'1TLiu'(!UE n..n..' s 1ilfIlIRl rE'1T L.rE'1T'1TrElRl 600 ALEXANDER ROAD, PRINCETON, NEW JERSEY 08540 MEMBER NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE, INC MEMBER NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF SECURITIES DEALERS, INC (609) 987-2300 ,, I.. May 30, 1986 -As, the majorJverages or-.some. of-themat any-rate)-go-sailing—on-to new highs.–there seem – -, to be developing two schools of thought as regards market forecasting. The first of these can be characterized as the it's-going-to-go-up-forevertl school which tends to gain more adherents the longer it proves to be the apparently correct one, which, of course, it has managed to do for some four years now. The second view, which, while losing adherents, manages to retain its die-hard supporters, can be referred. to as the early-puritan school of analysis. The rationale for this coterie of gloom-and-doomers has always been that a bull market constitutes a form of debauchery for which there must ultimately exist retribution in the form of fiancial damnation. Technicians, within limits, tend to be more sympathetic to the former view, since one of the basic tenets of technical work has always been that an established trend tends to remain in force. We have invariably been forced to recognize, however, that, at some point, a trend can become overextended, and a corrective process may become required. Our own stance of late has been to place ourselves somewhere between the two extremes mentioned above. The market has reached a stage. we think, where dogmatism, in either direction, becomes unwise, and it is best to allow the market to tell its own story. This got us into trouble last week. We tried in our last issue to explore the possibility that the Dow, which, since March, had shown some loss of momentum, might be in the process of forming a modest top formation. We did note that such an interpretation was far from a certainty, and the wisdom of this particular hedge was almost immediately validated by this week's move to new highs. Concerning this move, a few factors must be noted, which, for the time being at least, may tend to raise some doubts. The high remains unconfirmed by breadth–which reached its peak back in mid-April–although we are unable to get unduly worried about this failure, since breadth indicators have behaved well enough to confirm new peaks with any market strength. We cannot, however, say that we are terribly impressed with the 190 new highs, fewer than ten percent of issues traded. posted on Wednesday. Nor does what is, so ff!!J a succession of three lower highs, in March, April, and May, in both the Transport and Utility'averages, engender a great deal of confidence. We admit. we are purposely, here, being picky. All the indicators mentioned above are designed to provide fairly significant lead times on peaks in the averages. Since most of them have not yet provided anything like definitive sell signals, it is undeniably best to continue to assume that the course of least resistence remains upward. Nonetheless, the forecaster can be pardoned for being less confident of this particular scenario than might have been the case a couple of years ago. The investor, along with the forecaster. may also, as the upswing continues, be forced to live with a greater level of discomfort than that to which he has been accustomed in recent years. The basic tenet of modern portfolio theory and the capital asset pricing model suggests that excess returns are achieved only by the assumption of excess risk. There is a good deal of theoretical truth to this formulation, but we have never accepted the purists' reasoning that it holds true in all times and all places. The early years of the 1982-198 bull market were a perfect example of a period when this particular law somehow got suspended. By and large, superior returns tended to be earned by a whole bunch of stocks, mostly consumer-related and interestsensitive, which should, theoretically, have gone up a great deal less than the market as a whole. As the stock market advanced, large numbers of issues, many trading over-the-counter, whose historical beta-coefficients were huge, were totally failing to participate in one of the greatest bull markets in decades. We enjoyed, in other words, a period when the investor could sit back with confidence holding a portfolio of high-quality stocks and still enjoy above-average returns. We doubt that this comfortable situation will continue as 1986 wears on. We would expect the theoretical construct to reassert itself, so that. if excess returns are to be achieved. it will have to be in secondary stocks. It seems to us, moreover, 'perfectly pardonable to be somewhat nervous about such a switch at a time when the market has already moved up close to 150 percent. The path of least resistence, unquestionably. remains the upward one, but the unusual momentum that has characterized the bull market to date is unlikely, we think, to prevail throughout 1986. AWTvfl Dow-Jones Industrials (1200 noon) 1887.33 S. & P. 500 (1200 noon) 247.59 Cumulative Index (5/29/86) 3202.71 ANTHONY W. TAB ELL DELAFIELD. HARVEY, TABELL, INC. No statement or expression of opinion or any other matter herein contained IS or IS \0 be deemed to be dlrectty Of indirectly, an offer or the soHcltabon of an offer to buy or sell any security referred to or ment loned The matter IS presented merely for the convenience oj the subSCriber White we believe the sources of our information 10 be reliable, we In no way represent or guarantee the accuracy thereof nor 01 the statements made herein Any action to be taen by the subscriber Should be based on his own inVestigation and Informal Ion Delafield, Harvey, Tabell Inc, as a corporation and Its oilicers or employees may now have, or may later take positions or !fades In rcspect to any secufilies menlloned In thiS or any luture Issue, and such POSition may be dlHerenl from any views nowol helca/ler expressed In thiS or any other Issue oela/leld Harvey Tabell Inc, which IS registered With the SECasan Investment adVisor may give advice to ItS Investment adVISory and other customers independently of any statements made In th1S or In any other Issue Further Information on any secunty mentioned heteln IS available on request

—— – — — — ————————————– TABELL-S MARKET LETTER 600 ALEXANDER ROAD, PRINCETON, NEW JERSEY 08540 MEMBER NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE, INC MEMBER NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF SECURITIES DEALERS. INC (609) 9872300 June 6, 1986 eadersof this letter (9L-SOme of themat least)h!lvJ'(LeJec.tejt.Jn rcenLissues,al1o–1lppar-,,I. , ent note of pessimisisni regarding the market outlook' Thiseffect -is not necessarily intended. The writing of stock-market commentary is an exercise in which we have been engaged for a while now t and we have become familiar with the expectations of a portion of such commentary's readership. Those expectations require the writer to be either unqualifiedly bullish or bearish, lest he be accused of the occupational sin of hedging. Unfortunately, much of the time the stock market itself does not foster the adaptation of an opinion at one or the other extreme of the bull-bear scale. About half the time, perhaps, equities are providing the sort of exceptional returns that they, almost alone among financial assets, can generate, or, alternatively, the market is inflicting on its participants large and painful losses. The other fifty percent of the time it becomes a much less exciting affair where, with hard work and careful selection, decent, if not spectacular, returns can be achieved. What we have been trying to do, of late, is to suggest the possibility that we may now be in transition to such a period. We are asserting, in other words, that the stock market, on an intermediate-term basis, may be overbought. This is a common