MEMBER NEW YORK STOCK eXCHANoe,lNC MEMBER AMERICAN STOCI( eXCHANGE May 19, 1978 It is probably not amiss, since this is a technical market letter, to begin a discussion ccof the recent'ma'rketexcitement'by defining-once'more the proper-subject'matter for analysis. Technical analysis is, to put it quite simply, the study of past stock-price data. Visualize, if you will, the continuous stream of reported transactions flowing each day across the consolidated ticker. It is the sum of these transactions, taken as individual items of information, that constitute the sole raw material for the technical process. The task of the technician is to manipulate this material. It ,may be reorganized, sep3- .-rated, collated, charted, graphed, averaged, smoothed, compared,' added, subtracted, multiplied and divided in infinite permutations and combinations of ways. Technical analys is, however, remains defined by its Input, which Is stock price action. Which leads us, of course, to a definition of what technical analysis Is not. It is not the analysis of Gross National Product, business cycles, inflation, receSSion, money supply, or interest rates. A technician may consider these Items, and, since they are quantitative in nature and quantitative work Is Indeed his stock in trade, he may use them, from time to time, In comparison with stock-price series. Such analysis, however, remains, in the purest sense, extrinsic to technical work. None of the above is meant to suggest that these various non-technical inputs are not a proper subject of study or that that study is not useful in the investment decision-making pocess. The portfolio manager would hardly be doing his job were he not to consider variables -, thissort and to utilize appropriate condusions deri;e;rfromthat cOnsMerauon in the COJrse of his work. The pOint is, though, that these inputs are sep3rate from technical analysis, not a part of it. We raise this subject at the moment simply because we are increasingly aware of some skepticism regarding the recent rally in the stock market. A good deal of that skepticism is, as far as we can gather, based on conclusions drawn from some of the factors mentioned above. As noted, we do not intend to belittle the value of these conclusions and, if they suggest pessimism at the moment, so be it. However, it should be made perfectly clear that the story being told by technical analysis is, at the moment, being writ plain. It is that the market is going up and, moreover, is likely to continue doing so. Now this rather clear indication may be at variance with conclus ions drawn from other facets of portfolio strategy work, and we Cdnnot help it. If, however, technical analysis has any validity and, after 25 years of practicing it, we think it does, it should perhaps stimulate the investment decision-maker to reexamine SOme of those conclusions. For what a study of the market is clearly telling us is that the negatives of interest rates, money supply and infla- tion are not so much an indicator of what the market is likely to do as an explanation of why it was down almost 300 pOints in the 18 months ended last February. The market is either telling us that, or it is telling us that the current conventional wisdom regarding recession, mflation ,andmterest rates,' is;quite simply .. mistaken. – ,0 ''''' – – – – – – – It has always been our view that economic-monetary analys is was valuable in stock market terms, but we have always felt it limited in the sense that investor reaction to these factors was a variable rather than a constant. We have long held, in summary, that the only way to get at the elusive variable of mvestor confidence was to observe the action of the investor in the marketplace via the simply-defined sort of technical analysiS referred to above. It is the technician's job, in other words, to gauge the health of the equity market. The con- clusion which must be drawn regarding that health at the moment is Simple. It could not be better, thank you. Dow-Jones Industrials (1200 p.m.) S&P CompOSite (1200 p.m.) 851. 61 98.52 ANTHONY W TABELL DELAFIELD, HARVEY, TABELL Cumulative Index (5/18/78) 743.23 AWTjt No statement Qf expressIon of opinIon or cny other matter herein contolned IS, or IS 10 be dee'Tled 10 be, directly or mdorectly, on oHer or the SOllCIIolion of on offer to buy or 1ell any security referred to or mentioned The mOiler 1 presented merely for the of the subscriber While -ne believe the sources of our Informo- tlon to be reliable, we In no way represent or guarantee the accuracy thereof nor of the statements mude herem Any action to be taken by the subSCriber should be based on hiS awn investigation and information Janney Montgomery Sco1t, Inc, as a corporation, and Its officers or employees, may now have, or may laler toke, positrons or trades 10 respect to any leCuntles mentioned In thiS or any fulure Issue, and such poslhon may be different from anv views now or hereafter expressed In Ihls or any other Issue. Janney Montgomery Scott, Inc, which IS registered With the SEC os on westment adVisor, may give adVice 10 115 ,vestment adVisory and other cvstomen Independently of any sotements mode In thiS or In any othe' Issue Further ,formatIOn on any security menhoned herein IS aVailable on request

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Tabell’s Market Letter – May 26, 1978

