Viewing Month: May 1973

Tabell’s Market Letter – May 04, 1973

Tabell’s Market Letter – May 04, 1973

Tabell's Market Letter - May 04, 1973
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,.I TABELL'S MARKET LETTER 909 STATE ROAD, PRINCETON. NEW JERSEY 08540 DIVISION OF MEMBER NEW YORk STOCK EXCHANGE. INC MEMBER AMERICAN STOCK EXCHANGE May 4th, 1973 The sharp market rebound of Thursday and early Friday constituted what is, so far, the most s'gnifi- cant attempt at a reversal of the downtrend in effect since January. Although many of the signs of a — c la-s s ic one-dayc IImax -were peesent, -additiona l–evlderfcewould be-deslrable-before 'suggestlng-that' the – reversal was one of Intermediate or major proportions. . As security analysts these days get to estimating earnings for 1973, at the same time examining the prices of the stocks whose earnings they are estimating, there is developing what could be called the gee-v.hiz school of financial analysis. For It Is, by this time, no surprise to anyone that the combirn- tion of a market downswing and an excellent 1973 economic outlook have brought many price-earnings ratios to their lowest levels In years. It Is interesting, however, to put this phenonmenon Into perspective. It will be recalled that the absolute historical nadir for price-earnings ratios in general was in 1949 when the certainty of a post- war depression caused wide-spread pessimism. The following table compares the PiE's of the thirty stocks in the Dow Jones Industrial Average with their PiE's for that long-ago year. The first three columns show the current price, 1973 estimated earnings and prlce-earmngs ratio for each of the thirty stocks. The next three show the 1949 price-earnings ratio, the pnce at which the stock would sell were 1973 earnings to be capitalized at that ratio, and the percentage difference of this price from the current one. Recent Earnings 1973 1949 1973 Earnings x PCT. Stock Price 1973-E PiE 1949 PiE Difference Allied Chemical 34 2.70 12.611.2 30 -11 Alcoa 57 5.00 11.4 10.7 54 -5 American Brands 40 4.70 8.5 8.7 41 3 American Can 32 3.25 9.8 9.6 31 -3 American Tel. & Tel. Anaconda 'BetfileheinSteel-'- 53 4.65 11.4 14.8 19 2.80 6.8 9.6 311—3-75—O-' 2.9 69 .27 .- II 30 ,-.J '-63- Chrysler 33 5.50 6.0 3.7 20 -39 du Pont 171 10.00 17.l 11.7 117 -32 Eastman Kodak Esmark 136 3.85 35.3 12.0 46 23 3.45 6.7 7.3 25 -66 9 Exxon 97 7.25 13.4 7.4 54 -44 General Electric General Foods 60 3.25 18.4 8.8 29 25 2.20 11.4 9.2 20 -51 -20 Genera I Motors 72 8.50 8.5 4. 