Viewing Month: May 1979

Tabell’s Market Letter – May 04, 1979

Tabell’s Market Letter – May 04, 1979

Tabell's Market Letter - May 04, 1979
View Text Version (OCR)

I TABELL'S MARKET LETTER 909 STATE ROAD, PRINCETON, NEW JERSEY 08540 DIVISION OF MEMBER NEW YORK STOCK eXCHANGE, INC MEMBER AMERICAN STOCK eXCHANGE – — …..-.. –, ..-. ………. '1 – .- , – -,,–;;;-.,..,. .-, ' – – , ……… …. 4 …- ,……. , May 4, 1979 There exists an old story about some Oriental entrepot, where a flourishing market developed in boatloads of canned sardines. These sardines were traded back and forth at ever-increasing and more widely fluctuating prices among various participants. One day, a buyer, more curious than most, decided to inspect his purchase, and opened a can of his sardines, which turned out to be totally rotten, whereupon he complained loudly to the seller. The response was, You fool, those aren't eating sardines; they're trading sardines. The story, of course, is intended to illustrate the difference between intrinsic and market value. The former derives from economic utility. The latter is simply a function of what buyers are willing to pay for a given good. An extension of the trading-sardine concept is the greater-fool theory. Under this theory, it makes sense to be fool enough to buy an item at an inflated price, if one expects to find a greater fool who will take it off one's hands at an even higher price. The existence of such a phenomenon as the sardine market described above depends on the availability of a sufficiently large group of greater fools. Trading sardines, as opposed to eating sardines, exist in almost all times and places, and an interesting question is, What are today's trading sardines There have been times in the past, of course, when common stocks took on many of the necessary attributes. Not totally, of course, since most equities usually possess some residue of intrinsic value. How- ever, market prices have, on occasion, become so unrelated to that value that the prices could be sustsined only by the continued existence of large numbers of purchasers who con- tinue to.gelugEl,.tlWll!l!lIXes, theory, …,.. 1 1929, certsinly, was an example or-such a case, and it is arguable that the prices of many growth stocks in the early 1970's constituted a similar example. The denouement in such in- stances is, of course, inevitable. It would be hard to sustsin the argument, however, that common stocks possess these attributes today. We see, indeed, in the raft of corporate takeovers, probably the unique financial phenomenon of the past couple of years, evidence that precisely the opposite may, in fact, be the case. The corporate acquisitor is manifestly interested in the real economic value, as opposed to the market value of a given enterprise. He is, in other words, interested in eating sardines, rather than trading sardines. Unless large numbers of corporate bidders are collectively stupid, the market value of many stocks today is significantly belOW their value to buyers as ongoing enterprises. Where, then, do today's trading sardines exist In light of the relatively poor record of conventional investment media over the past decade, many advisors have, of late, been touting the merits of some relatively arcane commodities as havens for investment funds. Gold, of course, has had its adherents for years, nay, even centuries, but creative imaginations these days are soaring far beyond the hoary barbarous relic. Diamonds, for example, to judge the proliferation of advertisements and the emergence of a group of questionable dealers, are apparently attracting increasing interest. All manner of so-called collectibles are coming to the fore, including a number with some rationale, such as Chinese porcelsin and Impression- ist psintings, and an equally large number w.hich make no sense whatsoever, i.e., Mickey Mouse watches. Now, in discussing the investment merits of these items, one can get sidetracked into' all' sorts of peripheral questions, involving scarcity, aesthetics, etc., etc., and there is insufficient space to get involved in these here. It is, however, we think, obvious that the price of many such items depends upon the existence of buyers, rather than a real economic usefulness. Some exotic investment media have done extremely well in the past; indeed, over fsirly protracted periods in the past. They may continue to do so in the future. We will, however, confess to our own old-fashioned prejudice for investments where an economic rationale for current pricing apparently exists. Dow-Jones Industrials (12 00 p.m.) S & P Composite (1200 p.m.) Cumulative Index (5/3/79) 855.60 101.65 748.88 ANTHONY W. TAB ELL DELAFIELD, HARVEY, TABELL AWT ld No statement or expreulon of opinion or any olher moiler herein contolned IS, or IS fa be deemed 10 be, directly or mdlrectly. on offer Of the solicitation of on offer 10 buy or sell any security referred to or mentIoned The moiler IS presented merely for the convePlenC!l of the subscrIber While we believe the sources of our Informo tlon to be rehoble, we In no woy represent or guarantee the accuracy thereof nor of the statements m..,de herein Any actIon to be token by the subSCriber shOUld be based on hIS own investigatIon and Information Janney Montgomery Scali, Inc, as a corporatIon, and Its offIcers or employees, may now hove, or may later toke, poslteon! or trades In respect 10 any secuntles mentioned In thIS or any future Issue, ond such posItIon moy be dIfferent from any views now or hereafter expressed In th'5 or any other Issue Janney Montgomery Scott, Inc, which 15 registered wl,h the SEC as on Investment adVIsor, may give adVICe 10 liS Investment adVISOry and othel customers Independently of any statements made 10 th.s or In any other .uue Further tnformatlon on any secunty mentioned hereIn IS avalloble on request