Tabell’s Market Letter – May 26, 1978

Tabell's Market Letter - May 26, 1978
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TABELL'S MARKET LETTER 909 STATE ROAD, PRINCETON. NEW JERSEY 08540 DIVISION OF MEMBER NEW VOAK STOCI( EXCHANGE, INC MEMBER AMERICAN STOCK eXCHANGE – May 26, 1978 – Since the latter partoLMarhc,.this letter.has been attempting to comment aspects of –'-, improving market action as they have become evident in, day-to-day activity. We noted on March 23 that the short-term downtrend channel started in November had been penetrated, suggested on April 7 that the continuing upside leadership by secondary stocks remained unabated, and noted on April 14 that the possibility of a bottom of some importance occuring in the spring of 1978 was not incompatible with our interpretation of long-term cycle theory. With the upside gap on record volume of mid-April, improving market action became far too obvious to simply ignore. We have tried to suggest, since that time, the fact that the rally which began on April 14 seemed to be of more than passing importance and that the evidence seemed to suggest that it was far more than a simple interruption in an ongoing bear market. It is perhaps worth while at this stage to attempt to become a bit more specific regarding our perception of the current probabilities for stock market action. We have already in past letters, we hope, taken note of the most salient fact, that evidence suggests to us that we currently have on our hands something a good deal more significant than a bear- market rally. If such were the case, appropriate investment policy would have been the maintenance of cash reserves, ignoring the market strength, or indeed, utilizing that strength to build reserves which had not previously existed. Since we believe that the action of the past month in fact possesses inter- mediate-to-longer-term upside significance, we have counseled against this sort of policy and suggested that an aggressive attitude toward equities be maintained. This we continue to do. As far as upside targets are concerned, we think the data relevant to a forecast can be found in the action of the Dow since early November of last year. From that time to the end of 1977, the average held in, roughly, the 800-845 range. Early 1978 saw a sharp drop to a February 28 low below 750 and 'range that'range'onLthe,upside- – and was followed by trading in early May at the 820-840 level. That range was, in tum, penetrated on the upside prior to the retreat of the past few days. If the six months of trading action discussed above is to be viewed as a base, a view which we now consider logical, an upside target in the 940-970 range appears plausible. This area is, of course, an all-too-logical stopping place, constituting, as it does, the level at which the Dow traded through- out most of 1976 and, more importantly, the ceiling around the 1,000 level which has placed an effective damper on upside action for more than a decade. A similar upside target for the Dow Transportation Index would be around 250, approximately equal to its mid-1977 high. In terms of our Cumulative Index, the most logical projection appears to be 920, a level COinciding with the overhead supply from its 1971-73 top. This is a move of approximately 25, more than we are able to foresee for the Dow, thus suggesting continued leadership on the part of the broad range of NYSE issues versus those contained in the averages. Attempting to time a move of this nature is of course hazardous at best, but it seems to us that two rough scenarios are possible. The first scenario would be an ongoing upside move with little in the way of interim correction, certainly none much greater than the modest downswing of the past few days. We confess we are inclined toward this view on the basis of the rather unique circumstances surrounding the current stock market scene. Insufficient attention, it seems to us, is being paid to one of the most basic of all stock market commandments, i.e., Don't fight the tape. The stock market has a way of 0,embarrassing those who engage in such an unequal contest, and this embarrassment would be accomplished by continuation the rally for another 100 pOints or so without much interruption. As we suggested a month ago, however, an alternate scenario is possible and, indeed, solely in historlcalterms; more likely; -Past volume reversals (and we think the last two weeks of – April fall into this category) have often been followed by a test, on lower volume, of the previous lows. Were such a test to occur, the long-range implications might become even more bullish, since it would have the effect of broadening the base pattern, As far as this possibility is concerned the key level to watch on the Dow would be 820. Downside penetration of this figure would suggest the possibility of something more than very-short-term weakness. In summary, although the exact shape of the pattern may be unclear, we think the evidence favors the upside with continued leadership by secondary stocks, and we would advise portfolio managers to adjust in order to take advantage of this prospect, DOW-Jones Industrials (1200 p.m.) 831 51 S&P Composite (1200 p.m.) 96.58 ANTHONY W. TABELL DELAFIELD, HARVEY, TABELL Cumulative Index (5/25/78) 733 93 AWTrak No stotement or expression of opinion or any other matfer herein contolned IS, or IS to be deemed to be, directly or indirectly, an offer or the sollcllollon of on offer 10 buy or sell any security referred 10 or mentioned The moiler Is presented merely for the corwerlenCfi of the subscriber While we believe the sources of our informa- tion to be reliable, we In no way represent or guorontee the occurocy thereof nor of the Slotement mvde herem Any action to be token by the subSCriber hould be bosed on hiS own Ilweshgofion and Information Janney Montgomery Scott, Inc, os a corporation, and lIS officers or employees, moy now have, or may later toke, pOSitions or trades m respect to ony secuntles mentioned m thiS or any future Issue, and such position may be different from any views now or hereafter expressed m thiS or any other ISlue. Janney Montgomery Seoll, Inc, which IS registered With the SEC 0 on mvestment adVisor, may give adVice to liS IIlvestment and other customers Independently of ony statements mode rn thll or In any other Further mformatlon on ony S(!o.Hlty mentIOned herem IS available on request

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Tabell’s Market Letter – June 02, 1978

Tabell’s Market Letter – June 02, 1978

Tabell's Market Letter - June 02, 1978
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.- TABELL'S MARKET LETTER 909 STATE ROAD, PRINCETON, NEW JERSEY 08540 DIVISION OF MEMBER NEW VOAK STOCK EXCHANoe, INC MEMBER AMERICAN STOCK EXCHANGE – June 2, 1978 We tried in our letter of last week to suggest that our own reading of the available evidence i;-t tne — . attitude toward equity investment appeared to be warranted. We suggested, as we have been doing for some months now, that we thought the low in the Dow which occured on February 28 (or, at worst, some future double-bottom low which would be associated with it) would tum out, on an historical basis, to be of more than passing significance. We are perfectly aware that we are not supported in this view by large numbers of our colleagues, a great many of whom are focusing on the current behavior of interest rates as being inconsistent with a stock market bottom, and, of course, only time will tell for certain whether our own reading of the current technical portents is a correct one. In a way, however, both we and thos e forecasters who are looking for lower prices are guilty of the same sin, for undo emphasis on the present rally fails to focus on the larger and more important question. That question Is whether the bottom of the recent bear market — whether it was achieved on February 28 or will be achieved on some future date — presages a move of sufficient magnitude to end the super-cyclical stock price behavior which began in the middle 1960' s. That environment, as we have been pointing out in this space for some eight years no',' has involved a trading range which, on the Dow, has centered on 800-900 with occasional excursions to the vicinity of 1,000 on the upside and equally occasional bear-market bottoms around the 600-700 level. Within that environment, we have seen three major bear markets, three major bull markets, and possibly a fourth one now underway. The major question is not really the direction of the next 100 or even 200 points on the Dow, but the imminence of the end of this more-than-decade-old phenomenon. Our own current working forecast, which calls for a possible move to the 940-970 range, Is of.no since.uch a move -the sort of environment we have discussed. From a purely technicai po'int of view, we think, more evidence – would be needed before it would be appropriate to forecast a move above the 1,000 leveland, consequently, significantly higher prices rather than simply higher prices. Nonetheless, we think a few background facts are worthy of note. The first such fact is an extremely Simple one. Common stocks are cheap. Every time we utter that sentence we feel vulnerable to charges of naivete and lack of sophistication. We fortify ourselves against this criticism by recalling the naive and unsophisticated little boy in the fable The Emperor's New Clothes. The woods are full of sophisticates who can tell us, often at great length, why stocks should be cheap. There were, of course, equally convenient explanations readily available in 1949, the last time stocks were selling at approximately current levels and, we suppose, equally facile explanations just prior to World War I, the previous comparable cycl!callow. A major low is, almost by definition, a period when all the bad news is known. Indeed, bearish developments continue to emerge well after Important lows are made and the market begins to ignore th ose developments and move ahead anyway (Any resemblance in this description to the action of the past two months Is intended.). A new super-cyclical environment for stocks would, It seems to us, require the emergence of new sources of demand for equities and it seems logical to suggest that such a nevI source of demand might be found in the renaissance of the individual investor. The past two decades have seen net sales of stock on the part ofindlv1duals while the market came to be more and more dominated by institutional Intermediaries, and there seems to be some evidence that this era may be coming to a close. The secur- Ities Industry as a whole seems to be gearing itself toward an aggressive wooing of the ir,dlvidual Investor ,by., a ,relatively. small group of.powerful,and,sophlsticated organlzations JOURNAL noted this week that institutions both bank trust departments and mutual funds, were net sellers of equities during the first quarter of 1978. This, of course, was the quarter during which the Dow was bottoming prior to a 100-point upward move. The big question, then concerns not the next bull market but the next market era, and the evidence Is by no means complete. It will be our firm intention, however, to comment upon it as it becomes avail- able In the future. NOTE The writer plans to be absent over the next six weeks on an extended vacation. During that absence, our colleague, Mr. Robert J. Simpkins, Jr., will be preparing the remarks which appear in this space each week. DO'N-Jones Industrials (1200 p. m.) S &P Composite (1200 p. m.) Cumulative Index (6/l/78) 842.95 97.60 737.83 ANTHONY W. TABELL DELAFIELD, HARVEY, TABELL No statement or expression of oplrllon or any Olher malter herCln conto,ed IS, or IS 10 be deemed to be, directly or Indlrl'!elly. on offer or the soliCitation of an offer to buy or sell any security referred to or mentioned The mailer 15 presented merely for Ihe convef'lJence of the subscriber While -He believe the sources of our Informa- lion 10 be reliable, we In no way represent or guoranlee Ihe accuracy thereof nor of Ihe statements mode herein Any action to be token by the subscriber should be based an hiS own Invesllga1ton and Informollon Janney Montgomery Scali, Inc, as a corporation and Its officers or emplovees, may now have, or may later take, or trades In respect to any securities mentiOned In thiS or any future Issue, and such pOSition may be different from any v,cs now or hereafter crpressed In Ihls or ony other Issue Janney Montgomery Scott, Inc, whICh ,s regIStered With the SEC as on Investment adVisor, may gl'…e adYlce 10 Its mvestment odvlsary and othel evstamers Independently of any statements made In th,s or ,n any ather ,ssue Further ,nformatlon on any secullly mentioned herein IS available on request

