TABELL'S MARKET LETTER … I I. ,.- 600 ALEXANDER ROAD, CN 5209, PRINCETON, NEW JERSEY 08543-5209 MEMBER NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE, INC MEMBER NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF SECURITIES DEALERS, INC (609) 987-2300 – May 26, 1989 …,-,-.–.,,– We-had –occasion4his-weektrtake-a-look -ahoary 'marktindicator -that iscp robably-;o—,….-,,-11 in many ways, out of date—the ratio of Standard & Poor's Low-Priced Stock Index to its High-Grade Stock Index. The original purpose of this indicator was to identify the existence of speculative activity, the low-priced stocks originally being conceived as those speculative issues with a public following, while the high-grade issues were taken to be those favored by conservative investors. An increase in the ratio .. therefore, tended to signify rising speculation, while a decrease suggested the opposite. The indicator can be criticized today largely on the grounds that the Low-Priced Index tends to consist of stocks that have been deservedly ignored and that more sophisticated tools for measuring secondary-stock activity (The Value Line Composite and NASDAQ Indices) are available. Nonetheless, the long sweep of the indicator—the figures are available back to 1926—makes it worth study. There has been a fair amount of consistency to the ratio's behavior. It tends to bottom out coincidentally with or shortly after major bottoms, this bottom being followed in most cases by a very sharp expansion. The rate of this rise tends to peter out fairly early on, following which the ratio itself tends to top out. These two events generally occur with substantial lead time on peaks in the major averages. There are. of course. difficulties. The lead time for the peak in the ratio is often so substantial as to make timing difflcult. There is, furthermore, the odd case of aberrant behavior. In the 1962-1966 bull market, speculative activity continued to increase merrily until a couple of months after the market had peaked, and in 1976-1978, the ratio actually moved ahead during a bear market and continued its rise throughout the subsequent bull market. A look at the current scene indicates the possibility of like strange behavior. The —iil.pIr-o.b-lTemheirse that was there has been, – a mna expansion since the between 1987 Dece bottom, hardly any ri mber, 1987 and-June, se in 1988, the at ratio at the end of which time the 6-month rate of change had reached 14.7 This is an absurdly low figure, considering that the range for this statistic over the past nine bull markets had been 25 to 54 The ratio itself has peaked out, so far at least, in September, again after showing by far the smallest rise for any bull market in the past 40 years. We have. in other words, enjoyed a bull market without. to date, any increase in what used to be considered speculative activity. This is a phenomenon totally without precedent over the past four decades. Now there are various conclusions that can be drawn from all of this. One, of course, is that a speCUlative phase will, somewhere along the line, duly emerge. This was the case in the 1962-1966 market referred to above, where the bulk of the move, from June, 1962 to May, 1965, took the Dow up some 75 in a fairly orderly fashion. The final upswing in 1965-1966 moved the DJIA hardly at all but featured a burst of activity in secondary stocks. (This is believed by many to be the usual ending for a bull market. Actually it is the exception rather than the rule.) There exists another explanation for the behavior of the Low-Priced/High-Grade ratio—that its current downturn is secular. The ratio, in July, .1983 stood at 4.65. The last time it had been this high, interestingly, was in 1926. From that time, it essentially continued to decline throughout the entire remainder of the bull market. Its increase since the 1987 lows, as noted above, has been miniscule. The reason for this may be found in the record of the Low-Priced Index itself. At the ratio's high, on July 6, 1983, that indicator was at 608.7. It did not exceed this high until 4 years later, in August, 1987, and only by a modest 16 At that point the Dow was 118 over its 1983 peak. On a short-term basis, below-average action continues. On May 17th the Low-Priced Index was just barely above its high of February. The Dow, by contrast, was over 5 above its year-earlier peak. It is conceivable, therefore, based on some 6 years of experience, that we have seen the start of a long secular downturn in relative action of secondary stocks. Only time will tell whether this pattern will continue or reverse to a more normal configuration. Dow Jones Industrials (12 00) S & P 500 (12 00) Cumulative Index (5/25/89) AWTlt 2493.77 320.66 4536.74 ANTHONY W. TABELL DELAFIELD, HARVEY, TABELL INC. No statement or expreSSion of oplnton or any other maner herein contained IS, or IS to be deemed to be, directly or Indirectly, an offer or the soliCitation of an offer to buy Of sell any security referred to or mentioned The matter IS presented merely for the convenience of the subSCriber While we believe the sources of our Information to be rellab!e, we In no way represent or guarantee the accuracy thereof nor of the statements made herein Any aciran to be taken by the subscriber should be based on hiS own Investigation and Information Delafield, HaNey, TabeU Inc, as a corporation and lIs oHlcers or employees, may now have, or may later take, poSitions or trades In respect to any secuntles mentioned In thiS or any future Issue, and such pOSition may be dlflerent from any views now or hereafter expressed In thiS or any other Issue Delafield, Harvey, Tabelllnc, which IS registered wlth1he SEC as an mvestment adVisor, may give adVIce to ItS mvestment adVISOry and other customers Independently of any statements made In thiS or In any other Issue Further Information on any securlly menltOned herein IS available on request

T IBUER.R.'5 Iil1iIRIET R.IETTIER 600 ALEXANDER ROAD, CN 5209, PRINCETON, NEW JERSEY 08543-5209 MEMBER NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE, INC MEMBER NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF SECURITIES DEALERS, INC (609) 987-2300 June 2, 1989 . In a.