1 35 -51 Goodyear Tire 26 2.85 9.1 4.8 14 -46 International Harvester 29 3.90 7.4 6.0 23 -21 International Nickel 30 1.75 17.1 13.5 24 -20 InternatlOnal Paper 34 2.75 12.3 4.1 II -68 Johns Manville 22 2.80 7.9 8.2 23 5 Owens Illinois 34 4.25 8.0 11.1 47 38 Procter & Gamble 102 3.70 27.5 16.2 60 -41 Sears 98 4.35 22.5 8.5 37 -62 Standard 011 of Ca lifornla Texaco 84 38 7.00 3.60 12.0 10.5 6.0 5.8 42 21 -50 -45 Union Carb.de 42 3.90 10.8 12.2 48 14 United Aircraft 37 4.50 8.2 7.2 32 -13 U. S. Steel 33 3.60 9.2 4.4 16 -52 Westinghouse 34 2.45 13.8 5.7 14 -58 Woolworth 21 2.85 7.4 12.3 35 66 Some of the results do, Indeed, Justify the gee-whiz reaction, notably the fact that no fewer than eight of the thirty components of the Dow are today available at lower mult.ples than was the case twenty-four years ago. As the table clearly shows, however, the vulnerability of a number of stocks could be great. That vulnerability, moreover, .s not confined to stocks with relatively high multiples. One would expect to see Eastman Kodak and Sears vulnerable to PiE erosion. However, the table also shows us that many current multiples in the 8-12 range would Indeed be subject to further decline If 1949 stan- dards were to be applied. None of this is meant to suggest that large numbers of stocks are Hkely to sell at 1949 levels–al- though the fact that eight are already doing so should give us pause. We do suggest,however,that a sense of historical perspective Is useful prior to becoming overly excited about current multiples. DMow-JlonOeOs Industrial (1200 p.m.) 110.84 p.m.) 953.49 ANTHONY W TABELL DELAFIELD, 'HARVEY, TABELL No statement or expression (;iF Opinion or (Iny other matter herem contomed IS, or IS to be deemed 10 be, dllcctly or wdlrectly, on offer or Ihe 5011(lIo110n of on offer 10 buy or sell ony security referred to or menhoned The moHer IS presented merely for the converlence of the subscriber Whde oNe bellevebhe sourcs ofbour hnfln tlon to be reliable we In no way represent or guarantee based on hiS own'lnvestlgotlon and mformotlon Janney the accuracy thereof nor of Montgomery Scott, Inc, as the statements a corporation, mude herem Any and Its officers or actIOn to be token y the su scn er s au employees, mOf now ha'he, or may later t ke e, poSlllOnS or trades In respect to any securities mentioned In thiS or any future Issue, and such POSition may be different from any views now or ereadf ter exprete hln thiS or ony other Issue Janney Montgomery Sco!l, Inc, which .s registered wl'h the SEC as on Investment adVisor, may give advll;e 10 Its Investment a VlSOry an ot er customers Independently of any statements mode In thiS or In any other Issue Further information on ony security mentioned herein IS avodable on request