phrase among technicians which also tends to engender misunderstanding. It is, first of all, not a pejorative term. Indeed, as we shall see, the ability of the market to reach a short-term overbought condition is often indicative of an above-average long-term momentum. What overbought, when used by technicians, tends to mean is that a class of indicators known as oscillators are at the extreme high end of their historical range. Let us take, as an example, one such indicator we have used for many years. It is constructed simply by taking the totals of weekly advances and weekly declines for the past twenty-five weeks and subtracting the latter from the former. For consistency over time, the result is conveniently expressed as a percentage of issues traded .. I;'u ',,0 … UO' u,, ' ….., H lneo level it has attained since World War II. The plurality of advancing stocks over declImng ones for the past twenty-five weeks was 12,793, or 22.82 of issues traded. Approximately 16 is normally considered an overbought condition. However, what must be emphasized is that it is not the attaining of an overbought condition by itself that signals the presence of market risk. It is the attainment of such a condition, followed by a fairly protracted decline, usually almost to the level where the twenty-five week advance-decline differential is close to zero. Furthermore, even when such a signal proves to be correct, the result may not necessarily be a bear market, but, rather, an intermediate-term cor- rection or even a simple consolidation. The most recent case may perhaps be instructive. In January-February of 1983, the twenty-five week oscillator reached a positIOn roughly comparable to the one in which it found itself two months ago. Ten months later it had reached negative territory. This, interestingly enough, was a month before the high reached by the Dow in November, 1983, which in turn led to the eightmonth, sixteen-percent decline into July, 1984. On the other hand, there have been many cases where a correction, properly forecast, has not amounted to much at all. Six months into the 1949 bull market a similar condition was registered. This produced nothing more than a short decline coincident with the outbreak of the Korean War, after which the market marched merrily on to new highs within a few weeks. Now, as noted above, this particular indicator reached its high only a couple of months ago. We can make some guess as to its future action. Since it is based on a twenty-five week period, we know those weeks which will be being subtracted from the totals for the next few months come from the period December, 1985 – March, 1986, and they are almost uniformly good ones. We may thus infer a strong likelihood that this oscillator, absent unusual market strength, will trend down for the next few months. However, along with other indicators we have been referring to in this space, its lead time is significant, and it is certainly not, at this stage, forecasting immediate lower prices. Even should it begin to do so as time goes on, other indicators will be required to assess how much lower, if at all, these prices ought to be. At the moment the oscillator is doing no more than suggesting that a somewhat more normal stock market era may, in the past few months, have arrived 6 AWTv\1 ANTHONY W. TAB ELL DELAFIELD, HARVEY, TABELL, INC. Dow-Jones Industrials (1200 noon) 1880.52 S. & P. 500 (1200 noon) 245.97 Cumulative Index (6/5/86) 3184.45 NO statemcnt or epresslOn of opl11l0n or any other maner herein contained IS or IS to be deemed to be dlrectlv or Indirectly, an offer or the soliCitation of an offer to buy or sell any secullty referred toor mentioned The mailer IS presented merely fOI the convemence of the subSCliber While we believe Ihe sources of our Iflformatlon to be reliable we In noway represent or guarantee the accuracy thereat nOI 01 the statements made herem Any action to be taken by the subSCliber should be based on hiS own mvestlgatlon and II1tormatlon Delafield, Harvey, Tabelt Inc, asa corporation and liS oHlcers or employees may now have or may later take pOSlllons or trades Ifl respect to any seculltles mentioned m this or any future Issue, and such poSition may be different from any views now or heleafter expressed In thiS or any other Issue Delafield, Harvey, Tabell Inc which IS registered With the SEC as an Investment adVisor, may give adVice to liS II1vestmenl adVISOry and other customllrs mdependen\!y 01 any statements mode m thiS or In any other Issue Further Information on any security mentioned herein IS available on request

TABELL'S MARKET LETTER 600 ALEXANDER ROAD, PRINCETON, NEW JERSEY 08540 MEMBER NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE, INC MEMBER NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF SECURITIES DEALERS, INC (609) 987-2300 June 13, 1986 A moderately interesting market week started out with one of those ho-hum all-time record!! declines. in which the 45.75 points shed by the Dow did indeed represent the largest such figure in its history. 1 – ….. The press—stories -on-these-!ecur-ring- non,eventare.–JNe-must..admit.– improving .hey -do -8t1'-e88;; that the,- record being set is in terms of points, and eVen go on to state that. in percentage terms. there have been many larger declines (363 since 1926 to be exact). About all that the Monday decline did. from an analytical standpoint, was to provide the third of a series of benchmark highs going back to the end of March. The theme of this letter for the past few weeks. it will be recalled, has been the changing character of the market. With some two and one-half months of experience now behind us, it becomes possible, it seems to us, to place a precise date on the beginning of that Change. That date, we think, is March 27th. On that particular day. prior to the Good Friday holIday. just about every average one could name posted a new bull-market high. A couple went on to post modest new peaks the following week. but all moved, during the post-Easter week. into a noticeable short-term retreat. which, uniformly bottomed on Monday, April 7th. It is from that point forward that the divergence between various indicators began to manifest itself. In general. a rally began from the April 7th low. with various averages reaching their peak in the two-plus weeks between April 17th and April 29th. The ensuing declines saw some mdicators bottom in mid-May and some in the early part of the month. Finally, the recent advance, in which the closing DJIA peaked last Friday, established. as we have noted. yet another benchmark. The table below shows the relevant figures for eight major averages and both our daily and weekly breadth indices. Intra-day figures have been used where available. The descrepancies are of some interest. MARCH HIGH APR. LOW APR. HIGH MAY LOW DJIA (lID) 3127 1849.74 417 1712.52 4117 1870.16 5/19 1769.84 S & P 500 (lID) 3127 240.11 417 226.30 4122 245.47 5116 232.26 DJIA (liD) 3131 842.98 417 765.46 4122 830.35 5116 765.58 DJUA (IID) 411 195.27 417 182.55 4121 193.42 5121 179.71 NYSE FIN.(CL) 3127 157,74 417 149.8L 4121 159.45 5119 146.95 – -0'l'1 IND—CCL)lT3I7590 -rl7369–50 '-41 2539-9–90 5/1 – 388.20 ASE (110) 3127 270.08 417 262,74 4129 275.97 511 267.93 VAL LINE CMP.(CL)3127 242.28 417 233.24 4121 246,20 5119 237.39 DLY BREADTH 3127 1144.40 417 1137.56 4121 1148.54 5119 1138.54 WKLY BREADTH 3127 1215.25 414 1211.09 4118 1220.33 5116 1214.16 JUNE HIGH 6112 CLOSE 5/30 1898.22 1838.13 5130 249.19 241. 