'! TABELL'S MARKET LETTER 600 ALEXANDER ROAD, CN 5209, PRINCETON, NEW JERSEY 08543-5209 MEMBER NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE, INC MEMBER NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF SECURITIES DEALERS, INC (609) 987-2300 June 3, 1988 -Ple, sun whJ-ch.,.J!nallyshone-on theEstern…seaboard.Jast..weeK..–.aimed–a…Jewrayliat….the..market , and Tuesday's 'and Wednesday's trading produced-a 107-poin't Jump in the Dow, The ris';–took' place,' , moreover. on volume which exceeded 200 million shares on both days. Tuesday's tradIng activity achieving the second highest level of 1988. Before allowing joy to become totally unconfined about all this, a few reservations must be noted. We need. first of all, to reiterate our customary warning regarding the measurement of market moves In Dow points. One hundred points, these days, is a bit over 5. non-trivial to be sure, but not of transcendent significance. Volume figures. moreover, are being distorted by that latest plague visIted upon technicians by the gods of the marketplace, the dividend capture. In terms of price. aU that the rise has achIeved. essentially. is the retracement of an earlier decline of an equal amount which simply took a little bit longer. the 15-day drop which brought the average from 2058,36 on May 3 to 1941.48 on May 23, a level which ended the sequence of higher short-term lows which had characterized the market in 1988 so far. Indeed, if encouragement is to be drawn from the market's behavior over the past two weeks, it is probably more appropriate to base it on what the market did not do, rather than on what it did. As suggested above, the low attained on May 23 actually constituted a short-term downside breakout, and, in the most simple-minded sort of chart-reading terms, suggested lower prices. However, short-term breakouts during 1988, both on the upside and the downside, have tended to be false ones. The downSIde break of a fortnight ago.fitted the mold, as the market stabilized and then put on its mini-explosion this week. Before the Dow moved out of new low territory on May 23. a fair number of stocks were flIrting with lows which. if violated. would have produced some fairly ominous downside targets. Thus it IS our feeling that the best thing the rally has achieved so far IS to cause many stocks to pull away from fairly important trading-range lows. Before leaving the subject of breakouts, it is necessary to note that the Dow's ability to move above 1960 this week constituted yet another small-scale upside penetration. At this writing. this – I,…… has ,engender,ed.Jlo.oillorethan.ajy,picall9J!jLlack..of..follow-1hr.ough .with.er.age–pulling–blcl;- from its newly-won heights in Thursday's trading. It is difficult for a technician, in discussing indicator action for recent weeks. not to mention current levels of market sentiment. One of the most widely used measures of sentiment over the past couple of decades, has been the series compIled by Investors Intelligence, which measures the percentage of bullish and bearish market advisors. We poor wretches, it must be blushingly admitted, tend, collectively, to be sadly wrong at major-market turning points, turning bearish at lows and bullish at highs. The latest figures, as of May 27, just before the 107-point rise, saw only 19.8 of all advisors bullish and a whopping 54,9 classifled as bearish, There have been only nine prior periods over the past 25 years during which the number of bulllsh advisors was this low. and the present is only the seventeenth instance of an interval when bearish prognosticators were so prevalent. Again, it is necessary to express reservations. These figures, like senbment indicators in general, tend to be useful as measures of market background rather than tools for precise timing. Although there are few prior instances where bullishness has been as rare, or pessimIsm as common, as is the case today. these intervals have often lasted for months, whereas in the present case there has been but a single weekly observation. Furthermore, while periods of bearIsh sentiment regularly occur around market lows, there are frequently numerous repetitions of such periods. starting, quite often, well before the lows are reached. Thus, their significance tends to be longer term rather than immediate. WIth pessimism abounding. we confess to hearIng a distant siren song—one trying to lure us toward an optimistic stance on the theory that Armageddon seldom arrives widely heralded. We devoted this space a few weeks ago to trying to fathom what might turn out to be the ultimate significance of October, 1987. The universal tendency among market observers has been to assume that this cataclysm, by many measures the steepest drop in recorded history, must assuredly portend something for the future—in .. all … probability something rather unpleasant.,.. We 'have heard nowhere ….— …….