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Tabell’s Market Letter – May 11, 1973

Tabell’s Market Letter – May 11, 1973

Tabell's Market Letter - May 11, 1973
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TABELL'S MARKET LETTER I .J 909 STATE ROAD, PRINCETON, NEW JERSEY 08640 DIVISION OF MEMBER NEW YOAK STOCK EXCHANGE, INC MEMBER AMERICAN STOCK EXCHANGE May 11, 1973 – – Seven'';-eeks-nowhave elap5e'crsrnceMar6h-2i, vJnen tJ1eTI6wJones-ltrdustrlalAverage- for- -. the first time pierced the 920 level and then rebounded sharply. During those seven weeks we have had no fewer than three tests of 920, and on each of those tests the average has met strong demand and rebounded sharply. The latest such instance was two weeks ago on April 26, 27, 30, and May 1st. In each of these four trading sessions, the average pushed well below 920 during the trading day, and during each session sufficient demand was manifested to push the index back up above that level. These four days were followed by a new rally which attaied a peak of 965 on Wednesday before being turned back by the failure of the O. p. E. C. talks. The fact that the market has, effectively, gone seven weeks without posting a new low makes it tempting to assert that the unpleasantness which characterized the first three months of 1973 is now pa st and that we expect the stock market, having found st rong support, to mount a fairly sharp and worthwhile rally. Unfortunately, we feel, the eVidence in favor of this contention is, as yet, insuffiCient. If what has taken place during April-May 1973 is ultimately to turn out to be a bottom of some importance, it's characteristics will be altogether different than those of most major bottoms in the past, that of May-June 1970 being a typical example. The selling climax char- acteristics of the low of May 26, 1970 were sufficiently obVious so that three days after the fact we could say in this space, We think, in summary, the effective bottom has been reached' What has been taking place over the past seven weeks is considerably less striking. – M-,)re()L,the weeks ollow!!, May 6,170 !.!ovided a continous chain ()t!2.'!.lishi- dence which has been asbsent in the present instance. As- just one- example-let us lookaCtne — weekly new low statistics for the nine weeks following May 1970 and the seven weeks since March 23, 1973. WEEK ENDED NEW LOW WEEK ENDED NEW LOW 5/29/70 1322 3/23/73 966 6/5/70 129 3/30/73 475 6/12/70 6/19/70 227 209 4/6/73 4/13/73 607 333 6/26/70 345 4/20/73 333 7/6/70 477 4/27/73 681 7/13/70 7/20/70 501 115 5/4/73 598 7/27/70 65 As can be seen from the table, the week following the market rebound in 1970 new lows dried up to 129, remained under 300 for another two weeks and never increased above 501 during a short decline in July. By contrast we have had two weeks with over 600 new lows since March, and even in the week ended May 4, when, incidentally, the Dow advanced 31 pOints, 598 issues posted new 1973 bottoms. Quite clearly a large number of stocks remain in downtrends. Thus, before we are to forecast with any certainty that a major market low has been attained, more eVid-ence will be-necessary. A sharply declining number of ne; lows would be one link in such a chain of evidence, as would the ability of the Dow to move above the 970 level, an area that has been as effective at turning back rallies as 920 has been in reversing declines. Were these and a number of other technical indicators to turn positive, we would indeed be happy to forecast a rally of some proportions. Lacking such evidence, however, we feel compelled to suggest that, for the time being, reserves to be maintained. Dow-Jones Industrials (1200 p. m.) 934.23 S & P Compo (1200 p.m.) 108.88 AWTRK ANTHONY W. TABELL DELAFIELD, HARVEY, TABELL No statement or expression of opinion or cny other matter herein contolned 15, or IS 10 be deemed 10 be, directly or Indirectly, an offer or the solu;ltotlon of on offer to buy or sell any security referred to or menlloned the mOiler 15 presented merely for the converlence of the subSCriber While oNe believe Ihe sources of our Informolion to be rIllOble, we m no way represenl or guarantee the occurocy thereof nor of the Slolements mude herem Any octlon to be token by Ihe subSCriber should be based on hiS own mvestlgotlon end mformatlon Janney Montgomery l;olt, Inc, os a corpora/Ion, and I/S officers or employees, moy now hove, or may later lake, positions or trades In respect 10 any seCUrities mentioned m thiS or any future Issue, ond such position may be different from any views now or hereofter expressed In thiS or ony other Issue Janney Montgomery Scott, Inc, which IS registered With the SEC as on Investment adVisor, may give adVice to Its Investment adVisory and othel customers Independently of cny statements mode ,n thIS or In any other Issue Further InformatIOn on any security mentioned herem IS available on request

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Tabell’s Market Letter – May 18, 1973

