TABELL'S MARKET LETTER 909 STATE ROAD, PRINCETON, NEW JERSEY 08540 DIVISION OF MEMBER NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE MEMBER AMERICAN STOCK EXCHANGE January 8,1971 The picture of an unfolding bull market continues to emerge in the day-to-day sequence of stock market events — almost in textbook fashion. The most obvious phenomenon of the last two weeks – –ha sbeen-the, broadening -ofmarket Jeader-s hip,.In ethelastoweek oLthe,oldwear.,Ahes'&andN ; York Stock Exchange Indices penetrated their January-March trading ranges confirming the upside penetration by the Dow made at 800 in early December. Last week, although the Dow failed to penetrate its December 30th high, all of the broad-based indices continued to move ahead into new high territory, and substantial pluralities of advancing over declining stocks indicated the healthy undertone of the market. As 1970 drew to a close, there was practically no important technical indicator that had not turned positive and confirmed the market uptrend. This included the whole series of lagging indicators which have a high degree of historical reliability in signaling market bottoms and which achieve this reliability at the cost of reversing course a number of months subsequent to the actual low. There is, in other words, very little point at this advanced stage in looking for further confirmation that an important upswing is underway. The upswing has been confirmed by just about every device possessing the slightest degree of statistical validity. All this is, no doubt, embarrassing to the diehard bear who is still muttering incantations about rallies in a bear market. It is equally embarrassing to the timid investor who is willing to admit that the name of the game has changed but who is waiting for some sort of weakness on which to purchase stocks. What the Casper Milquetoast forgets, of course, is one of the characteristics of the early stages of an upswing is that precious little weakness tends to present itself. Since June, the largest correction which has appeared in the DJIA has been under 4 and there is, on a historical basis, little reason to expect that,cQrrections !lluch greater.than this will take place until a – – – mUCh more–advanced- stage'o- tne upswing. -. The point was reached. some time ago-whn-ih-erewas- – only one sensible course for the investor, that course being to be long equities to the maximum extent prudently permitted by his personal investment situation. For the investor who is not now in that position, we think it advisable to get there and do so as fast as possible. The advisability of such a policy is further underscored by the decreasing rewards available to those remaining out of the equity market. The rally in fixed -income securities, albeit that it was a natural and predictable consequence of the monetary policy of the past year, has been, in its own fashion, just as dynamic as the advance in the stock market. Short-term governments, of course, are now returning less than 5 vs. as much as 8 this Spring, and AAA corporates are well under 8 vs. levels in excess of 9 a few months ago. Moreover, from a technical point of view, most fixed income securities appear to be reaching near-term objectives, thus indicating that the opportunity for further capital gains in long-term bonds is, from this point, somewhat limited. In this sort of environment, of course, the entire focus of technical work changes radically. As we said above, there is little point in looking for further confirmation of the bottom. Indeed, the focus of effort at the moment is to look for those signs which typically begin to appear toward the middle stages of an advance and, of course, ultimately, for signs of a top, although, with most indices and individual stocks having objectives well above current levels, one would hardly expect the emergence of these signs for some time. Already, however, some of the early signs of maturity are 'beginning to appear. A few stocks are approaching near-term objectives or supply . areasindicatingthat'their limIted potential'from presemt'levels-suggests- themas pOssibsv,itch''–' candidates. Moreover, new candidates for leadership begin to emerge as base formations are penetrated on the upside, a case in point, from last week's trading, being the airlines. It is the kind of market where the investor should be highly critical of his own performance. It is typical of the formative stages of an upswing that almost all stocks go up, at least a little. In 1954 and 1958, for example, averages of all major industry groups scored advances on the year. The challenge for the investor is to take advantage of shifting leadership so as to own those equities which are likely to score the biggest percentage advances. The challenge of 1969-1970 was that of preserving capital. The challenge for 1971 will be increasing it. Dow-Jones Ind. (1100 a.m.) 837.97 S&P (1100 a.m.) 92.39 AWTmn ANTHONY W. TAB ELL DELAFIELD, HARVEY, TABELL No statement or expression of oPInion or any other maller hereIn contamed IS, or IS 10 be deemed to e, directly or ndlfl'!1!ly, on offer or the 5011l110110n of an offer 10 buy or sell any security referred to or mentioned The moiler IS presented merely for the convenience of the subscriber WhIle we believe the sources of our Information to be reliable, we in no way represent or guarantee the accuracy thereof nor of the statements mode. herein, Any action to be token by the sub 5mber should be based on hiS own investigation and Information Montgomery, Scott & Co, as a limited partnership, an lis partners or employees, may now have, or may later take, positions or trades m respect to any seCUrities mentioned In thiS or any fuftJre Issue, and such pOSition may be different frm any views now or hereafter expressed In thiS or any other issue Montgomery, Scott & Co, which is registered With the SEC as an Investment advisor, may give adVice to lIs Investment adVISOry and other customers 'ndependently of any statements made In thiS or In any other Issue ,

TABELL'S MARKET LETTER l —'J 909 STATE ROAD. PRINCETON. NEW JERSEY 08540 OIVISION OF MEMBER NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE MEMBER AMERICAN STOCK EXCHANGE January 22, 1971 It is wise, in the stock market as elsewhere, to be somewhat SUSPIClOUS about universally-held opinions. This is often difficult to do. Market analysts are not totally unreasoning beings and, for – an6Pin1(;,-n-to-be-aTinostunrversahn-th-e'1irllTpliite–;-it'niu-st-pos-seSs'ahlghd-egree 6f plausibllity-.- — – At the moment, inspection of the market views of a number of observers reveals a forecast which appears, on the surface at least, highly plausible and which is the focus of a good deal of agreement. That forecast runs more or less as follows. The market (most observers have gotten around to agreeing with us on this point) is in a healthy state, and the long-term outlook is good. However, so the conventional wisdom runs, the persistent rise since November has been too great to be sustainable, and the market is in need of a correction of some sort if it is to remain soundly based. Now our conviction, based on experience, is that, whenever an opinion is as common as the one above, the market tends to surprise the proponents of that opinion. In this particular instance, the surprise could take one of two forms. 