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Tabell’s Market Letter – June 09, 1978

Tabell’s Market Letter – June 09, 1978

Tabell's Market Letter - June 09, 1978 page 1
Tabell's Market Letter - June 09, 1978 page 2
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TABELL'S MARKET LETTER 909 STATE ROAD, PRINCETON. NEW JERSEY 08540 DIVISION OF MEMBER NEW VORK STOCK EXCHANGE, INC MEMBER AMERICAN STOCK EXCHANGE June 9, 1978 The stock market, since the February 28th low of 742.12 as measured by the Dow Jones Industiral AVerage in.D trading days is ,up 124.39 pOints or 16.76 without a significant correction to date. In , face of bank' trust ';'ere-net' sefiers first quarter of 1978. Where then is the recent strength in the stock market coming from Logically, the source of the buying panic can be attributed to institutional and foreign buyers reversing dramatic- ally their position of the previous quarter. Nonetheless, the institutional community is embarassed as their soon-to-be-released June 30th quarterly reports will no doubt show. Another source, however, that should be examined is the.1ndlvldual Investors. An excellent proxy to examine the potential buying power of the Individual investor is New York Stock Exchange margin debt. During April, margin customers Increased their indebtedness to New York Stock Exchange member organiza- tions by 340 million — the largest monthly Increase since' December, 1976. Stock margin debt totaled 10,260 million at the end of April. A new record I The number of margin accounts jumped from 900,000 to 915,000 at the end of April. Although margin debt Is at an all time high, it Is Interesting to note that the number of margin accounts is stHl, after almost ten yeaI!!,well below the level hit In 1968 when mar- gLn accounts numbered 945,000. In the following exhibit, we compare margin debt to margin accounts and show this as a ratio. We have then taken recent major highs and lows of margin debt and compared them to the corresponding sig- nificant highs and lows of the DJIA. EXHIBIT I Margin Debt (mil) Acc'ts. (thou) Ratio Total Mkt. Value Ratio Date Do….. – Jones June, 1968 High 6690 940 14.05 641037 1.043 12/3/68 985.21 July,1970 Low 3780 770 20.37 531077 .712 5/26/70 631.16 Dec.,1972 High 7900 , , 750 ,.. 9.49 872000 .9061/11/731051.70 .76512/6/74.,……5JJJiO'-…..– Aprll,1978 High 10260 915 11.21 821000 1.250 6/6 /78 -866.51 From 1965 to date the range of this ratio Is 20.37 high on July, 1970 and 9.49 low on December 1972. The ratio tends to be high at market bottoms (July, 1970 and December, 1974) and low at market tops (June, 1968 and December, 1972). The relative high ratio In June, 1968, a market high, can be attributable to the large amount of speculation in the market. Also, the ratio peaks before a market high and after a market low. Another way we are able to analyze the customer stock margin debt is to compare It to the total market value of equities listed on the NYSE. The observations seem to be the same. The higher the ratio of margin debt to market value, the higher the averages and, conversely, the lower the ratio, the lower the averages. But in both cases from the 1974 low to date the behavior of the mar- gin debt series has changed. The Dow Jones Industrial Average has moved from 577.60 in December, 1974 to 1004.65 in December, 1976 (73.9) to 742.12 in February, 1978 (-46.4) to the present Dow 866.51 (16.8). During this same period margin debt increased without correction from its 1974 low of 3,910 mlllion to 10,260 mlllion (160). Matters are quite different today than the days of the 5(1s and early 60's when average dally volume on the Big Board was fewer than 5 million shares and most trades were between Individuals. Margin debt is being used by the individual In different ways. In the last number of years, margin accounts have been used to purchase high-yielding securities rather than speculative issues, the cost of borrowing in some cases being less than the yield of the securities purchased. This in fact has created greater stability in the type of securities held in the Individual margin account. Another effect on the margin debt series has been the various uses of options. An obvious example Is the Individual ,writer' of'naked stock' g6es 'up .' This-is';-adassic- reversal of the historic effect of margin calls for declining stocks. Also, the use of options has provided greater liquidity to margined stocks. Finally margin debt Is used for non-purpose loans by individuals who find It easier and In some cases cheaper to borrow. These factors have had an effect on another statistical series that is positive for the stock market — the quality of security credit. Percentages of margin debts in accounts with equity under 40 fell to 1,550 million representing 15 of debt and 11 of the accounts. It should be remembered in August of 1974, this ratio reached a high of 23, a series record, and was thought to be a major contributor to the decline in late 1974. Therefore, these new influences in the margin debt series can be viewed constructively. However, the significance and the historical correlation of this awakening giant must be reexamined. ROBERT J. SIMPKINS, JR. DoW-Jones Industrials (1200 p.m.) 864.78 DELAFIELD, HARVEY, TABELL S&P CompOSite (1200 p.m.) 100.28 Cumulative Index (6/8/78) 758.02 RJSrak No statement or expression of opinion or any other molter herein contOlned IS, or IS to be deemed to be, directly or indirectly, on offer or the soliCitation of on offer to buy or sell any security referred to or mentioned The motler IS presented merely for the conver'!ence of the subscriber. Wlule e believe the sources of our lI,!formo tlon to be relmble, we In no way represent or guarantee the accuracy thereof nor of the stotements mude herein Any action to be token by the subSCriber should be based on hiS own Investlgollon and information Janney Montgomery Scott, Inc, 0 a corporaflon, and lIs officers or employees, may now have, or may toler toke, poslhons or trades In respect to any seCUrities mentioned In thiS or any future Issue, and such Posl\lon may be different from any views now or hereafter expressed In thiS or any other Issue Janney Montgomery Scott, Inc, which IS registered With the SEC as on Investment adVisor, may give adVice to Its Investment advisory and other customers mdependently of any statements mode In thiS or In any other Issue Further Informotlon on any seCUrity mentioned herein IS ovolloble On request IT –, o '- LLI lLJ 0 Cfl – Z Z H L'l IY y- 'm- m– en-' m-' ISNOIllI81 1830 o mm m' m'' m''