Tabell’s Market Letter – May 18, 1973

Tabell's Market Letter - May 18, 1973
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TABELL'S MARKET LETTER 909 STATE ROAD, PRINCETON. NW JERSEY 08540 DIVISION OF MEMBER NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE, INC MEMBER AMERICAN STOCK EXCHANGE May 18, 1973 The five-month old downswing plunged to yet another new low early this week with Monday's t&'l9ingprducing.an,18;J)9int\!eyn il1he pognd a,cQntinuaji9non uesdi'lym()lning which brought the index below the 900 level for the first time since 'the market drop began.Tuesday-after- noon and Wednesday produced a fairly typical rebound, an intra-day peak of 927.83 being scored at mid-week. As has been the case in the recent past, however, this advance failed to follow through, and by the end of the week prices were again trending lower. Following the early rally, the words selling climax were being heard in a few quarters. By no stretch of the imagination could the claSSic technical definition of a selling climax be applied to Tuesday's and Wednesday's markets. Such action requires, among other things, a substantial increase in volume on both the downside and the upside, substantial being defined as a two-to- three-fold rise. Tuesday's advance in volume to 18 million shares from 13 million shares the previous day hardly qualifies. As any market decline begins to gather momentum, the basic question posed to the forecaster centers around how far it may be expected to go. Before answering this question in the present in- stance, it is perhaps best to back off and reexamine once more the longer-term stock market picture. Regular readers of this letter will be well aware that just about everything we have said about the stock market over the past 2 1/2 years has been within the context of a particular thesis— that the secular trend of the stock market can best be described by a broad, relatively flat trading range in terms of the major averages. We first expressed this view as early as January 1971 when we stated in this space, the equity market from 1942 until 1966 was buoyed by a secular uptrend advancing at the rate of about 9 a year on the Dow. Sure, there were bull markets and bear -.-'mbeaarrk'emtsaiwkeitthsi,nal.ththeo.fr'agmhepwaionfrki.oLsthhaotrtupatnrd.enqdu,ibkluYt trheecobveulel.dm-a-rkTheets;-we eire.rleoanfgevafnddendcyn-aamtiicJianed-mthomeen;- however, that the secular uptrend is no longer with us. Indeed, computed from 1966, the slope of the DJIA has been virtually zero. The most statistically accurate description of the market on average for the past five years is that it is a wide, flat trading channel. Nothing has happened in 2 1/2 years to change this view. If the market is, then, to hold within a trading range that range is, so far at least, defined by two pOints on the DJIA, the high of 1067.20 made early this year and the low of 631.16 scored on May 26, 1970. If we assume that the market is vulnerable to a return to the lower part of that range, the downside risk from these levels is substantial indeed. Unfortunately, the existence of such a risk is suggested by a number of technical factors. The most peSSimistic possible reading of the DJIA pattern indeed suggests a return to the 1970 low, and, as we suggested early this month, capitalizing the earnings of the Dow components at their lowest historical multiples would also suggest such an eventuality. There are, further, suffiCient poor technical patterns extant1D suggest that the risk of lower levels is a real one. Yet we are reluctant at this point to offer numbers as low as this as a forecast, and we feel compelled to suggest that, even were a decline of this magnitude to take place, that the stock market would not, throughout such a decline, be acting as badly as the averages would suggest. Our cumulative index, which we feel is much more descriptive of the average stock than is the DowortheS&P,was, at the end of this week, atalowof717.55vs. a 1970 low of 677.65. Quite clearly, for a great many stocks, the.process of correction back to-,or in.some cases SUb stantlally below–the lows of 1970 has already taken place. IUs in the higher-multiple, institutiona'- quality favorites where the largest gap between present prices and the lows of 1970 exists. It Is in these issues we feel, as our readers are well aware, that the risk is greatest. It must further be pointed out that, when talking about a trading range with a lower limit of 630, we are making allowances for conventional bull and bear markets within the context of that trading range. Certainly the market in the present instance is deeply oversold, and we would be willing to believe any evidence that pOinted to a intermediate-term rally were such evidence to manifest itself—which. it should be pointed out, since January it has consistently refused todo. Meanwhile, however, it seems to us the risk implicit in the apparent longer range pattern must be kept in mind. Dow-Jones Industrials (1200 p.m.) 900.21 S&P Comp (1200 p.m.) 104.37 AWTrk ANTHONY W. TABELL DELAFIELD, HARVEY. TAB ELL No stotement or expres(o of opinion or any other moiler here'n contolned IS, or IS to be deemed 10 be, directly or indirectly, On offer or the ollcltotlon of an offer to buy or sell any security referred to or menlloned The matter IS presented merely for the converlence of the subSCriber While we believe the sources of our information to be reliable, we In no way represent or guarantee the accuracy thereof nor of the statements mode herein Any aCTion 10 be laen by the subscriber should be based on hiS own InvesllgaTlon and Informallon Janney Mcntgomery Scott, Inc, as a corporation, and Its offlcrs or employees, may now hav, or may later take, positions or trades In respect to any secl,lrllles mentioned In ThiS or any future ISsue, and such position may be different from any views now or hereafter expressed In thiS or ony olher Issue Janney Montgomery Scali, Inc, which IS registered With the SEC as em InVestment adVisor, may give adVice to Its Investment adVISOry and othel ClJstamers Independently of any statements mode In thiS or In ony other Issue Further Information on any security mentioned herem IS available on request