1) The market could continue to advance without any notice- able correction or, 2) the correction, when it finally arrives, could be bigger than anyone suspects. Concerning the second alternative, we are, of course, wary of such an occurrence, but we confess we are unable to see in our technical work, at the moment, any of the sort of deterioration that would normally accompany significant vulnerability. We are forced, therefore, to a closer examina- tion of the conventional theory that a significant correction from these levels is inevitable and that, were such a correction to occur, the market would, thereby, find itself in a more healthy condition. Like many pieces of conventional wisdom, this theory does not find its elf borne out by the facts. Indeed, an inspection of stock market history seems to indicate that precisely the reverse is true. In other words, the market will indicate a sound technical base by continuing to advance without substantIal corre6t16n and, conversely,- a protractea'Clownswing attJ5 stage would suggest greater – vulnerability to come. To buttress this conclusion, we ask that the reader bear with us through a recitation of some arid statistics. The bull market is now 166 trading days old and has scored, so far, a 35 advance in the Dow. If we define bull markets as upward swings without an intervening correction greater than 15 , we find that there have been eight such since 1942. twe are making an exception here for the 1945-1953 upswing, generally considered by most analysts to be a separate market phase even though the sub- sequent correction was only 13.) These eight upswings have ranged from 284 to 1211 trading days in length. Thus the historical record would suggest that there should be at least another six months of life remaining in the present advance. Now let us examine the interruptions that have occurred in the present upswing. A 4 downswing in the Dow took place in early June, and a 7 decline occurred in late June and early July. This is consistent with the historical record since it is fairly common, following a sharp drop, to have wide swings early in the process of a base formation. Since July, however, there have been only four notable corrections — none of them as great as 4 and none lasting longer than 16 trading days. It is this lack of downside action, evidently, that leads many analysts to feel some sort of purgation is required. However, six of the eight previous bull markets continued longer than the present one without a single 4 correction ever being observed once the base formation stage was passed. The 1957-1960 upswing, for example, once past the base, continued almost a year and a half from the low before a 4 correction took place and it was, by that time, four-fifths completed. In the majority of past cases, an advancehas been at least Iialf-way complete from a-time standpoint before a 4 ,— downswing interrupted it. What about the chances for a 7 correction, one which, in the present case, would bring the Dow back to 790 In most previous bull markets, no such correction has ensued until the latter third of the advance and, in at least two cases, the bull market ran to its ultimate completion without ever scoring a decline of this magnitude. Greater corrections, i.e., 10 or more, have occurred exclusively in the terminal stages of previous bull markets, and six of the eight past bull markets never saw a 10 correction during their entire history. We are thus inclined to find ourselves at variance with the conventional thmking in this regard. We think that the more the market continues to display the sortof strength it has been showing, the greater the likelihood of its internal condition being basically a healthy one. Were the market to undergo a modestly severe decline here, we would conSider it an indication that the advance had reached a more mature stage than we now have reason to suspect it has. Dow-Jones Ind. (1100 a.m.) 858.02 ANTHONYW. TAB ELL AS'&ArPT(F1R1R00 a.m.) 94.53 DELAFIELD HARVEY TABELL 'I No statement or exprE!Ulon of OpinIon or any other motler herein contolned IS, or IS to be deemed 10 be, directly or indirectly, an offer or Ihe ;ollCIlollon of on offer 10 buy or sell any security referred 10 or menlloned The matter IS presented merely for the convenience of the subscriber Wltlle we believe the sources of our information to be reliable, we In no way represent or guarantee the accvracy thereof nor of the statements mode herein Any action to be taken by the sub 5crlber should be based on hiS own investigation and Information Montgomery, Scott & Co, as a limited partnership, and lIs partners or employees, may now have, or may later lake, pOSitions or trades In respect to any seCUrities menltoned In this or any future Issue, and such posilion may be different from ony views now or hereafter expressed In thiS or any other issue Montgomery, Scoll & Co, which IS registered With the SEC as an Investment adVisor, may give adVice 10 Its Investment adviSOry and other customers Independently of any statements mode In thiS or In any other Issue

,— —————……., TABELL'S MARKET l LETTER – – —–J 909 STATE ROAD, PRINCETON, NEW JERSEY 08540 OIVISION OF MEMBER NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE MEMBER AMERICAN STOCK EXCHANGE – January 29, 1971 It is an oft-voiced criticism of the military establishment that generals are invanably superbly prepared to fight the last war. The failing, however, is a human one and hardly restricted to the military. It is at least' an arguable premise that investors also equip themselves to wage the investment battles of the past, ''giving'little'thought as-to 'how-the-future environmentmaydiffer frompast-ex-perience- 'I'hus,–manycin- – –' vestors may be entering the 1970's superbly equipped to cope with the environment of the 1950's and 1960's. This proved somewhat expensive in the 1969-1970 bear market,and it may, we have a feeling, prove to be expensive in the future. The tendency to look backward is not a new one, as anyone with a decent financial library and an in- clination to browse through it will be aware. Twenty years ago, in the early 1950's and late 1940's, in- vestment theorists, still scarred by the memory of the 1929-1932 depression, devoted a great deal of in- tellectual energy to devising plans by which portfolio managers could avoid a repetition of that disaster. One method, widely advocated at the time, involved the use of so-called formula plans or plans under which switches were made between cash and stock in accordance with a pre-determined formula. The plans had one difficulty, however. Unprepared to cope with the rising markets of the 1950's and 1960's, they tended to take their us ers out of the market early in that rise and, as stocks continued to advance, they fell into total disrepute. This is illustrated by the table below which contrasts the percentage results of investment in the DJIA via a typical formula plan — the constant -dollar plan — with the policy of Simply buying and ho1dmg the average. The constant-dollar plan is a Simple one whereby the market value of stocks in an account is maintained at the same level each month, by purchases if the market has fallen during the month or by sales if the market has risen. The table shows the various dates at which an mvestor could have started such a plan since 1926 and the results for each of four termination years, 1945, 1955, 1965 and 1970. In each instance, the number to the left of the slash is the percentage change achieved in an account by buying and holding the Dow, and the number to the