Viewing Month: December 1977

Tabell’s Market Letter – December 02, 1977

Tabell’s Market Letter – December 02, 1977

Tabell's Market Letter - December 02, 1977
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TABELL'S MARKET LETTER 909 STATE ROAD, PRINCETON. NEW JERSEY 08540 DIVtSION OF MEM8EA NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE, tNC MEMaER AMERICAN STOCK EXCHANGE December 2, 1977 Is–!' -. -. .. Part of,.tpe lIlillket. pO!!Irnntato utockJll-trad.ejs tl)e fQrecast. Indeed,it. couldalmost be said that indulgence- in this exercise 'somethfng 'e';pect'ed byh!S llders, who 'come to expct,' . on a regular basis, some comment on what the stock market is likely to do. The word likely is worth stress, since what is usually expected is a forecast rather than a prediction, and there exists here a subtle distinction. The latter word is Latin in its origin, stemming from prae, before, and dicere, to say. The former is a pure Anglo-Saxon product, related to the German Y! and the Old Norse kasta, meaning to throw or project. In modern usage, Webster tells us, both imply inference from facts or accepted laws of nature, but ' forecast' adds the implica- tion of anticipated eventuality and differs from 'predict' in being usefully concerned with probabilities rather than certainties. Undue emphasis on probabilities versus certainties has often cynically been called hedging, but that is another matter. We have often thought the demand for forecasts — or even predictions — to be an ex- cessive and, indeed, unnecessary one. Forecasts do not earn an investment return and past rightness about the course of the stock 'market is generally not accepted as currency at the local supermarket. In asset management, a forecast is useful only insofar as it suggests a course of investment action and that course of investment action later turns out to have been a profitable one. The baSic function of the investment advisor is to suggest appropriate investment policy. That policy may, indeed, be unrelated to a forecast, or the forecast which prompts it may, in fact, be a purposely limited one. We have in the past attempted to illustrate the investment decision-maker's dilemma by the admittedly over-simplified diagram below. It postulates two possible investment decisions, to be long stocks and not to belongstocks, andtwopossiblestatesoftheworld, the stock market is going either up or.down.. There are thus four possible results, two of which are right and two wrong. II The two wrong decision boxes represent risk, and part of the problem confronting the investment manager at the moment centers on which of the two risks MARKET DIRECTION tlP DnWN he prefers to assume, that of being long stocks if the true course of the market is, indeed, downward, or that of not being long stocks if the market's real direction is up. We have been documenting in this space for about a month the sorry fact that recent markets have provided us with little on which to base a concrete forecast. We know that the past course of the market, from July to the end of October, was down, and we know that, last month at least, that downward course was temporarily stemmed. As we have been suggesting, however, the November rally failed to provide us with the zg'z- rig h t wrong o -III -U'- III iCI oZ– wro n g rig h t !- L – …..L. sort of concrete reversal evidence normally seen at market bottoms. Thus, the difficulty in forecasting. In the absence of a forecast, then, we are forced to choose between which risk it is more appropriate to take and here, we think, it is possible to come down firmly on the side of the proposition that the risk involved in owning stocks is preferable to the risk involved in not owning them. There are a number of reasons, both fundamental and technical, for this preference but, 'suffice it to say, we-are willing to-defendthem.- – – . – – – …..,…….- Once we have come this far, an investment policy clearly follows, and that investment policy involves a reasonably aggressive attitude toward equities. The process of arriving at this policy has involved little in the way of a forecast about the viability of the current rally, that task, as we have suggested, being more than usually fraught with difficulty. It is policy, however, that will ultimately prove useful or otherwise, not a forecast. Dow-Jones Industrials (1200 p.m.) S & P CompOSite (1200 p.m.) Cumulative Index (12/2/77) AWT/jb 822.94 94.47 678.64 ANTHONY W TABELL DELAFIELD, HARVEY, TABELL No stclement or e(preslon of opinion or any other matter herem contolned IS, or IS;O be deemed to be, dlfectly or indirectly, on offer or the sol,cllchen of on offer to bvy or sell any security referred 10 or mentioned The molter IS presented merely for the converllnce of the subSCriber While we believe the sourcbs ofbour hnflnI' lion to be relloble, we In no way represent or guarantee the accuroy thereof nor of the statemenTS mude herein Any actIOn 10 be to\.en by the su TI er S au t e based on hiS own mvestlgahon and Information Janney Montgomery Scali, In , as a corporation, and Its offICers or employees, may now hahe, or may later \.e, positions or trades In respect 10 any SeCIJrltics mentioned In thiS or ony future Issue, and suh position may be different from any views now or ercodfter expredse hm Ihls or any other Inuc Janney Montgomery Scali, Inc, which IS registered With the SEC 05 on Investment adVisor, may give adVice to Its Investment a Yisoryon at er customers Independently of ony statements mode in thiS or in any other Issue Further Information on any security men honed herein IS available on request