Download PDF

Tabell’s Market Letter – May 11, 1979

Tabell’s Market Letter – May 11, 1979

Tabell's Market Letter - May 11, 1979
View Text Version (OCR)

– – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – — —- r TABELL'S MARKET LETTER 909 STATE ROAD, PRINCETON, NEW JERSEY OB540 DIVISION OF MEMBER NEW YORK STOCK eXCHANGe. INC MEMBER AMERICAN STOCI( EXCHANGE May 11, 1979 -h!', … … ….—…… -.!.,-oo '-!..—- As May-June, not always one of the best periods for the stock market, approaches this year, the major averages have embarked on yet another instance where a trend apparently in effect has failed to follow through. The Dow reached a closing high at 877.60 back in early April and, after another attempt at that high at the end of that month, broke sharply to close at 833.42 on May 7th, a day on which more than 1,400 issues declined. Further lows were posted on heavy volume on Thursday and early Friday. The weakness was all the more disappointing, in that it occurred shortly after the index had penetrated its previous minor-trend high of 859.75 scored ll\st January, thus establishing an upswing of intermediate-term proportions. To date, however, the technical damage cannot be said to be serious. So far, the two previous benchmark lows, 807.00 on February 27th and 785.26 on November 14th, remain intact. At the moment, technical evidence does not appear to suggest a downside penetration of either of these lows, with the most plausible targets for the Industrials centering around the 820 area. Were either of the two nadirs mentioned above to be penetrated, so the conventional wisdom runs, the stage would be set for an attack on, and possible penetration of, the starting low for the whole upswing, the one scored on February 28, 1978, at 742.12. Many of our col- leagues suggest the likelihood of just such an event, preferring to call the entire process that began in February, 1978 a bear market rally within the context of a downswing that began at over 1000 on the Dow in 1976. There exists, we are prepared to admit, some evidence in favor – -of sucha case we-have-, failed — bearish evidence so adduced is couched in terms of the familiar four-year cycle, and it is inter- esting that the time appears to be running out on this argument, thus, perhaps, accounting for some of the nervous stridency of those of bearish persuasion. The cycle referred to, it will be recalled, runs from trough to trough, and its average length in the post-World-War-II period has been slightly more than four years (51 months). If one looks at the entire twentieth century, the average length becomes a good deal shorter, 42.3 months to be precise. The central argument, still not fully resolved, hinges on whether or not February, 1978 constituted a low in terms of this cycle. Since the previous low point (OctoberDecember, 1974) is known, a February, 1978 cycle low would mean a cycle length of 40-42 months, a length, it is regularly noted, unprecedented in the past 35 years, but, it is less regularly noted, not at all unusual if one takes the longer view. The alternate theory, that the low is yet to be seen, now finds itself running up against a time deadline. The longest cycle on record in the twentieth century is 60 months, and that length from the fall of 1974 takes us, of course, to the fall of this year. Believers in this theory, therefore, need substantial weakness, and need it in a hurry, in order to prove their case. Now, such a phenomenon as the four-year cycle is as much a theoretically interesting device as a practical one, and there exist, we will be the first to admit, complexities in the present case. A great many of these complexities center around the absence of a benchmark low, comparable to February, 1978, for most broad-based indices, which have essentially been in an upswing since the 1974 lows, at least through last September, and, in the case of the American Stock Exchange Index, until just recently. Nonetheless, we have been able to resist the rally-in-a-bear -market interpretation of the period since February, 1978, and the passage of time, we suspect, will make such resistance still easier. Dow-Jones Industrials (12 00 p. m.) S & P Composite (1200 p.m.) Cumulative Index (5/10179) 829.78 98.46 718.58 ANTHONY W. T ABELL DELAFIELD, HARVEY, TABELL AWTld No statement or expression of opinion or any other matter here'n contOlned Il, or IS 10 be deemed to be, directly or Indirectly, on offer or the soliCitation of of offer hI' Idb'to buy or sell ony security referred 10 or mentioned The motter IS presented merely for the COfWel'lenCI9 of the han to be reliable we In no way represent or guoronlee the accuracy thereof nor of Ihe statements m….de herein While we believe Any action to be toh.en y t heousurbssconfbeoru,rs t au t k e based on hiS own'lnvestlgotlon positions or trades In respect to and Information Janney Montgomery ony securlhes menllaned In thiS or ony Scott, future Inc, as a Issue, and corporation, and Its offtcers or such pOSition may be different employees, may from any views now now ohrOhee,reoarf/meray a er 19, thin Ih,s or any olher Issue Janney Montgomery cott, Inc, whICh IS reglslered With Ihe SEC as on Investment adVisor, may give adVice to It Investment a VISOryt on a 191 customers Independently of any statements mode In Hus or In any other Issue Further Information on any seo,lIIly mentioned herein IS available on reques