49 5128 819.80 779.38 5130 190.96 185.06 5129 157.98 148.67 6/6 407.90 404.00 612 282.97 279.94 5/30 246,79 241.75 5/29 1145.90 1138.47 5130 1219.05 ——- The Dow and the S & P, of course, are following a continuing pattern of higher highs and higher lows. In general the action of the Dow has been more dynamic. Indeed it continued on to post a new closing peak, although not an intra-day one, on Friday before the 45-point drop. The Transport and Utility indicators show precisely the opposite pattern. Each of the three highs has been notably lower than the one preceding it, as have the two short-term lows. (On an intra-day basis, the April and May Transport lows were almost equal, but the May closing bottom was lower). The Financial index shows an intermediate pattern. continuing to a new peak in April but then falling off to a new low and failing to equal its old high. Paradoxically, it is the Over-the-Counter Index. the ASE Index and the Value Line Composite which have shown the best action. All three indices show a consistent uptrend pattern, and found themselves, at recent peaks, considerably above their late-March highs. In general, they all bottomed in early May rather than mid-month and, at last night's close, found themselves closer to their highs than did the other averages. This newly-emergent leadership from the speculative sector has some interesting implications. It could, of course, be dismissed as the typical froth which emerges at the tail-end of a bull-market. We have had, on the other hand. as recently as 1976-78. the phenomenon of a blue-chIp bear-market in which secondary stocks failed to participate. A similar environment might repeat itself today. The worst acting series, of course, have been our daily and weekly breadth indices. Although they continued to reach new peaks in April. they failed to equal those peaks In June. and the daily breadth index this week moved below its May low and is close to its April bottom. The weekly breadth indicator will also probably show a new low when figures are available, thus. along with the daily index. setting ,. up at least a potential breadth divergence. We admitted last week that we were guilty. at least to some degree. of the sin of hedging. but it is hard to see how a mixed picture such as that outlined in the table above can yet yield a definitive conclusion. Continued deterioration in major sectors such as the transportation. utility and financial areas. would have to engender a certain degree of bearishness. However with both the blue-chip and the Over-the-Counter areas acting well, it is hard to see immediate weakness emerging. That pattern change, which we now can date from the end of March. will have to clarify itself further before a radical change in market direction can be predicted. AWTvf1 Dow-Jones Industrials (1200 noon) 1869.35 S. & P. 500 (1200 noon) 244.49 Cumulative Index (6/12186) 3147.36 ANTHONY W. TABELL DELAFIELD, HARVEY, TABELL, INC. No statement or eypresslon of opinion or any other matter herOin contained IS or IS 10 be deemod to be, directly or indirectly, an oller or the solicUatlon of an oHer to buy Of sell any security relerred to or mentioned The matter IS presented merely for the convenience 01 the subscftber While we believe the sources 01 our enformatlon to be reliable, we en no way represent Of guarantee the accuracy lhereot nor 01 the statements made herein Any aclton to be taken by the subscnber should be based on his own rnvestlgatlon and rnlorrnatlon Delafield, Harvey, Tabell tnc, as a corporation and ItS officers or employees, may now have, or may laler take, poslllons or trades In respect to any securrtlos mentIoned In thiS or any future Issue, and such position may be dllterent 110m any views nowor hewafter efpressed in thIS or any other Issue Delafield Harvey Tabell Inc which Is regIstered With the SEC as an Investment adVisor, mayglYe advIce to ItS investment adVisory and other customers Independentty of any statements made In thiS or In anv other Issue Further Information on any security mentioned herem IS avallabfe on request

– TABELL'S MARKET LETTER 600 ALEXANDER ROAD, PRINCETON, NEW JERSEY 08540 MEMBER NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE, INC MEMBER NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF SECURITIES DEALERS, INC (609) 987-2300 June 20. 1986 It is now almost sixteen years since this letter adapted the practice of submitting final copy to the — ,- priQJ,er at nponQnAric!ay Jbu …publls1!.ipgfJ!tlO1.tl5.nmylg9e'Lth -',ut!!-..of..lading 9uillg the !in'…,.,..,.–I hours ofLthe week. This has caused fewer embarrassing moments than might be expected. However,- the – recent advent of the triple witching hour renders any comment on the short-term course of the market in this issue totally superfluous. We will. therefore. resort to what some wag once called the last refuge of the technician, and talk about fundamentals. What stImulates this discussion is a headlme which appeared a week ago in the business section of the New York Times. explaining a thirty-six point rally in the Dow on the previous day. The headline read Weak Economic Data Spur Bonds and Stocks. It is not our Intention to criticize that particular head. Indeed, to the extent that daily stock market swings can be ascribed to particular events. it. and its following story, are probably perfectly true. It is, however, necessary to note that a Rip-Van- Winkle financial analyst, returnmg after a sleep of less than a decade, would have been certain that it was a mIsprint. There was indeed a time, when, at least according to the conventional wisdom, stocks were supposed to go down on weak economic data rather than put on exceptionally strong rallies. The Times story definitively explained the rationale. It noted that Interest rates fell early in the day after the Government reported that industrial production declined by sIx-tenths of a percentage point in May. The larger-than-expected dechne. combined with recent reports of sluggish retail sales and declining manufacturing employment, was enough to revive speculation that the Federal Reserve might try to stimulate the economy by easing monetary policy and encouragIng lower interest rates. This is, of course, an excellent distillation of the current, as opposed to the old-fashioned, conventional wisdom. The stock market. we are told, has become the handmaiden of the bond market, and lower interest rates are the sole requirement for leading the market higher. Such lower rates, in the Wall Street view at least, are the product of efforts on the part of the gnomes of Liberty Street to stImulate, or at least not to restrain, the economy. Thus a drop in industrial production suddenly becomes bullish for the stock market. Taking this logic to its reductIo ad absurdum, of course, means that what the country really needs is a major depression which would prompty produce 2 bond rates and a Dow of 5.000. The poinHs-t'Whe–tdit4ma…and4h,,o&r-llstockmakeLtheociesmuBt.atsomepoint.cometo'–'—I conflIct. They are reasonably close in our VIew, at the moment. to doing so. Let us hypothesize for a moment that continued economic weakness were to produce yields on AAA Industrials of 8 verses the current level of around 9 114 . The current ratio of the triple-A yield to the Dow yield is roughly .37. Thus. theoretically. an eight-percent trlple-A might support a DJIA yield of 2.96. which would equate roughly to a Dow of 2180 at current dividend rates. This is all very well, but it is at this stage that we begin to run afoul of tradition. For the twelve months ended March, the DJIA turned in earnings of 96.43. This brings the price/earnings ratio at current levels uncomfortably close to the twenty level. The Dow has previously sold above that level for only four quarters In 1961-1962. historically the peak of a major upward cycle for pI e ratios. The Dow's yield, moreover, currently finds itself at around the 3 1/2 level. The so-called yield ceiling which tends to come into play somewhere around 3 to 3 112 on the Dow can be better documented historically than can the stock market's relationship with the bond market. DJIA yields at around that level accompanied market tops in 1973, 1968. and 1961 to name just a few instances. Meanwhile the stock market's supposed