-recent .. survey–,, markej. ,,-tejJhnici!It8…..wr,eslt4– wlmt…90.!lOm.!Bta tist!cs-.!to be most cruc..,i,aI , in determining the market's course over the short term. Two-thirds of them- mentioned interest rates, and there is no reason to argue with this consensus. The market quite clearly, in the past year or so at least, has been highly sensitive to interest rate developments, moving up on the prospect of lower rates and weakening on the possibility of higher ones. We intend, therefore, to make interest rates the subject of this, and in all probability a number of subsequent letters. In these discussions we will be attempting to view the long-term historical perspective rather than the short-term relationship to which the technicians in the survey were referring. Indeed, those same technicians, familiar as they would certainly be with market history, would undoubtedly raise some of the questions regarding the long-term relationship of interest rates and stock prices that we intend to discuss. The watershed date for that relationship (at least the only such that will fall within the lifetime of readers of this letter) occurred in the Spring of 1957. At that point the yield for AA Corporates moved, for the first time in over thirty years, above the 4 level, rising in the process, above the yield on the Standard & Poor's 500. The relationship was reversed for a few short months around the bottom of the 1957 bear market, but, commencing with the 1958 stock-market upswing, the yield for the 500 fell below that of bonds and has remained there in the thirty-one years since. Interestingly enough the prior norm, stocks yielding more than bonds, had prevailed for thirty-plus years prior to the 1957 transition—back into the early 1920's. It is hard for investors today to envision a world where stock yields in excess of bond returns were the normal thing, but it was equally difficult for the previous generation, whose formative years were the 1930's and 1940's, to acclimate themselves to the current environment. Even the great Benjamin Graham had trouble with the concept. A plausible explanation for the shift in the relationship is a change in the conventional view of dividends. Those who remembered the 1930's, when dividends were cut and lor eliminated with great regularity, tended to view such an Income stream as a risKy-one…..wlfiChsnoultt..therefore comrn8.YIl-ii—-L I premium return. As we entered the 1960's, the magic word growth began to be regularly heard, and the view of dividends shifted to one which envisioned them as a steadily increasing income flow. Given this perspective, it was possible to justify a lower initial income from equities. The transition of the mid-1950's antedated by some ten years the emergence of another factor relevant to interest rates—increasing inflation. The period 1955-65 generally saw inflation at around the 1 level or a bit higher, and the yield on twenty-year Governments during this period remained in the 3-4 range. That decade was the foundation for the not-totally-unreasonable theory of a real interest rate, measured by subtracting the inflation rate from bond yields. This rate remained for the decade mostly in the 2-3 range. It was slow to respond to the accelerating inflation of the 1970's. By the middle of that decade, the real interest rate had actually turned negative, despite bond yields which, in 1974, surpassed 8.5. The first emergence of double-digit Treasury coupons, in 1980, still failed to produce positive real returns, since the inflation rate. at that point, was in excess of 12. The 1980's, however, were to be the decade of falling inflation. By 1983-85, the rate of price increases had dropped under 4. Bond yields, however, did not decline that much, and the yields in excess of 13 available in the summer of 1984 produced the highest real return—9—that has been seen in recent history. The period from 1984 to date has seen a sharp decline in bond yields, to 1986 lows under 8, along with a slight rise in the rate of inflation. This has lowered the real return on 20-year Governments to 4. The popularity of the real-interest-rate concept explains why inflation is probably, after interest rates, the second most important factor affecting the short-term direction of the stock market. If one believes in real interest rates, reduced inflation obviously leaves room for bond yields to come down and thus, presumably, for stocks to rise. One wonders, however, whether the true real interest rate is the 2-3 of the 1955-1965 era, the 5-9 of the early 1980's,-the 4 to which it has recently declined, or something else. It it likewise difficult to find in the history recounted above any convincing evidence of a long-term relationship between stock and bond yields. We have done very little here, we freely admit, other than raise questions, and we will probably, in future issues, be raising some more. We hope also, in the course of the discussion, to provide some tentative answers. ANTHONY W. TABELL DELAFIELD, HARVEY, TABELL INC. Dow Jones Industrials (12 00) S & P 500 (1200) Cumulative Index (6/01189) AWTmjs 2514.15 324.83 4586.74 No statement Or expression of opinion or any other matter herein contained IS, or IS to be deemed to be, directly or Indirectly, an offeror the soliCitation Of an offerto buy or sell any security relerred to or mentioned The matter IS presented merely for the convenience of the subscnber While we believe the sources of our tnformailon to be reliable, we In no way represent or guarantee the accuracy thereof nor 01 the statements made herein Any action to be taken by the subscriber should be based on hiS own mvestlgal10n and Information Delafield, Harvey, Tabelltnc ,as a corporation and Its officers or employees, may now have, or may later take, positions or trades In respect to any seCUrities mentioned In thiS or any future Issue, and such poSition may be dlf1erent from any views now or hereafter expressed In thiS or any other Issue Delafield, Harvey, Tabelllnc, which IS registered With the SEC as an Investment adVisor, may give adVice to ItS Investment adVISOry and other customers mdependently of any statements made In thiS or In any other Issue Funher information on any security mentioned herein IS available on request

VLinlmrEn.n.-s LinIRlIEV LrEVV(E1Rl 600 ALEXANDER ROAD, CN 5209, PRINCETON, NEW JERSEY 08543-5209 MEMBER NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE, INC MEMBER NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF SECURITIES DEALERS, INC (609) 987-2300 June 9, 1989 The Wall Street Journal Should 'nvestors 10 Now -f1eta'tfuerieidtutrheids-awnienekdaenptahrtdiicsl ecuhsseiaodnli nOfe d,seveInnt edriefsfte-rRenatt elhvTeusmtmbelre1 tW;;hat ''- vehicles, discussing the changing returns and the pros and cons of each one. It is an article that never would have appeared a couple of decades ago, when CD's and money funds did not exist and Treasury securities were not considered vehicles for the individual investor. This relatively new level of sophistication regarding competitive returns highlights another aspect of the long-term perspective on interest rates, discussion of which we initiated last week. Bank deregulation and the broad availability of relatively high returns have created a sophisticated public awareness of investment alternatives not present some 20 years ago. This watershed can be compared with the one we noted last week, the shift which took place in the late 1950's when bonds began to yield more than stocks. It became necessary. at that time, to justify why this should be so, and the obvious justification, in unsophisticated terms, was that stocks, at least some of the time, went up. To a generation whose memories of 1929 and the greater-fool theory were still strong, expressing the case for equities in such blatant terms lacked respectability The academic community, however. was not hard put to come up with concepts such as return on reinvested capital and dividend discount modeling. Which provided a more sophisticated rationale for accepting a lower return on common-stock investments. An important concept was thus born, one which has been basic to our thinking about investing in the modern era—the concept of total return, the combination of income from dividends and capital gain from rising equity prices. As we moved into the 1970's and 1980's, the concepts of an earlier era slowly began to be discarded, and the once-hallowed principle of separation of principal and income came to be a thing of the past. If common stocks were to be considered as appropriate investment vehicles, rising prices had to be considered. and relatively sophisticated comparisons of available total returns began to be seen regularly in widely-available financial publications. Around this time also there emerged from the groves of academe yet another concept, the view of –financial–markets-e.