Download PDF

Tabell’s Market Letter – May 18, 1979

Tabell’s Market Letter – May 18, 1979

Tabell's Market Letter - May 18, 1979
View Text Version (OCR)

TABELL'S MARKET LETTER 909 STATE ROAD, PRINCETON, NEW JERSEY 08540 DIVISION OF MEMBER NEW VORk STOCk EXCHANGE, INC MEMBER AMERICAN STOCI( eXCHANGE -\ May 18, 1979 – – commented on the rather obviOus downtrend phase'; which, we now know by hindsight, began at the early April high of 877.60 on the Dow. We went on to suggest that the April-May weakness, while it constituted a somewhat disappointing development, did not appear to have an unduly serious downside potential, and we mentioned 'that the most plausible downside targets appeared to center around the 820 level on the Industrial Average. That low was approached, if not actually reached, in this week's trading. A closing bottom for the move was chalked up on Monday with a final posting of 825.02. Tuesday and Wednesday showed somewhat better closing figures, but intraday lows around 821 were attained on both days. While all this was going on, most short-term oscillators were approaching reasonably deep oversold territory. Short-term indicators based on percentage change and on advances and declines both reached oversold conditions comparable to those attained in mid-February, suggesting that the recent declining phase may well turn out to be of approximately the same magnitude as that correction. The February decline, it will be recalled, took the Dow roughly from 860 to 800 over about a four-week period. With downside objectives having been reached and an oversold condition having been attained, the market posted a fairly dynamic Thursday rally, moving up over 14 points to close at 842.95 with prices gradually improving during the day. Quite obviously, with short-term lows having been made this week, no base supporting a meaningful advance now exists. The rally, however, — We are inclined to think this to be the case, and, if it is true, it is worth reminding ourselves of a market axiom — that it is the character of short-term rallies within an uptrend that suggests the deterioration or lack of deterioration within that uptrend. As we noted last week, a good deal of the April-May disappointment stems from the fact that a new high for the move from the lows of last fall had just been posted. If another upswing has indeed begun, it would be hoped it could demonstrate its vigor by ultimately moving above the April high and confirming the existence of a six-month upswing. Failure to do so, on the other hand, would have to be viewed in a fairly serious light. Different patterns are displayed at the moment by the various market components although they all have the common denominator of having reached short-term downside targets at recent lows. As we have stated in the past, the Dow Jones Industrials, on the strength of the base formed last fall, have an upside target in the 900-940 range, and current prices find that index on the support provided by the October-December base. The Transportation Average, which had been a feature on the upside prior to the onset of weakness a month ago, has, on an intermediate-term basis at least, an even more constructive pattern. The top formed was small, and its downside objective was clearly reached at the recent low around 220. The eventual upside target remains at the 242-250 level versus a current level of 228. The Utilities, on the other hand, show a much less dynamic but potentially interesting pattern. This group, it will be remembered, has been in adowntrend since reaching its high in 1977 at , around 118;-and it moved as low as 97 last fall. Last week's low of 98.07 on Tuesday tested that level and also represented the attainment of a downside objective. Were the prior low to hold, the possibility of a six-month base with worthwhile uspide objectives would become a real one. Since the group is essentially interest-rate sensitive, this could have fairly important implications for the general market as well. Dow-Jones Industrials (12 00 p. m.) S & P Composite (1200 p.m.) Cumulative Index (5/17179) 842.86 100.03 724.37 ANTHONY W. TABELL DELAFIELD, HARVEY, TABELL AWTsla No statemenf or expression of opinion or any olher motter herein contolned IS, or IS 10 be deemed 10 be, directly or 'ndHcc!ty, on offer or the 501llollon of on offer to buy or sell any security referred to or mentioned The maller IS presented merely for Ihe converolcnce of the subscriber While we believe the sources of our Informotlon to be reliable, we In no way represent or guarantee the occurocy thereof nor of the stotements mude herein Any aeilon to be token by the subscriber should be based on hiS own investigation and information Janney Montgomery Scoll, Inc, as a corporotlon, and ItS officers or employees, may now have, or may later toke, paslhons or trades In respect to any securlhes mentioned In 11'115 or any future Issue, and such position may be different from any views now or hereafter e)rpressed In thiS or any other IHue Janney Montgomery Scott, Inc. whICh IS registered With the SEC as on Investment adVisor, may give adVice to Its ,vestment adVisory and othel customers Independently of any statements mode In thiS or In any other Issue Further ,formatIOn on ony serunty mentioned herein IS available on request