relationship with the bond market can be historIcally documented just about as far back as the last couple of market swings. The great take-off from August, 1982, was of course accompanied by falling bond yields, and a turnup in yields between mid-1983 and mid-1984 did indeed produce a fairly Important downswing. It IS, however, diffIcult to carry this relationship very far back in time. It can be argued, of course, that, with bonds currently yielding so much more than stocks, equities should today be a great deal more sensitive to competition from senior securities. However, in one sense, all financial history since 1949 can be viewed as a swing from stocks prOViding a yield 2.75 times as great as bonds to a stock-bond yield ratio of around .31 today. Our own view, for what it is worth, is that the conflict will ultimately be resolved by a renaissance of the traditional view. We would, in other words, regard an economic environment in Which stock earnings were able to increase by the 30-40 not so long ago envisioned by analysts for the major averages as being a more bullISh one than a period of earnmgs dechne and concomitant lower interest rates. The ultimate syntheSIS of the two stock marketviews will be-interesting. – '.. … AWTvfl Dow-Jones Industrials 02 00 noon) 1859.30 S P. 500 (1200 noon) 244.34 Cumulative Index (6/19/86) 3155.67 ANTHONY W. TABELL DELAFIELD. HARVEY. TABELL. INC. No statement or e)!prCS510n of opmlon or any other mattcr herem contained IS, or Is to be deemed to be, directly or Indirectly. an otfer or the sohCltahon of an of/or to buy or sell any security referred to or mentioned The maher Is presented merety tor the convenIence 01 thesubscflber While we beheve the sources ot our Information to be rehable, we In no way represent or guarantee the accuracy thereof nor of the statemenls made herein Any action to be taken by Ihe subscrlbel should be based on hiS own Investigation and mformatlon Delafield, Harvey, Tabell Inc, as a corporation and liS officers Of employees, may now hMe, or may laler lahe, pOSitIOns or trades In respect to any securities mentioned In thiS or any future Issue, and such position may be dlHarenl from any views nOWOf hereaf1er expressed In this 01 any other Issue Oelafleld Harvey, Tabell Inc whiCh IS registered wllh the SECas an Investment adVisor may give adVice 10 Its InVestmenl adVisory and olher customers Independently of any statements made III this Of m any other Issue Further Information on any secunty mentioned herem IS available on reQuesl

—————————————————————————————— TABELL'S MARKET LETTER 600 ALEXANDER ROAD. PRINCETON, NEW JERSEY 08540 MEMBER NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE. INC MEMBER NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF SECURITIES OEALERS. INC (609) 987-2300 June 27, 1986 The season has arrived for discussion of the Summer rally and republication of the table below. – -.,..duly-rec.mpute-''c!yr-8sneWfigtlres – . ' b e-c….o….m… e a v ail a b l e . -. …..- – which One Month Periods (1926-1985) Two Month Periods (1926-1985) End-Month Advances Declines Average Change Advances Declines Average Change January 38 22 1.05 February 30 30 -0.22 March 33 27 -0.04 April 34 26 1.21 May 29 31 -0.85 June 31 29 0.91 July 37 23 1.70 August 38 22 1.53 September 23 37 -1.30 October 32 28 -0.30 November 37 23 0.83 December 44 16 1.24 39 21 2.29 34 26 0.84 28 32 -0.34 37 23 1. 24 34 26 0.56 27 33 0.03 37 23 2.57 40 20 3.38 35 25 0.20 28 32 -1.56 36 24 0.57 43 17 2.10 TOTAL 406 314 0.48 418 302 0.99 The 60 years since 1926 have comprised a total of 720 months. Of those months. 406. or 56. produced advances. The normal expectation for any single month for the GO-year period, therefore, would be that approximately 34 months would show a rise and some 26 months. a decline. As can be seen, the record for both July and August, the latter month especIally, is somewhat better than this. It is on the basis of these numbers that many analysts have remarked the tendancy toward a rally in the Summer months. s we have pointed out in the past, however. July and August do not constitute the- most statisticallysignificant periods In the table. The most unusual record shown is that of September which occured as a rising month in only 23 of the 60 years, a phenomenon widely at variance with the overall history. Likewise, the year-end rally, as shown by the fact that a rising December has occured in 44 of 60 months. is a considerably more likely occurence than an advance in July or August. Nonetheless, although the significance may be marginal. the July-August period does demonstrate an advancing propensity. This propensity becomes even more significant when one looks at two-month periods. The two months together have produced a rise in 40 of 60 years, and the average change for that two-month period is 3.38. a number almost 3 112 times as great as the average for the 720 periods under study. Interestingly, however, summer behavior since the current bull market began has been somewhat at variance with past history. three of the four Julys since 1982 having been down months. The reason for this is that each of the past four summers can be identified with fairly important market turning points. This is somewhat unusual, based on pre-1982 behavior, which generally saw important turns occuring in the Spring or Fall. The past four years, however, started with one of history's most important bottoms in August. 1982. The initial phase of the ensuing rally was topping during the Summer of 1983. and the 1983-1984 intermediate-term correction bottomed in mid-summer (July 24th) of the following year. Last summer saw a flat consolidation phase preceding the latest upward swing. which. it will be recalled, began at the end of September. It will thus be interesting to see whether summer, 1986 produces the traditional rally or a continua- tion of the recent tendency for stocks to exhibit some sort of reversal behavior. AWTvfi – ANTHONY W. TABELL DELAFIELD. HARVEY. TABELL. INC. Dow-Jones Industrials (12 00 noon) 1885.12 S. & P. 500 (1200 noon) 249.18 Cumulative Index (6/26/86) 3176.79 –,.., NO statement or epresslon Of OpiniOn or any other mailer herem contamed Is or IS 10 be deemed 10 be directly or mdllectly, an oller or Ihe soliCitation of an offer 10 buy or sell any secunty referred to or mentloned The malter IS presented merely for the convemence of the subscriber White we believe the sources of our information to be rehable, we in no way represent or guarantee the accuracy thereof nor of the statements made herem Any action to be taken by the subSCflbershould be based on hiS own invesllgatlon and information Oelafleld, Harvey, labell Inc, as a corporafion and ItS officers or employees may now have, or may later take, POSitions or !fadeS In respecl to any socunlles mentioned In fhls or any future Issue and such position may be dlfterent from any views now or hcrcalter e..pressed in thIS or any otherlssuc Delafield Harvev label! Inc which Is registered With the SEC as an Invesfmenl adVisor may give advice to ItS Invesfment adVISory and other customers Independently of any statements made In lhls or In any olher Issue Further information on any security mentioned herein IS available on request 0