right is the percentage change under a constant- dollar formula. -Start E-N D Date 1945 1955 1926 22/100 210/201 1927 – 4/ 73 141/174 1928 -35/ 31 62/132 1929 -22/ 44 96/145 1930 17/ 81 196/181 1931 147/142 526/242 1932 22V152 714/252 1933 93/ 89 388/190 1934 85/ 83 369/184 1935 33/ 50 238/150 1936 7/ 27 171/127 1937 59/ 64 304/164 1938 24/ 32 215/132 1939 28/ 32 225/132 1940 47/ 42 272/143 1941 73/ 58 340/158 1942 61/ 50 309/150 1943 41/ 36 259/136 1944 26/ 24 220/125 1945 153/100 — -1946 175/107 1947 169/105 j)-A-r—E 1965 1970 516/276 433/267 378/249 314/240 223/207 179/198 290/221 237/211 488/257 409/248 1144/318 976/308 1517/328 1299/319 870/265 739/256 831/260 706/250 572/226 482/216 438/203 366/193 702/240 594/230 526/208 442/198 545/208 458/198 639/218 539/209 773/234 656/224 711/226 602/216 613/212 517/202 536/200 450/191 402/176 334/166 446/183 373/173 435/180 363/171 Start Date 1948 1949 1950 1951 1952 1953 1954 1955 1956 1957 1958 1959 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 E- – N 1955 175/105 144/ 93 107/ 76 81/ 62 67/ 53 73/ 57 20/ 19 DDA T' E'' 1965 1970 446/181 373/172 384/169 319/159 311/152 256/142 260/138 211/128 232/129 187/119 245/132 198/123 139/ 95 107/ 85 98/ 75 71/ 66 94/ 72 67/ 62 122/ 85 92/ 75 66/ 55 44/ 46 42/ 39 23/ 30 57/ 48 36/ 39 32/ 31 14/ 21 48/ 40 28/ 31 27/ 24 9/ 14 10/ 10 4/ I – 13/- 9 6/ 10 , .., 71.-4,,– 'O. 11/- 9 4/ 6 The first column suggests the reason for the vogue of formulas in the late 1940' s. It shows that a con- stant-dollar plan formula would have enabled the mvestor to avoid the risk of buying at the top m the late 1920's and would have, in 1945, given him a proht rather than a loss even had he started the plan at that time. The formula, in fact, produced results superior to buy/hold in 10 of the 19 starting years up to 1945. However, as the second two columns show, the experience ending with 1955 and 1965, was qUIte different. A glance at the figures mdlcates that the investor, whenever he started his fund, would have been better off simply by buying stocks and holding them rather than operating under the formula. It is, however, the last column showing results ending in 1970 which is of interest. For starting years from 1926 through 1955, the policy of buy and hold tends to be clearly superior. However, in the middle 1950' s that superiority erodes and, as the table shows for every starting year since 1958 the investor would have fared better under a constant-dollar plan t\-ian under a plan of SImply holdmg stocks. Ihe wheel, in other words, may have come full circle. The long ago-discarded concept that portfolIO policy should center on aggressive switching between stocks and cash may again have a great deal more validity than many analysts now suspect. ANTHONY W TABELL Dow-Jones Ind. (1100 a.m.) 865.42 DELAFIELD, HARVEY, TABELL SAWT.t-l prcsslon..o slalemen( or of opinion or any other mottcr hercin contomcd IS, or IS 10 he deemed to be, directly or indirectly, an offer or the SOllcltollon of an xMto buy or sell any seCUrity referred 10 or mentIoned The mailer IS presented merely for the convenience of the suhKJlber WhIle we believe Ihe sources of our mformolton to be relloble, we In no woy represent or guarantee tile acc;urai)' tllereof nor of the statements made Ilerem Any action to be taken by the sub- SCriber should be based on hIS own Inveshga\ian and Information Montgomery, Scott & Co, as a limited partnership, and Its portners or employees, may now have, or may later take, positions or trades in resRcct to any seCUrities mentioned In Ihl or any future Issue, and such pOliti on may be different from ony views now or hereafter expressed In thl or any other Issue, Montgomery, Scott & Co, which IS regltered With 'Ile SEC as an Investment advisor, may give advice to 11 Investmenl adVisory and other customers 'Independently of any statements mode In IIlls or In any other issue

TABELL'S MARKET LETTER 909 STATE ROAD PRINCETON, NEW JERSEY 08540 DIVISION OF MEMeER NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE MEMBER AMERICAN STOCK EXCHANGE February 5, 1971 Those who are forced to comment daily on the action of the stock market have always had our sympathy. In the bulk of instances, the significance of a given day's action is either limited or -obscure. . and, under these c..onditions, it becomes difficult to find a theme around which to build a– -;——- — —- -,– ———– 0- – – —- .h . -nomarket commentary. Over the past couple of weeks, however, such dlfficulfy-l1a-s preseiitee – , itself, since it was easy to center market comment on one obvious facet — the new record levels of trading volume. And volume has, indeed, been setting records. The 22,030,000 shares which changed hands last Tuesday constituted a new peak in daily trading activity, and, in the week ending January 29, 100,870,000 shares were traded on the New York Stock Exchange, an all-time record for a one-week period and the first time in Exchange history that weekly trading had passed the 100,000,000 mark. Indications are that this mark will be exceeded this week. Since volume statistics obviously fall within the province of the stock market technician, we feel our responsibility to comment there on, and a few preliminary thoughts are offered herewith. They can be summarized as follows 1) There is absolutely nothing historically unusual about the current high level of activity, 2) it isn't all that high anyway, and, 3) it is probably going higher. First of all, trading volume is, at least to some degree, a reflection of the total number of shares listed. This latter statistic has been a constantly increasing one ever since the 1930's. As a consequence, there has tended to be a secular rise in trading volume. The rise actually was dampened somewhat through the 1950' sand 1960' s by a sharply decreasing rate of turnover so that volume in those years did not actually increase as fast as did the number of listed shares. Since 1960, the rate of turnover has gradually increased and appears to have entered a slow secular up- trend although at current levels — an annual turnover rate of around 20 of total shares listed — it has still done no more than return to where it was in the late 1940' s. In any case, though, the conrbmation ofgrOwing-USfings anafising turnover oBviously wil1 terrene' proaUce'increased- tfa(r— ing activity. Moreover, sharp increases in volume are a normal concomitant of the early stages of almost all major upswings. The rise, so far, can even be called modest when conSidered by historical stand- ards. Our practice is to smooth New York Stock Exchange volume by conSidering it on a 25-week total basis. As of the end of last week, volume for the past 25 weeks had risen to 1,650 million shares, up moderately from the 1970 low of 1,270 million shares. Now, it is almost inevitable that this figure will rise further. If volume remains steady around recent levels, it should rise within a couple of months to above the 2,000 million share level. This 32 advance will hardly be abnormal. From mid-1964 to 1966, for example, 25-week volume doubled, and between 1953 and 1954, it increased by more than 150. We would, therefore, not be at all surprised to see activity increase sufficiently to bring the total 25-week figure to close to 2,500 million shares some time in 1971. Such a figure would imply a few peak days where daily trading approached the 30 million share level. Moreover, as we suggested above, despite the records