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Tabell’s Market Letter – June 16, 1978

Tabell’s Market Letter – June 16, 1978

Tabell's Market Letter - June 16, 1978 page 1
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TABELL'S MARKET LETTER 909 STATE ROAD, PRINCETON, NEW JERSEY 08540 DIVISION OF MEMBER New YOAK STOCI( EXCHANGE, INC MEMBER AMERICAN STOCK eXCHANGE June 16, 1978 A regularly released series, appearing recently in the financial news, was the monthly mutual fund- Sales- CirtnutUaTfUiids;'-exCllldfngnfi)ney 'iriarket fiifids-; a-mounteeT-to 6-2-5 ' Aided by rising stock prices, total net assets of these funds climbed to 46.6 billion in April, Redemp- tions also increas ed in April to 580.2 million. The analysis of these mutual fund statistics is difficult without an explanation of the history of the series. For many years the Investment Company Institute has made available these statistics relating to the mutual fund industry. We have in tum been making available analytical measurements based on these statistics and have been maintaining the figures in our computer data bank. Since the beginning of the series in 1954, the raw figures, as released, worked well for this pur- pose. Until recently, most mutual funds were in fact common-stock oriented. This is no longer the case. Around 1974, money market funds began to gain popularity as an investment vehicle, and, for a while, statistics were distorted by the growth of these funds. The ICI recognized this and properly began separating money market fund figures from those of conventional mutual funds. More recently, however, new non-common stock vehicles have appeared 'on the scene. With growing investor interest in income and a wide spread between stock/bond yields, bond funds have gained increasing popularity and new sales of thos e funds have dramatically increased. Also, with the advent of new legislation, municipal bond funds have become an important factor. The activity of non-common stock funds, therefore, has become a major factor In this series. Unfortunately, through- out 1976 and early 1977, the necessary figures to isolate the activity were unavailable and, therefore, caused distortions. Quite correct ly, this situation has changed as the ICI has released separate statistics covering bond and muni cipal bond funds. An interesting fact to note in factoring out bond -de-Eyoenaars Statistics cipal bond funds thus covering common stock oriented funds only. Having outlined the background of the series, it must be kept in mind, in looking at mutual fund statistics, that we are looking at the behavior of two different groups of individuals. When we look at sales and redemptions, We are examining the behavior of the mutual fund investor. When we look at changes in the cash position of mutual fund assets, we are noting decisions made by the mutual fund manager. With this in mind, let us look at a few of these statistics. The historical tendencies of fund redemptions have been that it dries up sharply during bear markets, rebounds a bit after bot- toms, and then begins a new sharp rise as a bull market gets underway. Generally, the level of redemptions levels off fairly close, but in advance of the end of a bull market. The last redemption peak was in March, 1976. Since then, the series has dried up sharply, reaching a low in April, 1978, and, in fact, has increased considerably through April of this year suggesting the possible start of a new bull market. Historically, sales tend to dry up along with redemptions during bear markets. After rebounding a bit, they generally do little during the early stage of upswings and generally commence a sharp increase around the middle of a bull market cycle. Thus, the recent rise in sales must be considered an encouraging factor and would, If it were to continue, suggest a healthy market. Finally, an analy- sis of the amount of their portfolio that mutual fund managers have chosen to retain in cash, leads us to some interesting conclusions. Cash pOSition generally tends to reach a peak near major market lows, to decrease sharply as bull markets get underway, and, finally, to remain flat for a period of time, increasing again as bear markets begin. Thus, cash position reached an all time high of 13.5 40 a -month' before' the bottom ii1-1974 'ano declined to lowof'4'. 92in'September DoW—o- approached its high in the 1, 000 area. Since then, the cash position has increased, as the chart on the opposite page shows, and appears to be peaking around the 10 level suggesting a possible major market low. Also, it is interesting to observe a four-year cycle, from 1958 to date, appears to have developed as the mutual fund cash/ asset ratio peaks. Therefore, the most bullish configuration of mutual fund data in the coming months would consist of a continuing rise in sales accompanied by a like rise at a somewhat slower rate in redemptions. This should also, on an historical basis, be accompanied by a willingness of managers to invest the cash inflow and reserves. It will be interesting to see how this scenario unfolds. Dow-Jones Industrials (1200 p.m.) 842.17 ROBERT J. SIMPKINS, JR. S&P Composite (1200 p.m.) 97.98 DELAFIELD, HARVEY, TABELL Cumulative Indes (6/15/78) 751. 80 No statemenl or expression of opInion or any other motter herein contained IS, or IS 10 be deemed to be, dlreclly or Indirectly, on offer or the SOIICltolll)o of on offer to buy or sell any security referred to or mentioned The mOiler IS presented merely for the convefllencs of the subscnber While oNe believe the sources af our Informat.an to be relloble, we In na way represent or guarantee the occurocy thereof nor of the statements m..,de here.n Any OellOn to be taken by Ihe subSCriber should be based on hl own Investlgollon and Informal lon Janney Montgomery Scali, Inc, as a corporation, and Its offICers or employees, may now have, or may laler take, poslhons or hade!. In respect 10 any secUrilies mentlaned In thiS or ol'ly future Issue, and such POSition may be dlfferenl from any views naw or hereohet expressed In thIS or any other Issue Janney Montgomery Scott, Inc, which IS reglslered With Ihe SEC os on Investment adVisor, may give odvlce to Its Investment odvlsory and olhel customers mdependently of any sloleme1lls made In Ihls or In any olher 'we Further mformatlon on any security mentioned herem 15 aVOllable on request 1200 1100 1000 .00 800 700 -a 600 -, Q 500 00 300 I il '. 1 l200 ))00 1000 !IJ) BIlO 1111 son 000 30Il 13 12 II 5 11954. f(\ 1\ 1-1 11955 -r1956 11957 ' , , I. II ,I, 'I' 1 I I /' 1/\ , ;J1 Iv f\ \, \tA , III 1111111111 11958 11959 1960 1961 A Ir 1962 11963 I I I 1\ rfif Y\ I ! 1, III 111111111 )1964 1965 1966 1967 A Af\ lfY V 11968 11969 11970 13 12 I I ! Iv ! 11 r 10 8 j! 7 1 h IrJ \ jI II I5 MU' UAL FUN ') CAS MIAS ET 1111,1111' 1111111111 11111111111 1111111111 III 11971 1972 1973 ' 1974 1975 PAT I b ( 1IIIIIIIIIt T II ' iJ976 1977 1978