TABELL'S MARKET LETTER 600 ALEXANDER ROAD, PRINCETON, NEW JERSEY 08540 MEMBER NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE, INC MEMBER NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF SECURITIES DEALERS, INC (609) 987-2300 July 3, 1986 It has been the thesis of this letter for some weeks now that the stock market underwent a transition – f – –12…8 ne b!tvior patteF!! abqut,.Jhree mQl)!lJL8cgQ.J\.t-.beqaYiopattern9!l.l2..-Lech(l.acterid-;-sa…tr,enl whose direction. for the time beIng at least. 'continues upward. but in 8 rnu-ch slower and-narrower fashion. This week's market action was entirely consistent with this hypothesis. The first three days of trading all saw new peaks for the Dow, but Wednesday's interday high of 1922.67 was less that 4 above the comparable figure posted over three months ago on March 27th. That March 27th peak, for most averages. was followed by three subsequent new highs. in mid-April, early June, and. lastly. this week. We attempted, this week. to examine the four-month period March-June in terms of the action of individual stocks. We examined 1306 NYSE issues and recorded the date on which each one made its high for the period, the date and percentage decline to the subsequent low, and the portion of that decline recovered as of Monday's close. Despite the action of the averages, individual issues have not behaved all that well over the past four months. Almost half of the stocks under study made highs in MarchApril, which they have not been able to exceed since. The average stock, for the period, posted a 15 loss from its high to its subsequent low and had, as of Monday, recovered a modest 40 of that loss. DATE OF NO. OF AVERAGE HIGH STOCKS DECLINE March 341 24.64 April 297 18.78 May I-June 13 301 14.02 June 16-Date 367 4.31 Total 1306 15.15 10 -8- 22 108 340 478 EXTENT 10-20 20-30 138 115 179 66 144 39 25 2 486 222 OF D ECLINE 30-40 40-50 50 48 15 W- 23 3 4 5 23 0 00 76 20 24 The table above records some relevent statistics. It shows the number of stocks reaching their March-June high in four periods–March, April, May 1st-June 13th and June 16th-June 30th. The second Jorcolumn shows the average decpne eacp grDupL.stocks-B.nd-1he-nurnber–Of.stookswhich-dtopped-by– various amounts.. While the number of serious declines is small, the large number of Issues which peaked early and subsequently exhibited dips in the 10-30 range is striking. DATE OF NO. OF AVERAGE HIGH STOCKS RECOVERY 20 March 341 30.86 135 April 297 38.84 79 May I-June 13 301 35.66 103 June 16-Date 367 50.45 77 Total 1306 39.29 394 EXTENT 20-40 40-60 101 60 82 71 77 55 63 74 323 260 OF RECOVE R Y 60-80 80-100 36 9 50 15 48 18 74 79 208 i l l The table above focuses on the amount of recovery, and that recovery is, in our view, surprisingly limited. The stocks that made their highs through June 13th have, on average, been able to regain only 35 of the ground lost, and almost a thIrd of them have recovered less than 20. What is also interesting is the persistence of declines in these Issues once individual highs were made. Of the 341 issues which made their high in March, 145 were still posting new lows subsequent to June 13th, and the same is true of 103 of 297 stocks that peaked in April. What evidently exists, therefore, is a rise in the averages being supported by an ever decreasing number of issues. This condition, of course, need not be permanenL Rotation of leadership could take place if stocks that peaked early in the perIod complete corrections and move on to new highs. The point of the study above, is that they apparently, to date, have not done so. AWTvfJ Dow Jones Industrials 1902.84 S & P 500 251.84 Cumulative Index (July 2, 1986) 3217.32 ANTHONY W. TABELL DELAFIELD, HARVEY, TABELL, INC. No statement or expression of Opinion or any other matter herein contained IS or IS to be deemed to be dlrectfyor Indlrectfy, an olfer or the soliCitation of an offer to buy or sell any secunty referred to or mentioned The mattor IS presented merely for the convenience of the subscriber While we believe Ihe sourcesot our Information to be reliable, we In no way represent or guarantee the accuracy thereof nor ollhe statements made herein Any acllon to be talen by the subSCriber should be based on hiS own IOvestlgatlon and Informal Ion Delafield, Harvey, Tabell Inc, as a corporation and liS officers or employees, may nolV have or may tater take, POSitions or trades In respeclto any securities mentioned In thiS or any future Issue, and such POSition may be different from any views nowor heleaftcr expressed In thiS or any other Issue Delafield Harvey,labell Inc, which IS reglslered With Ihe SECas an Investment adVisor, maYQlve adVice 10 Its Investment adVISOry and other customers Independently of any statements made 10 thiS or In any other Issue Further mtormatlon on any secuflty mentioned herein IS avaIlable on reQuest

'1l'LiUIEUEIL.n.s LiUIRl t;EV n. E V V E IRl 600 ALEXANDER ROAD, PRINCETON, NEW JERSEY 08540 MEMBER NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE. INC MEMBER NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF SECURITIES DEALERS, INC (609) 987-2300 – – July 11. 1986 We have spent a great deal of time of late minimizing the importance of the multi-point declines (and advances)which havebeen-pr-ov4dmg.,fodder cfornewspa per headlinesformuch cof1986.,.,..l tLis'not; q uite, so easy to do this in the case of the 62-point. 3.25 plunge on Monday. especiallyin light of the further downside action the following day We could, of course, point out that Monday's fall ranks only 88 the 163rd largest drop since the Dow emerged in its current form in the 1920's. There have, however, been only nine larger ones in the post-World-War-II, modern era. The timing of their occurance does not tell us a great deal. Five occured in reaction to totally unexpected outside events, two in response to the Truman election in 1948, two in response to the outbreak of the Korean War in 1950. and one following the Eisenhower heart attack in 1955. Two others. May 1962 and November 1974. occurred preceding. but close to, important cycle bottoms. October 25. 1982 was a correction, erased in a couple of weeks. of the sharp advance that had started in August. Only one. November 26. 1973 was the start of an important market decline. Enough. however. of interesting facts probably not worth knowing. It is certainly a requirement at this stage to examine just what effect the rather spectacular events of the past week may have on the market outlook. Our readers are aware that we have been pointing out since May the various changes. not for the better. that have been occuring in the technical market picture since the first quarter of this year. This week's action must first be viewed. we think. as another link in the chain of evidence suggesting internal deterioration. It occured t we are duly informed. in response to the assertion by two respected forecasters of the existence of a relatively high degree of short-term market risk. The sensitivity of the market to these forecasts demonstrates. we think. its current fragility. We suspect that both John Mendelson and Bob Prechter would agree that they could. theoretically at least. have made these assertions in another sort of environment without the immediate effect having been anywhere near 8S great. We find ourselves, we admit, being unable to take serious exception. except perhaps in degree. to the forecasts involved. Twenty percent is. after all. the normal threshold for a bear market. and the week's events should not destroy the memory that we made a new high in a forty-seven-month-old bull market as recently as last Wednesday. Quite simplistically. bearmarkets ormallyfollow bull markets. RecentlsBues oftniSletter have been nobng some ofthe similarities of -the current era to the . first part of the 1921-1929 period. a market expansion whose central feature was the lack of any bear market in the normal sense. Thus the ultimate emergence of a cycle downswing at some stage would be neither surprising nor unhealthful. We must confess. however, some doubt about the immediacy of the prospect. This week's break brought us out of a clearly defined top. the downside targets of which seem to center around 1770-1760. A basic question, in our view, is whether the market will be able to hold in that area and mount. at least. a further test of the former highs. Should it fail to do so. the immediate-bear-market thesis would certainly have to be granted increased validity. We think. however. that there