being set on the New York Stock Exchange, total securities market activity is still well below past peaks. American Stock Exchange volume, although it has just recently started to increase, had recently been running at the 3- 4 million share level as compared to peak days in excess of 10 million shares in 1968. Over-The-Counter activity, while not measurable, is quite obviously running far, far below the level of a couple of years ago. rs-iStsi ntcreu ec'us irgr enni ft itcraandCi neg activit Some y li when ghtis cshloedse'loyntahneaSily.tzuedatiisonnio;t Yrcetailvliydianlgl tthacttsiuvriptriysinign,towuhPastitdheeann,ct-1 downSide volume. It is interesting to note that, while total volume is currently in the process of setting records, downSide volume, again measured on a 25-week basis, has been decreasing steadily and last week declined to its lowest level since early 1967. This phenomenon, also normal in the early stages of bull markets, has at least negative Significance since it strongly tends to suggest a lack of immediate vulnerability in the present market situation. Major tops in the past have inevitably been accompanied by one of two events, a sha. rp increase in downside volume while total volume remains steady, or, alternatively, a decrease in upside activity. Neither phenomenon has yet taken place, and it would take at least six months for a reversal in volume trends to be completed. The strong implication of today's volume statistics, in other words, is that the current upswing still has a relatively long life ahead of it. Dow-Jones Ind. (1100 a.m.) 872.74 ANTHONY W. TABELL S&P (1100 a.m.) 96.46 DELAFIELD, HARVEY. TAB ELL AWTmn No statement or expressIon of opinIon or ony other molter herem contained Is, or IS to be deemed to be, directly or Indirectly, on offer or the 501lcdollon of on offer to buy or sell any security referred 10 or mentioned The motter ! presented merely for the convenIence of the subscnber While we belreve the sources of our information to be reliable, we in no way represent or guarantee the accuracy thereof nor of the stotements mode herein Any action to be token by the sub scriber should be based on hIS awn rnvestlgatlon and Informatron Montgomery, Scott & Co, as a lImIted partnersh,p, and its partners or employees, may now have, or may later take, positIons or trades In respect to any seCUritIes mentIoned In thIS or any future Issue, and such posrtion may be dIfferent from any vIews now or hereafter expressed In thrs or any other luue. Montgomery, Scali & Co, whICh IS regIstered WIth the SEC as an Investment advrsor, may gIVe adVIce to Its investment adVISOry and other customers Independently of any statements mode In thIS or In any other Issue

— —— – -.. — ……… TABELL'S MARKET LEIIER ,L 909 STATE ROAD, PRINCETON, NEW JERSEY 08540 DIVISION OF MEMaER NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE MEMaER AMERICAN STOCK EXCHANGE – February 12, 1971 The stock market continues to behave with an almost eerie normality. Three Weeks ago, we ven- tured to suggest in this space that the historical record failed to support the contention that a short- – terll!Lcprrctton .was ,neces sarilyJikelyand, that ..!Lcollttn!liIJgadvance1!!!',o!lJdnotbcunu sgal. Sin4'—-,… that time, the Dow-Jones Industrial Average has advanced some 30 points. Last week we suggested that volume, which, at that time, had just set a daily record of 22 million shares and a weekly record of 100 million shares, could probably increase still further with daily peaks approaching the 30 million share level. Two days later, on Tuesday, trading exceeded 28 million shares, and this week's total volume will probably exceed 110 million shares. The rise, it seems obvious to us, is quite soundly based. This is true, not only when purely technical factors are considered, but also, we think, based on fundamentals as well. The following table shows the 1970 earnings for the 30 stocks in the Dow-Jones Industrial Average (in some cases estimated), a consensus estimate of 1971 results for each company, the high and low pie ratio at which each stock sold between 1966 and 1970, and the price at which each stock would sell, applying these pie ratios to estimated 1971 earnings. Per Share Earnings 1970 1971-E Multiple Range Current Possible High & Low 1970 – 1966 Price Based on 1971 Earnings Allied Chemical 1.55 1.85 29 – 10 28 53 – 19 Aluminum Co. 5.20 5.50 20 – 9 65 110 – 50 American Brands 4.03 4.35 13 – 7 46 56 – 30 American Can 3 . 55 3 . 90 17 – 9 42 66 – 35 American Tel & Tel 3.99 4.30 17 – 12 53 73 – 51 Anaconda 3.90 3.00 16 – 5 22 48 – 15 Bethlehem Steel 2.05 2.50 15-7 23 38-18 Chrysler DuPont -6.76 2.00 7.65 15-7 29 l 29 12 30-14 2-21 .Ui7 Eastman Kodak 2.55 2.85 37-22 77 105-63 General Electric 3.60 4.50 32 – 17 105 144 – 77 General Foods 4.72 5.00 23 – 14 83 115 – 70 General Motors 2.09 6.50 17 – 11 82 110 – 72 Goodyear Tire 1.80 2.50 17 – 11 31 43 – 28 International Harvester 1.92 2.75 17 – 8 34 47 – 22 International Nickel 2.80 3.20 28 – 12 46 90 – 39 International Paper 1.85 2.20 18 – 10 36 40 – 22 Johns-Manville 2.02 2.40 19 – 11 44 46 – 27 Owens-Illinois 3.90 4.05 26 – 10 59 105 – 41 Procter & Gamble 2.80 3.00 25 – 14 59 75 – 42 Sears Roebuck 2.95 3.25 26 – 17 81 85 – 55 Std. Oil of Calif. 5.36 5.60 16-7 53 90-39 Std. Oil of N.J. 5.90 6.25 17 – 9 72 106 – 56 Swift & Co. 2.24 2.60 22 – 9 36 57 24 Texaco 3.02 3.20 16 – 8 35 51 – 26 Union Carbide 2.64 2.90 21 – 11 44 61 – 32 United Aircraft 4.20 U.S. Steel 2.72 -Wes-tingho-UseElecti-iC-3-0-6 4.40 3.75 4'700 n 25 – 6 38 16 – 8 33 g'(4'7'7 110 – 26 60 – 30 1 10if-'S6 – Woolworth 2.30 2.50 19 – 8 45 48 – 20 DOW-JONESIND.AVER. 52.28 61.58 885 1315 – 660 The results are interesting. According to the projection, Dow earnings should advance some 18 for 1971. Assuming it is correct, then almost half of the 40 rise in the Dow to date has been recognition of improved 1971 prospects rather than a simple advance in multiples. The projected price probabilities for the Dow are equally interesting. Even the lower end of the range is above the 1970 low emphasizing again the abnormality of last summer's prices. The median figure between the high and low multiples is 927, and, based on peak multiples, a price of better than 1300 could be justified on the basis of estimated 1971 results. Of even more interest is the fact that all but six of the 30 stocks in the average are in the lower half of their prOjected price range and 11 of the 30 are in the lower quarter of that range. The numbers strongly suggest, it seems to us, that a great part of the rise so far has been based on probable earnings recovery and that speculative mark- up is only a minor factor in the advance so far. Dow-lones Ind. (1100 a.m.) 887.46 S&P (100 a.m.) 98.10 ANTHONY W. TABELL DELAFIELD, HARVEY, TABELL AWTlffiR No stotement or expreSSion of OPiniOn or any other moiler herem contained IS, or IS to be deemed to be, directly or Indirectly, on offer or the soliCitation of on offer to buy or sell any security referred to or mentioned The moiler IS presented merely for the convenience of the subSCriber While we believe the sources of our Information to be reliable, we In no way represent or guarantee the accuracy thereof nor of the statements mode herein Any action to be token by the subscnber should be based on hiS own Inveshgatlon and Informahon Montgomery, Scott & Co, as a limited partnership, and Its portners or employees, may now have, or may lafer fake, poSItions or trades In respect to any secufllies mentioned In thiS or any future Issue, and such pOSItion may be different from any views now or hereafter expressed In thiS or any other Issue Montgomery. Scott & Co. which IS registered WIth the SEC as on mvestment adVisor, may give adVice to Its Investment adVISory and other customers mdependently of any statements mode m thIS or m any other issue