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Tabell’s Market Letter – June 23, 1978

Tabell’s Market Letter – June 23, 1978

Tabell's Market Letter - June 23, 1978
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TABELL'S MARKET LETTER 909 STATE ROAD, PRINCETON, NEW JERSEY 08540 DIVISION OF MEMBER NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE, INC MEMBER AMERICAN STOCK eXCHANGE – – –., Asth e, st,l,m1!\!'r , ;comm entsare beginningto em erge June 23, 1978 expectat1ons,ofcAhe-tra summer rally. Long time readers of this letter are aware, we have examined this phenomenon and in the past expressed a mild degree of skepticism about It. The following table updated through 1977, shows the number of advances and declines for the llme-and two-month periods ended each month of each year from 1926 through 1977 together with the average percentage change for the period. ' One-Month Periods (from 1926-1977) Two-Month Periods (from 1926-1977) Ending Month Advances Declines Average Chq. Advances Declines Averaqe Chq. January February March April May June July August September October November December TOTAL 33 19 28 24 1. 10 a.oo 28 24 -0.11 29 23 0.92 26 26 -0.85 26 26 0.95 33 l'll 1.81 33 19 1.38 22 30 -1.36 28 24 -0.30 30 22 0.42 11. 1.35 355 269 0.44 -….5.-,. – 34 18 2.45 29 23 1.10 25 27 -0.21 31 21 0.89 30 22 0.30 25 27 0.06 32 20 2.71 35 17 3.35 30 22 -0.03 25 27 -1.62 31 21 0.16 II 11 1.80 362 262 ll,9,1 A preliminary look at the table, indeed, supports the notion of a probable summer rally. The average monthly advance for the Dow over the period has been .44, whereas the average performance in July is an advance of 1.81, almost four times as great. Likewise, the average advance of 3.35 for the two months ended August is a good deal larger than the average two-month advance. It would, Indeed, appear that the expectation of an advanCing market during July and August has some solid grounding in fact. Having made this statement, however, a few doubts must be raised. The first factor which needs to be pOinted out Is that a large part of the high average advance for the summer period rests on the accident of the 1932 bottom's having occurred at the end of June. Thus, July and August of that year produced the largest two-month advance in stock market history, an astounding 70 rise. If this single year is eliminated from consideration, the results for July and August are much clos er to normal. Secondly, while it is true that July and August do show significant pluralities of advancing months over declining months, It must be remembered that advancing periods tend to outnumber declining ones over the 51 years by almost three to two. When standard tests of statistical significance are applied, the period with the clearest seasonal action is the month of December, which Is why this letter has always emphasized the Importance of the year-end rally. Llkewlse, the tendency toward a declining market in September Is statistically more significant than that of a rise in July or August. Interestingly enough, none of the other months show any discernible seasonal pattern whatsoever. Lastly, In looking for seasonal patterns, it is Wise to examine the most recent data to see If It seems to be deviating from the past, and, indeed, this is apparently the case. The twelve years between 1966 and 1977 have produced three rallies and nine declines In' July and five rallies and seven -declines.in August, and the two-month'perlod ended August has 'produced four rallies'ana elght-deellnes——-'' with an average percentage change of -1.96. Interestingly enough, a new seasonal ten,dency, not heretofore apparent, seems to be emerging — that of a decline In May-June. Every May. from 1965 through 1978, with the exception of 1972 and 1975, has produced a declining market, and twelve of the thirteen years since 1965 have shown a two-month drop In May-June. To date, 1978 Uts this category. The moral of the whole exercise, we suppose, is that the stock market is a difficult and changing beast, and, while certain seasonal tendencies are apparent, they constitute only one factoiln what Is invariably a highly complex equation. Dow-Jones Industrials (1200 p.m.) S & P CompoSite (1200 p. m.) Cumulative Index (6/22/78) , RJSrak ROBERT J' SIMPKINS, JR. DELAFIELD, HARVEY, TABELL No stolement or e)(preSSton of opinion or cny other matter herein contolned IS, or IS to be deemed to be, directly or indirectly. an offer or Ihe soliCitation of on oHer to buy or sell any sec;urlly referred to or mentioned The motter IS presented merely for Ihe converlenCI; of Ihe subscnber While -Ne believe the sources of our Informo- han 10 be reliable we In no way represent or guarantee the ac,uracy thereof nor of the statements mode herein Any action to be token by The Substrlber should be based on hiS own 'lnvestlgotlon and Information Janney Montgomery Scott, Inc, as a corporation, and Its off.cers or employees, moy now have, or may loter POSitions or trades In respect to ony securtlles mentioned In thl or any future ISSue, and such pOSition may be different from ony views now or hereafter expressed In thiS or ony other Issue Janney Montgomery Scott, Inc, which IS registered With tne SEC as on Investment mo)' 9\\!C adVIce to ItS adYlsory and other customers Independently of any statements mode In thiS or In any 01 her Issue Further tnformotlon on any securrty mentioned nefeln IS ovorloble on request

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Tabell’s Market Letter – June 30, 1978