-s–essenHaUy–perfectGnes …in.-.whioh-an-k-nG-wn-i-nfor-mation-'.-was.-instantaneously 1 reflected. In such markets, the existence of differing returns could be explained only by some factor which decreased the attractiveness of higher-return instruments. That factor was assumed to be risk—risk being equated in this case with variability. (There are a number of good reasons for questioning this particular concept, but that is the subject of another letter.) Risk-adjusted rate of return. therefore, became a widely used tool in common-stock evaluation, and the change in return on riskless instruments. i.e. Treasury Bills, became an important factor in the valuation of common stocks. The emergence of such sophisticated valuation models has become the feature of institutional investing in the 1980's, much as the increasing consciousness of return has become the new keystone for individual investment. What seems to be emerging is indifference toward the form of return. There existed a time when capital gains and income were regarded as widely differing concepts. This is now less true. Tax-exempt investors. such as pension funds, have long been able to be indifferent as to the source of their investment return. Current tax laws, at least for the present, encourage the same sort of indifference on the part of all investors. It does not require too long a memory to recall an era when the top-bracket income-tax rate was 70 and the capital-gains rate was 25. It seems axiomatic that attitudes toward common stocks under such conditions should not necessarily constitute a useful frame of reference today. President Bush's predisposition in favor of a lower capital-gains tax has been widely publicized, and recent headlines suggest he may even be successful in attaining his goal. It is doubtful, however, that the tax differential between income and capital gains will return any time soon to the levels which characterized the 1950's and the 1960's. It is, moreover, arguable that a more serious inequity in the tax laws, as far as the common-stock investor is concerned, is the ongoing double taxation of dividend income embodied in the current corporate income tax. As was the case last week, the purpose of this discussion is only to raise questions. It is our observation that thinking about return from rising common stock prices is something that has changed dramatically over the period we have been writing about financial matters. This changing concept, we think, goes directly to the heart of the investment process. ANTHONY W. TABELL DELAFIELD, HARVEY, TABELL INC. Dow Jones Industrials (12 00) S & P 500 (1200) Cumulative Index (618189) AWTlt 2508.64 326.12 4657.22 No statement or expression 01 opinion or any other matter herein contained IS, or IS to be deemed to be, directly or Indirectly, an otler or the sohcltatlon of an oHer to buy or sell any secUrity referred to or mentioned The matter IS presented mereJy for the convemence of the subscnber While we beheve the sources of our information to be rehable, we In no way represent or guarantee the accuracy thereof nor of the statements made herein Any action to be taken by the subscriber should be based on his own investigation and information Delafield, Harvey, Tabelllnc, as a corporallon and Its oHlcers or employees, may now have, or may later take, posItIOns or trades In respect to any securities mentIOned In thiS or any future Issue, and such position may be different from any views now or hereafter expressed In thiS or any other Issue Delafield, Harvey, Tabellinc ,which IS registered With the SEC as an Investment advisor, may give adVice to ItS Investment adVISOry and other customers Independently of any statements made In thiS or In any other Issue Further informatIOn on any secunty mentioned herem IS available on request

'1l' (BUED..D..'S IRZIE'1l' D..1E'1l''1l'IER 600 ALEXANDER ROAD, CN 5209, PRINCETON. NEW JERSEY 08543-5209 MEMBER NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE. INC MEMBER NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF SECURITIES DEALERS, INC (609) 987-2300 June 16, 1989 —–EEspecially g-iven-'o -T-h-uraday!s–weak-ness.- it….is .-..hard…..to 'avoid–tflempres8ion… that….there….has…been….some 1 change in the character of the market, although that impression is difficult to quantify. The Dow. after all, made a new bull-market high as recently as Monday,. However, this high. at 2518.66. was virtually identical to the one posted on June 2. and not all that much above one posted over three weeks ago when the average moved above 2500 for the first time,. A modest flattening of the uptrend is, thus, perceptible. One can conveniently divide the major cycle so far into two phases, the first of which moved the DJIA from 1766.74 in December, 1987 to 2183.50 last October. The second began on November 16 at 2038.58 and brought the average to its Monday high. Coincidentally, in percentage terms, these two advances are identical to within a tenth of a point at 23.5. However. the most recent one took place in far less time, and the advance has been at an annual rate of 45. It is the technical condition of that second-phase advance shown at the right by a 10-point point-and-figure chart on the Dow, which should now be our major concern. As the chart suggests, this is the third noticeable interruption in the rise so far. The first one took place during February and March, with the average holding in a trading range between 2240 and 2350. New highs in April were followed by a much smaller consolidation between 2370 and 2420, and we now have the most recent cilooO 1—t—–lpause.-bclweenOand2510r.—————————————————————I- This range has. as yet, not been violated. and there is, at the moment, no suggestion that It is anything more than another consolidation. Were a downside penetration to 2460 to take place, a decline to the support around 2420 would be indicated. There are, of course, many ways in which this pattern could broaden, and it will need to be watched. At this stage, however. neither it nor individual tops on most stocks suggest anything particularly worrisome. .–,-h–u-l-g-e—– Nov 10. ——- feb Hlgl1 ——– .S. ClI.g .Mu—lo-w- 001 JORU I,d us 2038.11 2341. U II.I 2213.01 S LP tOI,ulh 163.81 29!.!3 13.11 281.11 S , P Itdnt. 302.l 346.41 IU9 331.41 On JOles trm 890.91 1011.91 1!.l1 lIOU9 Do. Jms UtU 181.11 190.91 I 19 \81.1 ASE Index m.31 32123 lUI 321.12 OTt hdustrlah 316.30 101.20 11.01 390 30 -I-.C-h-g Apr High ——– I Chg —– .M-e-,–lo-w. .41 1111 99 1.8 231\.33 1.11 30UI 1.81 m.