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Tabell’s Market Letter – December 09, 1977

Tabell’s Market Letter – December 09, 1977

Tabell's Market Letter - December 09, 1977
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TABELL'S MARKET I LETTER 1 I J 909 STATE ROAD, PRINCETON, NEW JERSEY 08540 DIVIBION OF MEMBER NEW VORK STOCK EXCHANGE. INC MEMBER AMERICAN STOCK EXCt-lANGE December 9, 1977 One of the reasons that technical analysis of the stock market has managed to hold '– –our -unflagginginterest for the'past -24 -yeacs-is thatit'isa subjectat 0nce-simpleand'inflnitely .- complex. In practice, technical work may involve numerous difficult and highly esoteric tech- niques including the application of some of the more abstruse branches of higher mathematics. And, yet, at the heart of it all are a few eminently simple principles. Among these principles are the dictum that a trend, once established, tends to remain in force and that longer-term trends, even as bricks and mortar make up a building, are made up of shorter and intermediate-term trends. The two principles above apply not only to trends, it seems to us, but to general markel environments, a subjective definition that goes beyond simple up or down trends. The longer a given market environment remains in effect, the more obvious its individual elements be- come and the more clearly-etched its profile. As time goes on, of course, there will be short periods of market behavior which are inconsistent with this long-range environment. Often the central question faCing the technician is whether or not the short periods cumulate to form a chain of evidence strong enough to suggest that the basic climate may be undergoing fundamental change. To illustrate this sort of dilemma, it is only necessary to look at the experience of the past two years. 1976, at least subsequent to mid-February, constituted an identifiable mar- ket environment. The Dow, although It reached Its high in September, moved sideways for a period of six months. It is a fair statement that, during this period, the Dow was typical of the action of most indiVidual stocks. Breadth, during the middle two quarters of 1976, had no notice- able trend nor did our Cumulative Index of all New York Stock Exchange issues. Indeed, unlike the Dow, it fa iled to move to a new high In the latter part of the year. After a short correction In October-November, 1976, the market began moving a- '-had 'sharply ;this 'ra1iy-occupying'mollt01'h-mrjth-Uf-Decem1Jenlyear ag-o-'Hbwever, starfing—I with this period, a noticeable divergence took place between the Dow and the more broadly-based market Indicators. The Dow topped out on December 31, having failed to move to a new high. In terms of individual issues, however, the rally was a good deal more dynamic. Breadth,the Cum- ulative Index and, incidentally, the American Stock Exchange index shot ahead to new cycle peaks. We, thus, embarked, In that short month, on a period in which the popular averages were drasti- cally understating the market's performance. That one month was indicative of a change in the ba sic climate. Thus, although the trend of the averages altered radically as 1977 began, the dis- parity between those averages and the broad market continued. If one looked at the Dow, the first half of 1977 could be characterized as an irregular, not very steep, downtrend. As far as the other three indicators were concerned, the trend was also irregular but the bias was distinctly up- ward. It was quite clearly a market environment In which, despite the fact that the averages were trending lower, It was a senSible proposition to own stocks. The scene shifted again in July. At that point, the downtrend in the averages be- came steeper, but this time It was joined by the other indicators. Breadth and the Cumulative In- dex both sunk to new lows although by a much lesser amount than the Dow. The question posed centered on whether this short-term action indicated an end to the superior performance of the broad-based indicators, just as the action of December, 1976 suggested the start of that per- formance. The evidence to date does not so suggest. As we all know, the Dow rallied sharp- – , l)i'last month -ana has; in the past week-;b-e'en correcting agood part of that rally. A character- istic of the rally once more was superior action on the part of broad-based indicators. Breadth moved above its October high and close to Its 1977 peak. So did the Cumulative Index, and the American Stock Exchange index, as recently as this week, posted a new high for 1977. Mean- while, the recent downswing,which brought that rally to an end, Is far too new a phenomenon to evaluate. The indication seems to be that the basic market environment which characterized most of 1977 remains essenhally unchanged. The picture on the Dow, In a downtrend all year, remains clouded. However, there appears to be little to suggest that that wavering action is not continu- ing to understate the performance of the market. Dow-Jones Industrials (1200 p.m.) 812.37 S & P Composite (1200 p,m.) 93.43 ANTHONY W. TABELL DELAFIELD, HARVEY, TABELL Cumulative Index (12/8/77) 668.00 AWT/jb No 510lement or exprenlon of opinion or ony olher motter here'n contolned IS, or IS to be deemed to be, dlredly or tndlredly, on offer or the soliCitation of on offer to buy or sell any security referred to or menhoned The mOiler IS presented merely for the converlence- of the subscnber While we believe the sources of our mforma tlon to be reliable we m no way represent or guarantee Ihe accuracy thereof nar af ,he statements mude herem Any achon 10 be token by the subscriber should be based on hiS own'lnvestlgalion ond Information Janney MOnlgarflery Scott, Inc, 05 0 corporation, and ItS officers or employees, may now have, or May lofer toke, paslhans or trades In respect to any secuTltl!!S mentioned In thiS or any future Issue, and such posllion may be different from any views now or hereafter expressed In thiS or any other Issue Janney Montgomery Scoll. Inc. which IS registered With the SEC as on Investment adVisor, may give adVice to lIs Investment adVISOry and other customers rndependently of any statements mode In thl or In any other Issue Further mformallon on any securFly mentioned herem IS available on request