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Tabell’s Market Letter – May 18, 1973

Tabell’s Market Letter – May 18, 1973

Tabell's Market Letter - May 18, 1973
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, , -, – -, . -. , TABELL'S , MARKET \ LETTER ,,, ,. . ……..- . – ' – ' — . . 909 STATE ROAD, PRINCETON. NEW JERSEY 08540 DIYISION OF MEMBER NEW VORl( STOCK eXCHANGE, INC MEMBER AMERICAN STOCK EXCHANGE May 18, 1973 The five-month old downswing plunged to yet another new low early this week with Monday's II,t,ras!ing Rlod,uiry9,-(ln, Lpo.\ltAecline)n thE'! ,D,o,(lnd.a c,mtinuat.ign gn Tuesday morning which brought the index below the 90iJi'evel fortheflrst time since-thenlarket(irop-began.Tuesday-after—- – – noon and Wednesday produced a fairly typical rebound, an intra-day peak of 927.83 being scored at mid-week. As has been the case in the recent past, however, this advance failed to follow through, and by the end of the week prices were again trending lower. Following the early rally, the words selling climax were being heard in a few quarters. By no stretch of the imagination could the classic technical definition of a selling climax be applied to Tuesday's and Wednesday's markets. Such action requires, among other things, a substantial increase in volume on both the downside and the upside, substantial being defined as a two-to- three-fold rise. Tuesday's advance in volume to 18 million shares from 13 million shares the previous day hardly qualifies. As any market decline begins to gather momentum, the basic question posed to the forecaster centers around how far it may be expected to go. Before answering this question in the present in- stance, it is perhaps best to back off and reexamine once more the longer-term stock market picture. Regular readers of this letter will be well aware that just about everything we have said about the stock market over the past 2 1/2 years has been within the context of a particular thesis— that the secular trend of the stock market can best be described by a broad, relatively flat trading range in terms of the major averages. We first expressed this view as early as Tanuary 1971 when we stated in this space, the equity market from 1942 until 1966 was buoyed by a secular uptrend advancing at the rate of about 9 a year on the Dow. Sure, there were bull markets and bear …; ml'lrk,!,it.9.\I) tefIJ!me;9Jkof.-t\lat yp.ttnc!LbJ!Lb,ull rIJ!kEl!s-Jl2 and!ynamical'd t bear markets, although painful, short and quickly recovered. There is real evidence at the moment 1. however, that the secular uptrend is no longer with us. Indeed, computed from 1966, the slope of the DTIA has been virtually zero. The most statistically accurate description of the market on average for the past five years is that it is a wide, flat trading channel. Nothing has happened in 2 1/2 years to change this view. If the market is, then, to hold within a trading range that range is, so far at least, defined by two points on the DTIA, the high of 1067.20 made early this year and the low of 631.16 scored on May 26, 1970. If we assume that the market is vulnerable to a return to the lower part of that range, the downside risk from these levels is substantial indeed. Unfortunately, the existence of such a risk is suggested by a number of technical factors. The most pessimistic possible reading of the DTIA pattern indeed suggests a return to the 1970 low, and, as we suggested early this month, capitalizing the earnings of the Dow components at their lowest historical multiples would also suggest such an eventuality. There are, further, sufficient poor technical patterns extant 10 suggest that the risk of lower levels is a real one. Yet we are reluctant at this point to offer numbers as low as this as a forecast, and we feel compelled to suggest that, even were a decline of this magnitude to take place, that the stock market would not, throughout such a decline, be acting as badly as the averages would suggest. OUT cumulative index, which we feel is much more descriptive of the average stock than is the Dow or the S&P, was, at the end of this week, at a low of 717.55 vs. a 1970 low of 677.65 . . Quite.clearly, fr.a.great.ll!I)ystoQks, theprocess of correctionilack t();or)n some cb- stantially below–the lows of 1970 has already taken plac'e. ltis in the higher''multiple, institutionaj,– quality favorites where the largest gap between present prices and the lows of 1970 exists. It is in these issues we feel, as our readers are well aware, that the risk is greatest. It must further be pointed out that, when talking about a trading range with a lower limit of 630, we are making allowances for conventional bull and bear markets within the context of that trading range. Certainly the market in the present instance is deeply oversold, and we would be willing to believe any eVidence that pOinted to a intermediate-term rally were such evidence to manifest itself—which. it should be pOinted out, since Tanuary it has consistently refused to do. Meanwhile, however, it seems to us the risk impliCit in the apparent longer range pattern must be kept in mind. Dow-Tones Industrials (1200 p. m.) 900.21 S&P Comp (1200 p.m.) 104.37 AWTrk ANTHONY W. TABELL DELAFIELD, HARVEY, TABELL No statement or expression of opinion or any other maHer herein contained IS, or IS to be deemed to be, directly or ,ndirectly, an offer or the soliCitatIOn of an offer to buy or sell any security referred to or mentIOned The mailer IS presented merely for the convellence of the subSCriber While we believe the sources of our ,nformatlon to be reliable, we In no way represent or guarantee the accuracy thereof nor of the statements mude herein Any action to be talc en by the subSCriber should be based on hiS own investigatIOn Gnd Information Janney Montgomery Scott, Inc, as a corporaTion, and Its officers or employees, may now have, or may later toke, POSitions or trades In respect to any secunhes mentioned In thiS or any future ISSUe, and such posilion may be different from any Views now or hereafter eypressed In thIS or any other Issue Janney Montgomery Scotl, Inc, which IS registered with the SEC as on Investment adVisor, may gIVe adVice to lIs Investment adVisory and other customers ,ndependently of any statements made ,n thiS or In any other Issue Further information on any secvnty mentioned herein IS available on request I