TABELL'S MARKET LETTER 909 STATE ROAD. PRINCETON, NEW JERSEY 06540 DIVISION OF MEMBER NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE MEMBER AMERICAN STOCK EXCHA.NGE February 19, 1971 It can't, we all should certainly be aware, go on forever — it in this instance being the ,..,…. meteioricrafifofstocK'rriatKetadvancewni'ahCarrietr'tlteDowJOrfe-S'Iii'dustttalAverage'tb'anoth-er -new …. high of almost 900 this week. The question, of course, is what happens next We have previously indicated our impatience with the view that the market is in need of a correction. This sort of thinking typifies a kind of perverted puritan ethic which seems to afflict many stock market observers. These commentators seem to view each stock market advance as akin to a drunken debauch which must be paid for with a hangover on the morning after — and the greater the debauchery, the greater the ensuing misery. We have suggested that this view flies in the face of all recorded market history, which, in effect, states just the opposite — that the notable feature of the early, dynamic stage of bull markets is the paucity of substantial corrections. Nonetheless, as we said, it can't go on forever, and around about now it would be logical to expect our rampant adolescent bull to start showing some of the signs of early middle age. And, indeed, a few such signs are, in fact, beginning to appear. Progress of the advance to date has been normal indeed. The number of weekly new highs reached 540 for the third week in January, and this figure has since sloughed off slightly, although it may well show another spurt after mid-March when the new-high criterion is revised to include 1971 only instead of 1970-1971. The spread between weekly advances and declines, taken on a 25-week basis, reached its peak two weeks ago and the differential has been narrowing for the past couple of weeks. Here again the data suggests that the differential will continue to narrow as 1971 progresses. Is this any cause for alarm Not at all. In fact, we selected these two indicators for discussion for the very reason that they are the most useful in pinpointing the end of the early stage of a bull market and suggesting the transition into a more- maturE,' phase. -In f963, -for- example; thE! -peak spread between new highs and new lows occurred in April and the widest advance-decline spread took place at Just about the same time. At that time, the Dow-Jones Industrial Average was at 720 and it was, ultimately, to reach 1000 some 3-1/2 years later. Similarly, both indicators reached their peak in April 1967 with the Dow at around the 900 level. It was subsequently to move to 990 over the next year and a half. There is, in other words, no hint in the available statistics that the end of the advance is in sight. There is, however, some real evidence thaJ the upswing is entering a new stage. We have previously dubbed this sort of transition, which invariably occurs around this point in a bull-market life-cycle, as the change from a non-selective to a selective phase. One of the more delightful features of the market since last summer has been the very promiscuousness of the advance Over this period, it took real genius to find a stock that didn't go up — at least a little bit. It was the sort of time when the famous dartboard approach to common stock selection, trotted out by a senator a few years ago, was probably at its peak of efficiency. In the ensuing months, we think things are going to become a bit more difficult. Many stocks are now beginning to reach upside targets and are likely to be inferior performers at least until a new pattern forms. In a minority of cases, at least, the possibilities of intermediate scale weakness are present. It is well to remember just where, at the 890 level, the Dow-Jones Industrial Average is today in comparison to its past price history. It is just underneath the trading range between 900 and 1000 which contained it from late 1968 to mid-1969. Many stocks show similar patterns in that -they. are, .currently,justunderneath -the overhead 'supply-from their-1968-1969pea'ksIn other-words;- – the panic underevaluation in these stocks brought about by the 1969-1970 bear market has just about been corrected. Now, in a great many cases, these companies, which are now testing their previous peaks, are fundamentally better situated today than they were two years ago. If this is true, they deserve to penetrate the supply and move into new high ground. On the other hand, those companies whose prospects have not markedly improved are probably as good sell candidates today as hindsight tells us they were at the same price level a couple of years back. The task of separating the truly-imprCJ,'- ed companies from those whose price advance has reflected nothing more than improved investor psychology will be a truly challenging one from here on out. Dow-Jones Ind. (1100 a.m.) 881.43 S&P (1100 a.m.) 97.22 ANTHONY W. TABELL AWTmn DELAFIELD, HARVEY. TASELL No statement or expression of opinion or any other matter herem contomed Is, or is 10 be deemed 10 be, directly or Indirectly, on offer or the 5oltcltalton of on offer to bvy or sell any seamty referred to or mentioned The matter IS presented merely for the convenience of the subscriber Whtle we believe the sources of our mformatlan to be reliable, we m no way represent or guarantee the acctJracy thereof nor of the statements mode herein Any action to be laken by the subcrlber should be bosed on hIS own Inveshgoilon and Informotlon Montgomery, Scott & Co, as a limited partnership, and 11 partnen or emplolees, may now have, or may later toke, POSitionS or trades in respect to any securities mentioned In thiS or any future Issue, and such poslilon may be different rom any Views now or hereafter expressed In HilS or any other Issue Montgomery, 5c01l & Co, which IS registered with the SEC as on Investment adVisor, may give advice to liS Investment adVisory and olher customers Independently of any statements mode In th15 or In any other Issue