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Tabell’s Market Letter – December 16, 1977

Tabell’s Market Letter – December 16, 1977

Tabell's Market Letter - December 16, 1977
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TABELL'S MARKET LETTER 909 STATE ROAD, PRINCETON, NEW JERSEY 08540 DIVISION OF MEMISEA NEW YORK STOCK eXCHANGE, INC, MEMBER AMERICAN STOCK eXCHANGE December 16, 1977 Mid-December has once again arrived, and anno Domini 1977 Is about to pass Into hls- tory . It I our u su al cust om t- ocelebrate the7' end-0..- ing of. eaGh….-01..— …….- stock-mar-ket year with a two-part series of letters The first consists of a -review cit what we'65nsider to bethe sallent features of the-year – just passed. The second, usually using the first as a takeoff pOint, generally attempts to peer into the future and to offer some thoughts as to the kind of market environment which will characterize the year ahead. Historically, the first of the two letters tends to be the easier task. Our personal crystal ball is,generally,a bit clouded, while the history of the prior 52 weeks has already been writ and is abundantly documented. Producing a history, therefore, should consist of nothing more than selecting those features of the prior year which may be germaine to a forecast for the coming one. Without implying that it will be easy to produce a forecast for 1978, it must be noted that, this year, Interestingly enough, producing a review of 1977 is just about as difficult. How, in- deed, are we to describe the fascinating and, in many ways, rather unique stock market wlth which we have been dealing for the past twelve months. An attempt at such a description immediately brings to light some of the difficulties. Let us look, for example, at the most commonly used stock-market measure, the Dow- Jones Industrial Average. Its most recent cycle high was reached the day before the new year began on December 31, 1976 at 1004.65. (It had been higher by a miniscule amount three months earlier in September, 1976). On November 2nd, it reached a closing low of 800.85. The decline's extent is ap- propriate for those obsessed with round numbers. The Dow dropped just over 200 pOints, and, since it started at just about 1000, those 200 pOints represent almost exactly 20. Succumbing,ourselves,to the conventional weakness for round numbers, we have, In the past, used precisely that 20 as our C rlteriafor. et1n9mi'lj opear lTlark!'ts. )9 77.,by.tis stanc!;trd, Jil!aJUJe, ancl theSceJttrtUi'l k 9four 1978 forecast should be to determine whether the signs of conventional bear market bottoms are, or have been, present. Yet, when we begin to measure the behavior of the average stock, all manner of diffi- culties intrude, for, indeed, most stocks, by most measurements, have not been declining throughout 1977. Throughout the first six months of the year, the general trend of the Dow was flat to slightly downward. The history of broad-based market Indicators through July of last year also showed a flat trend, but that flat trend had a distinct upward bias. The period July-October produced a decline of fairly serious proportions In the Dow. In terms of broad-based indicators, it produced only a minor correction. That correction was, Indeed, so