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Tabell’s Market Letter – May 25, 1973

Tabell’s Market Letter – May 25, 1973

Tabell's Market Letter - May 25, 1973
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TABELL'S MARKET LETTER — – – – – – – – – – – – – – 909 STATE ROAD. PRINCETON, NEW JERSEY 08540 DIVISION OF MEMBEA NEW YORK STOCK eXCHANGE, INC MEMBER AMERICAN STOCK EXCHANoe May 25,1973 We indicated in last week's letter a degree of skepticism regarding the application ofthe , – term fetl1ng'clim1lX'to-th'''i'm'iHi ta11y'wh1ch took place-on'MaY''15 and 1'6e-We -have'no doubt-that' the term will be dragged out again to describe the much more impressive performance on Thursday of this week when the Dow chalked up an almost 30-point advance. Climax is one of those technical terms that tends to get tossed about rather glibly, so it will perhaps be worthwhile to look at past selling climaxes in order to get s orne idea of just what a real one looks like. We know, by hindsight, that major selling-climax bottoms occurred in October 1957, May 1962, August 1966, and May 1970. The following table gives some pertinent market statistics for these periods including the Dow-Jones Industrial Average, pOints change, percentage change, and volume. In order that the volume figure be meaningful, it is related to a 25-day moving average of volume and the ratio of actual volume to that figure is given. The comparable stattstics for the past five market days are presented at the bottom of the table. Date Oct. 21, 1957 Oct. 22, 1957 Oct. 23, 1957 May 25, 1962 May 28, 1962 May 29,1962 May 31. 1962 DJIA 423.06 419.79 437.13 611.88 576.93 603.96 613.36 Pts. Chg. -10.77 – 3.27 17.34 -10.68 -34.95 27.03 9.40 Chg. -2.48 -0.77 4.25 -1. 71 -5.71 4.68 1.55 Volume 4,670,000 5,090,000 4,600,000 6,380,000 9,350,000 14,750,000 10,710,000 25-DayVol. 2,440,000 2,584,000 2,707,000 3,911,000 4,156,000 4,624,000 4,919,000 Ratio 1. 91 1. 97 1. 70 1. 63 2.25 3.19 2.18 Aug. 26,1966 780.56 -11.81 -1.49 8,190,000 6,527,000 1.25 –Aug; 29 ,196-6' -'16'f'03- – ' -.; n. 53'(; – -10,900';'00''''0-''……,E-'6','';'6'''81''','''''OOO 1'63'';';-'''-1 Aug. 30,1966 775.72 8.69 1.13 11,230,000 6,826,000 1. 65 Aug. 31,1966 788.41 12.69 1.63 8,690,000 6,930,000 1. 25 May 25,1970 641.36 – 20.81 -3.14 12,660,000 11,178,000 1. 13 May 26,1970 631.16 -10,20 -1.59 17,030,000 11,520,000 1.48 May 27,1970 663.20 32.04 5.07 17,460,000 11,787,000 1.48 May 28.1970 684.15 20.95 3.16 18,910,000 12,102,000 1.56 May 18, 1973 895.17 -16.55 -1.81 17,080,000 14,639,000 1.17 May 21, 1973 886.51 – 8.66 -0.96 20,690,000 14,890,000 1. 39 May 22, 1973 892.46 5.95 0.67 18,020,000 15,157,000 1. 19 May 23, 1973 895.02 2.56 0.28 14,950,000 15,242,000 .98 May 24,1973 924.44 29.42 3.28 17.320,000 15.379,000 1. 