.—- '——- TABELL-S MARKET LEIIER J 909 STATE ROAD. PRINCETON, NEW JERSEY 08540 DIVISION OF MEMBER NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE MEMBER A.MERICAN STOCK EXCHANGE February 26, 1971 We noted in last week's letter what appeared to us to be a change in character in the stock market, centering our comment on the fact that a more selective phase appeared to be emerging. As would normally be expected, this new phase seems to be ushering in a new market leadership. -One wayofkeififfngtrecICofcliang!lig'mifrJ'Elt lea-dershlp ifhesfudYbnntennectIater;;r;n' group rela- , tive strength action. The following table divides the Standard & Poor Industrial group indices into six categories reflecting their action relative to the general market over the short to intermediate term. Column I includes those groups which had recently been showing intermediate relative weakness but are now evidencing signs of improvement. The second column consists of industries where the recent improvement has been particularly sharp and dynamic, and the third group comprises those industries which have shown continued above-average relative action for a period of time with no Sign of deterioration. The last three columns are the converse of the first three. Column 4 includes those indices which had been strong but are beginning to show preliminary signs of weakness. Column 5 includes those where the weakness is more pronounced, and Column 6 lists industries where relative weakness has persisted over a protracted period. 12 3 4 5 —'6'– Alr Conditioning Aluminum Broadcasters Aerospace Apparel Agricultural Mach. Auto Equip. Air Transport Bread &Cake Appliances Autos Cigarete Mfrs. Drugs Elec. Equip. Food Banks B,scuit Bakers Business Mach. Bldg. Material Chemicals Mach-Industrial Packaging Coal Hotels Const. Mach. Mall Order Nafl Gas OiI-Dom. Canned Foods Cans-Bottles Confectionery Railroads Dept. Stores Mobile Homes OiHnt'l. Copper Com Refiners Discount aores OnProducers Rubber Distillers Life Insurance Home Fum. Oil Well Mach Soaps Grocers Machine Tools Land & Real Est. Retail Soft Drinks Heating &Plumbing – Macn .-Specnm'yC–…,…——LeIsure Time RooC&WaIlBd Investment Cos. Sulphur Meat Packing Sugar Lead & Zinc Synthetic Fibers Metal Fab. Metals Textiles Pollution Conn Paper Publishing Steel Radio-TV Telephones Shoes Steam Gen Mach Truckers The first caveat that should be noted about the table is that it should not be used as a buy and sell guide. It is, first of all, based on action relative to the overall market so that even groups showing below- average action may be in major uptrends. Secondly, a great many groups showing intermediate term de- terioration continue to show attractive long-term action and, therefore, constitute strong holds or buys on weakness, examples of this being, in our opinion, cigarete manufacturers, mobile homes, natural gas pipe- lines, etc. Moreover, groups which have been weak over the recent past may have sizable upside poten- tials which make them attractive at present price levels. Banks, grocers and selected paper issues would be examples of this category. Conversely, for reasons unrelated to relative strength. many stocks in the improving categories may be unattractive as new purchase candidates. What the table does show, however, is those areas which have, in fact, provided recent market leader- ship, and here we think a glance shows that that leadership can be summed up in one phrase, 1. e .. cyclical issues. The most meteoric relative improvement of late has been in such highly cyclical groups as aero- are-. space,' air transport,industrial 'machinery 'and 'railroads.-Meanwhile;-prelimfriary' signs'of improvement being seen in aluminums, building materials, chemicals, machine tools, synthetic fibers and textiles. Such a shift is, of course, perfectly normal at the present stage. As investor confidence slowly returns, coupled with an improved business outlook, the market tends to be more and more willing to look ahead for earnings improvement to the latter part of 1971 or early 1972. It may be argued, of course, that first and second quarter earnings for many cyclical companies will be, in fact, disappointing, but, this is a factor we feel already discounted in the present prices of a great many cyclical stocks which, despite their recent improvement, are still modestly priced by historical standards. We think, in other words, higher grade cyclical companies may well constitute attractive areas for new investment. Dow-Tones Ind. (1100 a.m.) 878.97 S&P (1100 a.m.) 96.73 ANTHONY W. TABELL AWTmn DELAFIELD, HARVEY, TABELL No statement or expression of opinion or any other motler herem contolned IS, or 1 10 be deemed 10 be, directly or Indirectly. an ,offer or the SOllCIIolion of on offer to buy or sell any security referred 10 Of mentroned rhe trlaller rs presented merely for theconvel1lence of the subscriber Whrle we belreve the sources of our Informotlon to be relIable, we In no way represent or guarantee Ihe accuracy thereof nor of the statements mode hereIn Any actIon to be token by the sub scriber should be based on hrs own Investlgatron and InformatIon Montgomery, Scott & Co, as a limIted partnersh,p, and Its parlne or employees, may now have, or may later toke, positIons or trades m respect to any securltles mentIoned In thIS or any future issue, and such posrtron may be dIfferent from any.vlews now or hereafter expressed In thrs or any other issue. Montgomery, Scott & Co, wtllch IS regIStered Wllh the SEC a an Investment adVIsor, may gIve adVICe to lIs Investment advisory and other customers mdependently of any statements made In thIS or In any other Issue

TABELLS MARKET LETTER 909 STATE ROAD, PRINCETON. NEW JERSEY 08540 DIVISION OF MEMBER NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE MEMBER AMERICAN STOCK EXCHANGE March 5, 1971 As might be expected after a three month rise which moved the Dow up nearly 150 points, . a period of relative lassitude temporarily overtook the stock market. After reaching an intra- .—- ……– …,…- '''. – – . -;- -o… – …,…, — -., – — . . . – ,;' .;;'–..-. '0-.' / day peak of 898.14 on February 16, the Dow put on a minor 2 decline in four days to an intra- day low of 861.99. For the next two weeks, relative firmness prevailed but little or no upside I momentum was generated, and volume dropped off to around the 13-14 million share level vs. the average 20-million share peaks that prevailed in the terminal stages of the advance. Actually, in the past three weeks, the market's internal technical position had improved rather noticeably. The 10-day plurality of advances over declines had, by mid-Tanuary, reached 3847, by any standard, indicative of an extremely overbought condition. 10-day upside volume by mid-February was up to the 120 million share level, a newall-time high and an equally un- tenable figure. For the 10 days ended Wednesday, advance-decline figures had changed to an almost 1600 plurality for declining stocks — a level suggesting a mild oversold condition — and upside volume had dropped off to the 63 million share level. Thus, a substantial amount of internal correction had taken place during the IS-day period of sideways movement. Thus, it was not that surprising when, on increased volume, the Dow burst to a new closing high in Thursday's trading. It is probable that a new minor advance has started which will attempt to carry the index through the next major supply level located at 900-925. The test of that supply will be extremely interesting, for a failure to move through the overhead resistance could possibly result in a distributional top large enough to suggest a more important correction than has been seen for the bull market to date. The present correction potentialities are miniscule. The possible top pattern now -existing suggests not111ng-'n6re1han a downsfde target in the 85'0-845 area It ouldal's-o''C'b-e''''''''''I .. possible for the Dow to continue to move sideways in the 860-900 range and, as it did after a similar consolidation last November, embarking on a straight-line rise through the 900-925 supply. The other downside possibility, as mentioned above, is a broadening of the distri- butional top which would ultimately suggest an objective lower than 850-845. The worst foreseeable action at the moment, therefore, would be either a decline to about 850 in the relatively near future, or dullness at around current levels that might last into the end of March or mid-April. Either of these two possibilities