is some likelihood that the final break may be delayed. The major factor giving force to this view J we think. is the patterns on individual stocks. especially the defensive, disinflation-beneficiary issues which have constituted market leadership during almost all of the bull's second phase. Serious market weakness arises from a combination of exploited stocks and major distributional patterns. The disinflation-hedge stocks. from a technical point of view. and to some degree from a fundamental one also. may be said to be exploited issues. What they do not possess is major distributional patterns along the lines of the niftyfifty in 1973-74. We also find ourselves unable to concur with various warnings that increased speculation is suggesting an imminent market decline. The NASDAQ Industrial Average is up from its September low less than is the Dow and has just barely exceeded its June. 1983 high. achieved when the DJIA was around 1250. Secondary offerings have indeed increased. but to those of us old enough to recall real new-issue booms. the current atmosphere seems fairly tepid. None of this is an attempt to ignore the real signs of technical weakness that have been manifesting themselves over the past four months. which we—and our colleagues—have regularly been pointing out. Nor is it an attempt to suggest that any further amazing upside potential exists in what can be agreed to be a well-exploited market. It is simply a suggestion that market crosscurrents may, indeed. continue for a while. -…….– — w–……………. — — — .. — —. In such a market. indeed. the indiVidual investor's reaction is often best determined by that investor's own frame of mind, as illustrated by the old story of the stockholder who confessed to his psychologist that he could not sleep at night for worries about his stocks. Sell was the doctor's advice. and the investor asked. How muchtI. To the sleeping-point was the reply. AWTvfl ANTHONY W. TABELL DELAFIELD. HARVEY. TABELL. INC. Dow Jones Industrials 1830.99 S & P 500 242.85 Cumulative Index (July 10. 1986) 3122.63 No statement or epresslon of opinion or any other matter herein contained IS or IS to be deemed to be, directly or indirectly an oller or the soliCitation ot an ofter to buy or sell any security referred loor menl!oned The matter IS presented merely lor the convenience of the subSCriber While we believe Ihe sources of our tnformatlon to be reltable, we In no way represent or guarantee Ihe accuracy thereof nOf 01 the statements made herein Any action to bfJ taken by the subscnber should bo based on hiS own Investigation and rnformatlon Delafield, Harvey, Tabell Inc, 8S a corporation and lis oHlcers or employees may now have, or may later take, pOSitions or trades In respect to any securities mentioned In thiS or any fulure Issue, and such POSition may be dlflerenthom any views now or hereafter e1pressed In thiS or any othellssue Delafield Harvey, TaOOIl Inc, which IS registered With the SEC as an mvestmefll adVisor, may give adVice to ItS mveslmenl adVisory and other customers mdependently of any statements made m thiS or In any other Issue Further mlormallon on any security mentioned herem IS available on reQuest

TABELL'S MARKET LETTER 600 ALEXANDER ROAD, PRINCETON, NEW JERSEY 08540 MEMBER NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE, INC MEMBER NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF SECURITIES DEALERS, INC (609) 987-2300 July 18. 1986 The most significant fact about the current stock market is that it made a new high on July 2nd. —-Thatt8.tementi8,ofcourseliberately-'aimedatprovXmtionHere…Lwe-have-a -markethich h a r – – – – …. –.!!' – ,..– undergones 6IT-point down day, was. at mid-week. down almost 150 points from that Bforementioned -high. and we are babbling about new highs two and 8 half weeks ago. Yet we reiterate the fact that the eleventrading-day-old high constitutes at the moment a more useful fact for determining investment policy (as opposed to a forecast) than the decline which followed it. Let UB step back a bit and review what has happened. First of all. the market has declined 7.35 between July 2nd and July 15th. There. That should make us feel better already. We have still. of course, not gotten over the culture shock of having the DJIA as high as it is. 150 points, of course, seems like disaster. 7.35 sounds like the minor decline that it. in fact, is. Furthermore, it gives us a historical benchmark. If we go back forty-four years. to April 1942, we find the recent drop was the 48th of equal or greater magnitude in those 44 years. It seems, perhaps. a more important occurance than it is. since it follows the third longest period, 490 days since July 24. 1984, without such a decline. (The three longer periods were October, 1962 – May, 1965, November, 1943 – February, 1946, and September, 1953 September. 1955). We return to the importance of that July 2nd high. Of the forty-seven similar highs that preceded it. thirty began from what we now know by hindsight to have been new highs within the context of bull markets. something we can all agree was the case on July 2nd. Of those thirty. ten constituted the final new highs in the bull-market of which they were components. Following the other twenty. the bull market in question went on to new peaks. Given the length of the current advance, it is probably unwise to translate this into two-to-one odds in favor of an ongoing upswing. but the statistic should, at least. be comforting. Let us, however. assume the W..oe'lcenariLBruLassume……that…J.nly-2nd.-1986 ……turnsout to..be,ttlhe, bull-market high. What sort of market action may be expected over the next few months The following table, while somewhat arcane, attempts to provide answers to this question. It gives the 10 dates over the past forty-four years when a 7.35 decline marked the start of a cycle bear market. It then shows the last date following the bull market high on which the Dow remained within 2. 5. 7 and 10 of its peak. The figures in parentheses are the number of trading days following the high. For perspective, in current terms. down 2 is equivalent to 1871, 5 to 1814, 7 to 1776, and 10 to 1718. BULL MARKBT HIGH LAS T Z DAT B WIT H I N A G I V B N 'II 0 F HIGH 5 7 10 May 29. 1946 Jun 15. 1948 Jan 5. 1953 Apr 6. 1956 Dec 13. 1961 Feb 9. 1966 Dec 3. 1968 Jan 11. 1973 Sep 21. 1976 Apr 27. 1981 Jun 17. 1946 (12) Nov 1. 1948 (lOll Mar 25. 1953 (55) Jul 26. 1957 (328) Mar 19. 1962 (65) Feb 17. 1966 (6) May 16. 1969 (109) Jan 12. 1973 (ll Jan 3. 1977 (7ll Jun 23. 1981 (40) Aug 15. 1946 (54) Nov 4. 1948 (103) Apr 2, 1953 (66) Aug 9. 1957 (338) Apr 6. 1962 (79) Apr 26. 1966 (52) May 29, 1969 (128) Jan 26. 1973 (10) Mar 17, 1977 (123) Jun 30, 1981 (45) Aug 23. 1946 (60) Feb 3. 1949 (172) Aug 18. 1953 (158) Sep 3. 1957 (354) Apr 25. 1962 (91) May 2. 1966 (56) Jun 9. 1969 (124) Oct 29. 1973 (20ll Apr 18. 1977 (144) Aug 6. 1981 (7ll Aug 26. 1946 (61) May 19. 1949 (264) Sep 9. 1953 (173) Sep 19. 1957 (366) May 8. 1962 (100) Jun 24. 1966 (94) Jun 18. 1969 (131) Nov 1. 1973 (204) Jul 25. 1977 (21ll Aug 20. 