\9 1.31 311.49 1.81 3\1.31 1.!1 IU 01 13.31 1I\!.66 1. II 191.80 1.03 \91 18 -1.18 34\.11 U2 341 66 '3.91 421.10 901 m.30 —–I thg —– lilt Rlgh ——— S thg 10.-tl-1—1–C-h- 1.91 2111.61 6.11 13.11 -1.41 311.91 1. \3 1.11 m.ll uo 13.93 23.41 '1.80 11\8.3\ 16 30.00 0.11 201.10 1. )3 13.11 0.11 366.16 6.1 18.31 -0.33 141.80 U 1168 As the table above shows. the action for the various averages on the bull-market leg since November has been remarkably similar, and there are only tentative indications of a possible shift in leadership The three major averages. the Dow, the SAP 500 and the S&P Industrials have posted almost identical percentage advances over the seven-month rise. and their action on each up and down swing has likewise been similar. Through the high of last April, at least, it has been the Dow Jones Transportation Average Which has been the star of the show. posting a rise half again as great as that of the IndustrIals. Some suggestion that it may be running out of steam arises from its somewhat larger decline in early May and slower rise since that time. The performance of the Dow Jones Utilities has, of course, been poor on an absolute basis, but much of this is explainable by their characteristically lower volatility. Interestingly. on the last leg up, from the beginning of May, this normally staid indicator has been the best performer. ThIS. we think, has some implications for interest rates. This subject was discussed at length in this … space back on May 5th. It is notable that, so far, the two speculative indices, the AMEX and OTe Industrials, have failed to outperform theIr senior brethren. It has long been an open question as to whether the secondary sector of the market is going to have its day in the sun during this advance. There appears, in summary, to be no suggestion of any major change in market direction or character, other than the possibility of a consolidation and 4-5 correction. along the lines of February-March. Further eVIdence of deterioration would have to manifest itself before anything worse than this could be foreseen. ANTHONY W. TABELL DELAFIELD, HARVEY, TABELL INC. Dow Jones Industrials (12 00) S l P 500 (12 00) Cumulative Index (6/15/89) AWT cg 2479.29 319.88 4620.45 No statement or expression of opinion or anyother matter herem contamed IS, or IS to be deemecllo be, directly or Indirectly, an offer or the sohcltatlon of an offer to buy or sell any security relerred 10 or menllOned The matter IS presented merely for the convenience of the subSCriber While we beheve the sources of our InformallOn to be reliable, we In no way represent or guarantee the accuracy thereol nor olthe statements made herein Any action to be taken by the subSCriber should be based on hiS own Investigation and InformaMn Delafield, Harvey, Tabetllnc, as a corporation and Its officers or employees, may now have, Of may later take, positions or trades In respect to any seCUrities mentioned In thiS Of any future Issue, and such pOSition may be different from any views now or hereafter expressed In thiS or any other Issue Delafield, Harvey, Tabell Inc , which IS registered With the SEC as an Investment adVisor, may give adVice to ItS Investment adVISOry and other customers Independently 01 any statements made In thiS or In any other Issue Further Information on any secunty mentloned herein IS available on request

TABELL'S MARKET LETTER 600 ALEXANDER ROAD. CN 5209. PRINCETON. NEW JERSEY 08543-5209 MEMBER NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE. INC MEMBER NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF SECURITIES DEALERS. INC (609) 987-2300 , , ,r' June 23, 1989 in the stock market. In connection therewith, we have H-V' -OUUT published, at around this -time -'v each y e a r .'a – tabl e like the one below. which, for each of the twelve months, shows the number of times the market has advanced for each month, the number of declines, and the average percentage change. Our original studies covered the years from 1926 to date. We have extended our data bank for the Dow back to when it was first computed in 1897. The table below, therefore, covers 92 years of market history. Not surprisingly, perhaps, the ,conclusions are essentially unchanged from those based on the shorter period. One Month Periods (1897-1988) Two Month Per10ds (1897-1988) End Month Advances Declines Average Chg. Advances DeclInes Average Chg. January 58 33 1. 09 59 32 2.46 February 44 47 -0.25 52 39 0.84 March 54 38 0.70 44 48 0.36 April 50 42 0.86 53 39 1. 61 May 45 47 -0.36 48 44 0.61 June 48 44 0.70 46 46 0.30 July 56 36 1. 40 56 36 2.09 August 61 30 1.77 61 30 3.43 September 36 55 -1. 28 53 38 0.43 October 50 41 -0.10 40 51 -1. 33 November 54 37 0.67 53 38 0.64 December 66 26 1. 38 — —– TOTAL 622 476 0.55 63 29 — — 628 470 1. 94 -;-;2 o .HC .au,c 01 tne 1U.. smce 1., OH- -or 57' 'C been au, ,;'V'HO Iiiid 476—or 43—have showed declines. Thus, the normal expectation for any given month wuuu be 52-53 advances and 39 -40 declines. Similar figures can be adduced for two-month periods. From the data above, we have been able to extract four patterns of a seasonal nature which seem to be statistically significant. The most significant one is the least known, the tendency toward a market decline in the month of September. Since 57 of all months since 1897 have been rising ones, the expectation would be a plurality of advances over declines. However, precisely the opposite is the case for September, which, in 92 years, has produced 55 declines and only 36 advances, with an average drop of 1.28 percent. The probability of such a pattern being due to chance, a chi-square test tells us, is less than 1 in 1000. The next most significant pattern has been the year-end rally, illustrated by 66 rising Decembers in 92 years. Our readers know that we have published an annual comment on this phenomenon around December or January of each year. Another seasonal n,anifestation, which we have demonstrated based on data since 1926, although we have no idea of the reason therefore, has been the fact that the direction in which the market moves in November has appeared to be a moderately successful predictor of the market's direction for the following year. Of the four seasonal phenomena, the least significant has been the summer rally, which is due to be analyzed at this juncture. As the table shows, the 56 advances and 36 declines for July are marginally better than one would expect. August shows an even greater aberration. The percentage advances for July and August, along with that for the two-month period ending in August, are the largest figures in the table, although December-January performance is close. Despite these figures, standard tests of statistical Significance suggest that the summer rally is a less reliable phenomenon than the others noted above. It has been even less reliable recently. especially in July, with five of the seven Julys since 1982 having been down months. Last year, indeed, is a good reminder that strong statistical probability falls short of certainty. Both July and August, 1988 were down months, the latter a severe oneoSeptember, then produced a strong rally. While Decemher, as suggested, was an upward month, the advance was only 2.56. There seems, incidentally. to have emerged