Download PDF

Tabell’s Market Letter – May 25, 1979

Tabell’s Market Letter – May 25, 1979

Tabell's Market Letter - May 25, 1979 page 1
Tabell's Market Letter - May 25, 1979 page 2
View Text Version (OCR)

– TABELL'S MARKET LETTER 909 STATE ROAD, PRINCETON. NEW JERSEY OB540 DIVISION OF MEMBER NEW VORK. STOCk EXCHANGe, INC MEMBER AMERICAN STOCI( eXCHANGE – May 25, 1979 r – —- exhibited a certain fascination with the various benchmark high and low points which have been established by the various market averages. There are, for example, three major high points stretching back to last fall which, from a technical point of view, possess some significance. The first of these was the highest of the three, establishing the peak to date for the move from the lows of February, 1978. It was scored on September 8 last year at 907.74 in terms of the Dow Jones Industrials. The second peak of some importance was the initial recovery high of 859.75, attained on January 26 this year. Finally, the most recent benchmark peak must be assumed to be the closing high of 878.72, last April 10. Each of these highs has been followed by a low of equal significance. The September high was followed by a triple bottom in October-December with the lowest closing within this forma- tion at 785.26 in mid-November. January's rally was followed by a February low of 807.00. Most recently, the decline from the April high reached a closing bottom of 825.02 two weeks ago. The resulting formation, of course, is somewhat irregular. The three lows posted to date have taken place at successively higher figures. The last two short-term highs have been at higher peaks, but neither has yet equalled the peak of last September. We have dwelt in the past on what we conceive to be the implications of these levels for the general market. However, while the averages have been following their unexciting course, individual stocks and industry groups have been following divergent paths. We recently took the opportunity to examine the highs and lows for 96 Standard and Poors industry group in-, dices at points comparable to the highs and the lows for general market indicators. The table – 1979-,- – — and March to mid-April, 1979. Also displayed are the fall, 1978 lows, the January lows, and the lowest points attained for each index from April 18 to date. In terms of highs, six groups have qualified for membership in a market elite by posting successively higher peaks at each of the three benchmark points mentioned. These groups are Aluminum, Distillers, Copper, Electronics, Miscellaneous Metals, and Office Equipment. Five of the six have managed to confirm long-term uptrends, despite the market's sideways action, by also showing successively higher lows at each of the three recent major low