1981 (8ll What the figures show, in effect, is that, in seven of the ten bear markets. the Dow returned to within 2 of its high over periods ranging from two to fourteen months. In nine cases it had returned to within 5 of that high within similar periods. and in all cases shown. a recovery to within 7 of the bull market high ultimately took place. The fastest-breaking bull market was 1973-1974, which fell from 1051.70 in January to 869.13 in June. It had recovered by October, however, to 987.06. By contrast the top between April 1956 and the Bummer of 1957 took over a year to form. – Now none of the above is intended to suggest blind optimism in the face of the market deterioration which we have been pointing out over the last two months. What it does suggest is that. even allowing for the most peSSimistic possible view of that action, that it is the immediate precursor of a cycle bear market. extensive further deterioration will have to take place before such a bear market is likely to take us significantly below current levels. History suggests. in other words, that the two-week-old new high which we mentioned at the beginning of this letter constitutes an argument against precipitous action. AWTvfi ANTHONY W. TABBLL DELAFIELD. HARVEY. TABELL. INC. Dow Jones Industrials 1768.14 S l P 500 234.52 Cumulative Index (July 17, 1986) 3068.56 NO statement or C/preSslon of opinion or any olher mAtler herein contained IS or IS 10 be deemed to be directly or indirectly. an offer or the soliCitation 01 an alier 10 buy Of sell any secuflty referred loor mentioned The mailer IS presented merely lor the convenience of the subSCriber While we believe the sources of our mlormatlon to be reliable, we In no way represent or guarantee the accuracy thereof nor 01 the statements made herein Any action 10 be taken by the subscriber should be based on hiS own Invesltgatlon and Information Delafield, Harvey TaOOIl Inc, as a coroorallon and ItS oU,cers or employees may now h.!ve or may later take pOSitions or trades U1 respect 10 any secunlles mentioned In thiS or any future Issue, and such POSition may be different from anv views nowor hereafler epressed In thiS or any other Issue Delafield Harvey Tabell Inc which IS registered with the SEC as an Invesmenl adVisor may give adVice 10 liS investment adVisory and olher customers mdependentlv of any sl alemenls made In thiS or In anv other Issue Further information on any securltv mentioned herein Is available on reQuest

TABELL'S MARKET LETTER 600 ALEXANDER ROAD, PRINCETON, NEW JERSEY 08540 MEMBER NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE, INC MEMBER NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF SECURITIES DEALERS INC (609) 987-2300 – July 25, 1986 We suggested in this space two weeks ago that the downside objectives of the top formed just prior ,-.tp.,1heshap ,J.uly.1.1h.b.eemedtocepterarqutl(t th.1.J70;J.Z6 Oar.ea ,B yJ!11yHjh, theind exhad reached that area, with a 1768.70 close, and has, so far at least, attempted to hold that low, -rising to 1798.37 on Wednesday, before pulling back in Thursday's trading. Continued action of this sort would be constructive. The Dow presently finds itself testing two fairly important previous bottoms, one at 1758.18, on May 19th, and the other at 1735.51, on April 7th. Continued ability to hold above these benchmarks would have to be construed as a positive sign .. It is. ironically. often difficult to poinpoint something so simple as a downside penetration. Both prior lows were made on spikes. where the average dropped to 8 new bottom and then rebounded sharply. Thus a short-term, one-or-two-day penetration of the figures mentioned above should not be immediately regarded as bearish evidence. Meanwhile. as the daily Wall Street Journal market chart quite clearly shows, the relative action of the widely followed DJIA lies precisely in the middle between its siblings, the Transport and Utility Averages. The Industrials have posted three bottoms at approximately similar levels as outlined above. For the Transport Index. the same three bottoms reveal a sharp downtrend, whereas, since May at least, the Utility Average has shown no disposition to correct and finds itself, as of mid-week, at a new bull-market high. None of this, of course, is really anything more than further evidence of the phenomenon we have been remarking on all along. Since March, the market has tended show a far less pronounced overall uptrend and to become less broad, i.e. to produce more and more widely disparate price movements by individual stocks. As downside targets were being reached, some mOderately positive signals were being flashed by a number of short-intermediate term indicators that in the past have demonstrated fair predictive accuracy. Coincident with the low of July 15, the 10-day advance-declIne total, one of the most widely followed short-term oscillators, reached -3,140. This could hardly be considered deep oversold territory amounting, as it does, to 15.8 of total issues traded. A deep oversold condition for this indicator, generally attained at major market bottoms, would be around 25, or, given the 2,000 plus -I-''6sues-t-hat–'-l1opmally—t.pa.Ge–Elaily-40EJa.YTll-PeUn-El…the,,-5TOOO.Llevelhe–leveh;at-tained..–however,can-'-be-,…–I considered as a normal oversold one for a neutral market, something which. for the time being at least, we are assuming this one to be. The same sort of action, suggesting a moderately deep. but not extreme, oversold condition, was being shown by the short-term trading index, the familiar advance/decline-up volume/down volume ratio, invented by Richard Arms and available on all quotation machines. This indicator is massaged by many technicians in many ways. We have found that the combination of a close above 2.00, coupled. within a three-week period. by a ten-day average moving above 1.25, has had some use as an indicator of short-term bottoms. Such an occurance took place early this month when the index closed at 2.81 on July 7th and its 10-day average spent July 15 – July 18 above the 1.25 level. This was the 27th occurance of this particular conjugation since 1964. Measuring market change two months afterward reveals 18 advances and 8 declines on the 26 prior occurances. The average for the 18 advances was 6.5 with the largest being 13. The 8 declines averaged 3.7, the largest being slightly over 8. The overall average for all occurances was a 3.4 gain. If this indicator turns out to be correct in presaging a rally over the next two months it would, of course, be consistent with the sort of scenario outlined in last week's letter, which suggests that, eVen if the market is in fact topping out, a test of the previous high at 1909 on the Dow would be a minimal expectation. Such a test would also be consistent with the normal summer-rally tendency. What might follow. of course, remains undetermined. MeanWhile, as action grows more diverse, the problem of individual stock selection has become increasingly difficult. We noted a fortnight ago a basic paradox of the current market. Those stocks which have produced excellent advances and might therefore be thought to be technically vulnerable do not. by and large. have tops. Those stocks which have topped—and there are an increasing number of these—do not seem, for the most part, to be particularly extended. The policy of sticking with winners, in other words. has paid off. However, it becomes more and more difficult to become excited about a market where-new leadership consistently fails to'present itself – – If the above discourse suggests that the market is awash with crosscurrents, it is indeed intended to do so. We do not think. as we have indicated before, that the nature of the process in Which we are now engaged is totally clear, and we think additional evidence will accumulate in the trading pattern to be built up over the remainder of the summer. We prefer to await that evidence, however, before suggesting major changes in investment policy. AWTvfl ANTHONY W. TABELL DELAFIELD, HARVEY, TABELL, INC. Dow Jones Industrials 1809.48 S & P 500 239.27 Cumulative Index (July 24, 1986) 3058.41 NO statement or eDf(!SSlon of opInion or any other melller herein contained IS or IS to be deemed to be dlrectlvor indirectly an ofler or the soliCitation of an oller to buy or sell any security referred to or mentioned The malter IS presented merely for the convenience of the subscnoor While we believe lhe sources 01 our information to be relmble, we In noway represent or guarantee the accuracy thereof nor of Ihe slatement made herein Any aCllon to be taen by the subSCriber should be based on his own investigation and Informal Ion Delafield, Harvey, labelt Inc, as a corporation and ItS ollicers or employees may now have or may later take positions or trades In respect 10 any securilies menlloned In thiS or any future Issue and SUCh POSition may be different Irom any Views now or hereafter expressed In thiS or any other Issue Delafield Harvey Tabel! Inc which IS registered WIth the SECas an Inveslment adVisor may give adVice to ItS Investment adVisory and other customers Independentty 01 any statements made In thiS or In any other Issue Further Information on any security mentIoned herem IS available on request