—the sort of heresy against conventional wisdom suggesting that the collapse may possess no long-term SIgnificance whatsoever. If this is the case, a market rally, probably one much greater than even today's tiny coterie of bulls expects, might well emerge—and perhaps rather suddenly. We rush to note that the above constitutes only an observation, not a forecast. In the dull market climate of 1988 so far, nothing has emerged. in our view. to push a market observer into an unqualified bearish or bullish stance. For this to happen, there would have to be some manifestation of momentum in one direction or the other. It may be. however, that an interesting market atmosphere is slowly beginning to build. AWT'ebh Dow ,Jones Industrials (12 00) S & P 500 (1200) Cumulative Index (6/2/88) 2058.85 264.51 3746.04 ANTHONY W. TAB ELL DELAFIELD, HARVEY, TABELL INC. No statement or expression of oplnton or any other matter herem contained IS, or IS to be deemed to be, directly or Indirectly, an ofter or the soliCitation of an offer to buy or sell any secUrity referred 10 or mentioned The matter IS presented merely for the convenience of the subscnber While we believe the sources of our Information to be reliable, we In no way represent or guaranlee the accuracy thereof nor of the statements made herein Any acllon to be taken by the subSCriber should be based on hiS own mvestlgallon and If'Iforma\!on Delafield, Harvey, Tabellinc ,as a corporation and ItS officers or employees, may now have or may later take, positions or trades In respect to any securrtles mentioned In thiS or any future Issue, and such pOSition may be different from any views now or hereafter expressed m thiS or any other Issue Delafield, Harvey, Tabellinc , which IS registered With the SEC as an Investment adVisor, may give adVice to Its mvestment adVisory and other customers mdependently of any statements made In thIS or In any other Issue Further miormatlOfl on any securrty menllOned herern IS available on request

TABELL'S MARKET LETTER 600 ALEXANDER ROAD, CN 5209, PRINCETON, NEW JERSEY 08543-5209 MEMBER NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE, INC MEMBER NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF SECURITIES DEALERS, INC 1609) 987-2300 June 10, 1988 W..!L l!icLinJatw.eek's ..-Jetter.-.. if-'o-encouragement…is ..to ..be,-dra wo,…fxom … themarkets …behav.ior over the past two weeks, it is probably more appropriate to base it on what the market did not do, rather than on what it did fl Following this week's continued upside action, it is necessary to temper that encouragement by again noting that the market. so far, at least, has not done what it might have. Let us drag that by one more time. It is no news that the market averages have, since last October, generally been contained in more-or-Iess lateral trading ranges. What is somewhat unusual is the extent to which many major stocks reflect that pattern, including sixteen of the thirty DJIA components which we shall be discussing below. A week ago. we were suggesting that, as the market reached short-term lows at the end of May, many stocks were close to falling out of these trading ranges on the downside, events which, had they become widespread, would hardly have brightened market prospects. The advance, as it continued through this week, seemed like a mirror image of the previous decline, in that, to date in any case, upside penetrations have failed to take place. It is true that. in the case of the averages. marginal post-crash highs were scored. The Dow achieved a new intra-day peak on Wednesday, but not a new high close—an accomplishment the S & p 500 and the NASDAQ Industrials managed to achieve. At this writing. however, none of this has yet produced significant follow-through, anymore than did the whole succession of minor new peaks which the averages have served up during 1988 so far. The tale of the once-more-traversed trading ranges by major issues can be exemplified by the action of the sixteen Dow components in the table below. The first column gives each issue's October low followed by the upper and lower limits of the trading range which followed the rebound from that low and which continues to date. Next shown is the May low and the percentile of that figure within the trading range. (This statistic measures the stock's relative position in the range. A low number indicates the price is near the range's bottom, and a high number, near 100, shows a level in the upper part of the range.) The same procedure is then applied to the high of this Wednesday. .. . Stock Subsequent Oct. Low Trading Range May Low June 8 Percentile High Percentile Allied-Signal 27 Aluminum Co. of America 33 3/4 American Express 20 3/4 AT & T 23 Coca-Cola 29 Du Pont 75 General Electric 39 IBM 102 McDonald's 31 3/8 Merck & Co. 49 Minnesota Mining & Manufact. 