points. By contrast, 29 groups have demonstrated below-average relative strength by posting suc- cessively lower highs at each of the three market periods in question. Of these 29, three (Cosmetics, Foods, and Soap) have posted series of lower lows, thus suggesting rather dramatic weakness relative to the general market. In terms of recent lows, it is perhaps of more than passing interest that no fewer than 61 of the 96 industry groups under study have been able, along with the major averages, to post successively higher bottoms, first last fall, then in January, and finally over the past month. Some two-thirds of the market, therefore, has been able to maintain the same shred of momentum that has been kept up by the Dow Jones Industrials and S & P 500. Of the 35 groups failing to post higher low points, only four (the three mentioned above plus Offshore Drilling) have posted a series of three lower lows. ' On an overall basis, it certainly cannot be asserted that recent leadership has been as broad as in earlier stages of the advance, but individual group studies fail to show any evidence of unusual underlying weakness. By and large, since last September, individual industries have managed to follow their own divergent paths and, in general, provide worthwhile opportunities for the alert investor. . Dow-Jones Industrials (12 00 PM) S & P Composite (12 00 PM) Cumulative Index (5/25/79) 836.28 99.99 734.13 ANTHONY W. TABELL DELAFIELD, HARVEY, TABELL AWTsla No llalemcn! or cxpreSlon of op,nIon or any other motler herein contamed IS, or IS to be deemed 10 be, directly or mdlrectly, on offer or the SOI'Cllotlon of on offer 10 buy or sell ony secunty referred to or mentIoned The moiler 15 presented merely for the ConVllllenCt of the subscrIber Whdll we bllllevll the SOU'CIlS of our infOrma- tIon to be reliable, we In no way represent or guarantee the accurocy thereof nor of the stotements mude hereIn Any actIon to be token by the subSCriber should be based on hIS own lJIveshgatlon ond InformatIon Janney Montgomery SCali, Inc, as a corporatIon, and lIs offIcers or employees, may now have, or may later lake, POSItIonS or hades In respect to any secUfltl(!S mentioned In thIS or any future Issue, and such positIon may be dIfferent from any vIews now or hereafter Ilxpressed In thIS or any othllr Issue Janney Montgomery Scott, Inc, whIch IS regIstered WIth the SEC as on mvestmllnt adVIsor may gIve adVIce to lIs Investment adVIsory ond other ('Ustomers Independently of ony stalements mode lJI thIS or 1JI any other IHue Funher InformatIon on any secuflty mentIoned hereIn IS ovallable' on request AEROSPACE ALUMINUM AUTOMOBILE AUTO — EXC GEN MOTORS AUTO PARTS — AFTER AUTO PARTS–ORIG EQUIP AUTO TRUCKS & PART BEVERAGES — BREWERS BEVERAGES — DISTILLERS