would be consistent with the slope of the uptrend which characterized the market from May of last year to three weeks ago. That uptrend can be mathematically described by a channel some 72 points wide whose upper limit, at the moment, is around 910 and whose lower limit is approximately 837. The upward slope of the channel is approximately one Dow pOint per day so that a decline to 850- 845 any time within the next two weeks would serve to bring the index to the bottom of that trading channel. If the market simply moves sideways, the lower limit of the channel will reach present prices in three to four weeks. Thus, as can be seen, either an immediate correction or a consolidation phase would be consistent with the market's behavior since May. Continued upside action in the upper part of the channel would also confirm the existing up- trend pattern. Meanwhile, the rotational leadership discussed in last week's letter continues with -, , –cyclical groups-in cgeneralcoming'to 'thefore -Thus the DowTones'Traifsp6itation'average;- .. although lOSing momentum, was edging into a new high ground while the industrials were correcting. The defensive, non-cyclical utilities show a different pattern, having essentially edged lower ever since the end of Tanuary. However, the lack of any serious distributional top on the utility index and its closeness to support suggests that this decline may be reaching its terminal phases. Thus, while the immediate future is perhaps clouded, the market remains firmly in the grasp of a long-term uptrend. Investmentdecisions should be made in that light. Dow- Tones Ind. (1100 a. m.) 896.36 ANTHONY W. TAB ELL S&P (1100 a.m.) 98.60 DELAFIELD, HARVEY, TABELL AWTmn No stotement or expression of opInion or any other matter herem contained 15, or 1510 be deemed 10 be, dlrcclry or indirectly, on offer or Ihe sollcitallon of on offer to buy or sell any security referred to or mentioned The molter IS presenled merely for the conver-lenCI; of the subscriber While -Ne believe the sources of our IIlformo- lion to be reliable, we In no way represent or guarantee the accuracy thereof nor of the stotements mude herem Any actIOn to be token by the subscriber should be based on hiS own ITlvestlgolion and IIlformalion Janney Montgomery Seoll, Inc, as a corporation, and Its officers or employees, may now have, or may toter toke, positIOns or trades III respect to any ,ecuntles menlloned III thiS or any future Issue, and such position may be different from any views now or hereofter expressed m thiS or any other Issue Janney Montgomery Scott, Inc, which IS registered With the SEC as on Investment odvlsor, moy give adVice to Its IIlvestment adVISOry and othel customers Independently of any stolemenls mode In thiS or III ony other Issue Further Information on any securoty menTioned herein IS aVailable on requesl

———-'———————————————————————- —- TABELL-S MARKET LETTER 909 STATE ROAD, PRINCETON. NEW JERSEY 08540 DIVISION OF MEMBER NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE MEMBER AMERICAN STOCK EXCHA.NGE March 12, 1971 Following the three-.eek period of torpor,. a weeJ ago, volu.me has, returned, t; .the …, –'-''- vhich elidd — – ' ..0,.- . – – – —— —-…; st)('m1i1'ket,–althOugh;tnis-time;-the frenetic -pace of trading has been accompanied by a good deal – .-less upside progress. Most comments on the week's tradmg activity seemed to center around the attempts of the Dow-Jones Industrial Average to break the 900 level, a price level repeatedly attained during the week on an intra-day basis, but which, through Thursday at least, could not be achieved at the close . . A good deal of talk about 900, of course, was based on nothing more than the theory, which has always been somewhat incomprehensible to us, that a three-digit number ending in two zeros some- how has more significance than any other. It does, however, happen that the general area around 900 in the Dow does have more than passing importance and the reason for this importance is worth discussing. The reason the present price area is of considerable Significance is that it represents the most important level of overhead supply with which the 1970-1971 bull market has had to contend in its short nine-month life. The concept of overhead supply is, of course, basic to technical analysis. The theory states Simply that when a stock — or an index — trades at a given price level for a protracted period of time and then moves lower, any subsequent attempt to penetrate the original price level will be met with some difficulty. The reason for this lies firmly grounded in human behavior. A stock- holder who sees his stock hold between, say, 45 and 50 for some time and then break sharply to 30 is going to berate himself for not having taken the repeatedly-offered opportunity to dispose of his holdings above 45. It fOllows that any return to that level may well stimulate him to sell, and, if a 1- ..dsiurf-feiectiernptronpuemrtbioenr 'ao-fl.i.tnov4eshteoarmsouancttothfitsrwaadyi,ngs'utphparlytoits5kthpursaccereaattlende, 'oarnidgltnhael amount of su j)i'lce level. pT;p';ll1hy,e-it;sli;e-'o-ry-',…,….. operates in exactly the same way on an average such as the Dow. Now, for the three years, 1967-1969, during which the distribution leading to the 1969-1970 declIne took place, the Dow held in a range between 760 and 990. The following table breaks this range down into IO-point brackets and shows the number of trading days and the total volume in millIons of shares which changed hands at each of these various price levels. The numbers speak for themselves. The market spent more time trading in the 900-910 range and traded more volume at that level than any of the others. And, in fact, 38 of the tradmg days and 39 of the volume in 1967-1969 was spent inthe area between 880 and 930, precisely where the average is today. As the market attempts to chew into this supply, it is logical to expect heavy offerings and thus high volume with little upside progress — precisely what is, in fact, taking place. Price No. Days Vol. This of Tot. of Tot. Level This Level Level Days Volume Price Level No. Days Vol. This of Tot. of Tot. This Level Level Days Volume 760-770 770-780 I 1 12.840.14 11.88 0.14 0.15 0.14 880-890 890-900 56 57 621.37 666.86 7.70 7.84 7.48 8.03 780-790 11 132.07 1.51 1.59 900-910 64 738.97 8.80 8.89 790-800 8 88.54 1.10 1.07 910-920 49 597.65 6.74 7.19 800-810 17 190.63 2.34 2.29 920-930 55 646.75 7.57 7.78 810-820 17 168.20 2.34 2.02 930-940 40 472.28 5.50 5.68 820-830 830-840 27 278.45 3.71 44 469.11.-.,6,,05 3.35 940!950 26 333.04 3.58 4.01 5. 