45 Philip Morris 77 118 Procter & Gamble 60 Sears 26 Union CarbIde 15 1/2 Westinghouse 40 38 1/2 – 26 1/8 51 1/8 – 38 5/8 29 3/8 – 20 3/4 30 1/4 – 25 1/2 43 3/4 – 35 94 3/8 – 76 1/2 51 – 38 3/8 121 5/8 – 105 518 48 – 39 1/4 63 3/8 – 48 67 1/2 – 55 114 96 3/8 – 81 89 1/2 – 76 3/4 39 7/8 – 29 3/4 25 5/8 – 18 5/8 55 7/8 – 40 1/4 30 7/8 43 1/8 23 25 3/4 35 1/4 79 1/8 38 3/8 107 112 41 7/8 48 7/8 56 7/8 80 1/2 70 3/4 33 17 49 3/4 38 36 26 5 3 15 0 12 30 6 13 — — 32 — 58 34 1/4 50 1/2 27 1/4 27 1/2 39 1/4 87 43 3/4 116 7/8 45 3/8 56 114 64 1/4 87 118 78 36 318 20 1/8 54 1/2 65 95 75 42 49 59 43 69 70 54 73 40 10 65 21 91 As the table shows, back in May, six stocks had either penetrated their previous lows by a fraction or were within 10 percent of doing so. Almost all stocks had retreated to the lower third of their respective formations. At this week's high, by contrast, most issues had returned to somewhere well above the mid-point of the ranges involved. It is important to emphasize that, in our view, these trading ranges, remain significant andthat, when a significant-number'-of confirmed— breakouts emerge, an important clue as to the market's course will have been provided. It may be worthwhile to indicate why the fourteen remaining Dow components do not find themselves in the above table. Bethlehem Steel, Boeing, Texaco, and Woolworth have all managed to move above their 1987 highs. General Motors and Goodyear have. like these four, produced important uptrends. but are now approaching heavy overhead supplY4 Chevron. Exxon. International Paper. and USX Corp have already penetrated post-October trading ranges and appear headed for higher levels. Eastman Kodak. Primerica, and United Technologies seem to be in ongoing downtrends rather than in base areas. and Navistar is too low-priced to be of significance. AWTebh Dow Jones Industrials (12 00) S & P 500 0200) Cumulative Index (6/9/88) 2105.79 270.76 3832.01 ANTHONY W. T ABELL DELAFIELD, HARVEY, TABELL INC. No statement or toor mentioned expression 01 The mathter IS opp,riensioennoerdamnyroethefrmrahtteryhOereiIncIont;altekIS,UobysISg;lbbSeebdscTr'eldet0hbboeul;ddebreeeIbtaseurldrncdoelnrsehcoiStflyouwarnnInoinfiofveremrsoatritg\ihoaentisotoonlblacenlladrelliloniafnboolremla, nawtoeioifnIenrlnDooebwlua'af)i'eyOldrfes,peHr\ea1sNaeenn'y)t',osTeraCgblu.Jearllrlt'ajInnretcele,eHateshcea\ cadInoicfvfrceepursoretramnactteyifonrtonthmaeadrnaVednIoSyf1O1nv5roiyoerfawfoniscfdetneroosslwhoteroarercemhumepsretleoonaymfesteeemrrsse,aIxmnpedraeeyspsnreeondwde'hna,'v,yhe0,,ooarrnmaiynaYsy,Oala',ehtmeerreIlnadsks,es,UPgasd;tlnhfdloOtraeersyhefrIsIsIeIZFnuhrstIhSeecrrueIrgnitlfsieolesrmremadelloWnnllitohonntehdaenISynEsthCeiScausorriatyannmIynevfnuetlsuiolrmneeeIdsnsthauederv,elasinnodrIS, smauvacayhIlgapibovelseitaioodnnvircmeeqau1y0ebslIest

TABELL'S MARKET LETTER 600 ALEXANDER ROAD, CN 5209, PRINCETON, NEW JERSEY 08543-5209 MEMBER NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE, INC MEMBER NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF SECURITIES DEALERS, INC 609) 987-2300 June 17, 1988 …..- r-I —-'I'-his-week's…majormarketev.entwlls1988'stourth .repet.ition of.the oc,,!,nc.eofta.n-epwi';e-!.!'- hIgh for the Dow Jones Industrial Average. Exuberance regarding 'this news is I ., best restrained, since the immediate aftermath of the three previous occurrences was that the market immediately turned around and went back down. It is probably worthwhile looking at what has occurred since last October in some detail, and the following table may be useful as background. It applies a 5 filter to each DJIA close since Meltdown Monday. 11 – —–l-a.t.e——- October 19 19B7 October 21 1987 October 26 1987 NovelTlber 2 1987 lecelTlbe r 4 1987 JanlJar 7 1988 JanlJar 20 1988 March 18 1988 March 30 1988 Ap T' 11 12 1988 May 23 1988 June 15 1988 Dow-JotlE'S AI,IE'rC'e ——-1738.74 2027.85 1793.93 2014.09 1766.74 2051.8 Q 187'9.14 2087.37 1978.12 2110.08 1941.48 2131.40 Percent -C-h-a-n-'1.p.- 0.00 16.63 -11.54 12.27 -12.28 16.14 -8.42 11.08 -5.21 6.67 -7.99 9.78 tIJnlber Of Days Th1S SWlns ———- -C-UR..IU-l-a-t-lv–e 00 22 3 5 10 23 33 2 55 9 64 41 10 8 113 8 121 29 150 16 166 Action from October 19th through December 4th essentially consisted of the market's ,a down from the shock set in motion by the crash, much as a pendulum winds down after being to one extreme or the other. After ten highly volatile davs through November 2nd, the Dow ,, then I–f—.res()l.v., ed. itself.intoa23day,…12declineto1766. 