in recent years a brand new tendency—the occurrence of important market turning points during the summer months. Major market bottoms took place on August 12, 1982 and July 24, 1984. In the opposite direction, the top leading to the 1983 – 1984 decline began to form during the summer of 1983 and, of course, the all-time high for the Dow, preceding the 1987 crash, occurred on August 25, 1987. The October-December, 1987 low was a return to the normal pattern of fall reversals. however. AWTebh Dow Jones Industrials 02 00) S & P 500 (1200) Cumulative Index (6/22/89) 2507.21 324.25 4634.76 ANTHONY W. TABELL DELAFIELD, HARVEY, TABELL INC. No statement or expression of Opinion or any other matler herein contained IS, or IS to be deemed to be, directly or Indirectly, an oHer or the soltCltatlon of an oHer to buy or sell any security referred to or mentioned The mailer IS presented merely for the convenience of the subSCriber While we belteve the sources of our Information to be reliable, we In no way represent or guarantee the accuracy thereof nor of the statements made herem Any action to be taken by the subscriber should be based on hiS own investigation and Information Delafield, Harvey, Tabelllnc, as a corporation and ItS officers or employees, may now have, or may later take, pOSlons or trades In respect to any secunlles mentioned In thiS or any future Issue, and such position may be different from any views now or hereafter expressed In thiS or any other Issue Detafleld, Harvey, Tabelllnc, which IS registered With the SEC as an Investment adVIsor, may glve adVIce to Its Investment adVISOry and other customers Independently of any statements made In thiS or In any other Issue Further Informahon on any securrty mentioned herein IS available on request

'1l'&.\ IBlIE IL.IL. S &'\IRZ 1E'1l' 1L.1E'1l''1l'1E1Rl 600 ALEXANDER ROAD, CN 5209, PRINCETON, NEW JERSEY 085435209 MEMBER NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE, INC MEMBER NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF SECURITIES DEALERS, INC (6091987-2300 June 30, 1989 1 ''Wediscussed.in this..spacetwoweeksago .thetIading .range. hetwee241q…and. 2510, 'owhichhad contained the Dow since the latter part of May. As recently as a week ago, it seemed as if an upside breakout from this range had occurred, as the average posted a new closing bull-market high at 2531.87 last Friday and followed it up with an intra-day peak on Tuesday of this week. That breakout turned out to be false, and the market plummeted back through the entire range on the last three days of the week, posting a downside penetration on Thursday, which was extended on Friday morning. It is difficult to see why all this should cause immediate concern. The broadened top now suggests a downside objective of 2400-2380 which, if reached, would simply produce the first 5 correction since November. The bull market is now 425 trading days old and has posted, through last Friday, an advance of 45.62. There have been, in the modern era, three cycle bull markets which have peaked with lesser advances (1946-48, 1966-68, and 1978-80, but the eight other rises posted moves in the 66-150 range before their conclusion. Except for 1982-1983, all of the bull markets in question lasted longer than this one has So far. The most recent phase of the rise, from November 16, has involved a 24.2 advance over 151 trading days. It has, as noted above, seen no correction greater than 5 and, indeed, the current one is the greatest since March. An inspection of past cycle bull markets reveal that upswings of approximately this extent and duration are a fairly frequent occurrence at this stage of an advance—one to two years into the rise. Interestingly, the highs for these latter-day advancing phases generally tend not to be the bull market highs, although often they are fairly close to it. That peak, however, is generally attained Some months later. Comparable rallies which can be cited are the 129-day, 21.7 advance in November, 1971-May, 1972; the 28.9, 140-day rally in October, 1975-April, 1976; and the 28.4, 107-day upswing of April-September 1980. The very fact that a new high was posted just last week tends to suggest the lack of immediate market risk. The following table shows the high date for the last 12 cycle bull markets – –andthenshows-thelae-followingthbUUnt1lrket-highn1wtriCh-theJJow traijedwitliill2-;or,,—-II- 7, and 10 of its peak. The figures in parentheses are the number of trading days between the high and the date shown. BULL MARKET LAS T D ATE WIT H I N A G I V E N 0 F H I G H HIGH 2 5 7 10 May 29, 1946 Jun 15, 1948 Jan 5, 1953 Apr 6, 1956 Dec 13, 1961 Feb 9, 1966 Dec 3, 1968 Jan 11, 1973 Sep 21, 1976 Apr 27, 1981 Nov 29, 1983 Aug 25, 1987 Jun 17, 1946 (12) Nov I, 1948 (l00 Mar 25, 1953 (55) Jul 26, 1957 (328) Mar 19, 1962 (65) Feb 17, 1966 (6) May 16, 1969 (109) Jan 12, 1973 (1) Jan 3, 1977 (70 Jun 23, 1981 (40) Jan 19, 1984 (35) Aug 27, 1987 (2) Aug 15, 1946 Nov 4, 1948 Apr 2, 1953 Aug 9, 1957 Apr 6, 1962 Apr 26, 1966 May 29, 1969 Jan 26, 1973 Mar 17, 1977 Jun 30, 1981 Jan 27, 1984 Oct 5, 1987 (54) Aug 23, 1946 (60) (103) Feb 3, 1949 (172) (66) Aug 18, 1953 (158) (338) Sep 3, 1957 (354) (79) Apr 25, 1962 (90 (52) May 2, 1966 (56) (128) Jun 9, 1969 (124) (10) Oct 29, 1973 (200 (123) Apr 18, 1977 (144) (45) Aug 6, 1981 (71) (40 Feb 2, 1984 (45) (28) Oct 7, 1987 (30) Aug 26, 1946 (60 May 19, 1949 (264) Sep 9, 1953 (173) Sep 19, 1957 (366) May 8, 1962 (100) Jun 24, 1966 (94) Jun 18, 1969 (131) Nov I, 1973 (204) Jul 25, 1977 (211) Aug 20, 1981 (81) May 10, 1984 (113) Oct 13, 1987 (34) The figures show that in seven cases, the Dow remained within 2 of its high during periods ranging from 2 to 14 months. In 10 cases it returned to within 5 of that high over a similar period. Thus, taking the worst-case scenario—that last week's high was in fact a bull market peak—the immediate downside potential does not appear to be all that great. Now, we humbly admit that the above figures have appeared here before and that their last publication was on June 26, 1987, absent, of course, the last line which proved to be the major exception in 40 years of market history. All prior bull markets had seen the averages still not far from their highs after intervals of as long as 17 months following the actual posting of those highs. By contrast, we can all painfully recall that 1987 saw the market lose over one-third of its value in less than two months after attaining an all-time peak on August 25. Now it is perfectly proper that the sorrowful recollection of 1987 should make us wary, but it should not cause us to ignore the long years of market history which preceded it. That history tells us that the process of bull-market deterioration tends to be a slow one and that most major upswings do not, as 1987 did, immediately turn on a dime and begin a precipitous plunge. ANTHONY W. TABELL DELAFIELD, HARVEY, TABELL INC. Dow Jones Industrials (12 00) S & P 500 (1200) Cumulative Index (6/29/89) AWTebh 2426.78 360.93 4596.35 No statement Or expression 01 opinion or any other matler herein contained IS, or IS to be deemed to be, dlrecUy or indirectly, an offer orthe sohcttallOn of an offer to buyor sell any security referred to or mentioned The matter IS presented merely for the convenience of the subscriber While we beheve the sources of our Information 10 be reliable, we In no way represent or guarantee Ihe accuracy thereof nor of the statements made herein Any action to be taken by the subscnber should be based On hiS own investigation and Information Delafreld, Harvey Tabelllnc, as a corporatIOn and lis officers or employees, may now have, or may later take, POSlbons or trades In respect to any securrbes menboned In thIS or any future Issue, and such POSlbon may be different from any views now or hereafter expressed In thiS or any other Issue Delafield, Harvey, Tabelllnc, which IS regIstered wlthlhe SEC as an Investment adVIsor, may gIVe adVice 10 tts investment adVISOry and other customers Independently of any statements made In this or In any other Issue Further InformellOn on any securIty menllOned herein IS available on request