BEVERAGES–SOFT DRINKS BLDG MATRLS — AIR COND BLDG MATRLS — CEMENT BLDG BLDG MATRLS–ROOF/WLBD BUILDING MATRLS — COMP CHEMICALS COAL — – CONGLOMERATES– — CONTNRS — METAL/GLASS CONTNRS — PAPER COPPER COSMETICS DRUGS ELECTRICAL EQUIP ELEC/ELECTRN–MAJOR COS ELECT — HOUSEHOLD APP ELECTRONICS ELECTRONICS (SEMI/COM()) ENTERTAINMENT FERTILIZERS FOODS — COMPOSITE FOREST PRODUCTS GOLD MINING REAL ESTATE HOME FURNISHINGS HOSPITAL MGMNT COS. HOSPITAL SUPPLIES HOTEL/MOTEL LEISURE TIME MACHINE TOOLS MACHINERY — AGRIC. MACH–CONST/MATRL MACHINERY – IND/SPEC METAL FABRICATING METALS MISC MOBILE HOMES OFFICE EQUIPMENT OFC EQUIP — EXCL IBM …… …. OIL CRUDE PROD. OIL DOMESTIC INTEG OIL INTL INTEG OIL COMPOSITE OIL WELL EQ & SVC PAPER POLLUTION CONTROL PUBLISHING PUBLISHING (NEWSPAPERS) BRDCASTRS — RADIO/TV RAILROAD EQUIP. RESTAURANTS RETAIL STORES — DISC. RETAIL STORES — DEPT. RETAIL STORESDRUG RETAIL STRS–FOOD CHNS GENERAL MERCHANDISE CHAINS RETAIL — COMPOSITE SHOES SOAPS STEEL STEEL — EXCL US STEEL FOOD; SUGAR TEXTLS — APPAREL MFRS TEXTILE PRODUCTS TEXTILES–SYNTHFIBR TIRE & RUBBER GOODS TOSACCO/CIGARETTE MANU TO'fS VENDING MACHINES ELECTRIC POWER – — -N1\TUR.4L GAS NATURAL GAS–PIPELNS TELEPHONE TELEPHONE — EXCL AT&T AIR TRANSPORT RAILROADS TRUCKERS BANKS — NEW YORK CITY BANKS — OUTSIDE NYC INSURANCE — LIFE INSURANCE — MULTI LN. INSURANCE — PROP/LIAS SAVINGS & LOAN ASSOC. FINANCE COS PERSONAL LOANS INVESTMENT COS REAL ESTATE INV TRUSTS THREE HIGHER HIGHS DR LOWS HI GH5 LOW 5 MAY 31 1978 DEC 22 1978 MAR 7 1978 SEP 13 1978 J.4N 24 1978 APR 11 1978 SEP 20 1978 JAN 31 1979 .4PR 18 1979 DEC 20 1978 FEB 28 1979 MAY 23 1979 125.42 116.11 103.25 113.00 81.45 72.65 29.70 26.52 17.25 16.04 16.76 15.64 54.71 44.30 41.98 37.47 131.97 139.86 127.36 116.66 30.73 32.61 35.53 31.48 91.64 76.37 77.45 64.70 65.86 58.38 57.98 55.25 37.60 T 19.3-0 – 17.72 41.31 35.35 166.47 154.89 28.48 28.98 75.56 67.44 18.04 16.70 31.00 28.62 96.10 82.15 163.29 132.65 25.86 26.64 22.92 20.n 182.03 167.01 12.59 10.79 79.48 71.98 2L06 21.54 116.80 107.12 27.02 20.60 24.78 24.46 0.00 0.00 42.37 36.80 74.46 56.74 35.89 28.61 65.01 55.99 78.30 73.96 43.14 41.20 125.56 111.96 162.55 141.25 50.75 52.71 73.03 53.96 124.93 126.99 26.42 25.42 57.01 28.40 27.58 175.46 172.26 159.09 154.70 167.81 163.09 10B.03 104.26 247.42 225.19 32.71 27.14 28.90 29.12 27.67 24.47 50.29 45.22 74.63 62.09 30.06 24.74 21.09 16.21 150.80 128.35 26.41 21.39 62.25 54.58 9.18 7.39 91.06 75.83 56.55 49.56 177.06 167.91 50.03 45.50 50.17 46.61 22.34 19.10 31.56 30.79 53.96 41.25 58.76 56.09 132.93 126.84 81.75 77.01 13.58 12.68 32.55 8.44 35.07, ….,32.90 79-;S7 144.10 13u.77 28.02 28.23 43.51 42.01) 65.18 50.46 49.37 45.14 117.15 77.02 49.43 45.00 116.70 103.61 23.10 20.45 16.67 15.43 120.51 106.09 31.62 26.01 67.85 58.74 93.18 83.10 49.84 47.28 2.28 2.02 110.67 X 1 98.19 117.86 . 