Tabell’s Market Letter – June 30, 1978

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TABELL'S MARKET LETTER 909 STATE ROAD, PRINCETON, NEW JERSEY 08540 DIVISION OF MEMBER NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE, INC MEMBER AMERICAN STOCK EXCHANGE june 30, 1978 – –r The measured by the Industrial Average appears to again be approaching anmterestiilg juncture' andIts worlliwa'tClllng 'cioselY;ToTe\fCew, 'slnce-the-Dj1Ahlgh of 1014.79 on September 21,1976, the market has corrected Itself 26.87 over 496 trading days, reaching a low on February 28, 1978, as the DjIA closed at 742.12. From the February low the 'Dow then rallied significantly to a high on june 6, 1978, of 866.51 or 16.76 In 84 trading days. 'Most recently the Dow has corrected from its high of 866.51 on june 6,1978, to a low on june 26,1978, of 812.28 or 6.26. What prompts this statistical exercise on the Dow Is to draw attention to the potential slgnlflcance of the rally from the February low. Utilizing a simple filter, listed below are selngs of greater than 25 down and 15 up on the Dow jones Industrial Average Since the post war. DATE DJIA CHANGE It OF DAYS 12/13/61 6/26/62 2/ 9/66 10/ 7/66 12/ 3/68 5/26/70 1/11/73 10/ 4/74. 9/21/76 2/28/78 6/ 6/78 734.91 535.76 995.15 744.32 985.21 631.16 1051. 70 584.56 1014.79 742.12 866.51 0.00 -27.10 85.75 -25.21 32.36 -35.94 66.63 -44.42 73.60 -26.87 16.76 0 134 913 167 518 367 665 437 496 362 68 years an average correction of 31.9 lasting in duration an average of 293 trading days. Prior to this date there had not been a 25 correction in the Dow for approximately twenty years. The other observation which can be noted Is the behavior of the DjIA after each of these corrections, excluding the most recent advance. By no means meant to be predictive, It is Interesting to ob- serve that the average percentage increase in the Dow and the average duration of the subsequent move following these declines are 64.6 and 648 days respectively, conSiderably above the most recent advance. The action of the Dow In relation to its computed trend channel, an attempt to quantify trend mathematically, can also be instructive. On this basis, two downtrend channels have recently contained the D)lA, the first starting In the December 31, 1976, high of 1004.65, and the second computed from the more recent November 11, 1977, high. These two downtrend channels are plotted on the chart on the back page. The most slgnlflcant channel. of course, Is the one covering all of 1977-78 signified by the solid lines on the chart. As the chart shows, the market has rallied to the top of this channel on five separate occasions. Likewise It has touched the bottom of the channel numerous times, and In each case, a significant rally has occurred. The same thing is essentially true of the shorter- term channel extending back to last November. As can been seen, at the end of February the Dow once again touched the bottom of the channel and from that point commenced a rally. For the first time In theprocess of that rally the Dow moved above both downtrend channels decisively, setting up conditions for a test of the IS-month old major downtrend. As the chart shows, the reversal unquestionably penetrated the upper limits of these channels. Indeed, we now have a new computed uptrend establlshed as shown on the right hand side of the chart. This trend rising for 1 84 .tradlng.-days …at…. approximately;cl -;90.,…polnts .. per ..day.. has …also, … been' penetrated. — What conclusions can be properly drawn from this action Simply, the distinct environment which has statistically characterized the market from january, 1977, through March, 1978, Is no longer in effect. The fifteen month long-term major downtrend has been arrested and new Invest- ment policies must evolve. St!ll the remaining question dividing the investment community is whether the rally since February Is merely a rally within a bear market and w!ll penetrate the old lows or Is in fact, as we believe, the start of a new bull market ultimately indicating higher levels. The most recent minor correction has placed the market in Its sharpest oversold position since August, 1975, as measured by our 10-day advance/decl!ne osc!llator. The behavior of the market as It recovers from this oversold condition may help answer the questionJat,.ed ..!',ndas stated..Ja.rller should be watched closely. ROBERT j. SIMPKINS, JR. Dow-jones Industrials (1200 p.m.) 819.99 Delafield, Harvey, Tabell S & P Composite (1200 p.m.) 95.37 Cumulative Index (6/29/78) 729.89 RjSrak – ,-, … -. ..- No statement or expression of opinion or any other malter herem contolned IS, or IS to be deemed to be, directly or indirectly. on offer or the oll(llollon of on offer to buy or sell any secuflly referred to or mentioned The motter IS presented merely for the of .he subSCrtber While we believe the sources of our mformo lion 10 be rellcble, we In no way represent or guarantee the accuracy theteof nor of the stotements mode herem Any action to be by the subSCriber should be based on hIS own mVestlgallOn and mformotlon Janney Montgomery Seoll, Inc, as a corporal,,m, and lIs officers or employees, may now have, or may later toke. POSitions or trades In respect to any securities menlloned In Ihls or any future Issue, and such position may be different from ony views now or hereafter expressed In thiS or any other Issue Janney Montgomery Scott, In whlh IS registered With the SEC as on Investment adVisor, moy give adVice to ,Is Investment advisory and other customers Independently of any state'l1ent mode In Ihls or In any other Issue Further Informahon on any secullty mentioned herem IS available on request -' I -30 – 1962 \ 11963 11964 10 DRY NET DlFFERENCE OF RDV.-DEC. RS PERCENTRGE OF TOT. lSSUES TRRDED I I'! i I Ii I I\1 I I II I II 'I \ /1 Hn r I !II . \ I) I I ;! II 11965 11966 1967 P RY nrl n 000 10Arii 11968 1969 1970 197 1972 11973 1974 111975 1976 1977 1978

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Tabell’s Market Letter – July 07, 1978