'tILiilIBUE n.. n.. s LiilIRl 1E'tI n..1E'tI'tI1E1Rl 600 ALEXANDER ROAD, CN 5209, PRINCETON, NEW JERSEY 08543-5209 MEM8ER NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE, INC MEMBER NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF SECURITIES DEALERS, INC 1609) 987-2300 July 7, 1989 1-1' We .tried,-Jastweek..-to-make–the point–that-historically i-the-process-of-top formaUen -generally –'—I–. requires a fair amount of time. Thus, we contended, even if the current market is beginning Buch a process, it should not be immediately vulnerable. 1987 J however, was an exception to this rule, and a major question is to what degree that experience is applicable today. We can illustrate the speed of the top formation two years ago by tracing, purely as an example, the price history of one stock, General Electric. 50 '10 10' The just eight weeks prior to the crash. The various patterns at right trace out the history of trading for GE as it developed over those fateful two months. The first five columns, leading to the stock's high at 66 are the same as the right-hand five columns on the chart above. Two 0,0 weeks after the high, on September 1, a small top had formed indicating a possible 58, only a couple of points below the then-current price. A week later, 50 on September 8, the downside objective of that top had been reached. Three and a half weeks passed, and (,,0 it seemed possible, despite rather serious signs of general market weakness, that a new base for General Electric might be forming. This was on Friday, 50 October 2, two weeks prior to the break. As the stock pulled back during the following week, the pattern began to look a bit more ominous. 40 However, it was not until Wednesday of the following week, October 14, that it became apparent that a serious top was completed. This was precisely three trading days before October 19. The stock, as indicated at bottom, plunged to a low of 40 on the morning of October 20, violating major support in the process. The final pattern shown is not from two years ago. It is the pattern that exists today, and the similarity to September, 1987 is obvious. The question, of course, is whether history is about to repeat itself. The- current two-point chart on GE at left shows, we think, how the patterns differ. General Electric's most recent rally represents a breakout from a protracted base ormation following the sharp 1987 correction rather than the end of a nine-year uncorrected rise. Support just under 50 is a great deal more formidable than was the case two years ago, and the ultimate upside objectives for the stock are much higher. It seems likely, In other words, that the GE chart should be interpreted conventionally—as having a minor top suggesting a decline into strong support where the stock would be a buy. This coincides with our present opinion on the general market ANTHONY W. TABELL DELAFIELD, HARVEY, TABELL INC. Dow Jones Industrials (12 00) 2486.15 S & P 500 (1200) 322.20 Cumulative Index (7/6/89) 4631. 78 No statement or expressIOn of opinion or any other matter herein contained IS, or IS to be deemed to be, directly or Indirectly, an offer or the soliCitatIOn of an offer 10 buy or sell any security referred to or menhoned The mailer IS presented merely for the convemence of the subscriber While we believe the sources 01 our Intormalloo to be retlable, we In no way represent or guarantee the accuracy thereof nor 01 the statements made herein Any acllOn to betaken by the subscriber should be based on hiS own Invesllgatlon and Information Delafield, Harvey, Tabell Inc, as a corporallon and tIs officers or employees, may now have, or may later take, posrtlons or trades In respecllo any secun\les mentIOned In \hIS or any future Issue, and such posrtlon may be different from any views now or hereafter expressed In thIS or any other Issue Delafield, Harvey, Tabel1lnc , which IS registered WIth the SEC as an Investment adVisor, may give adVIce to Its Investment adVISOry and other customers Independently of any statements made In thiS or In any other Issue Further informatIOn on any security mentioned herein IS available on request

, '1rIBHE IL.IL.'S IiUiI R CIE'1r IL.IEVVIER 600 ALEXANDER ROAD, CN 5209, PRINCETON, NEW JERSEY 08543-5209 MEMBER NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE, INC MEMBER NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF SECURITIES DEALERS, INC (609) 987-2300 July 14, 1989 -I— -The-last 'two-issuesoftlfislet'terslfiii'ea-a-cdmmontheme,–Ifffilweoel(ourrdei's' ———I indulgence in allowing us to enlarge upon that theme in one more issue. The theme is the relevance of the 1987 market crash to the current market outlook. We do not think it quixotic to say that the market analyst's attitude toward the 1987 break should probably constitute the most important factor in determining how he views the stock market at this juncture. The point is—if only we can safely ignore the experience of two years ago—that there exists at the moment only one logical market posture and that is an unreservedly bullish one. We noted two weeks ago the fact that we are, in mid-July, 1989, lucky enough to know precisely i , ,, where we stand in market-cycle terms. On October 19, 1987, the Dow bottomed at 1738.74. Yesterday, it closed at 2538.31 without having seen any appreciable sort of correction in I , between. That, children, is called a bull market. We were in it at last night's close, and there is absolutely nothing that the market can do from here on out to change that fact. The bull market in question has, moreover, advanced precisely 45.99 over 21 months—438 trading days to be exact. Now. since bull markets, happily. are not a new phenomenon. having occurred regularly in the past, we are entitled to ask whether either of these figures is, in i,, I ! i , historical terms. excessive. There have been cycle upswings in the past which have topped out before they had risen as much as 46—a couple in recent history. The 1966-1968 advance was only 32 and that of I 1978-1981. 38. The vast majority of earlier bull markets, however, has exhibited rises far greater than the present one to date. Advances greater than 100 have not been uncommon, and increases in the 60-80 range have tended to be more or less the norm. The most elementary I I sort of historical analysis would suggest that the expectation that the market will equal or exceed the 1987 high on the current upswing is not any sort of off-the-wall opinion. It is I simply the normal expectation. 