74.47 1 'I 95.85 68.28 26.70 1 23.41 16.29 1 14.76 15.81 1 14.24 47.31 36.22 X 1 I 41.18 34.18 149.01 . 108.19 X 1 I 120.68 106.54 32.54 I 28.39 32.96 I 25.41 83.01 , 67.74 69.29 1 58.09 61.63 1 51.73 57.88 1 50.27 36.37 -1838 I 36.66 1 —-,27 . 21..-5 79 33.57 169.98 1 144.26 33.61, 25.20 61.82 X 1 64.21 16.25 X 15.17 27.74 X 1 26.50 82.61 1 77.52 140.45 I 123.53 28.19' 20.37 1 I 22.59 18.21 164.97 X 12.78 I I 138.72 9.40 70.31 X 23.32 I I 68.94 18.61 115.24 1 89.44 24.91 23.93 X 1 I 15.83 23.09 0.00 34.30 X 1 I 0.00 33.89 60.97 I 43.88 27.90 X 1 25.05 64.04 76.17 1 I 48.01 65.63 41.02 X 117.22 148.93 I I I 36.98 98.56 116.57 57.76 47.41 X 129.23 1 I 1 44.84 45.08 106.97 25.35 X 1 22.14 ….. ..;.1—-……… -.- 31.99 1 23.56 198.25 166.00 1 I 160.83 148.58 180.94 I 155,06 114.31 I 94.34 242.27 I 202.82 26.94 X I 25.15 27.00 I 23.34 24.03 X 1 22.82 42.46 X 1 42.27 62.17 23.52 X 1 I 57.30 23.30 18.58 I 13.40 128.92 I 121.90 21.72 I 20.87 61.40 I 50.03 7.57 78.60 50.43 158.95 X 46.46 1 I I I I 7.19 73.12 44.53 159.27 39.97 49.13 I 41.18 22.81 1 16.57 32.26 49.45 1 I 27.68 38.98 61.34 1 51.26 124.60 X 1 111.43 76.47 X 1 73.90 11.86 t 10.63 27.38 X I 25.12 32.57 X I . , 31.47 147.56 27.93 40.88 X 46.09 X 49.91 84.17 44.77 X 103.36 X 21.06 16.49 120.10 26.86 65.92 81.45 X 45.68 X 2.14 1 1 1 I 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 118.69 27.10 39.66 44.02 42.06 69.59 42.2 97.25 19.27 13.23 98.43 23.12 54.42 76.49 42.78 1.89 102.14 107.10 68.20 24.31 14.57 14.66 42.10 35.69 132.17 107.04 31.60 29.27 72.84 62.17 56.13 51.89 3106 . 33.68 153.58 29.77 60.27 15.52 26.84 76.88 126.57 25.13 18.24 153.14 11.15 68.77 21.09 103.35 18.78 22.68 0.00 31.67 46.63 25.66 52.91 71.15 38.89 108.50 134.48 52.89 46.51 120.53 22.71 27.31 168.71 152.68 161.31 99.77 218.14 25.71 25.52 22.96 42.41 57.52 21.32 15.15 121.77 19.58 54.51 7.12 74.06 47.44 158.19 41.93 43.80 17.52 30.44 39.88 53.02 118.39 73.00 11.79 22.15 17783 129.22 27.54 40.33 4u.23 43.79 74.64 40.92 96.15 19.31 14.46 104.20 23.39 58.36 78.72 42.38 2.00 101.14 111.59 . 72.64 25.04 . 14.73 15.43 . 46.65 33.31 140.38 . 97.79 31.50 30.26 . 79.19 . 67.64 . 59.67 . 53.00 17.79 . 35.60 147.40 30.45 58.02 X 15.61 . 26.77 80.39 136.97 . 25.52 19.30 . 149.64 12.11 . 66.59 X 21.99 106.58 24.84 . 23.02 0.00. 32.86 54.05. 23.20 61.27 . 71.22 37.09 114.7u . 139.20 50.25 41.45 124.83 24.53 . -,43.89 -X.,.-…. 30.88. 190.99 . 158.85 173.75 110.13 232.51 . 24.64 25.81 22.54 41.53 61.35 22.90 18.01 128.38 20.97 56.24 7.14 74.85 . 49.52 153.97 X 42.93 . 46.03 . 21.12 . 31.47 46.14 54.30 117.58 74.84 13.82 25.69 . 81-;-22 …… 140.26 25.98 39.75 41.25 79.66 43.84 99.96 20.18 15.41 115.08 25.88 . 60.44 81.07 43.74 2.07 X THREE LOWER HIGHS OR LOWS

Download PDF