65 ……….950,-96026 349-;-683584–21- 849.J'850 56 567.59 7.70 6.83 960-970 20 291.10 2.75 3.50 ,.s50-860 42 428.21 5.78 5.15 970-980 11 180.78 1.51 2.18 ,,,860-870 48514.426.60 6.19 980-990 4 61.980.55 0.75 870-880 47 486.70 6.46 5.86 TOTAL 727 8308.36 100.00 100.00 As we have suggested before, we expect the present test ultimately to be successful, at least in- sofar as the averages are concerned. We are, however, more skeptical of the ability of a number of stocks to penetrate comparable overhead supply and believe that, as this supply is reached, the market will enter a much more selective stage. The past nine months, dunng which almost all stocks shared, to a greater or lesser degree, in the general ebullience, are unlikely to be repeated. Dow-Jones Ind. (1l00 a.m.) 897.18 S&P (1100 a.m.) 99.25 AWTmn ANTHONY W. TAB ELL DELAFIELD. HARVEY, TABCLL No statement or eypreSSlOn of opiniOn or ony other moltl!' herein contolned IS, or IS to be deemed to be, dtrectly or indirectly, an offer or the sollltctlon of an offer to buy or sell cny security relerred to or mentlaned The matter IS presented merely far the canvellence of the subscnber While we believe the sovres of avr Informahon to be reliable, we In no way represent ar guarantee the aC(uracy thereof nar of the statements mude herein Any action to be taen by the svbscreber shovld be based on hiS own Inveshgallon and information Janney Montgomery (;Oit, Inc, as a corporation, and lis officers or employees, may now hove, or may later tal.e, pOSItions or trades In respect 10 any secvrmes menl10ned In thiS or any Ivture Issue, and svch position may be different from any views now or hereafter expressed In thls or any other Issve Janntly Montgomery Scott, Inc, whICh IS registered With the SEC as on Investment adVisor, may give adVICe 10 liS Investment adVisory and othel cvSlomers Independently of ony statements made In thIS or en any other Issue Further Information on any securety mentioned herein IS ovalloble on request

———————————————————————————– TABELL'S MARKET LETTER 909 STATE ROAD. PRINCETON. NEW JERSEY 08540 DIVISION OF MEMBER NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE MEMBER AMERICAN STOCK EXCHANGE March 19, 1971 The stock market last week continued to display the same sort of strength and vigor that has be- come its hallmark since last November. Monday's trading, commg after a week of sideways action, sa1(l',theSO0.Jevelonthe DowfinaU-penetratedwithalh–alm0st-IO-point'UdvanGe-to-aclo singhigh of 908.20. This advance was further extended in early trading Tuesday before reaction set in which continued through noon the following day. Then the tide was abruptly reversed and what had started as a seven-point decline turned into a day of almost no change. The advance continued on Thursday as a new bull-market high of 922.30 was reached. The action of the Industrials was mirrored in the Transportation Index which, early in the week, also reached a new peak, although here the followthrough was not quite as vigorous. Of more importance was the strength shown by the Utility Average which reached an intra-day peak of 125.70 on Thursday. Unlike the broader averages, the Utilities have been in a downtrend since the last week of January. An ability to reverse that trend would be constructive, and such a reversal would probably be signaled by a penetration of 126.50 on an intraday basis. The most recent phase of the rise, the one which began in mid-February, has, it must be admitted, displayed somewhat less vigor than some of the earlier stages. For the first time, breadth has begun to lag a bit behind the averages, and the new highs in the major indices posted a week ago were not confirmed by advance-decline action until this week's move. Also, as pOinted out two weeks ago in this letter, high-low indices continued to show some deterioration. None of this, we hasten to add, constitutes anything more than evidence that the bull market is approaching a vigorous middle age. Confirmation of a new high by market breadth normally lags in all but the very early stages of a bull market, and the action of this week can be interpreted as nothing more than an indication that the bull is growing old gracefully. It would, furthermore, be logical to expect some minor weakness i/Llljewo.f,Jh e,sgppl .factors..mentioned….,n.Jhi.s..J.etteI-Jast..week-F-lI'thervid enee o.of4h e cexistenGe of that supply could be adduced from the late tapes which prevailed during the week's trading, suggesting an abundance of small offerings being absorbed as the market moved ahead. While the bulk of technical analysis, in our opinion, should consist of sound statistical reason- ing, there must be, it seems to us, a good deal of the subjective attached to the analyst's thinking. One of the subjective evidences of the market's strength, we think, is the fact that worries about the end of the bull market still persist. A question we are asked frequently runs something like this. We know you are bullish, but what would the market have to do in order to make you change your mind The question is always a difficult one to answer. We have a difficult enough time as it is analyzing the lines already on our charts. The analysis of lines that mayor may not be there six months from now is almost impossible. The first thing, paradoxically enough, that the market would have to do to show deterioration would be to post a decline of some magnitude — something it hasn't done in over six months. We would then have a bench mark and the subsequent rally could then be viewed in the light of that decline and its ability to continue to a new recovery high. This, after all, is what technical work going back to the Dow theory is all about. It would not work, of course, if the market, after it preCipitately moved to a new high, dropped off with equal sharpness. However, markets, historically, have not behaved that way. Declines of major proportions are invariably preceded by top formations and it is the job of the technician to recognize those formations when they occur. Portfolio. management ,in ,a.bull.market ,it.seems.to.us ,ds.muchlike,driving.acar.at-night.The – headlights allow a limited vision of the road ahead and, as long as it is clear, the traveller proceeds in relative serenity. Quite obviously he remains alert, but, were he to continually worry about obstacles just beyond the range of the headlights, he would turn himself quickly into a nervous wreck. At the moment, all technical signals suggest that the stock market road ahead is clear, and the investor who worries about what might happen beyond his field of vision is dissipating a good deal of intellectuql energy that could better be applied elsewhere. Bull market conditions have been defined as conditions under which the investor, with application and skill, can achieve respectable results through selection of indiVIdual common stocks without regard to what market conditions might do to otherwise sound stock values. Such conditions, quite obviously, exist at the moment,and it is to the process of stock selection that the investor should devote his energies. Dow-Jones Ind. (1l00 a.m.) 916.28 S&P (1l00 a.m.) 101.07 AWTmn ANTHONY W. TABELL DELAFIELD, HARVEY, TABELL No stat to buy han to ement or eprcsslon or sell any security be relIable we In of optnlon or any o referred /0 or mentio na way represent ar ther maN ned The guarante er here'n contOined IS, or mottcr IS presented merely e the accuracy thereof nor IS to for of t be the he deemed to be, dnecl!y or Indirectly, converlenCE of the subSCriber While statements mude herem Any actIon t on oNe ob offer or belIeve e taken bttyhheethseo0u1srucl(bllssoclroIl0fbneoruorfshoonunflooftfbeer based on hIS own'mvestlgatlon and InformatIon Janney Montgomery Scott, Inc, as a corporatIon, and lIS offIcers or employees, may now have, or moy later take, pOlhons or trades In respect to any seCUritIes mentioned In thIS or any future Issue, and such posItIon moy be different from any vIews now or hereoJter expredsedhm thIS or any olher Issue Janney Montgomery SCali, Inc, whIch IS regIstered WIth the SEC as on Investment adVIsor, may gIve adVICe 10 Its mvestment a visoryon at el ClJslomen mdependently of any statements mode In thIS or In any other Issue Further informatIOn on any security mentIOned here, IS avaIlable on request