11 I–;–,SNg.!…….houlc!..-there, based on this kind of analysis. be anY-Kreat worry about the market's-,-1 -topping out any time soon. There have been only two bull markets since the 1930's which lasted less than 438 trading days. One was the baby bull market of 1938, whose very name implies its uniqueness. The other is 1982-1983, and this one is the subject of technical hairsplitting concerning it was In fact, a single bull cycle or part of a larger one. There have, it must be admitted, been major-cycle rises which peaked after not a great deal more than 438 trading days. 1974-1976 was 452 days long and 1966-1968, 518. On the other hand, the advance of 1957-1961 lasted over 1,000 trading days and that of 1942-1946, 1211. By these standards, we could still be sailing along into new high territory in 1991. The final point that we made two weeks ago was that, even if one chooses to take the view that we are at or close to a major peak, there should be no immediate cause for concern. Market tops, we tried to point out with historical statistics, generally are relatively slow to form and provide the assiduous analyst with some advance warning of an impending break. The market, we pointed out, once having made a high, generally tends to remain close to that high for what is often a fairly lengthy period of time. All the lessons of history, then, argue in favor of an aggressive attitude toward common stocks. All of the above would be true where it not for the experience of two years ago, which we tried to summarize last week by tracing the action of a single stock over a three-month period. We were, in August, 1987, in the throes of a bull market, superficially not unlike the present one. Only minor top formations were present. Within a few weeks, those tops had assumed major proportions, and, less than three months later, well over one-third of the total market value of U.S. equities had gone down the drain. Thus, the question of the relevance of 1987 for today. Could important tops be formed with such speed again There had, of course, been nothing precisely like August-October, 1987 for 58 years and, if such occurrences are that rare, we can undOUbtedly forget about them and focus on the Bort of market statistics-cited above. If, on ,the other hand, the crash means that a fundamental change in market structure has taken place, our attitude at the present time should be a great deal more cautious. We once likened investment policy in a bull market to driving a car at night. It is necessary to be vigilant in observing what may occur within range of the headlights and fruitless to fret over what lies beyond their range. Such is probably the proper attitude at the moment—possibly with a bit of extra vigilance inspired by the events of 21 months ago. Dow Jones Industrials (1200) S & P 500 (12 00) Cumulative Index (7/13/89) AWTebh 2521.05 330.01 4710.57 ANTHONY W. TABELL DELAFIELD, HARVEY, TABELL INC. No statement or expression 01 opinion or any other matter herein contained IS, or IS to be deemed to be, dlrectlyor mdlrectly, an offer orthe solicrtallon of an offer to buyor sell any secunty referred to or mentioned The matter IS presented merely for the convenience of the subscnber While we beheve the sources of our information to be reliable, we In no way represent or guarantee the accuracy thereof nor of the statements made herein Any action to be taken by the subSCriber should be based on hiS own Investigation and Information Delafield, Harvey, Tabelllnc, as a corporallon and liS oHlcers or employees, may now have, or may later take, posilions or trades In respect to any securllies mentioned In thiS or any future Issue, and such position may be different from any views now or hereafter expressed In thiS or any other Issue Delafield Harvey, Tabell Inc, which IS regIstered with the SEC as an Investment adVisor, may give adVice to ItS mvestment adVISOry and other customers Independently 01 any slatements made In thIS or In any other Issue Further information on any security mentioned herein IS available on request

TABELL'S MARKET LETTER 600 ALEXANDER ROAD, eN 5209, PRINCETON, NEW JERSEY 08543-5209 MEMBER NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE, INC MEMBER NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF SECURITIES DEALERS, INC (6091987-2300 1 – – – – – – r.Tlll)lll11-nlarket 'con tinued;1it-'1east'th1'ough-ye-stel'da July 21, 1989 wltll-th,,-Do-w J clllesIhTI u s t r uf l – — – – — I Average breaching the 2600 barrIer and the S & P Composite attaining an all-time hIgh, before pulling back In program-related trading later in the afternoon. We have devoted the last three issues of this letter to an exposition of why this turn of events should not be all that surprising. We would like, this week, to examine a couple of other trends Which also continue unabated and Which antedate the 21-month-old bull market. The chart at left traces the ratio of Standard & Poor's Capital Goods Index to its Consumer Goods Index from 1968 to date. As the chart clearly shows, this ratio can be represented by a line WhICh has been heading due southeast since December, 1980. At that point, the Capital Goods Index was at 157.4 It has managed to eke out an advance to 281.3 this month, a 78 tise over an 8 1/2-year period. Over the same timespan, the advance in the Consumer Goods Index has been 341. There were a couple of short periods—the first year of the 1982 bull market and the tail end of the rise to August, 1987—durmg which capital goods issues briefly exhibited superior performance. In both cases the improvement fizzled out and most recently, since the end of 1988, the consumer measure has risen 23 while capital goods have barely a 10 advance. The ratio is The chart at rIght shows the Dow Jones Industrials and the NASDAQ Over-The-Counter Industrial Average together with, at bottom, the ratio of those two indicators. Like the Capital Goodsl Consumer Goods ratio, this one has been declining for some time, in this case since mid-1983. At that point, topping some five months before the Dow, the OTC Index embarked on a precipitous bear market whue the DJIA was undergoing a ..elatively mild correction. Throughout the entire 1984-1987 upswing, the performance of OTC issues was distinctly ij ! g M M inferior to that of the higher-grade issues in the Dow, and the same has been true from mid-1988 to date, the ratio now being at the lowest level since the 1987 bottom. We have thus, undergone a protracted period. one spanning two major market cycles. during which leadership has clearly centered on a specific area—consumer-oriented, high-grade, defensive issues. What is interesting is that there exists no current indication of an immediate change in this leadership taking place. Since major leadership shifts often take place during the transition between bull and bear markets, it is quite possible that those stocks …which…-have led the parade so far will continue to do so for the remainder oLthe – ' – upswing. ANTHONY W. TABELL DELAFIELD, HARVEY, TAB