Tabell’s Market Letter – July 07, 1978

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— TABELL'S MARKET LETTER 909 STATE ROAD, PRINCETON, NEW JERSEY 08540 DIVISION OF MEMBER NEW VOAK STOCK EXCHANGE, INC MEM8ER AMERICAN STOCK EXCHANGE July 7,1978 – -last week's 'market-lettlrr;-the behaviOrOnhe 'stbck'ma-rket'Eis- it re-c6vewtro-m oversold condition can be instructive. The term oversold is used to describe the short-term behavior of the stock market, stating Simply that the market has been moving down with above-normal momentum and breadth. Identifing this condition is useful in two respects. First; it helps measure the short-term direction of the market, and; secondly, such measurements have implications for the longer-term direction, i.e., extreme oversold conditions possess bullish longer-range implications. In order to measure this short-term, overSold condition, we utilize a technique that cumulates the total of net difference of advances and declines on each of the previous 10 days, a procedure which tends to produce large negative values when the market has been down sharply. La-st Monday, June 26th, the total of declines over advances for 10 days was 4378. This figure by itself seems impreSSive, but is worthless for long-range historical comparisons. It is easy to put this basic figure into historical perspective by expressing it as a percentage of the total number of issues traded. This allows for the secular increase in the number of stocks listed on the NYSE. In this case, therefore, the percentage to total issues traded for the same 10 days is 23.1 – It is important to put this figure into proper context by noting the number of observations since May, 1940, the fall of France, in which the 10-day excess of declines over advances reached 20 or more of the total issues traded has occurred in excess of 500 times. (Listing of these dates available on request.) Obviously, this number or level by itself certainly does not suggest anything of a significant nature. igure-;-furthermore,is Lnotone-which . ha t–wi nt'hottom-s– '' The lowest point of the oversold condition at such bottoms has exceeded 30 of issues traded and in most cases it has managed to move above the 35 figure. This is illustrated on the chart on the back page which shows the DJIA since January, 1962, together with a 10-day total of daily advance minus declines expressed as a percentage of issues traded. DATE May 29, 1962 Aug. 29, 1966 May 26, 1970 Aug. 23, 1974 10-DAY A-D -5,013 -6,288 -6,259 -5,522 EXHIBIT 10-DAY A-D/ TOTAL ISSUES -038.7 -044.1 -039.3 -031. 8 DJIA 603.96 767.03 631. 16 686.80 DJIA IN 60 DAYS 616.00 796.82 723.99 624.92 DJIAIN 120 DAYS 626.21 847.88 768.00 726.92 The above exhibit shows the past four major bottoms in 1962, 1966, 1970 and 1974 together with the extent of the oversold condition and the behavior of the DJIA after the nadir of the oversold condition had been reached. This same behavior was true also at the important 1973 and 1975 intermediate-term bottoms. Another point which must be raised is that the present occasion represents only the third time in the -.past.12,months.thaCa comparable-oversold-condition .(20. O),has been.reached— the last one.belng-in -.–…;. January, 1978. As the chart on the back page shows, previous major bottoms have been characterized by multiple and separate occasions in which the 10-day advance/decline total dropped below the 20 figure. The conclusion of the above discussion is not meant to dictate an overly bearish position. In fact, the market's ability to begin todemonstrate a difference of opinion among investorlS by exhibiting wide swings in both directions is viewed as constructive. What the historical record would seem to us to suggest, therefore, is the continuation of such a sequence which appears to have started earlier this year. The recent short-term oversold condition does not signal an end to this process. Dow-Jones Industrials (1200 p. m.) S & P Composite (1200 p.m.) Cumulative Index (7/6/78) 810. 12 94.53 716.74 ROBERT J. SIMPKINS, JR. DELAFIELD, HARVEY, TABELL No slolement or expression of opinion or Clny other motter herem contOlned IS, or IS to be deemed to be, directly or ,ndlrectly, on offer or the soliCitation of on offer to buy or sell any security referred to or menhoned The motter IS merely for the converlencc of the subSCriber While oNe belIeve the of our ,nforma- hon to be rei table, we In no way represent or guarantee the accuracy thereof nor of the statements mode herein Any octlon to be taken by the subSCriber should be based on hIS own investigatIon and informatIon Janney Montgomery Scott, Inc, as a corporatIon, and liS offIcers or employees, may now have, or may later take, poslltons or trades In respect to any mentioned In thiS or any future Issue, and such position may be different from any views now or hereaher expressed In thIS Of any other lSue Janney Montgomery Scott, Inc, which IS registered With the SEC as an Investment adVisor, may give adVIce TO Its Investment adVisory and other customers lndependently of any statements made m thiS or m any other Issue Further mformotlOn on any security mentIOned herein IS ovollable on request Air RATIO RATIO MMT Alrl OTC OTCI NYII AI, OTe a.DATI DJ!A INDIX DJIA COMPo OJIA IAiAOTH IRIADTH l.rADTH '8 197' 742.li III S I.I'S' 1II,a7 1.11'7 1,17 '.I! 7. MAR I 197. 74'.JI li'i71 1,1'51 111.a7 1.11.' 