7oj. on 4th nf .1, .t ILiB now apparent that this was an initial successful test of the October 19th low. The rest of the table shows what has happened since. Four rallies, each achieving a new high, have taken place — December 4th – January 7th, January 20th – March 18th, March 30th – April 12th and May 23rd – June 15th. So far, each of these advances has terminated with 2 – 3 successive days on which a new peak was scored followed by a noticeable pullback. There are a number of ways we can view this history. One is in terms of market breadth, a statistic not normally useful at bottoms, but one which may have some relevance in the current instance. The most important factor to be noted is that our daily breadth index reached its high on March 17th, the next-to-last day of the second of the four upswings. Two subsequent highs — in April and this week — have seen a failure on the part of breadth to confirm. We hasten to note that we do not think it proper to interpret this phenomenon in the same way one would at a market top. We do not, in other words, see it as presaging a major decline. This weak breadth action can, however, be cited as inconsistent with the hypothesis of a major bottom. Such bottoms in the past have regularly produced new breadth highs on most short-term upswings — often well in advance of the Dow itself. For whatever it IS worth, the downward-sloping cumulative breadth line seems to be the product of increasingly severe declines rather than weaker advances. The four advancing phases since December 4th have produced, respectively, 6,109, 7,591, 2,297 and 4,816 net advances. There is little pattern here but, by contrast, the three declining episodes brought forth 1,306 net declines in January, 2,540 in March and 5,026 in April – May. In volume terms, the four rising periods were similar, averaging between 178 and 186 million shares traded. The declines have shown lessening volume. 165 million average shares in January vis-a-vis 154 million in April and May. It is not clear, of course, to what extent these figures are distorted by dividend captures, but in any case, they provide little in the way of sustenance for either the bullishor bearish argument. .- – – There is little in these numbers to change our basic opinion that the market glass may be viewed as either half-empty or half-full, depending on one's own optimism quotient. However, to the extent this sort of backing and filling continues, it would tend to pull us in the direction of optimism. Successive new highs, even with no follow-through, cannot, it seems to us, be viewed as beariSh. The more that relatively flat trading continues, the more stocks will build bases sufficient to penetrate the overhead supply, and the more existing bases will be broadened. This process may continue for some time, but it could eventually lead to a reasonably decent rally, enough of a rally to provide, minimally, a test of the previous highs. More precise definition as to timing and as to how all this fits into the long-term picture must, it seems to us, await the accumulation of further evidence. AWTlt Dow Jones Industrials 0200) S & P 500 (1200) Cumulative Index (6116/88) 2096.02 270.45 3861.42 ANTHONY W. TABELL DELAFIELD, HARVEY, TAB ELL INC. No statement or expressIOn of opinion or any other matter herein contatned IS, or IS to be deemed to be, directly or indirectly, an offer Of the sohcltahon of an offer to buy or sell any security referred to or mentIOned The matter IS presented merely for the convenience of the subscnber While we believe the sources of our Information to be reliable, we In no way represent or guarantee the accuracy thereof nor of the statements made herein Any action to be taken by the subSCriber should be based on hiS own investigation and information Delafield, Harvey, Tabetllnc , as a corporation and ItS officers or emptoyees, may now have, or may later take, pOSitIons or trades In respect to any secUrities mentioned In thiS or any future Issue, and such positIon may be drfferent from any VieWS now or hereafter expressed In thiS or any other Issue Delafield, Harvey, Tabetllnc, which IS regIstered WIth the SEC as an Ilwestment adVisor, may give advice to ItS mveslment adVISOry and other customers Independentty of any statements made In this or In any other Issue Further Information on any security mentioned herein IS available on request

TABELL'S MARKET LETTER 600 ALEXANDER ROAD, eN 5209, P,F1II'1RETON, NEW JERSEY 08543-5209 MEMBER NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE, INC MEMBER NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF SECURITIES DEALERS, INC (609) 987-2300 – June 24, 1988 .- —-, '-James torie;-not…a;great–believer i&.th e ef-ficacy….of-'- either technicaL.analy,sis , oo)r' '' .l conventional investment management, has suggested that the most useful task performed by the investment counselor involved the determination of his clientts risk aversion. Needless to say. we disagree with Professor Lorie on a large number of issues. but we think that here he may have a point. Determining risk aversion is a complex task. often involving the necessity of deciding what one fears the most at a given time. In the uncertain markets of 1988 so far, it may well be fear as much as forecast which determines appropriate investment policy, Most of today's fears about the market and the economy tend to be cosmlC ones and can still, essentially, be