TABELL'S MARKET LETTER 600 ALEXANDER ROAD, PRINCETON, NEW JERSEY 08540 MEMBER NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE, INC MEMBER NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF SECURITIES DEALERS, INC (609) 987-2300 August I, 1986 1 – -'We-v01ced-!1i-Opiion 1astekth-atheDbw—was-pro)5abl.fl.n tRe process of fest1rig-lt- KpriI.'May — -'I – lows. and this week's action seemed to confirm that thesls. A spIke down to 1741.56, modestly below the May low. occured on Wednesday before the market rallied in the afternoon. The subsequent followthrough was unimpressIve, as has tended to be the case. Meanwhile. upside leadership continues to narrow. We noted last week that the best acting stocks, since the market began its decline early thIS month, have tended to be the disinflation-hedge issues. which have shown superior relative strength all year. However. in this group some stocks are beginning to peel off and correct quite sharply. as the follOWIng tables show. HIGH SINCE HIGH FO HIGH SINCE HIGH FO NAf'lE– 1gAT2IORP I/11B6 7/30/86 'CHANGE 15gg ;55 t NAME BEEsUALTY 1/1186 7/30/86 7.CHANGE igg g 8 AMERICAN ElECTJC PW AMERICAN HOME f'F.OD 30.00 29.63 -1,3 92.38 86.)8 -6.5 AHHAN50N HF CO AMERICAN CAflTAL liND 28.75 24.88 5,75 -10.4 !4.5 -!. ARCHER DANIELS I1II1LAN1 ASSOCIATED !IF.Y GOOls BALTiMORE GAS I EL BORDEN INC BRISTOL MYERS CO CPC INTEF.NATIONAL CAMPBELL SOUF CO CAF.TEF. HAWLEY HALE CENTF.AL I SOUTHWEST COCA COLA CO COMMONWEALTH EIIJSON CONAGRA INC. CON lISON CO Nf lNC DART I. AFT INC. DAYlON HU11SON CORP 20.25 66.63 36.25 51.00 86.50 74.00 66.50 38.50 34.75 44.8B 35.75 62.00 50.50 o5.BE' 58.50 19.13 60.00 34.75 46.2 76.88 68.2; 64.00 36.00 34.50 39.75 31.13 57.75 49.63 61.!5 46.25 -10.!i -9.9 -4.1 -9. -10 -1.8 -b.6 -6.5 -0.7 -11.4 -12.9 -6.1 -1.7 -7.0 -20.0 AMERICAN EXPRESS AMEF.ICAN GENEF.AL COF.F AMER INTERNATIONAL BANK BOSTON COF.P BANAHEF.ICA BANKM'IEF.ICAN F.EALlY INV BANKEF.S TF.UST NY COF.r BAF.NETT BNK Of rLA BENEFICIAL COF.F CIGNA CNA FINANCIAL CORF CAFITAL HOLVING COEf CHASE HANH(ITTAN COF.F CHEMICAL NEW YDF.t CHURES TF. 70.13 44.38 141.00 40.63 18.75 34.25 51.BB 60.3L ;S5 77.25 75.00 39.75 49.75 56.25 78.13 59.75 40.88 135.25 38.75 13.31 32.00 46.BB 56.00 48.25 61.!i0 56.75 33.00 38.75 44.50 71.63 -14.8 -7.1 -4.1 -4.6 -29.0 -6.6 -9.6 -7.2 -12 7 -20.4 -24. -14.8 -22.1 -20.9 -8,; DEHOIT EllISON CO 19.38 17.38 -10!' CITICORP 6.1. ,; 53 80 -15.!. DOHINION RESOUF.CES 49.S 47.88 -!.8 CONTIENTAL COF.F 55 00 44.38 -19.3 DUt-.E rOWEF. CO 49.50 48.50 -!.O EDWI'F.IIS G f. SONS 31.00 2'5.00 -19.4 FPL GROUf INC 35.75 34.75 -2.5 fINANCIAL COf\F MF.IC 17.25 8. -50.0 FElRAHI) DEPT STORE 89.75 82.75 -7.B rIf\ST ,OSTON COF.F 62.75 47.25 -24.7 GENEF.AL CINEh 59.00 45.!J0 -22.9 FIF.ST CHICAGO COF.P 34.88 29.50 -15,11 GENEf\AI. MIllS INC 89.00 86.75 -2. 1ST INTEF.STATE IlANCORr 67.38 61.50 -8.7 GERBER PRODUCTS CO ).63 42./5 -25.8 rIF.ST PlNNA COf 9.;-; 7.b3 -21.8 1-r—-Mo-C-OfP,—,…f;i55c–1'i!)7!!—'l!——l!I..,-mNbHn1—-;.c,rg-..-rg—2-,—— HOUSTON IND. KELLOGG CO. LILLY ELI f. CO 34.e8 58.75 83.50 34.88 54.00 76.88 0.0 -8.1 -7.1 GF.EAT WESTEN FIN JOHN HANCOC INC SEC HOUSEHOU' INT'l INC. 48.2 17.!5 117.00 44 00 16.7 42.13 -8.8 -2.9 -10.4 LIMITED INC. LOWEb HAY ltEfT STOF.ES MEF.CANTILE STORES LO MERGt-. 1 CO INC MIDDLE SOUTH UTIL NIAGARA MOHAWK FOWE NOF.THEF.tl STATES HIE OHIO HilSON CO PACIFIC GAS 1 ELEC PEPSICO INC PFIZER INC PHILADELPHIA ELECT PHIUF HOPRIS INC PILLSBURY CO PUB 5ERV INDIANA PUPLIC SERV E & G OUAKER OATS CO F.ALSTON fUF.INA CO REYNOLDS J INIS SARA LEE COF.F SCHERING FLOUGH INC SHITHLINE DECKMAN STHI\N CALIF EDISON SOUTHEF.N CO 34.25 41.0 44.11 117.00 10ll.8 14.38 25.50 38,00 20.75 2;.75 35,62 7.88 2!.88 76.88 82.38 13.50 44.25 84.7!i 77.00 55.13 7.1,6! 8B.00 105,38 35.88 26.13 30.63 30.00 36.50 106.50 106.00 13.00 23.00 38.00 20.00 2;,25 31,75 66,00 22.7 72.00 75.00 13.00 42.88 8!.00 71.2 2.7; 68.63 BJ,OO 9! 00 33,00 24.75 -10.6 -27,7 -17.3 -9.0 -0.4 -9.6 -9.8 D.O -2.6 -1.9 -10.4 -9.4 -0.; -b.3 -9,0 -3.7 -3.1 -3.2 -7.5 -4.3 -6.6 -5.7 -11.7 -!.4 -5.3 HUTTON E,F. 6f\OUF INHF.CAFITAL INC S!;'C INTEF.FIRSl Ol.F JEFFEF.50N FILOT COf LEHHAN CUF LINCOLN NATIONAL COF.F LOMAS & NETTLETON H!(, !1ANUFACTUF.CS HANO'JEF. HASS I1UTUAL INC INV Hf.LLON MEF.F.ILL LYNCH MONT60MEF.Y SH. INC SEC MONY MOf\lGAGE INVST HOF.GAN JF CO NCNfI t-IOl\THWE5T BANCOF.F FAINE WEflBEF. TES COMHEFCE BANt-. TF.ANSAHEI\lU. COhf' TF.AVEl.EF.S CORf' rfl-CONTINENTAL CORF U S FIG COF.FOATION USLIFE CORF WELLS FAf.GO HTG SAFEeO 44.13 !4.50 10.63 40.50 16.5 62.75 34.00 57.75 13.75 72,;0 43.3 23.13 9 88 90,,18 5.;( 40.50 44.75 28.88 40.13 !l,O 30.63 46 75 49.50 28 50 60.63 36.50 !3.88 5.18 .14.;0 15.7 ;3.8 32.13 44.25 12.38 ,9.15 34.00 22,13 0,50 87,88 48.25 38.;0 34.l3 17.5 35.13 4.-; JO.38 39.13 42.75 26 62 56.00 -17,3 -2.6 -491 -14.8 -3.1 -14.9 -5,; -23.4 -2.7 -17.' -!!.1 -4 .1 -J.8 -3.3 -13 1 -49 -!3.7 -40.3 -12.; -3.9 -0.8 -16,3 -13.6 '6.6 -76 SOUIBII COflP STERLING lI\UG INC SYNTEX 1'1.50 49.88 72.75 116.50 48.'0 67..' -4.1 -2,8 -7. ST PAUL AVERAGE 54.06 41.75 -!.8 -13,13 TEXAS UTILITIES CO TOYS-F.-US 3;.25 34.4! 33.25 31.88 -5.7 -7.4 UF'JOHN CO WAF.NEF.-LAHBERT CO 103.75 63.13 87.00 -16.1 58.88 -6.7 WRIGLEY j'l; JF. CO ZAYR CORr PRICE CO. 46.50 43.88 5S.71 43.75 36.00 40.50 -5.9 -17.9 -27.4 AVERAGE -8.0 The left-hand list above conSIsts of S & P 500 Issues m the Food. Drug. Retail. Tobacco and Electric Utility categories. showing theIr 1986 highs, their highs as of Wednesday, and the percentage change. The average-decline is 8 verses 6.8 for the S & P, relatively good performance since each stock is being measured against its yearly high. 33 of the 67 stocks have declined less than the S & P. However, Financial components of the 500. leaders through mId-summer. have shown considerably poorer recent action. The average decline for these stocks (brokerage issues are included). as shown by the right hand list. IS 13.8. Also only 19 of the 58 issues have performed better than the average. Clearly, It seems to us, thIS process of narrowing leadership must be reversed if current price levels are to be supported. AWTvfl Dow Jones Industrials S & P 500 Cumulative Index (July 31, 1986) 1777.56 236.62 3008.08 ANTHONY W. TABELL DELAFIELD, HARVEY, TABELL, INC. No statement or expression of opinion or any olhe' maIler tmrem contained IS or IS 10 be deemed 10 be directlY or mdlrectly an oller or tne sollc.tatlon of an oller to buy or sell any secunly referred 10 or mentioned The maller IS preented merely for tl'1o convenience of Ine SUbscriber While we beltee Ihe sources of our mformatlon to be reliable we In noway representor guarantee the accuracy hercol nor of !he statements made herem Any aCIlon to be taken by the subSCriber should be based on hiS own Investigation and mformal10n Delafield, Harvey, Tabell Inc, as a corporation and lIS officers or employees may now have, or may later take positions or \fades m respect to any seCUrities mentioned m thiS or anv future Issue, and such pOSI\lon may be different Irom a'ly views now or hereafter expressed m thiS Of any othellssue Delafteld Harvey Tabell Inc \,h.ch Is registered With Ihe SECas an mvestmenl adVisor may give advice to Its ,nvestment adVisory and olher customers mdependenHy 01 any slalements made rn thiS or In any other ISSue Further Information on any securrty mentioned herem IS available on request -.