ELL INC. Dow Jones Industrials (12 00) S & P 500 (1200) Cumulative Index (7/20/89) 2580.61 333.89 4729.81 AWTebh No statement or expression of opInion or any other matter herem contained IS, or IS to be deemed to be, directly or Indirectly, an offer or the soliCitation of an offer to buy or sell any securrty referred to or mentioned The matter IS presented merely for the convenience of the subscriber While we believe the sources of our mformatlon to be reliable, we In no way represent or guarantee the accuracy thereof nor of the statements made herein Any acllon to be taken by the subscriber should be based on hiS own Investigation and InformatIon Delafield, Harvey, Tabell Inc , as a corporation and lIs officers or employees, may now have, or may later take, positions or trades In respect to any secuntles mentioned In thiS or any future Issue, and such position may be different from any views now or hereafter expressed In thiS or any other Issue Delafield, Harvey, Tabellinc , which IS registered with the SEC as an Investment adVisor, may give adVice to Its mvestment adVIsory and Dlher customers mdependenlty any statements made In thIS or many olher ISSue Further mforma\lon on any securrty menboned herem IS available on request

,——————————————————————————————————— TABELL'S MARKET LETTER 600 ALEXANDER ROAD, CN 5209, PRINCETON, NEW JERSEY 08543-5209 MEMBER NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE. INC MEMBER NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF SECURITIES DEALERS, INC 1609) 987-2300 July 28, 1989 This week's action produced yet another burst of market strength, taking most major averages to – -new-bull-market highs.and-producing ,- inthe-process ,-an- alltime-closing–highfor the ,B&,.p500 The burden of this letter's argument over the past month has been that, from a technical' point of view, there is nothing historically unusual about the current market rally. Both in terms of percentage advance and of lapsed time, the marks for the pl'esent upswing have typically been exceeded in prior cycle bull markets, suggesting that there remains. currently, further room on the upside. The same suggestion is supported by basic fundamental valuation statistics. This point has, of course, been made elsewhere, but we think it is worthwhile to cite a few numbers and offer some notes on methodology. We will be using the S & P 500 as an example. Earnings and dividends for the twelve months ended June 30 on the 500 are not yet available, but reasonable estimates, based on three quarters of actual figures are 25.90 of earnings and 10.38 of dividends. At last night's close of 341.99, the 500, therefore, was selling at 13.2 times earmngs to yield 3.04. Note that this statement is based on trailing figures and, except for a single quarter, no estimates are involved. Date of High 5&P 5ubseq.Percent PIE 5&P Percent Yield S&p Percent 500 Low Decllne at Hlgh Equiv Dlff. at High Equiv Diff. Jan 5 53 26.66 22.71 -14.8 11.3 314 -7.6 5.29 212 -37.8 Aug 2 56 49.74 38.98 -21.6 13.9 386 13.6 3.44 325 -4.3 Dec 12 61 72.64 52.32 -28.0 23.8 661 94.5 2.70 414 21.9 Feb 9 66 94.06 73.20 -22.2 19.7 547 61.0 2.83 395 16.3 Nov 28 68 108.37 69.29 -36.1 19.1 531 56.1 2.80 400 17.5 Jan 11 73 120.24 62.28 -48.2 19.4 539 58.6 2.59 432 27.1 5ep 21 76 107.83 86.90 -19.4 13.0 361 6.3 3.49 321 -5.7 Nov 28 80 140.52 102.42 -27.1 9.6 267 -21.5 4.32 259 -23.8 I-I—l\-.'.U9S….s'1-3-3…7-7–2U-92-33-.s23….4—…6….S 0……….9.1-.3-0–;2 53 -4.42-.-.3.Q—–1-f In the table above. We present several figures for the last nine major bull-market highs in the S & P 500. The first four columns show the date of the high, the average at that high, the subsequent low and the percentage decline. The key figures are the price learnings ratio and the yield which existed at each of these market highs. Both of these statistics, to make them comparable with those cited above, are computed using trailing earnings and dividends—those for the quarter ended prior to the high. To the right of the columns for P IE and yield, we show the S & P equivalent. This figure represents a possible value for the first quarter of 1990, using S & P's estimates of 27.79 for 500-stock earnings in 1989 and the index's indicated annual dividend of 11.19. The equivalents show where the S & P would sell were these historical PIE ratios and yields to be duplicated. To the right of the equivalent is shown the percentage change to that price from the current one. The clear implication is that, based on earnings at least, the S III P composite is conservatively valued vis-a-vis past bull-market highs. Only two bull markets, 1953 and 1980, have ended with the 500 at a lower PIE. Were the average, before this advance is over, to trade at 19-23 times earnings, a level which characterized 1961-1973 market highs and was again reached in 1987, it could sell some 60-90 above today's price. When one looks at yield, the historical comparisons are till positive, albeit a little less optimistic. The so-called yield ceiling has been an effective cap for most bull markets. generally cutting off rises when dividend return for the S & P 500 has dropped significantly under 3. As the final column of the table shows, there is room for a modest further advance in price based on current dividend rates, but astronomically higher prices appear unlikely. DiVidends could, of course. rise well beyond 1989's indicated annual rate. Indeed, given the sharp rise in earnings since 1982, the current payout ratio, around 40. is at historically low levels, indeed the lowest it has been in sixty years with the exception of 8 brief period In 1979. There thus appears room for continued improvement in dividends despite a possible slowdown in earnings growth. In any case, just as technical comparisons do not suggest that the advance to date has been excessive. valuation analysIs indicates that. at present levels. the S &; P 500 remains relatively inexpensive. ANTHONY W. TABELL DELAFIELD, HARVEY, TABELL INC. Dow Jones Industrials (12 00) 2644.34 S & P 500 (1200) 341.85 Cumulative Index (7/27/89) 4773.78 AWTebh No statement Or expression of opInion or anyother malter herein contained IS, or IS to be deemed to be, directly or Indlreclly, an offer Of the solicrta1lOn of an offer to buy or sell any secUrity referred to or menlloned The matter 15 presented merely for the convenience of the subSCriber While we believe the sources of our information to be reliable, we In no way represent or guarantee the accuracy thereof nor of Ihe statements made herein Any action to be taken by the subSCriber should be based on hiS own Investigation and mformatlon Delal!eld, Harvey, Tabelllnc, as a corporalion and rts officers or employees, may now have, or may later take, poSitions or trades In respect to any secuntles mentioned In thiS or any future ISsue, and such POSfllOTl may be different from any views now or hereafter ex-pressed In thiS or any other Issue Delafield, Harvey, Tabell Inc, which IS regIstered with the SEC as an Inveslmen! adVisor, may give adVice to Its Investment adVISOry and other customers Independently of any statements made In thiS or In any other Issue Further information on any secunly mentioned herein IS available on request