minor that the miniscule recovery which the Dow enjoyed during the first two weeks of November brought most inclusive performance measurements back close to their 1977 highs and, indeed, brought a few to new highs. All this took place while the Dow (and the S & P 500) were languishing around their year's lows, where they remain today. It is not unusual for analysts with bullish or bearish biases to disagree on where the mar- ket Is going. At the present, they find themselves embroiled In a controversy as to where it has been. The optimist can look at the Dow and suggest that, having undergone a decline of major bear-market proportions, It should be fairly close to its bottom. Or he can take the oPPosite tack and point out that broader-based indicators remain In a continuing uptrend with only tentative signs of loss of momentum. Conversely, the pessimist may point to the unrelieved downtrend in the Dow and use the argument that, since broad-based indices have declined relatively little, the market as a whole retains a good deal of potential on the downs ide. The most perplexing part of all this i the fact thatit is largely -unprecedented.- It Isnot- unknown fo; broad-based indicators to outperform the Dow -by a Significant extent and, indeed, this usually occurs around the middle stages of bull markets. It is hard to fit 1977 into this particular category. Furthermore, such a divergence usually consists of superior upside performance by the bulk of stocks, while the Dow moves ahead to a lesser degree. The phenomenon of moves in opposite direc- tions is rare, to say the least. We have managed to write a whole page without really saying what happened to the mar- ket In 1977, and, as we have suggested, this is possible only because dlfferent,but equally valid, market measurements relate strongly divergent versions of the facts. It will be our job In next week's forecast to try to guess what implications this divergence may hold for 1978. Dow-Jones Industrials (1200 p.m.) 817.74 ANTHONYW. TABELL S & P Composite (1200 p.m.) 93.49 DELAFIELD, HARVEY, TAB ELL Cumulative Index (12/15/77) 668.46 AWT/jb NQ slolemenl or e)(preslon of opinion or any olner molter herein contolned IS, or 15 10 be deemed 10 be, directly or indirectly, on offer or the soliclfatlon of on offer to buy or sell ony serufiTy referred to or mentioned The mOlter IS preented merely for the converlence of the subc(lber While oNe believe the !.Ources of our InformotlOn to be relloble, we In no way represent or guarantee the occuracy thereof nor of the statement mode herein Any Clchon to be token by the subSCriber should be based on hl own Investigation and mformaloon Jonney Montgomery Scott, Inc, os 0 corporation, ond Its officers or employees, may now have, or may later toke, poSitions or trades m respect to any securities menhoned In thiS or ony future Inue, and such pOSition may be different from any views now or hereafter expressed tn thiS or any other Issue Janney Montgomery Scot!, Inc, which 15 registered With the SEC as on Investmenl adVIsor, may give adVice 10 lIs Investment adVISOry ond other C\JSlomer Independently of any stotements mode In IhlS or In any other Issue Further informatIon on any security menlloned herein IS aVOllable on request