9'lfll 1111.11 , MAR 2 191' 14 4' 1.1.1. 1.1.4, LII,71 1.11 Iil' 1111.al Ille.I' MAA , 11 1a'.JI 1.11 111. 1.IJ1S 9jI1 1111.5' IIII.JI MAR 1.7' 74a. Iii.,. 1.11 111.14 .91.11 lell.'1 MAR 7 1.7. 7.1' 111.21 1.1'51 1 ,11 1.13', ',1' 1111 7 MAR I 1911 7'1.17 MAR 9 1.71 7SI.11 IIJ,'7 1.1'11 11 41 e.II.. 9'9,94 1111.18 1'11.1, ,i4.4' 1.1.59 112 , 1.1111 1101… 1111. 1111.'1 MAR II 197. 75 1.I.t. 111.41 1.li.1 lll.,14 1111.', 1111.12 MAA IS 1' '. MAR 14 1911 7.a.,. Iii ' 1.1.5' 113.11 1.12 1111.25 1111.1. 1111.1. 1.5.1T 1.1'49 I.' 1.19 Ilil.14 1112.13 1111. MAR IS 1971 I. MAR I. 19'1 1.a 5 ,MAR 11 1.1& 1.1.11 1' 1' 1.1 2 11'.'1 1.1. iel' , Illi.41 1111. li 7. 1.1' 114.11 e.II.. 1111.19 1111.1. li1.31 1.1.5. 114.94 1,IleS ill5.I, IBII.!1 21 1.1. ,13.12 1.13 115.3. 1.1381 il11.21 1113.14 1111.7J MAR '1 ,911 , a li7.S1 0.19 IIS.12 1.1111 IIIJ.II 1181. MAR 1.7. 7.,4 li7.3. 1.1'.1 leS,I' 1.1,.1 ill 11 111'.19 III i,MAR '5 51 121.11 1.1'91 115.19 1.13 ill!.', IIIJ.4, 1111.91 — I1AR.iI1I'7!l3.ill –IU.U – – MAR I.U 115.61 I.U', in un,74 IIln.2I MAA a9 1.71 1'1.7' lil.94 1.1. 1.'.11 1,IS9 1117.21 1111.9' Ile3.S. MAR JI 1'78 7'i 1.1.8. 1.1' 11'.11 1.1, ille. 1114.11 118J 7 MAR 31 ,978 1'7.J' fili9a 1.1712 1,11 1,1482 ill Ilia.,. 118 1' A'R J 1.7. 751.14 (i',41 0,1711 III. 1.1411 ill',14 1114.5' IIIJ 7 A'R 4 191. 75!.J1 118.', 0.1717 18',11 e.14 '181'.11 1114.14 IIIJ. A'R '1.7. ,, (i a, 1,1111 I,.' 1.141, '.11.12 IIIS.14 1114.41 A'R I'll 1'J.'S 111.8' 1.171J 111.47 1.141' Ili1,.. lei!.'. 1114. A'R 7 1911 7'9.1' A,R II 1.,' 773 5 (JI,al 1.171' ,III,i 1.14e. ill 41 IIB5.11 111'.11 112.a1 '.1711 118. 1.141J ill 18 111'.11 1111.2. APR II 1.,1 171.1' i'2.1' 1.1711 1II,a4 1.1418 1118.11 101 19 111'.1' A'R II 1.,1 7 29 (Ji.54 1.1711 118.17 1.14il 111 4. 1015.47 A'R IJ 1.71 115 IIJ.'8 e.11i4 11'.99 '.1419 lel1,II 111 el A'R 14 1971 795.1' 14. e.I.9' 111.'9 1.141e ili 89 1111,41 111 41 A'R 11 1911 111.12 IJ5.11 1.1.,. 111.'1 e,Il81 l1i4.41 1117.14 111'.5' APR II i971 813.21 114 , e.I.1. 111.4J 1.1'11 Ill 1 1117.51 III J. APR ,. 191. ., e4 1.1' 111.&a ,1.1'8. i0il.11 1117,'1 111'.10 APR II 1.11 114.54 APR II 1971 '12.11 IJ'.ll 1.11 IIi… 1.11.. 1114 1 1117.9, Ile7.1' 111.4, e.I' II'. ,ei119. lila… 1111.1' IIe7. A'R 24 1971 1 1& 11 44 1.1.51 111 e e.131' le.11 le' 44 II A'R II 1.,1 11'.59 APR -a. 197. 11'.'1 II…. 1.1'41 114.11 1.1111 iei1,II 1111 1 Illa.4. II, 1.I'lJ 114.11 1.1111 1111.11 111 7' 11'1,1' A'R 17 1'1' 11 91 IJS.I' e.I' 114,'9 I.IS.& 11i,.TS III'. II8a.1' A'R II 1911 137.11 11'.3. 1.1… 111.18 1.IJ1' iei 1119 7 111'.1' MAY MAY , ca I 1911 MAY , 197. I'MAY 4 1'7' MAY ! ,U4.n '.11 .,1 114,41 al e' 7.14 -I,IU',-1l5 …-I.UU117.1. a.I.J. 11'.11 1.11'1 ,11.07 e.I' 11 11 1.141. 111 81 il'.1' 1.1'8' 11 41 e.141J ill'4 13'.1' 1.1' 111 7 1,1414 III' 1111.1, 1111.'. 1111.1, 4.11, Ile9.41 II' 1111.1. MAY I 1911 .24.,8 141.14 1.1&91 111.14 1.1411 ili1. 11,'4 1111,'8 MAY 9 191. 11'.11 141.1. 1.1715 111.1' 1.1414 1111,11 1111.14 MAY II 11 .22.1& MAY II 1.7' ala.ae MAY 12 1.18 .41.11 141 1 0.1711 117.5' 1.14J' 1111.1. 1111.41 1111.'4 141.5. 1.1.91 11'.21 1.1418 ili 19 1111.87 1111.11 141.51 1,1'9' 119.41 0.1411 Ilil.J9 1111.11 IIII.!I MAY 15 1'7a 84'.7& 142 2 0.1 119,11 Ilil,11 1112.51 1111. MAY I, 197. 1'4.,1 14J,.1 e,I4 111.11 1,1414 Ilil 5 111 11 IIII.IS MAY 11 1911 851.31 MAY I. 1971 151.92 MAY 19 1.7. .4 85 4.11444.&7 1.1'.' 1.1' 1.1.14 121… 1.141' 0.1411 ilii.11 1113.11 1111.11 1111.'1 Ilt'. 144… 1.17'1 111.11 1.143. 1111.41 1113.JI 1112.15 MAY II 1911 15!.34 145.'S e.17'! 111.9' 1.14a. 1111.57 1111. MAY', 1.71 14s.a9 MAY 14 197. IJ1.'. MAY 15 1.71 ,IS.41 1'1 , 1.1411 Ilal.IJ 111'.71 1111 14'.9. 0.1711 119.11 1.1410 IIIJ.41 Illa 9 14J.91 1.1121 11'.11 1.1414 1111 4 III'. 1111.4, MAY I. 1971 8'1.,9 144.JI 1,173' 119. e.1441 (lit.11 111'.9' 1111. AY J.-1.7. 4.11 JMUAYN JJUUNNN II 197. I 1' Z 197. -I,-1- '1 84e.'1 11 .47. 1.1' – — – 144.1' 1144.4,..1a1 141 , 14…. 1.1731 1.112J lil1il 1.1111 1 . 1-' , . 11 11 1.14', '1,7.1' 1ll4,It 1111 1 1 i4 1.1411 l'ia.I' 1114.1, 1111 ' 111,14 1.14'1 11'1.11 1014.4. 1111.'1 1'1,1' 1.14 illl, 1114.11 IIIJ.3' 111-l1e1-11.1-441J- '-I,ile- l-l .-ITllns.I' U I' I. JJUUNN I I' ' a.I' '1'11 8.11 JU JU N N II IJ I'll 1.78 1.91 JU N 14 I'll .,…. JUN 15 1911 '84.a, &,JUN I. 1971 .11 JUN I. 1911 2 JUN II 1. 131.14 JUN '1 197. 114.9' JU JU N N II IJ 191. 1'1. .27.11 113.11 JUN I. 1.11 '11. JUN '7 I'll 117.'1 JUN 197' '19.'1 JUN 1.7. 811 4 JUN '1 I'll all. J 197 1 1'7. 1.7' 1 I.'ill 1.17JI 14'.1. '1.11 149.JI 1.114' ISI.4' 1.1. 151.7. 1.17 Ise.I' e.11'4 14'.57 1.1114 14 21 1.111' 14 11 1.117' 14'.1' 1.1111 147 7 1.17.. 145. 1.17'. 144,77 1.1111 14'.'1 '.17 141 ' ,1.177J 144.11 I.17.S 14',54 ,119' 1'4,'1 '1.17.8 la3.'9 114,41 114.i9 .,4 II….114.1' IIZ.9. 111.1. I.I J 111.'8 111.14 11'.54 11'.1' 119,S' 119. I'I,JI 1.1.1' 11',il 1.1411 1.14', 1.14'1 1… 1.1471 1.1411 1.14 1.1411 1.14tl 1.1411 1.14.1 1.141. '.1451 1.lall 1.11 1.1' 1.147. '.1.18 ilil.91 Ilii.4, 1111.1. lll 33 1111. 1111.51 1117,25 lliJ.4, i11J.11 1111.'1 illl.11 illl.l. (111,1, illl ' ilile 1111,., ill 10 I .' 111 4. 111 4 1111.1, 1111 1 1111.a. 1111.14 1111.1. 1117.11 IIIt,71 III',.J 1111.'1 1017 7 III , 1111.'7 1111.1' 1111.11 1111.1' 1114.14 1110.11 Illa.7S 1114.1' 1110.11 1115.11 1114.17 1114. 1114.41 111'.'4 1114.11 1114.18 IIIJ. III'. 1111. 1114.lt 1114.'1 1114.1.

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