13 A glance at the numbers enables one to draw some fairly obvious conclusions. In terms of market change, the tendency has been for climax bottoms to be characterized by a large percent- age of change on the downside, occasionally one day of intra-day reversal such as October 22, 1957 and May 26, 1970, followed by an equally sharp reversal to the upside. The present instance. by contrast, showed a sharp drop on May 18 followed by three days of rather desultory action before the market was able to mount a strong rally on May 24, which, for all its vigor, was of considerably lesser magnitude than October 23, 1957, May 29, 1962 or May 27, 1970. Equally noticeable about the current market is the lack of volume buildup. As can be seen, past climax bottoms invariably featured a rise in volume toat least-l '1/2 'times the 25-'day– – – , moving average. Volume on Thursday was only 1.13 times recent volume levels based on a 25-day average. Now forecasting remains an uncertain business, and we would hesitate to state, on the basis of the figures above, that the low of May 21 did not, in fact, constitute a bottom of some import- ance. Quite obviously bottoms can occur without the accompaniment of classical climax condi- tions. We think, however, on the basis of the above, that it would be advisable to await additional evidence before stating with any finality that a Significant low had taken place. Dow-Jones Industrials (1200 p.m.) 922.94 S&P Compo (1200 p.m.) 107.01 ANTHONY W. TABELL AWTrk DELAFIELD. HARVEY, TAB ELL No statement or expression of opinion or any other motter herein contained IS, or IS to be deemed to be, directly or mdHec1ly, on offer or the sollcltotlon of on oHer to buy or sell any security referred fo or mentioned The mOiler 1 presented merely for the converlence of the subscriber While 'lie believe the sources of our information to be reliable, we In 1'10 woy represent or guorantee The accuracy thereof nor ot the statements mode herein Any action to be token by the subSCriber should be based on hiS own Investlgotlon and Informatlon Janney Montgomery Sca1t, tnc, as a corporation, and Its officers or employees, may now have, or may IOler take, pOltJOns or trades In respect to any securities mentioned In thiS or ony fuTure ISSUe, and such position may be different from any views now or hereafter e..-pressed In thiS or any other Issue Janney Montgomery Scali, Inc, which IS registered With the SEC as on II'IvestmenT adVisor, may give odviCe to lis Investment adVisory (md other customers II'Idependently of any statements mode IJl ThIS or 11'1 any other Issue Further informatIon on any security menhoned herein IS aVailable on request

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