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Tabell’s Market Letter – December 23, 1977

Tabell’s Market Letter – December 23, 1977

Tabell's Market Letter - December 23, 1977
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,' TABELL'S MARKET LETTER 1 909 STATE ROAD, PRINCETON. NEW JERSEY 08540 DIVISION OF MEMBER NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE, INC MEMBER AMERICAN STOCK EXCHANGE December 23, 1977 As we noted last week, regardless of our own personal preference or the existence of factors'which -becloud the future outlook7tr8ditI9n'dictatesthat .duFing the last week in December, we express an opinion as to the market outlook'for 1978. As is often the case, it is perhaps worth starting with our thoughts of a year ago. At that time we suggested the likelihood of some market strength during the first part of 1977 and indicated that the prospects thereafter were, at best, confusing. We suggested, moreover, that the market's action follOWing the aforementioned firsthalf strength might well beLhelpful in clarifying the longer-term outlook. While we are not inclined to rank this forecast as one of the outstanding successes of the many we have undertaken, we are not altogether displeased with it. The Dow-Jones Industrial Average, admittedly, spent most of the year 1977 heading due southeast but, as noted last week, most broader-based, 'unweighted indicators displayed a fair amount of strength through July and attained new cycle highs at that time. They then Joined in the weakness shown by the more widely-followed indices, although some recovery since October has erased their earlier losses. The final point of our year-ago effort was that we thought that 1977 was likely to be the year in which the pattern for the next decade may emerge and become clear. We struck out on the timing of that one Simply because, as was noted last week, it is very difficult to describe exactly what the market did, in fact, do during 1977. We pOinted last year to the 51-month (on average) cycle which is identifiable in stock market action and sugges,t.ed, furthermore, that the major difference between these cycles during the 1970's and those during the prior 30-someodd years was the fact that recent cycles had spent only 60 of their total length advancing, whereasthe,formeLones hadgenerallyadva.l),-d…fpr80fl, o!.their.d.uration. If we look atlheDow, with its top on December 31, 1976, we see a cycle which spent 24 months in an advancing phase. This would constitute 60 of a 40-month cycle. If we place the top in July, it would be possible to formulate a 39-month cycle which advanced for 80 of its length. Either interpretation would be consistent with past history, and, interestingly, either would call for a bottom sometime in spring, 1978. Without a doubt, the most noticeable feature of 1977 was the aforementioned supe- rior behaVior of unweighted indices. It is this feature which must constitute an important part of the input to a 1978 forecast. It it is expected to continue, quite obviously, the outlook for next year is more bullish than if one expects this prop under the stock market structure eventually to collapse. Our own interpretation of the technical picture is that this behavior is likely to continue for a least the foreseeable part of the year to come. Although a few secondary issues have become relatively exploited on a technical basis, strength in these issues has been, and, by and large, continues to be, a rotating process. As a few issues begin to approach upside objectives, more bases tend to materialize, and leadership, thus continues to be maintained. It is hard for us to see weakness developing in this segment of the market other than the normal short-term problems which can occur with any group of stocks that have, in general, been mov- ing ahead. All this leads, in our view, to a forecast exactly opposite from the one we proposed 52 weeks ago. If weakness occurs in 1978, we would expect it during the first half. Since we do not expect anything more than short-term deterioration in secondary stocks, the only neces-'I—s-a-r; ingredlenf'for' a fail-ly dynamic advance'is til'gCsoOi'eOf the'large-capitallzation iss'ues' get-' into gear with their smaller brethren on the upside. Were this to occur during the year ahead and the resultant strength to carry to or through the existing overhead supply, the latter part of 1978 might see the resolution of the dilemma we thought might occur in 1977 — the ultimate end of the dreary sidewise action that has characterized the market since the mid-1960's. A VERY MERRY CHRISTMAS TO ALL Dow-Jones Industrials (1200 p.m.) 826.84 S & P Composite (1200 p.m.) 94.31 ANTHONYW. TABELL DELAFIELD, HARVEY, TABELL Cumulative Index (12/22/77) 666.56 AWT/jb No statement or expression of oplmon or any other molter herein contained IS, or IS 10 be deemed to be, directly or ,ndirectly, on offer or the sOlitltol,on of on offer to buy or S!!I any security roferred to or menlloned The moiler IS presented merely for Ihe ConVelIenCE of the subscriber While Ne believe the sources of our Information to be reliable, we In no way r!present or guarantee the accuracy thereof nor of the statement mude herein Any acllon to be token by the sub5CTlber should be bosed on hiS own lnve511gallon and Informallon Janney Montgomery 5ott, Inc. as a corporation, and liS offKers or employee5, may now have. or may later toke. poSitions or trades In repect to any e(urllles mentioned In thiS or any future ,nue, and such POSition may be different from any views now or hereafter expressed In thiS or any other Issue Janney Montgomery 5011. Inc, which IS registered w,th Ihe SEC as an mvestment adVisor, may give adVice to ,IS Investment advls.ory and othel customers Independently of any statemenlS mode In thiS or m any other Issue. Further Information on any secunty mentioned herein IS available on request

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Tabell’s Market Letter – December 30, 1977