summarized by the simple word 111929. This remains true despite the fact that the uncannily exact parallels between 1987 – 1988 and 1929 – 1930 have eroded over the past couple of months, We presented this history in detail in this space on May 6. The November, 1929 – April, 1930 rally peaked out 32 weeks after the 1929 high and, for so long as the last 1988 post-crash high occurred on April 12, 33 weeks after August 1987, the similarities between the two markets were striking. Now that, 44 weeks after last August, new highs are still being aChieved, a marked disparity begins to emerge. If retracement of the 1930 pattern had continued, the DJIA, around this time, would be selling for about 1550. This is, of course, all well and good but no one has seriously made the claim that forecasting 1988 action ought be as simple as overlaying it with a 1930 chart. Today's economic similarities to the 1920's and 1930's, the pessimist argues. are conspicuous enough to give one pause. Such comparisons often tend to be made in terms of long-cycle or Kondratieff-wave theory. This sort of analysis suggests that presently, as in the 1930's, the natural dynamics of a capitalist economy require an extended period of economic contraction. For those persuaded by this view, it is not hard to find flaws in the current U,S, 1–I-'—ec6fl6mie-scene -fr n. .tt bail out just about the entire savings industry of the state of Texas, A look at the loan portfolios of money-center banks does not suggest that the underlying affliction which has brought us to these straits is one restricted to unsophisticated country bumpkins running small SilL's. There is likewise the possibility. if one is so inclined, to find fault with the present state of our own securities industry. Much of its efforts, rather than financing additional productive capacity, appear. in the eyes of many observers, to involve nothing more than the shuffling of pieces of paper, The results of such shuffling tend to be increasingly creative financing schemes which produce not additional bricks and mortar but additional balance-sheet leverage. To the extent that one is totally paralyzed by these apocalyptic visions, the proscription is fairly simple. It is to step aside from the equity market and hope to find vindication as a house built upon the rock resists the buffeting storm. There is only one small problem. The Chicken Littles have been abroad for some time now. and the sky is still up there. The market of the 1930's, as the collapse became evident. plunged to new lows. Today, we have a market Which, however tentatively, is making new highs. In what is essentially a modern development, a rising stock market can become a source of fear, fear of underperformance on the part of institutional money managers. As the talk increasingly turns to summer rallies and election years, those managers with excessive cash—and the figures suggest there are not a few of these—may find themselves becoming increasingly uncomfortable. Should this discomfort become great enough to cause the sort of stampede familiar from 1982 and 1984, the upside results could be impressive. We said above that current policy is perhaps appropriately determined today by fear as much as by forecast. and there is no forecast implied in any of the above. As we have been noting repeatedly, we.have..-seen.. in.technical work -so.farho evidence,..thatr' about to deviate immediately from its current pattern involving a slightly-upwardly-biased trading range. It seems to us, however, the investor should be thinking ahead as to what his stance might be if further technical improvement materializes. ANTHONY W. TABELL DELAFIELD, HARVEY. TABELL INC. AWTebh Dow Jones Industrials (1200) S & P 500 (12 00) Cumulative Index (6/23/88) 2151.49 273.70 3899.64 No statement or expression 01 opinIOn or any other matler herem contained IS, or IS 10 be deemed to be, directly or indirectly, an offer or the solicrta1lOn of an offer to buy or sell any security referred to or mentioned The matter IS presented merely for the convenience of the subscnber While we believe the sources 01 our InformallOn \0 be reliable, we In no way represent or guarantee the accuracy thereof nor of the statements made herein Any action to be taken by the subScriber should be based on hiS own Investigation and mformallOn Delafield, Harvey, Tabelllnc, as a corporation and ItS officers or employees, may now have, or may later take, positions or trades In respect to any securrlles mentIOned In thiS or any future ISsue and such posrtlOn may be secdlfterent from any views now or hereaNer expressed In thiS or any other Issue Delafield, Harvey, Tabellinc , which IS registered wrth Ihe as an Investment adVisor, may give adVice 10 lIs Investment adVISOry and other customers Independently of any statements made In thiS or In any other Issue Further mformatlon on any secunty mentioned herein IS available on request