Tabell’s Market Letter – December 30, 1977

Tabell's Market Letter - December 30, 1977
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TABELL'S MARKET LETTER L – .. -.— 909 STATE ROAD. PRINCETON, NEW JERSEY 08540 DIVISION OF MEMBER NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE, INC MEMBEFI AMERICAN STOCK EXCHANGE December 30, 1977 For some years now, we have studied the familiar seasonal tendency of the stock market to stage a year-end rally, andit has been the customof-this -letter around the -NewYear to-point outsome of the ' conclUSions that can be derived from a study of this phenomenon. We have suggested that an exhaustive study of chart patterns, since the Dow-Jones Industrial Average first was computed in 1897, indicated that such a rally, however miniscule, invariably had taken place. Until last year, the yearend rally as measured by the Dow-Jones Industrial Average had always carried into January. However, for the first time in the history of the DJIA, the 1976-77 year-end rally failed to continue into January reaching a closing high of 1004.65 on December 31, 1976. ' Nevertheless, a number of interesting facts about the market action of the year-end may still be noted. (1) – We have observed an identifiable year-end rally has taken place in every year since 1897. This rally often has been of great magnitude with advances as great as 28 having been recorded. It also, on occasion, has continued with only minor interruptions for as long as six months into the new year. However, on other occasions, it has been of only a few days' duration, reaching a top extreme- lyearly. Thus, in 1960, 1962, 1970 and 1973, the rally reached a peak by the first week in January. As stated above, the 1976-77 year-end rally failed for the first time to carry into January but for this exercise is conSidered in this category. In 1961, 1964, 1967, 1971, 1975 and 1976, the rally continued into February or March. (2) – There has been a persistent tendency for the rally to begin early in years when the market has been up, and late in years when the market has been down. In recent upward years, 1959, 1963, and 1967 are examples, the rally commenced from early December. In 1975 the year-end rally started .— early owoDecember 5T an-upyear; at 8-1-8780-,—In-recentdownward-yearsrI96-27'196-6-andin-1969,- the– rally began late in the year. This year, 1977, a down year, is no exception to this rule as the year- end rally started on December 20th at 806.22. (3) – The important thing to watch in connection with market action in the early months of the new year is the low for the previous December. This low has been broken in forty-six years out of the past seventy-seven. However, in twenty-seven of these forty-six cases, it was broken in January and February. Since 1937, it has never been broken later than mid-March, with the exception of 1965 and 1974. Thus, if the market is able to hold above its December low for the first 2 1/2 months of the year, chances become good that this low will not be broken. For example, in 1969, 1970, 1973 and 1977, the December low was broken by early January. In 1963, 1964, 1967, 1971, 1972, and, most recently, 1975, it never was broken. 1965, an up year, and 1974, a down year, as noted above, were unusual with the December, 1964 closing low of 857.45 being broken in June when the Dow closed at 840.59 and the December, 1973 low of 788.31 being broken in July when the Dow closed at 770.57. (4) – In years when the December low has been broken, the subsequent trend has been downward two-thirds of the time. 1962, 1966, 1969, 1973, 1974 and 1977 are typical cases. Again, 1965 was an exception. 1970, of course, was a down year in the first half. (5) – The magnitude of the rally is an important clue as to the year's market trend. For example, an advance of 10 or more from the December low has been followed by an upward or neutral market in thirty-three of the thirty-nine years that such an advance has occurred. An advance of less than 10 from the December low before an identifiable correction takes place has been followed by a downward market in twentY-Six of thirty-eight years. In 1963,1964 and 1971, the year-end rally approximated 10, and in 1972, it was 17. In 1962, 1970, 1973 and 1977, for example, it was less tha!lU;Is o- figure.- ——o – (6) – The length of time in which the rally continues into the new year also is important. For example, in twenty-one years, the rally continued into March or later. In eighteen of these twenty-one years, the eventual trend was upward. In 1964, 1972, 1975 and 1976, the year-end rall continued into March and in 1961, 1963, 1967 and 1971 into February. The most recent painful exception as previously noted was 1974. This year, therefore, the December 20th closing low of 806.22 becomes an important reference point to watch. On Thursday of this week, the Dow-Jones Industrial Average closed at 830.39. The fact that this average has already advanced approximately 3.0 can be viewed constructively. If the rally continues in magnitude and continues into February or March, unlike last year, historically a good market year would be indicated. Dow-Jones Industrials (12/30/77) S & P Composite (12/30/77) Cumulative Index (12/29/77) 831. 51 95.15 672.16 RO BERT J. SIMPKINS, JR. DELAFIELD, HARVEY, TABELL No statement or e)l.preSSlon of opinion or any other motter here'n onlolned IS, or IS to be deemed to be, directly or indirectly, on oHer or Ihe sollcltotlon of on offer 10 buy or sell any security referred 10 Or mentioned The molter IS presenTed merely for the conVel'lenCf of the subSCriber Whde we believe the SOurces of our mforma- tlon to be rellClble, we m no way represent ar guarantee the accuracy Thereof nor of the statements mude herem Any action 10 be token by the subSCriber should be based on hiS own Investigation and Informalion Janney Montgomery Scott, Inc, as a corporaTion, and Its officers or employlJCs, may now have, or may later toke, positions or trades In respect to any seCUrities mentioned In thiS or any future Issue, and such position may be different from any Views now or hereafter expressed In thiS or any other Issue Janney Montgomery Scolt, Inc, which IS registered With the SEC as on Investment adVisor, may gIVe adVICe to Its mvestment adVisory and other customers Independently of any statements mode In thiS or In any other Issue Further mformohon on any security mentioned heTeln IS ovadable on request

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